

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






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VOLUME III



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The *Harvard Theological Review* has been partially endowed by a bequest of the late Miss Mildred Everett, "for the establishment and maintenance of an undenominational theological review, to be edited under the direction of the Faculty of the Divinity School of Harvard University. . . . I make this provision in order to carry out a plan suggested by my late father, the Rev. Charles Carroll Everett." During the continuance of *The New World*, Dr. Everett was on its editorial board, and many of his essays, now collected in the volume entitled *Essays, Theological and Literary*, appeared first in its pages. Sharing his belief in the value of such a theological review, and in devotion to his honored memory, the Faculty of the Harvard Divinity School, of which he was a member from 1869, and its Dean from 1878 until his death in 1900, has accepted the trust, and will strive to make the *Review* a worthy memorial of his comprehensive thought and catholic spirit.

The *Review* is edited by a Committee of the Faculty of the Harvard Divinity School consisting of Professors G. F. Moore, W. W. Fenn, and J. H. Ropes.

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HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

VOLUME III.

JANUARY, 1910.

NUMBER 1.

THE THEOLOGY OF CHARLES CARROLL EVERETT¹

WILLIAM W. FENN

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

It is related that Dr. Everett was once asked by the professor of systematics in another institution what subjects he found it possible to discuss in a non-denominational school of theology. The question was a silly one, for it assumed that in such a school no teacher gives utterance to the particular views which determine his own denominational affiliations, whereas, in Harvard at any rate, each instructor expresses without hesitation or reserve his entire thought, not seeking to present a composite picture but trusting that his instruction will blend with that of his colleagues to impress upon the minds of his students, whatever distinctive features they may finally adopt, the deep common lines of Christian faith. Characteristically, however, Dr. Everett did not point out the false presupposition of the question, but mentioned some of the principal topics considered in his lectures,—the nature of religion, the thought of God as Absolute Spirit, and the like,—to which the inquirer replied in some surprise, Why, we take all those things for granted. Dr. Everett answered mildly, I wish we could. It was a thoroughly charac-

¹ The more important of Dr. Everett's books are: *The Science of Thought*. Boston, William V. Spencer, 1869. Revised edition: Boston, De Wolfe, Fiske & Co., 1890. *Fichte's Science of Knowledge*. Chicago, S. C. Griggs & Co., 1884. *Poetry, Comedy, and Duty*. Boston, Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1888. *The Gospel of Paul*. Boston, Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1893. *Essays Theological and Literary*. Boston, Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1901. *The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*, edited by Edward Hale. New York, Macmillan, 1902. *Theism and the Christian Faith*, edited by Edward Hale. New York, Macmillan, 1909.

teristic remark not only because of the humor of its gentle rebuke, so gentle that probably the victim did not realize that his head was off, but also on account of its utter fidelity to his own theory and practice. He did not take fundamental things for granted; hence it was that while students in other theological schools were articulating a body of divinity, Dr. Everett's pupils were searching into the deep things of the spirit. For he was, first of all, a philosopher whose religious nature made him a theologian. The twenty-fifth chapter, of the thirty-five which make up the recently published volume upon *Theism and the Christian Faith*, begins with the words, "It may seem as though we were only now beginning our examination of the content of Christian faith." Doubtless it would have seemed so to most of his contemporaries in theological chairs, but it was precisely in the relation between the Christian faith, as he conceived it, and the profound metaphysics of the preceding chapters, that Dr. Everett found the supreme worth of Christianity and the assurance of its absoluteness. The heart of a worshipper made the mind of a philosopher that of a Christian theologian.

This distinction appears likewise in the method of his work. He offered no array of proof-texts. Occasionally, indeed, he cited a passage from Scripture, but always by way of illustration and never, I think, as decisive argument. It is true that in his little book *The Gospel of Paul* he entered the realm of New Testament interpretation, but the theological aspect of the book is more valuable than the exegetical. Of some old-time preacher the story is told that his hearers once exclaimed, "He is preaching the Bible, for, see, he has it in his hand all the time." From such a point of view Dr. Everett's theology would not be deemed Biblical, and yet it actually was, in the sense that he thought and lived in the world of the spirit where the Bible took its rise. In a word, his theological method is that of the philosopher and not that of a Biblical exegete.

It is not at all improbable that readers of Dr. Everett's earlier volume of lectures will feel that in the later one there has been a change in orientation. Those who listened to the lectures in the class-room sometimes had, at first, a similar feeling. There seemed to be a transition from the world of Schleiermacher to that

of Hegel. Of the former he said: "No writer has had more influence on modern theological thought. He is one of the pillars of Hercules, with Hegel the other, that mark the entrance through which one passes into modern theology" (*Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*, p. 60), but it seemed as if the two courses hugged opposite shores. In the first, religion was defined as consisting primarily in feeling: it is true that in the description of the religious feeling Dr. Everett parted company with Schleiermacher, defining the feeling not as one of absolute dependence but as feeling first towards a supernatural presence, and then towards a supernatural presence manifesting itself not only in truth but also in goodness and beauty; nevertheless the general impression made was like that of Schleiermacher. But in the lectures on Theism and the Content of Christian Faith, a student was introduced at the outset into the Hegelian world. The plan of the course showed the characteristic division: first, ideal affirmation; then the moment of difference, with a distinction between the creator and the creature, which rises to a negation of the ideal of unity in freedom, and to actual antagonism in sin and evil considered as negations of the ideals of goodness and beauty respectively; and finally, the stage of reconciliation in a higher synthesis, with discussions of retribution, forgiveness, and atonement. In conclusion, Christianity was presented as the Absolute Religion because exemplifying this higher synthesis in its purest and noblest form. Moreover, the three ideas themselves were treated as examples of the dialectic: truth is that which is; goodness, that which ought to be; beauty, that which is as it ought to be.² And not merely in the great lines of the course, and in the concept of God as Absolute Spirit manifesting itself in the dialectic process, but also in the several and specific discussions, Hegel was everlastingly in evidence. It seemed a remarkable change from immediacy of feeling to reason with its dialectic, and students were occasionally somewhat bewildered by the transition. The difficulty is removed, however, neither by recognition that Schleiermacher sometimes hegelianizes, although that is true, nor by pointing out, as Dr. Royce once did, that the Hegelianism is more in form than in substance, but by the per-

² The *Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*, p. 200.

ception that with Dr. Everett feeling and reason are virtually identical. The religious feeling is that awakened by a supernatural presence manifesting itself in truth, goodness, and beauty, which are the three ideas inherent in reason. This point is so important, for a just appreciation of Dr. Everett's theology, that it must be brought out more plainly, and his practical identification of reason and feeling will become evident if we consider what he means by each of the terms.

If religion consists in feeling, Dr. Everett asks,³ shall we say that religion exists to make a man feel good or to make a man of good feeling? Manifestly, the answer is not in doubt, but the distinction marks an important and significant difference. An eminent physician once said with reference to a case presented to him for diagnosis, "I guess that the fundamental trouble is thus and so,—but of course you understand that this is a scientific guess." Now the difference between a superficial and a scientific guess is that the latter is the guess of a disciplined mind, trained in the realm in which the guess is made. The Yankee has often been derided for his much guessing, but his guesses have opened the way of advance just because it was a Yankee that was doing the guessing, and acting upon his guesses. The distinction is akin to that which Dr. Everett himself draws between fancy and imagination:⁴ fancy is the dreaming of an untrained child, imagination is the same power working in a disciplined and scientific mind. Fancy may lead astray, but imagination is humanity's pioneer. Hence, when Dr. Everett speaks of the imagination as the essential faculty of religion,⁵ and of religion as "poetry believed in," he is but putting in another way the thought that religion consists primarily in feeling. A thoughtful man may feel that an argument is fallacious, even though at the moment he is unable to put his finger on the fallacy; a good man feels that a proposed course of conduct is wrong, although he may not be capable of exposing the speciousness of a plausible plea in its behalf; a man of aesthetic appreciation feels that a picture is poor, although he cannot logically justify his disapproval; a trained critic feels that his favorite author

³ *The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*, p. 24.

⁴ *Poetry, Comedy, and Duty*, p. 4.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

cannot have written a certain passage, although tradition may ascribe it to him and no objective considerations contradict. In such cases, and they might be multiplied indefinitely, judgment is passed on the ground of the "feel" of things, notwithstanding the absence of logical warrant or intellectual demonstration. In a word, there are two kinds of feeling, lying one on the hither, the other on the thither, side of thought.⁶ The first kind Dr. Everett calls emotion, undifferentiated feeling, but the feeling which properly deserves the name is that which transcends the intellect, although resting upon it. Here, again, is the dialectic: first, feeling which is mere emotion; then the discriminating intellect which stands over against the feeling, producing in theology the conflict between the heart and the head; and finally the higher synthesis in which feeling and reason are one. This suggests the approach to the identity from the side of reason.

In a valuable essay,⁷ Dr. Everett distinguishes between reason and reasoning, holding that the former is intuitive in character, while the latter is discursive and analytic.⁸ It is the familiar difference between the reason and the understanding, or the intellect. We say occasionally, it stands to reason that a thing is thus or so, and it will usually be found, when such a statement is made, that decisive logical proof is lacking. To say that something stands to reason is not the same as to say that it stands by reasoning. Now according to Dr. Everett, reason consists in the intuition that something is harmonious with, or inconsistent with, truth, goodness, or beauty; it does not wait on the analytic understanding; it may, and often does, hold its ground in spite of it, for it comes with a certainty which the understanding can neither give nor take away. It is indeed a feeling, but a feeling which is held trustworthy because one cannot help trusting it. Thus the conflict between Schleiermacher and Hegel

⁶ See essay on Instinct and Reason, in *Essays Theological and Literary*, pp. 157 ff., especially p. 169.

⁷ Reason in Religion, in *Essays Theological and Literary*, pp. 1-29. Cf. also *The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*, pp. 145 ff.

⁸ "Reason is the faculty which discerns the inner unity." *Science of Thought*, p. 109. Cf. *Poetry, Comedy, and Duty*, p. 45. "The imagination gives us the Universe in its wholeness."

disappears before the three ideas of the reason which give reason its content and feeling, its distinguishing character for religion.

The use of the term "idea" as applied to truth, goodness, and beauty, may need brief explanation. It means not so much concept as form. The ideas of the reason are like the categories of the understanding; we may not be conscious of them as such, but we use them habitually, they underlie all our mental activity and are implicit in all its methods and conclusions. Perhaps this is as good a place as we shall find to point out a slight confusion attending Dr. Everett's use of these ideas. By truth he means unity,⁹ and the idea of truth is the universal and everlasting human tendency to reduce all things into order and system. Unfortunately, however, truth is used sometimes in this general sense and sometimes in the more specific sense of the operation of this unifying principle in the world of thought alone. It would not be unjust to Dr. Everett to say that with him the tendency to unity is the inherent principle of reason or spirit which shows itself in thought as truth, in social relations as goodness, and in feeling as beauty. There are obvious reasons why Dr. Everett did not make explicit this classification, chief among which perhaps was his feeling that classifications have more significance than is now commonly accorded them, but if we regard classification as a device for convenience, the scheme suggested will serve to make his meaning clearer and remove some intellectual embarrassments.

For example, the three ideas are usually treated as if they were equal and coördinate, nevertheless in *The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith* (p. 149) it is said that "Goodness and Beauty are really manifestations of Truth, so that ultimately we have the one innate idea, the first idea of the reason." Similarly in *Theism and the Christian Faith* (p. 183) he declares that "an analysis of the three ideas shows that the idea of unity is the basis of the others." Thus Dr. Everett seems to lay himself open to the criticism he himself had passed upon Schleiermacher for putting freedom, an outgrowth of the sense of dependence, upon the same plane with it—"to place these two elements (primary and secondary) on the same plane is not properly to define" (*The Psy-*

⁹ *The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*, p. 131.

chological Elements of Religious Faith, p. 80). Furthermore, in his own discussion of freedom, he gives the idea of goodness veto power over the idea of truth, which would seem to exalt a secondary over the primary element. The riddle is read, however, when we realize that although unity is fundamental, it is known to us only through its manifestations in respective realms. The trinity is an economic trinity.

Returning now to the three ideas of the reason, we must repeat that they appear as modes of activity earlier than as definite concepts, else their universal inherence could not be maintained. "The truth of the matter appears to be that we come into the world with certain instincts of activity, bodily and mental, and a faith by which we follow these instincts, confident that they will not deceive or mislead us" (*Science of Thought*, p. 122, cf. *The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*, pp. 42 ff., 153 ff.). Of course, a savage has no idea of vast systematic unity comprehending and systematizing all phenomena, the concept of a universe has not dawned upon him. Yet, to borrow one of Dr. Everett's apt illustrations, like the farmer who repudiated the idea that he wanted all the land there was, but confessed that he always coveted the field adjoining his, so the savage acts in such a way as to prove that the impulse towards all-embracing unity is present and operative within him. That he is animistic, indicates, first, that he seeks a cause for whatever sufficiently interests him to excite thought, and to seek a cause for anything signifies desire to take it out of its seeming isolation and bind it to something else (thus causation is an expression of that tendency towards unity), and, secondly,¹⁰ by supposing as cause a being like himself he is employing analogy, which, again, testifies to a constructive conviction of unity.¹¹ Thus, at the very beginning of mental life one finds evidence of the presence of this idea of unity as a form of activity. Similarly with goodness,¹² man at first has no theory of a social order which depends upon goodness and is its ultimate meaning, yet man is prone to act as a member of a

¹⁰ *The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*, p. 163.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 165.

¹² *The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*, p. 185. *Science of Thought*, pp. 143 ff.

tribe or clan, even as there is a jungle-law which wild beasts unconsciously obey. A savage, likewise, shows the rudiments of aesthetic taste in his habit of adornment,—bad taste, to be sure, but bad taste is still taste,—and thus testifies to the presence of an aesthetic tendency.¹³ There is a somewhat wistful glance towards Darwin's theory of sexual selection, as if Dr. Everett would gladly carry love of beauty down into the lower orders, but his main concern is with man and the phenomena of human life. Man's experience, then, is determined by impulses inborn within him, and when later he comes to the state of reflection, and strives to read the meaning of his experience, he attains to the intellectual recognition of the principles upon which he has all along been acting, and the ideas of the reason become definite and conscious concepts.

It follows, then, that these ideas of the reason have not been given man from without. They are in his experience, but, like the categories of the understanding (which are only their specific applications) they are elements of experience contributed from within. That is to say, they are supernatural in character, for Dr. Everett uses the word "supernatural"¹⁴ to denote that which is non-composite. "By 'nature' [he says] we mean the universe as a composite whole, and by 'supernatural' the non-composite unity in and through which this composite whole exists; the supernatural is not a disturbing influence apart from and over against the natural, but the absolute unity which manifests itself in and through the diversity of nature" (*Theism and the Christian Faith*, p. 15). Here Dr. Everett aligns himself with those who virtually identify the supernatural and the personal. Objects in the material world are made up of atoms (so the theory ran before the atom became anachronistic), and can be disintegrated into their component parts, but man's impulse to unify cannot thus be compounded, since itself is present to effect the composition into unity of sensations and ideas. Goodness, too, is not the sum of acts, but reaches its perfection in love, which is a creative principle of conduct and hence an inner bond of unity. "The filthy rags of our own righteousness," Dr.

¹³ *Theism and the Christian Faith*, p. 181.

¹⁴ Cf. *The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*, p. 89.

Everett used to say, "yes, our separated moralities are rags, and filthy rags, compared with the seamless robe of love in which is the life of the spirit." Goodness finds its fulfilment in love, which is more than goodness conceived as morality. Beauty, also, is not the product of analysis; we do not appreciate beauty by first evaluating the various parts of an object and then pronouncing the sum of the parts beautiful. On the contrary, beauty lies in the intuitive perception of the whole upon which the parts depend, and in its consummate form is the divination of a living presence animating nature with which man is capable of communion. Truth, goodness, beauty, then, these are supernatural elements in man, and religion consists in the feelings appropriate to these ideas when man believes himself in the presence of a supernatural being, of whom, because He is supernatural, these ideas are the manifestations. Or, to put it more concretely and accurately, because these supernatural elements are in man they are in the world also, and that man is incurably religious is the supreme testimony to their universal presence. And this leads us to a more detailed exposition of Dr. Everett's theology.

How can it be shown that these elements in man witness to their existence in the world beyond him? How can psychology pass over into theology? To this crucial question there are various answers, some of which must be mentioned. First of all, then, how do we know that there is anything beyond our own consciousness at all? Why should we not reduce all science to psychology, as some are inclined to do? But the fact is that man naturally and normally approaches the world in good faith;¹⁸ if he has certain sensations, he takes it for granted that there are objects, corresponding to those sensations, which carry for him the possibility of further experience. No man doubts the objective reality of things until he sips of the Pierian spring. Then the philosophical problem vexes him, the world of consciousness and the world of material things stand over against each other, and between the two is a great gulf fixed. When the question has once arisen, there seems to be no answer possible save a resort to the primitive good faith, which now, however, has

¹⁸ *Science of Thought*, pp. 122 ff.

become sophisticated and may be called simply faith. The intellect has raised a question it is incompetent to answer, but even in our deepest doubt we practically take the world in good faith, a convinced solipsist sets out to convert the world, and it is for philosophy to baptize at its font the primitive good faith of the child. But if we thus take our sensations at their face-value, if we trust our powers of perception, why may we not legitimately extend this good faith to cover all our experiences, and all our powers, including the religious? If we do think, and must think, in certain ways, why should we argue that because these forms are ours, they are therefore ours alone? Why not rather take it for granted, until the contrary has been proved, that they are ours because they pertain also to that larger world in which our lot is cast and with which our experience has to do? Thus, the good faith which gives us a world at all gives us also a world wherein truth, goodness, and beauty, are real as they are real in us.

And, secondly, this good faith finds confirmation in various ways. The fact that action dictated by the impulse to unity gives us the experience we ought to have if the mysterious world were indeed the home of unity, furnishes strong corroboration. Again, if man is really a part of this world then whatever is in him is also in the world, and, if we hold to the notion of evolution, it is but a natural inference that what is patent in man was latent in the world which has produced him as distinct but undivided part. Or, to put it otherwise, and more superficially, if these elements in man were not present in the world, then action dictated by them would put man out of harmony with his environment with disastrous results. The fact that in the world man, in whom these three ideas exist as modes of activity, has arisen, developed, and maintained himself, is good evidence in support of faith.

But with such answers Dr. Everett was not quite content, for, as has been said, he was most of all a philosopher and a metaphysician. We have these three ideas, our good faith in the world requires that it shall correspond to them, but how is such a world to be conceived? The world of space and time is not a world of unity, therefore the world of space and time cannot

meet our demands. Unity in space can be realized only when each finds itself in its other, unity in time when identity is preserved through the changes so that the present gathers up into itself the past. Then it is plain that only in the world of conscious spirit can the demand of unity find its realization. For the very nature of consciousness is to find oneself in the opposite, and only in memory does the past live and identity consist. If, then, we are to trust our tendency to unity,—and, be it observed, we do trust it in every moment of our lives and in every action whether instinctive or deliberate,—we must conceive of the world under the forms not of space and time but of conscious spirit. The world then is spiritual, even as man is spiritual, and only in absolute spirit does the ideal of unity find its fulfilment. Similarly with the ideal of goodness; with respect to goodness conceived as morality, there is an apparently irreducible antinomy, for if goodness have any reason beyond itself, it cannot be absolute, and if it have no such reason, it must be pronounced arbitrary and capricious; but this antinomy is resolved by the recognition that love is more than morality, and hence the second ideal of the reason leads us to conceive of the Absolute Spirit as “good and more than good,” even as perfect love. Finally, since beauty is the expression of the ideal in the actual, the thought of God as the Spirit manifest in all carries with it the conviction of the glory of God in an ordered creation. This is Dr. Everett’s form of the *a priori* argument; we cannot help believing in our ideal of unity, therefore we cannot help believing in Absolute Spirit which alone satisfies that ideal, without which indeed it could have no validity. Thus the three ideas of truth, goodness, and beauty, find their fulfilment only in the Absolute Spirit, in whom they are inherent and constitutive, even as they are in the finite human spirit. It follows, therefore, that whatever can be truly said concerning this Absolute Spirit must be in harmony with truth, goodness, beauty, and since the Spirit is one, even as the life of the tree is one with the life of the least and outermost leaf, whatever is consistent with these ideas in man may safely be attributed to God.

But this is a growing world, and man is a growing man;

his tendency to unity finds fulfilment in no system; his ideal of goodness has different concrete exemplifications from age to age and from race to race; his ideal of beauty creates one school of art after another,—are not these ideas, then, quite abstract and, because abstract, worthless? How, then, is it possible to reason from a man and a world in process to God? The answer is that our thought of God is and can be only a *Vorstellung*. But, indeed, all our ideas have both an individual and a universal element, and the latter always tends to burst the confines of the former. Because of this universal element, therefore, every idea is dynamic instead of static, our idea of God among the rest. Yet our idea of God may have the same value as other ideas, provided like them it is recognized only as an approximation destined inevitably to negate itself in the dialectic process toward a larger and truer thought.

Now, however, the deeper question comes, how this manifold world with its flux and change stands related to the One who is eternal. It is the old baffling problem—how out of the One has come the many, out of the changeless the changing, out of all-embracing truth individual error, out of perfection sin and suffering? It is in reality the problem of creation which Dr. Everett discusses at length and in detail. Without following the intricacies of the discussion, we may simply note in passing that Dr. Everett holds to what he describes as the philosophical, instead of the more common theological, view that creation is a manifestation of spirit and hence eternal, since of two antithetical terms one must be as real and as enduring as the other. Nevertheless, he insists with apparent inconsistency that “the gulf between the material world and the very germ of consciousness is absolute,” although in the next sentence he adds, “It is like a magnet,—a single grain of the magnetic stone will have its two poles with the absolute antithesis between them” (*Theism and the Christian Faith*, p. 159). But, in any event, this antithesis between matter and spirit involves the absolute dependence of the world upon God which satisfies all the interest that religion has in a theory of creation. Hence it follows that spirit is not abstract but of concrete fulness, the One does not cancel the many but includes the manifold con-

creteness, the imperfect is taken up as an element into the perfect. The world is a world of process just because of the immanent dialectic of spirit—if it were not a world of process it could not be a manifestation of Spirit, whose very being is life and process. The Hegelian insists that since goodness consists in victory over evil, there could be no goodness unless there were evil to be vanquished; consequently, so far from the presence of evil in the world being an objection to Theism, we could not believe in a good God in any other kind of a world. Dr. Everett demurs at this, holding that the possibility of evil would suffice for the argument, and not its actuality,¹⁶ but he does rest in the assurance that, since spirit is what it is, a world created by and dependent upon Spirit, its manifestation, must necessarily be a world of process. The only important question is whether the world reveals the supremacy of Truth, Goodness, and Beauty.

At this point in his unfolding thought, Dr. Everett introduces a discussion of evolution by natural selection. It is conceded that the method is of slight consequence, provided only the ideas of the reason appear as supreme. From what has already been said it is evident that the success of activity unwittingly dictated by the ideas, and, after conscious recognition and adoption of them, the firmer consistency and progressive enlargement of life loyal to their demands, amply satisfy the needs of his discussion. These facts also seem to prove the presence of a teleological principle in the world. "From the first nature has been an idealist. That is, the ideas which we claim, whether rightly or wrongly, are in some sense innate in the spirit, have been innate in nature itself . . . through the working of the material forces, these ideas have been the ruling principle to which the material world has been subject" (*Theism and the Christian Faith*, p. 186). It is manifest that from Dr. Everett's point of view it is absolutely essential that the world should disclose in its process the dialectic of spirit. The teleological principle must be exhibited. After arguing that ultimately there must be a choice between chance and teleology, Dr. Everett pleads that the present outcome of the

¹⁶ *Theism and the Christian Faith*, p. 260.

process is of such a character that chance must be pronounced an impossible explanation. Furthermore, he argues, to produce the unity which is the distinctive mark of spirit from the discreteness which is the distinguishing characteristic of matter, atomically considered, is an absolute inconceivability. Teleology, then, remains, although the care with which his statements on this subject are guarded is very noticeable. He will not speak of design, for that seems to him to go beyond the facts; he insists only upon a teleological principle, or impulse, in things having truth, goodness, and beauty, as final causes.

It is this teleological principle in the universe, conceived as the dialectic of the Spirit, which governs Dr. Everett's treatment of the more specific theological problems. This may be shown by reference to the discussions concerning hamartiology and Christology. The question of Determinism falls under the first of these categories because of the assumption that moral responsibility depends upon individual freedom, so that unless some amount of freedom be acknowledged sin and salvation become meaningless terms. But the difficulty is to find enough freedom to enable man to become a sinner. After thorough discussion of the opposing arguments, in which, however, the argument for freedom based on consciousness is perhaps too summarily dismissed, the question is reduced to an antinomy between the first and the second idea of the reason; truth seems to demand a unity wherein freedom is impossible, but goodness requires individual initiative and responsibility. If this antinomy be irreducible, the assertion is that the idea of goodness must be held decisive, since in such matters the practical reason is more likely to be true than the theoretical,¹⁸ but an analysis of the meaning of freedom and our desire for it, leads to the recognition of an absolute freedom reconciling real and formal freedom. In so far as man is at one with the Absolute Spirit he has real freedom in the expression of inner purpose, and formal freedom because his will is at one with the will of God. And man has power to win or not to win this absolute freedom by the amount of earnestness he puts into life. "A man is under restraint everywhere; whatever the immediate sphere in which

¹⁸ Theism and the Christian Faith, p. 226.

he finds himself, he is bound by the laws of that sphere. But by greater earnestness of life, he may pass from one sphere into another. . . . The owner of a music-box cannot change its tunes, but he can determine which of those tunes shall be played. A man in a balloon is in a certain sense at the mercy of atmospheric currents, but these currents move in different directions at different heights, and the aëronaut can cause his balloon to rise or fall from one current to another" (*Theism and the Christian Faith*, p. 229).

Manifestly, this conclusion satisfies neither side in the great debate: indeed, the determinist may justly protest that it begs the whole question by assuming that man has power over his own earnestness, ability to rise from one level to another, if indeed the stratification appealed to is not completely subversive of the principle of unity. On the other hand, a believer in freedom may marvel that where any freedom at all is granted, and the contradictory principle so far denied, more freedom is not claimed. A modern aëronaut is by no means at the mercy of the air-currents. Our present business, however, is not to criticise but to expound, and from Dr. Everett's point of view it is plain that since the Spirit is onward-pressing, sin consists in failure to rise to ever higher levels of life. In a word, sin is inertia. Man's real being and destiny is to live and grow in obedience to the immanent Spirit, if he fail to respond to this inner impulse he is in a state of sin. Sin is regarded, therefore, as a state rather than an act, sins are but manifestations of this inert, unprogressive condition. It is negative, because it means the absence of the animating and directing principle which should be present. It is selfishness, because the Spirit which should prevail is universal, and by denying it man falls into the isolation of his merely individual interests. It is death, because in death the organism is at the mercy of the environment which disintegrates its unity, while life means the supremacy of a principle superior to the natural environment. From this it follows that the penalty of sin is deeper sin. "We find the complete punishment of sin only in sin itself, either a deeper sin or, if there is repentance, in the pain of struggle with which sin is relinquished" (*Theism and the Christian Faith*, p. 298).

In sin, therefore, there is a breach between man and the Spirit, a breach which religion has sought to heal in various ways, notably by sacrifice. But Christianity professes to close the chasm without the aid of sacrifice, and by its effect upon those who receive it amply justifies its claim. How, then, is the reconciliation accomplished by Christianity? The outcome of a rather disproportionately long discussion of the doctrine of the Atonement is that no theory can be considered Orthodox; that is, none has thoroughly and universally commended itself to the Christian consciousness; hence no particular theory can be deemed essential for the production of harmony, and, therefore, no doctrine of the atonement is essential. Dr. Everett's view is that since in the life of Jesus, and in his teaching concerning the fatherhood of God and the sonship of man, the teleological principle which is at the heart of all finds perfect expression, Jesus appeals persuasively to the spirit in every man, which when thus quickened effects the inner reconciliation.

Thus we are brought naturally to a consideration of Christ and Christianity. The discussion of the Trinity is rather surprisingly brief. Explicit reference is made only to the theories of Augustine, Shedd, and Dorner, of the last of which it is said: "If this is the doctrine of the Trinity, then every theist is a Trinitarian. But Dorner's statement does not satisfy the historical conception of the Trinity" (*Theism and the Christian Faith*, p. 325). Declaring that historically the doctrine was developed from a Scriptural basis, he goes on, with no careful canvassing of the evidence, to affirm that "the nearest approach to the New Testament position, considered as a whole, is found in the Arian doctrine" (*ibid.*, p. 326). The treatment of the doctrine of the Incarnation, by which is meant the dual nature of Christ, is even more unsatisfactory, but Dr. Everett's statement of his own view is clear and definite. Given a teleological principle in the world, we should expect to find prophetic personalities appearing in whom that principle finds more perfect expression than in the mass of mankind, who for this very reason become leaders of their fellows. Just because the spirit which is more abundant in them abides in the breasts of all men, these leaders are not alien to their kind, neither is their voice that of

a stranger. On the contrary, their presence and teaching sharpen and fortify the ideal which each man vaguely and dimly cherishes; therefore they lead by human right and by no official status. Such anticipative personalities one finds in all departments of life—they are the geniuses in art and letters, in science and state-craft. Such a man was Jesus in religion; in him the teleological principle in the world showed at what it had all along been aiming. Hence he is the leader of the race just because he leads (*Theism and the Christian Faith*, p. 361).

Moreover, Jesus came of the Hebrew race as the flowering of a long historical development. The more intimately therefore he is related to the process in the life and thought of Israel, the more evident it becomes that this national process is a replica, diminished to scale, of the process of the Spirit in humanity. That process is a process of revelation, consequently the unfolding of Hebrew history is revelation. In the Bible one finds the record of that revelation, which, as chronicling revelation, may itself also justly be deemed revelation, the more since its writers were men in whom the immanent teleological principle peculiarly resided. Hence Christianity, the religion of Jesus, being at once the consummation of the process in Israel and in humanity, is the Absolute Religion which can no more be surpassed than can the personality of its founder.

At this point one naturally asks, what is meant by Christianity—is it the religion of Jesus himself, or is it the religion which under widely different forms the world has called by the one name? Dr. Everett answers the question by emphasizing historic continuity. The Christian stream of influence proceeds from Jesus and, however many its affluents, still preserves its identity. It has proved the dominating power: influenced by the Mazdean religion, which next to the Jewish was the best embodiment among the religions of the world of the teleological principle, it nevertheless showed its preëminence by taking the influence up into itself instead of being absorbed by it. So reinforced, the stream received what was in harmony with its essential character and interpenetrated all with its transforming power. To say that Christianity is the absolute religion, however, does not mean that now or at any previous time it is or has

been perfect. That it is more perfect than any other religion known to us is affirmed as matter of fact, notwithstanding a popular prejudice against such a position,—a prejudice which amiably blurs all distinctions and cancels differences,—but it is argued that absoluteness does not imply perfection. Absoluteness, that is, consists in the fact that “it presents the sphere, it lays down the limits, within which development and progress are to take place, just as in the law of gravitation are laid down the limits within which the study of the heavenly bodies is to be pursued. Christianity is not perfect, but it contains within itself the possibility of an infinite development, which must however take place along the lines and in the direction that are indicated by it” (*Theism and the Christian Faith*, p. 345). That is to say, within Christianity is room for the perfect expression of all three ideas of the reason, which other religions of the world express severally and often in mutual opposition. There is unity in the doctrine of the interpretation of the human by the divine, goodness in the harmonious blending of religion and ethics in the perfection of love, beauty in the vision of the world as manifesting in ever-growing completeness an ideal life until its consummate exhibition appears in the personality of Jesus. It does not therefore follow that all will become Christian in name or that all religions will merge in Christianity. Whether or no that will be the event, time alone can determine. Yet in the universal and intuitive character of its principles, in the personality of its founder as an ideal for all lives and a symbol of the essential nature both of the religion and of humanity, and in the organization of the church, Christianity has advantages which make it improbable that any religion will surpass it.

From the whole character of Dr. Everett's thought his attitude towards immortality may be easily forecasted. After a terse but trenchant survey of the arguments for and against, he finds assurance of immortality in its compatibility with his general world-view. All along he has rested upon the Hegelian principle of the process from unity through differentiation into a higher, synthetic unity, and now the argument is that if the individuals in whom the Absolute has found manifestation

merely fall back again into the original unity, the process lacks its third and culminating stage, which is realized only if the individuals, as such, return to their source in the higher way of fellowship and love. This is but a more technical way of putting the argument from the theistic world-view. "I hardly understand how one who has real faith in God, can have serious doubt in regard to the immortality of the spirit. . . . If we grant the existence of God, then the fact that the individual is conscious of the divine life, and feels that his own life is rooted in it, makes the thought of immortality in one aspect easy if not necessary, while the fact that an infinite sphere is provided in which the spirit may dwell when severed from the material world, removes the difficulty of the belief in another aspect" (*Theism and the Christian Faith*, pp. 478-9).

Perhaps we may best review the course of Dr. Everett's thought by recapitulating the six definitions of religion which like milestones mark the stages of his advance. He begins with an inclusive and ends with a typical definition; the first is intended to include all phenomena that may properly be called religious, the last is designed to describe religion at its best. First, then, religion is defined as "feeling, or essentially feeling." Here he enters upon Schleiermacher's path, recognizing, however, that feeling can never exist wholly apart from thought and will, but insisting that in religion feeling takes the accent. But in defining the character of the feeling, he presents his second definition, "Religion is essentially feeling towards the supernatural." By the supernatural he means, as has previously been said, that which is non-composite. The savage does not worship the fetich as such, but rather the mysterious power akin to himself which is present in the fetich or somehow associated with it. A closer definition of the supernatural, or better a careful inquiry into what is supernatural, leading to a discrimination between the supernatural considered negatively, as superstition, and positively, as religion properly so called, followed by a consideration of the various higher religions of the world (to which his course on comparative religion was devoted), yields a third definition, "Religion is essentially feeling towards a supernatural presence manifesting itself in Truth,

Goodness, and Beauty." At this point the lectures published in *Theism and the Christian Faith* take up the discussion, and by a profound study of the implications and requirements of these ideas of the reason justify substitution in the fourth definition of the word "spiritual" for "supernatural". Here he enters the broad highway of theological progress. In man spirit is partially and imperfectly manifest, but truth, goodness, and beauty in him testify to their perfection in absolute Spirit, wherein alone they are capable of full realization. This perfect Spirit is in the world as a teleological principle which has reached its consummate issue in the personality of Jesus. Hence we have the fifth definition, "Religion is essentially a feeling toward a spiritual presence manifesting itself in Truth, Goodness, and Beauty, especially as illustrated in the life and teachings of Jesus." Yet, inasmuch as the spirit that was in him is also in all, he is the first-born among many brethren, and in ever-increasing numbers men accept his way of life and approach his personality, realizing in themselves the universal spirit. Consequently we have the sixth and final definition, "Religion is essentially feeling towards a spiritual presence manifesting itself in Truth, Goodness, and Beauty, especially as illustrated in the life and teaching of Jesus and as experienced in every soul that is open to its influence."

One of the most brilliant among younger philosophical writers in America has recently referred to Dr. Everett as an "old-fashioned teacher." Although other pupils of Dr. Everett may resent the term, it must be conceded that it is not indefensible. He was old-fashioned in his manner of teaching. In his lectures there was no splutter of epigrammatic paradoxes, such as one hears from many teachers and writers of the modern school. His lectures moved with smooth and gentle flow, so evenly in fact that often his most important teachings seemed almost to slip from him casually, and the full import of his unemphasized sentences was not immediately discerned. Yet if wit was lacking there was often a touch of subtle humor so subtle that it frequently passed unnoticed at the time. It must be acknowledged, too, that in substance and method there was something which may fairly be called old-fashioned, now that

Hegelianism is out of vogue and the Absolute is almost everywhere spoken against. A great deal of water has flowed under philosophical and theological bridges since his thought took form. We hear of truth as expediency, of the mind as merely an instrument by which adjustments to environment may be more speedily and surely effected, of a pluralistic universe, and the like, all of which seems alien to his thought. Nevertheless, it is not so certain that there were not fundamental, if the term had not acquired other associations one would rather say radical, elements in his thought which are congenial with recent developments, and, perhaps one may be permitted to add, corrective of them. The most general description of the present philosophical movement would be to say that it has been from intellectualism to voluntarism, from the static to the dynamic view. It is true that in Dr. Everett's system the static quality often seems to predominate, but it is only in seeming, for his emphasis upon the teleological principle was constant, and the notion of process everywhere prevails. Perhaps if unity should be defined by the category of purpose (and such a definition would be essentially true to his thought), he might be more manifestly in harmony with present tendencies. One of his colleagues in the philosophical department of Harvard said soon after his death, that Dr. Everett seemed to him in a process of intellectual transition, and it would have been interesting to see whither a few more years of mental activity would have led him. It may be doubted whether there would have been any change in the creative principles of his thinking, indeed whether there would have been need of any. His recognition of the three ideals of the reason as modes of activity opens a most interesting vista along which, as he journeyed, he would have found many modern companions. Certain recent discussions of beauty, a subject to which he gave much attention, deeming it one of great significance too often neglected by theologians to the detriment of their science, read like Dr. Everett's thought translated into a different dialect and with new orientation. Upon this point, however, we cannot dwell here; it is enough to suggest that perhaps a studious reading of Dr. Everett will reveal that notwithstanding the "old-fashioned

habit of his mind" his thinking puts him among the moderns in philosophy.

A somewhat similar remark must be made about his theology. Dr. Everett was a Unitarian in his denominational relations. The fact is mentioned not merely because it is a fact but because I am sure he would have been glad to have it stated here, and because in existing circumstances, here in New England where he lived and taught, it has exceptional significance. Unitarianism in New England has already had two distinct phases of theological thought and seems about to enter upon a third. The earlier, pre-transcendental phase was rationalistic in character, but, largely through the influence of Emerson and others of the same way of thinking, the mystical elements which, as has recently been shown, were present in the thought of Channing, were vivified and came to the front, thus introducing the second phase of New England Unitarianism. When Dr. Everett began his theological career these two phases were coexistent and in antagonism, threatening to disrupt the fellowship. He recognized the opposition, but interpreted it as one of the antitheses in which his soul delighted. It was essentially a conflict between common-sense and mystical theology, and the bent of his mind was decisively towards the latter, and this although he expressly declares that the former has been represented by the Socinians and kindred schools, while the latter has been "more prominent in the so-called Orthodox belief of Christianity" (*Theism and the Christian Faith*, p. 18). In his emphasis upon the Spirit,—he was accustomed to declare the doctrine of the Holy Spirit the most significant doctrine of Christianity,—he was at one with the mystical school, and in his doctrine of the immanence of the Spirit as a teleological principle he exalted the reason of the rationalists into something higher and finer. It is not extreme to say that his own theological thought furnished the synthesis in which each of the elements in his own communion found its fulfilment. In the circumstances it was of inestimable benefit to Unitarianism that, in the non-denominational school where most of its ministers studied, the intellectual and personal influence of Dr. Everett was supreme. But his service was of much wider range. A prom-

inent Trinitarian Congregational clergyman of New England has said that he owes it to Dr. Everett that he became able to remain philosophically and sincerely a Trinitarian. On the other hand more than one pupil of Dr. Everett entered his classroom a Trinitarian and came out a Unitarian. But it should be added that in either case the Trinitarianism or the Unitarianism was of a peculiar type. This would seem to imply, what indeed is probably the case, that in Dr. Everett's theology there were principles which, carried to their fulfilment, mean a higher synthesis of religious thought in which Unitarian and Trinitarian may yet be at one.

*MODERNISM AND CATHOLICISM*¹

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In the instrument providing for the endowment of the series of lectures which bears his name Judge Dudley directed that the third lecture should be for "The Detecting and Convicting and Exposing the Idolatry of the Romish Church, their Tyranny, Usurpations, Damnable Heresies, Fatal Errors, Abominable Superstitions, and other Crying Wickednesses in their high places; and finally that the Church of Rome is that mystical Babylon, that man of sin, that apostate Church, spoken of in the New Testament."

It is upon this topic that I am to speak this evening. The times have changed since the lectureship was founded in 1750. Many of the animosities of the fathers are no longer felt by us, and particularly in religious matters union has taken the place of division, sympathy of hostility, coöperation of rivalry. We are interested in other things. Our sense of proportion has changed. We are farther away from the days of persecution, and less nervous about many movements and institutions that our fathers dreaded unspeakably. The spirit of toleration has taken hold upon us all, and Protestants can think and speak kindly of men of other faiths, and can coöperate gladly and heartily with them as opportunity offers for the promotion of good ends dear to them all.

With this spirit I am myself in cordial sympathy, and it is as an historian, not as a polemic, that I shall treat the subject assigned me. I wish to consider as dispassionately as possible the great system that still remains essentially unchanged, in spite of all the vicissitudes that have overtaken the affairs of men since Judge Dudley made his will a hundred and fifty years ago.

¹ The Dudleian Lecture, delivered at Harvard University, May 13, 1909.

The present situation in the Roman Catholic church caused by the open conflict between conservative and liberal tendencies within its communion is most interesting and instructive. Not since the sixteenth century has there been so splendid an opportunity and so pressing an invitation to study the nature of Catholicism as exhibited in its greatest exponent the Roman Catholic church.

The so-called modernist movement is a very complicated phenomenon, appearing in different forms in Germany, France, Italy, England, and America.² It is not the fruit of any single principle, nor the expression of any single philosophy. The endeavor to embrace it within the compass of a single formula is foredoomed to failure. One may describe with accuracy the positions of some particular modernists, and others may claim with perfect right that the description does not fit them. The situation is the same in the Protestant world. No formula can possibly be invented that will cover all the Protestant liberals of the day, or even any large number of them. Some are moved by one interest, some by another. Some repudiate this feature of the old system, others that. In their constructive work some follow one line of thought, others another, while many do not attempt to construct at all, but content themselves wholly with criticism, Biblical and historical. It is as difficult to describe Roman Catholic modernism as it is to describe Protestant liberalism. The two are the outgrowth of the same general situation, and both reveal the effort, in varying degrees and more or less consciously, to adjust their religious ideas and their theological thinking to the modern world in which they live. Some are historically, others philosophically or theologically or socially or politically, interested. All are more or less out of sympathy with

² Books and articles dealing with the movement are very numerous and are continually appearing. Among them the brief work by Holl, *Modernismus*, 1908, in the *Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher*, and the longer work by Kübel, *Geschichte der Katholischen Modernismus*, 1909, are perhaps the best general accounts. Lilley's *Modernism: a Record and Review*, 1908, is also useful, especially for its bibliography; and some of the writings of the Abbé Houtin are particularly important for the growth of the movement in France (*L'Américanisme*, 1904; *La question biblique chez les catholiques de France au XIX^e siècle* 1902; *La question biblique au XX^e siècle*, 1906; *La crise du clergé*, 1907). For Italy the *Lettere di un prete modernista* (Rome, 1908) is instructive.

traditional modes of thought and traditional ways of looking at things, and the common interest that binds them all together, if there be any such, and justifies us in speaking of a common movement, is the desire to bring about a better adjustment between Christianity and the modern world. Roman Catholic modernism cannot possibly be understood unless it be brought into intimate connection with similar tendencies within Protestantism. The modernists may protest, and with perfect right, against being identified with Protestant liberals. But, fundamental as are the differences that separate them, Catholic modernists as well as Protestant liberals are children of the modern age, and both feel in their own peculiar way the influence of modern tendencies. The new scientific spirit, the new historical sense and the new methods of historical criticism, the new psychological interest, the new emphasis on evolution, the new estimate of nature and the supernatural, in general the new way of looking at the universe, all this has made itself felt within Catholic as well as Protestant circles, and the result has been similar in both. The effects have naturally been present more widely and for a longer time within Protestantism than within Catholicism. It was easier for the new spirit to penetrate the former than the latter. Not only was the one divided and unorganized, while the other was a compact and centralized whole, but the one was, at least in theory, a child of the modern age and open to its influences, while the other was in theory irrevocably bound to an ancient past.

But what has long been happening in Protestantism has now begun to happen in Catholicism. The new spirit has not only penetrated the church but it has come to conscious and vigorous expression, and the result is controversy and condemnation in the one case as in the other. To regard the Roman Catholic modernists as mere followers or imitators of liberal Protestants would be grossly unjust. Influence of one kind and another there may have been, but the modernists are Catholics, not Protestants, and they have read the message of the modern age in their own way. Its spirit has spoken as directly to them as to any Protestant, and by training and temperament they have been fitted to learn from it lessons that no genuine Protestant

could have understood. They have been accused of crypto-protestantism or of being only Protestants in disguise. The Roman Catholic authorities have denounced them as wolves in sheep's clothing, and Protestants have wondered why they do not come out of the old church and throw in their fortunes with one or another Protestant sect. But this means a complete misunderstanding of their attitude, even more complete than has been widely manifested in connection with various Protestant liberals who have happened to be members of conservative denominations. Both by orthodox and radicals they, too, have been denounced because they did not withdraw and go where they belonged. But they believed they belonged where they were, and even more emphatically it may be said that the Roman Catholic modernists believe themselves to belong in the bosom of Mother Church. They count themselves still loyal, faithful, and devout Catholics. Their reading of Christianity in the light of the modern spirit has not, they think, made them Protestants. On the contrary it has made them more truly Catholic than ever; and why then should they go out? Are they not called rather to minister the new light and the new life to the church to which with heart and soul they belong? Only as we appreciate and sympathize with their attitude in this matter can we understand them and do them justice at other points.

We must distinguish Catholic modernists and Protestant liberals from those, of whom there are many, who have been driven by the influence of modern thought to break altogether with Christianity, or at any rate with the Christian church; who have recognized the lack of harmony between the old and the new, but, instead of trying to readjust or reconstruct, have simply given the thing up and turned to other interests, believing readjustment and reconstruction impossible or not worth while. The religious views of some of these men may be not unlike those of modernists and liberals, but their attitude toward Christianity and the church is very different, and the two classes must not be confounded. The modernists are within the church, not without it, and they apparently propose to remain within it, believing that Catholic Christianity is essentially in harmony with modern thought and has a message for

the modern world. Had their attitude been other than this, had they recognized a necessary incompatibility between their own views and Catholic Christianity and withdrawn from the Catholic church, no controversy would have resulted. It is because they have remained within, and have thereby challenged the traditional view of the nature of Christianity and of the church, that the conflict has come.

What, then, is the controversy about? What are the positions of the modernists at which the Roman Catholic authorities have chiefly taken offence? In the famous papal encyclical *Pascendi Dominici Gregis* of September, 1907, there is an elaborate description of the modernist views against which the encyclical is aimed. It has been denounced by leading modernists as utterly unjust. In the very nature of the case any summary of such a complex movement must be unsatisfactory, particularly to the representatives of the movement itself. And yet an impartial observer can hardly fail to recognize that the encyclical contains on the whole an admirable diagnosis of the situation. The account, to be sure, is too schematic. Too much emphasis is laid on philosophy and too little on historical criticism. The theological opinions of perhaps no single modernist are accurately reflected in the document, and certainly much less than justice is done to the personal motives of those condemned. But a number of tendencies which have made themselves felt in one and another way and in greater or less degree in the thinking of many modernists are here depicted, in spite of some exaggeration and of a natural lack of sympathy, with adequate correctness on the whole.

Many replies to the encyclical have been written by modernists. Among them Abbé Loisy's *Simple réflexions*, the anonymous *Lendemain d'encyclique*, and, most important of all, because of the clear and systematic presentation of the matters in which the modernists themselves are chiefly interested, the *Programme of Modernism*, which appeared anonymously in Italian and has been translated into English and widely circulated.

The modernist movement, as has been said, is a very complicated thing and comprehends a great variety of interests and opinions. At the same time there are certain positions, inti-

mately related to each other and representing a common spirit, which appear and reappear in modernist writings. Among them are such as the following, to which I can only refer in passing.

First of all, Biblical and historical criticism. Undoubtedly this had much to do with the inception of the movement, although its influence is perhaps somewhat exaggerated by Loisy and the authors of the *Programme of Modernism* and of *Lendemains d'encyclique*. In the field of literary and historical criticism some of the modernists are as radical as any of our leading Protestant scholars.³ The Bible is taken to be a record of religious experience, and its value thought to lie not in its infallibility and dogmatic authority but in the fact that it induces religious faith and life in us.⁴

The old idea of fixity and permanence in the religious and theological realm has been displaced by the idea of growth and development. Where the traditionalists have a closed system, the modernists are commonly standing for change and progress.⁵ In general it may be said that the modern dynamic conception of the universe has taken the place of the static conception.

God is widely thought of as immanent in man and the world, and the old contrast between the natural and the supernatural tends to disappear altogether.⁶ Accordingly, the external and mechanical idea of revelation is abandoned, and religious truth is conceived not as something given from without but discovered through human experience.⁷

³ Compare for instance the numerous writings of the Abbé Loisy and some of the historical works of the Abbé Duchesne; also the brief summary in the *Programme of Modernism*, pp. 23 f.

⁴ Loisy, *Simple réflexions*, pp. 47 f., *Quelques lettres*, pp. 145 f.; *Programme of Modernism*, pp. 59 f.

⁵ Loisy, *The Gospel and the Church* (English translation of *L'évangile et l'église*), pp. 166 f., 214 f.; LeRoy, *Dogme et critique*, pp. 275 f., 355 f. It is worthy of remark that the philosophy of Henri Bergson has had large influence over the thinking of some of the French modernists, notably LeRoy.

⁶ Loisy, *Quelques lettres*, pp. 45 f., 149 f.; Laberthonnière, *Essais de philosophie religieuse* and *Le réalisme chrétien et l'idéalisme grec*, pp. 106 f.

⁷ Loisy, *Autour d'un petit livre*, pp. 195 f., *Simple réflexions*, pp. 61, 159; LeRoy, *Dogme et critique*, pp. 63 f.; Laberthonnière, *Le réalisme chrétien*, pp. 104 f.; *Programme of Modernism*, pp. 92 f.

Dogmas are considered true only in so far as they express facts of vital religious experience, and their value is made to depend upon their practical bearing on the moral and religious life.⁸

Some have felt the influence of Kantian epistemology, and recognize that by ordinary rational processes we cannot penetrate to the reality back of phenomena.⁹ A more or less thoroughgoing relativism is thus not uncommon.¹⁰ The organ of religious knowledge is sometimes said to be faith,¹¹ sometimes the moral will,¹² in close agreement with Kant himself, with Fichte, Ritschl, and pragmatists in general.

Most of the modernists emphasize the social element in religion, laying stress upon solidarity over against individualism. In this connection much is made of the Kingdom of God.¹³

Finally, all are opposed to absolutism in religion and consequently to Roman Catholic ultramontanism.¹⁴

In all of these matters we recognize a striking similarity to tendencies widely felt in Protestant churches as well, and it is quite evident that the modernists are children of their age as truly as any of our Protestant liberals. It is certainly not to be wondered at that they have been denounced by their Roman Catholic brethren and condemned by the ecclesiastical authorities. Even in Protestant churches similar positions have caused similar trouble, and the situation must necessarily be more acute in the Roman Catholic church. Some of the positions are of a sort to undermine the whole Catholic system,

⁸ Loisy, *Autour d'un petit livre*, p. 200; LeRoy, l. c. pp. 25 f.; Laberthonnière, *Essais de philosophie religieuse*, pp. 272 f.

⁹ Loisy, l. c. p. 10; *Programme of Modernism*, p. 110; *Lendemain d'encyclique*, p. 49.

¹⁰ LeRoy, l. c. p. 355.

¹¹ *Programme of Modernism*, pp. 110 f.; Tyrrell, *External Religion*, pp. 148 f.

¹² LeRoy, l. c. pp. 133 f.

¹³ Loisy, *The Gospel and the Church*, pp. 59, 209 f., *Simple réflexions*, p. 124; Tyrrell, *Medievalism*, p. 74; Williams: Newman, Pascal, Loisy, and the Catholic Church, p. 233 f.

¹⁴ Loisy, *Quelques lettres*, pp. 140 f.; *Programme of Modernism*; *Lendemain d'encyclique*; and the numerous passages quoted below from Tyrrell's writings.

and hostility to them is by no means necessarily a sign of ultramontanist and reaction.

The controversy has brought to light a fundamental difference touching the theory of the church and its authority, and it is this which particularly concerns us, for it is in connection with it that the genius of Catholicism most clearly reveals itself. This difference constitutes the heart of the whole matter, and it is because it has emerged in the course of the controversy that the conflict has more than a merely temporary significance. The question is not primarily whether this or that historical and theological opinion is in accord with the teaching of the church and may be tolerated within it, but what is the nature, the extent, the seat of ecclesiastical authority. This is a much more important and far-reaching matter.

The issue appears perhaps most clearly and sharply in the writings of the Englishman George Tyrrell, one of the best known of the modernists and until recently a member of the Society of Jesus.¹⁵

The first point of difference between him and the Roman Catholic rulers is the authority of the papacy. He takes sharp issue in his book entitled *Medievalism*, published in 1908, with what he calls "the new-fangled dictatorial conception of the papacy" (p. 38). That conception he sums up in the following words: "The Pope is the Church. To him alone Christ has committed the apostolic mission, the deposit of revelation, the plenitude of doctrinal authority and of spiritual power and jurisdiction. Him alone he has commissioned to teach and sanctify, not the world, but the bishops, the clergy, the faithful: 'Feed my sheep; feed my lambs.' If the episcopal or clerical sheep have any doctrinal or spiritual power over the lambs it is as mere delegates of the Pope, as streams deriving from that single fountain of all supernatural life and teaching. The shepherd is no part of his flock. He stands outside and above it as a being of another and higher species. They are absolutely passive and receptive under his guidance. They have no mind or will of their own singly or collectively" (p. 58).

¹⁵ Since this lecture was delivered, Father Tyrrell has died, to the great sorrow of a large circle of friends and admirers, Protestant as well as Catholic.

The ultramontane conception, accurately described in these words, Tyrrell denounces as uncatholic and heretical, because individualistic and opposed to the collectivity of true Catholicism. And over against it he sets the theory of the authority of the episcopate. "The promises made to Peter were made to every Apostle and bishop as such; and in the early centuries every bishop regarded himself as successor of Peter and heir of those promises. Formerly a bishop was the highest ecclesiastical official in his own diocese. He was answerable to no other official, but only to the universal Church of which he was the organ or officer. But now that your new theology has concentrated the universal Church into the person of the Pope, we have a sort of double episcopate in each diocese—the bishop of Rome and the local bishop, the latter being merely the delegate or Vicar-General of the former. Of this system there is not a trace in the first six centuries of Church History, from which we learn that the Pope is neither over the bishops as their master, nor under them as their delegate, but alongside of them as first in the rank of his brethren" (p. 61).

This historical statement is perfectly correct, and in opposing the theory of episcopal authority to the papal absolutism of the ultramontanists Tyrrell is true to the prevailing conception of the early Catholic church, and has with him a large and highly respectable body of theologians in all the centuries since. The division of opinion is an old one. The theory of papal absolutism was developed during the Middle Ages under influences which cannot be recounted here, but it never received universal recognition, and at Trent the opposition to it was so strong that the council adjourned without promulgating any dogma whatever upon the church, although the Protestants' theory of the church was their chief heresy in the eyes of the Catholics. The Society of Jesus stood consistently for papal absolutism, and scored its great triumph at the Vatican Council of 1870, when the dogma of papal infallibility, taught already by Thomas Aquinas and long widely believed among the faithful, was finally promulgated.

The Vatican decree runs in part as follows: "We teach and define that it is a dogma divinely revealed, that the Roman

pontiff, when he speaks *ex cathedra*, that is when in discharge of the office of pastor and doctor of all Christians, by virtue of his supreme apostolic authority, he defines a doctrine regarding faith or morals to be held by the universal Church, by the divine assistance promised to him in blessed Peter is possessed of that infallibility with which the divine Redeemer willed that his church should be endowed for defining doctrine regarding faith and morals; and that therefore such definitions of the Roman pontiff are of themselves irreformable and not because of the consent of the Church."

This is very explicit and thoroughgoing, and yet like most conciliar decisions it admits, or at any rate has received, a double interpretation. Tyrrell says: "The Council tells us that the infallibility of the Pope is not other than that which belongs to the whole Church. This may mean either that the Church is said to be infallible only because she possesses an infallible Pope . . . or it may mean that the Pope—like the Council—speaks *ex cathedra* and infallibly only when and so far as he truly represents and utters the general mind of the Church" (p. 86).

The former was undoubtedly the meaning of those who framed the decree and of the majority of the council in adopting it. But the latter, which has been the interpretation of many that have accepted the dogma, brings it more into line with the ancient conciliar theory which conceived the collective episcopate assembled in oecumenical council to be an infallible mouthpiece of divine truth. This was not repudiated but rather confirmed by the Vatican decree, which was itself a conciliar decree. And in view of the explicit declaration of the council, that "the Holy Spirit was not promised to the successors of Peter in order that by his revelation they might make known new doctrine," it cannot fairly be denied that the second interpretation is legitimate, even though it does not agree with the intention of the framers of the decree. It has not, indeed, hitherto been the interpretation of the Roman authorities under Pius IX, Leo XIII, and Pius X. On the contrary, the tendency has been all in the opposite, or ultramontane, direction,—to magnify more and more the authority of the Pope at the expense of the bishops. But it is entirely conceivable that the

other interpretation may ultimately prevail within the Roman Catholic church without leading to a repudiation or revision of the Vatican dogma. Any Pope may so interpret his own infallibility if he pleases. And even now, one who stands for this interpretation rather than for the ultramontane cannot fairly be accused of disloyalty and heresy, even though he suffer excommunication.

But this is not the only point at issue. If it were, the situation would be simple, and the modernists might well hope for ultimate victory. As a matter of fact the difference is far more fundamental. Tyrrell, for instance, goes further, and interprets the authority of the bishops as resting upon the authority of the people as a whole, the collective children of God. Thus he says: "What we really bow to is a Divine Tradition of which the entire Church, and not merely the episcopate, is the organ and depositary" (p. 54). "Tradition is the faith that lives in the whole Church and is handed down from generation to generation, of which the entire body, and not a mere handful of officials, is the depositary and organ of transmission. Of this rule and law the Holy Spirit diffused in the hearts of all the faithful is the author; the episcopate merely the servant, the witness, the interpreter" (pp. 55 f.)¹⁶.

Is this a correct reading of the Catholic principle of authority? To answer the question we have to go as far back as the second century. Over against the heretics of that period Irenaeus, Tertullian, and Hippolytus, commonly known as Old Catholic Fathers, set up a theory of external authority upon which the historic Catholic church was built. In primitive days dependence upon the Holy Spirit, present in the hearts of all believers, was commonly supposed to be adequate protection against false teaching and evil living, but the spread of gnosticism and kindred errors had convinced at any rate the theologians mentioned that something more definite and decisive was needed if the church were not to be completely overwhelmed and the simple faith of the gospel forever lost. In this emergency they appealed to the teaching of the apostles as perma-

¹⁶ Cf. Loisy, *The Gospel and the Church*, pp. 175 f.; and Williams, l. c. pp. 224 f., 290, 294, 304 f.

nently normative, and insisted that all would-be Christian truth must be tested by it. But where was the teaching of the apostles to be found? In answer to this question recourse was had to apostolic writings, which now came to be recognized as constituting an authoritative Biblical canon, and to apostolic rules of faith, in which it was claimed that the essential features of the teaching of the apostles were summarized for the use of the church. But neither of these standards proved adequate to the emergency. The apostolic writings were susceptible of diverse interpretations, and for the current rules of faith there was no sufficient guarantee of apostolic authorship. In this situation Irenaeus took his stand upon the doctrine of the authority of the bishops as successors of the apostles. They were in possession of a divine charisma, received from the apostles, which enabled them to transmit and interpret apostolic truth. To them recourse was to be had in all cases of dispute. They and they alone were in a position to determine beyond question the mind and will of the apostles. The very essence of this theory of episcopal authority was that it erected a standard external to the Christian populace in general. To cut off the appeal either to the individual or the common Christian consciousness was what Irenaeus was concerned to do. It was not the divergence of individual gnostics from the universal sentiment of the church that made the trouble, but the divergence of multitudes and the formation of sects, in some cases approximately as large as the Catholic churches themselves. It was not common consent that Irenaeus appealed to, the appeal would have been futile and ineffective, but episcopal authority. Because the bishops were in this matter independent of their flocks and in direct connection with the apostles, they could declare in a final and authoritative manner, and if necessary against all other Christians, the will and truth of God.

Side by side with this theory of episcopal authority was growing the notion of the church as an institution offering to men through the sacraments the divine grace needed to transform their fallen and corrupt natures and make them heirs of eternal life. Apostolic succession, involving the transmission to the bishops of the grace necessary to enable them to mediate apos-

tolic truth, had been emphasized in the conflict with the heretics. It came now to be believed that the power of communicating the grace necessary for salvation had also been intrusted to them. According to Cyprian, who states the theory most clearly, the divine grace without which no one can be saved is in the hands of the bishops alone, and only they themselves or those whom they have empowered thereto can mediate this grace to others. Inasmuch as the church is the saving institution which supplies this needed grace to fallen and lost humanity, the bishops are themselves the church. The church is not the multitude of Christian people, or of followers of Jesus Christ; it is an organization providing them with salvation. The power which enables the bishop to mediate saving grace to men comes not from the people whose ruler he is, but from the apostles whose successor he is. And similarly the power to utter and interpret apostolic truth comes not from the people but from the apostles. This independence of the clergy over against the laity is of the very essence of the historic Catholic conception of the church. The steps by which it attained to universal recognition cannot be traced here. The process indeed is not wholly clear, but the fact is abundantly evident. The only guarantee of the possession by the church of saving grace and of apostolic truth has been recognized throughout all the centuries from the third to the twentieth to lie in the connection of its episcopate with the apostolate. To make this connection depend in any way upon the will of the laity, to make the laity in any way the medium or instrument by which grace is conveyed either for the one or the other purpose, is to overturn Catholicism completely, Greek as well as Roman. It is just at this point that Luther took sharp issue with the Catholic church of his day. The right of private judgment was but an incident, and to make that the whole of Protestantism is to misunderstand the situation. Back of and beneath that was the denial that the mediation of saving grace is confined to the clergy, and by consequence that they alone know the mind and will of God. The Reformers were condemned as heretics not because they repudiated this or that doctrine of the Catholic system, but because they struck at the very root of Catholicism in as-

serting the universal priesthood of believers and the direct access of every Christian to the fountain of divine grace and truth. The fundamental thing in Protestantism is not anti-collectivism but anti-sacerdotalism. To put oneself on the side of the laity against the hierarchy, to make the latter depend upon the former, to base the claim of the bishops to be the depositary of either saving grace or divine truth upon their relation to the people instead of upon their relation to the apostles is essential Protestantism.

Much, then, as we might wish that Tyrrell's interpretation of episcopal infallibility would find general acceptance within the Roman Catholic church, we cannot fail to see that it would mean the abandonment of an underlying principle of Catholicism which has controlled the Catholic church for more than sixteen centuries, and the adoption of a fundamental plank of Protestantism. This it is difficult to believe can happen.

But Tyrrell goes still further in the matter of authority, and claims that even the agreement of all Christian people, including popes and bishops, is not a guarantee of infallibility. In a private letter, the appearance of portions of which in an Italian journal led to his expulsion from the Society of Jesus, and which has since been published with an introduction and notes in a volume entitled *A Much-Abused Letter*, Tyrrell says: "It seems to me that a man might have great faith in the Church, in the people of God, in the unformulated ideas, sentiments, and tendencies at work in the great body of the faithful, and constituting the Christian and Catholic 'spirit'; and yet regard the Church's consciously formulated ideas and intentions about herself as more or less untrue to her deepest nature; that he might refuse to believe her own account of herself as against his instinctive conviction of her true character; that he might say to her: 'Nescitis cujus spiritus estis'—'You know not your own essential spirit'" (pp. 56 f.). And in the volume on *Medievalism* already quoted he says, "I ask myself whether a consensus in purely theological matters could ever possibly be more than that of a mere handful of experts; whether the general acquiescence of the crowd can have the slightest confirmatory value, any more than that of a class of schoolboys can be said

to confirm the teachings of their master" (pp. 81 f.). In other words, in the last analysis the religious experience of those truly Christian, and of those alone, is the only competent and adequate authority. "A general consensus of the faithful," he says, "can only obtain in regard to those matters where all may be experts; matters within the potential experience of each; matters which interest and affect their daily spiritual life—the life of Faith in virtue of which they are called 'the faithful.'" "If Faith were theology its problems could never be settled by general consensus. But because it is not theology, but the Gospel, because its object is that life of which Christ is the Divine Revelation, and not the analysis of that life, every believer may, as an expert, speak of his own personal response to the Gospel. Each is a judge of faith; and the agreement of all is an infallible judgment, eliminating private errors and idiosyncrasies" (p. 82).

Perhaps not all Protestants, but certainly many of them, would have no quarrel with such a statement as this. Its agreement indeed with the position of the great reformer Luther is very striking. In his Exposition of John 17 (Erlangen edition, vol. 50, p. 304) Luther says: "It is true that the Christian church cannot err. But listen, dear friend, and take notice what the true Christian church is. They, indeed, say that the Pope is the head of the church. Nevertheless they cannot deny that the Pope has erred dreadfully. But if the head has erred, the body easily follows. . . . But do you on the contrary say, 'Whoever cleaves to Christ cannot err; whoever does not must err even if he be more than a Pope.'" And what he means by not erring is made abundantly evident where he distinguishes, as he does over and over again, between theology and the fundamental truths of Christian experience. Where there are true Christians, there is a common and infallible knowledge of the forgiving love of God in Christ. This is in essence exactly the position of Tyrrell, though his interpretation of the central content of Christian truth may be different. Tyrrell's agreement with Luther is still more apparent in such passages as the following from his *Much-Abused Letter*: "After all, the visible Church (unlike the invisible) is but a means, a

way, a creature, to be used where it helps, to be left where it hinders. It is not the Kingdom of Heaven, but only its herald and servant" (p. 86). "Faith is not a sharing in the common creed of the visible Church, but in the common vision of the invisible Church which is, in a measure, that of God Himself" (p. 81).

This is true and beautiful, but it is at bottom Protestantism, not Catholicism, and in repudiating it the Catholic authorities are acting not in accordance with an uncompromising ultramontaniam but with the underlying principles of Catholicism as it has existed from the second century to the present day. It is true that the modernists do not stand alone among Catholics in their emphasis upon Christian experience as the ultimate source and standard of Christian truth. They have upon their side a long line of pious souls, commonly known as mystics, who have looked within rather than without for revelations of the divine. And the theory has always existed, even outside of mystical circles, that the truth taught by the church is harmonious with the individual experience of all true Christians, so that it can be assimilated and given a vital place in their religious life. The Catholic principle of authority therefore must not be interpreted too externally and mechanically, and if the Roman hierarchy and the Roman church at large shall be led to realize this more clearly than they do it will be a great victory for the modernists and a great gain for Catholicism everywhere. But it must be recognized that in the last analysis the authority not of individual believers or of the totality of believers but of the official ecclesiastical institution is on genuine Catholic principles supreme. If this has not always clearly appeared, it is because the personal experience of Catholic Christians has commonly fallen naturally into line with the Catholic tradition in which they were trained, and expressed itself easily in accepted religious formulae. When a divergence of any importance has appeared, the church has always, consistently with its age-long principle of authority, insisted upon conformity. Cardinal Mercier's words in his Lenten Pastoral of 1908 reproduce that principle roughly and mechanically, to be sure, but, on the whole, with substantial accuracy. "The Christian," he says, "is one who trusts the

teaching of the Church and accepts sincerely the doctrines she proposes for his belief. He who repudiates or questions her authority, and by consequence rejects one or more of the truths she compels him to believe, cuts himself off from the ecclesiastical community." "Catholicism says that the Christian Faith is communicated to the faithful by an official organ of transmission—the Catholic episcopate—and that it is based on the acceptance of the authority of that organ." "The Church, as a supernatural society, is essentially a positive and external institution, and must be accepted by its members as organized by her Divine Founder. It belongs to Christ Himself to dictate His will to us." "The bishops continue the apostles' mission. The faithful must hear them, believe their teaching, and obey them under pain of eternal damnation."¹⁷ This is not ultramontaniam, it is Catholicism, Greek and Roman. For the essence of Catholicism, as it has existed ever since the second century, in a true sense as it has existed ever since the Apostle Paul, is the conception of a salvation given from without. Man is radically bad and utterly helpless, and only as supernatural grace is bestowed upon him from above can he escape destruction and win eternal life. The idea of the Church as a saving institution external to its members and independent of them, and the idea of this external institution as authoritative in the religious sphere, were inevitable consequences. The modernists have repudiated this ancient, even apostolic, conception of salvation and have denominated it mediaevalism, though the Middle Ages inherited it from a much older past. It is therefore not to be wondered at that the principle of authority which was built upon it should also go by the board. The truth is that not the mediaeval church alone but the ancient church from Paul down stood under the dominance of a philosophy upon which modern men have generally turned their backs. Historic Protestantism is in this respect in much the same situation as historic Catholicism. In Protestantism, too, the old realistic views of philosophy and the old external and mechanical idea of revelation and of divine activity in general have commonly been in control. But there is this great difference

¹⁷ Quoted by Tyrrell, *Medievalism*, pp. 4, 7, 14, 15.

that at the very beginning Protestantism denied the traditional theory of the church as an institution external to and above its members, upon which they must depend for saving grace and truth. This was not all that should in consistency have been repudiated, and the old that was left remained to trouble Protestantism and to keep it bound to the past long after the new age had dawned. But the partial break, incomplete and in many respects ineffective as it was, has made other breaks easy, and modern Protestantism, unlike as it is to the older Protestantism, is yet not fundamentally untrue to it, while an equally modern Catholicism breaks with the Catholicism of all the past just at its most characteristic point.

Why, then, do the modernists remain Catholic? Why do they not withdraw from the Roman church and enter some Protestant communion? The Catholic authorities are continually accusing them of being Protestants at heart. Thus Cardinal Mercier traces the whole movement to Protestant influence, and declares that "in itself the idea, which first inspired many generous champions of Catholic apologetics and caused them to fall into Modernism, is at root identical with that Protestant individualism which is substituted for the Catholic conception of a teaching authority officially established by Jesus Christ, and commissioned to tell us what, under pain of eternal damnation, we are compelled to believe" (*ibid.*, p. 11).

Against the accusation of being an individualist Tyrrell strongly and justly protests in his reply to the Cardinal, and it is because he interprets Protestantism as the Cardinal does, as thoroughgoing individualism, that he finds it impossible to be a Protestant. He remains a Catholic because Catholicism means to him collectivity over against individualism, unity over against separatism, the social principle in religion over against the atomistic.¹⁸ Upon this he lays the greatest stress also in his *Much-Abused Letter*, coming back to it over and over again. Thus he says: "Communion with the visible Church, with those, namely, who *profess* to be Christ-like, is a great *desideratum*, is a condition of more fruitful communion with the invisible.

¹⁸ See also Loisy, *The Gospel and the Church*, p. 209; and Williams: Newman, Pascal, Loisy, and the Catholic Church, pp. 296 f.

For, besides the more obvious reasons which will occur to everyone, there is a depth, height, width, and fulness added to our inward life by our conscious and sympathetic association with a great world-wide cause or work such as that of Catholicism; something analogous to the spiritual expansion produced in us by an intelligent, self-sacrificing, and active participation in the life of our state or country. If God's cause on earth should be championed by each individual, it is certainly rational that, like other causes, it should be championed by a society; not merely by knights errant, but by an organized army. In the Catholic Church, God's cause on earth, the cause of Christianity, of Religion in its highest development, finds its visible embodiment and instrument" (p. 63).

This is doubtless the secret of many a modernist's remaining in the Roman Catholic communion, though he finds himself so completely out of sympathy with some of its principles and practices. But is this necessarily a distinguishing feature of Catholicism as contrasted with Protestantism? Is the latter inevitably individualistic, and is the kind of unity Tyrrell speaks of, unity of effort for the promotion of the cause of Christ, impossible to it? The modernists' criticisms of existing Protestant individualism are well taken. The history of Protestantism abundantly justifies their estimate of it, and, the situation being what it is, it is not strange that they should find it utterly uncongenial. But is the situation permanently necessary? It is to be noticed that the modernists are not seeking an external authority upon which they may throw themselves, and so find release from religious doubt and uncertainty. To those who feel this need Roman Catholicism offers what no other system can. This is the need which has driven many a troubled spirit into it from St. Augustine to John Henry Newman. But for fellowship in Christian life and work an institution like the Roman Catholic church is not indispensable. Its hierarchical principles and its external infallibility, which are of its very essence, are at best indifferent to such fellowship, at worst a hindrance and a bar, as the present situation abundantly shows.

What the modernists desire, and the desire is a noble one, is world-wide unity of purpose and of effort for the promotion

of the Kingdom of God on earth. As Tyrrell says, the mission of the church "is to impress upon every man the duty of living, not for himself, but for the common good, for the Kingdom of God, according to the opportunities of his station; to kindle in each that fire of self-devotion which Christ came to kindle upon earth; to stimulate faith, hope, and enthusiasm in the cause of an Ideal before whose immensity and remoteness the unaided spirit grows weary and discouraged. For without such faith and hope who could struggle for the reign of truth and justice upon earth?" (*Medievalism*, p. 74.)

This kind of unity, unity of purpose and of effort in a common cause, has laid hold also upon the imagination of many Protestants. The plans for organic church-unity which were so vigorously prosecuted in various quarters a few years ago, bear testimony to it perhaps only in part; but the many practical efforts at coöperation which we are to-day witnessing on every side are abundant proof of it. The extreme individualism and competition of an earlier day are giving way in religious work as in every other kind of work. It does not necessarily indicate a growing agreement in theological opinion, but it indicates the recognition that another kind of oneness is far more important, a oneness of purpose and of effort in labor for the good of humanity. Such oneness many Protestants believe is entirely possible on Protestant principles. Collectivism of this kind, they claim, is as truly Protestant as individualism. If without an infallible doctrinal authority which shall compel all Christians to a common faith it is impossible to unite them in effort for a common purpose, then such Protestants are wrong. But if, on the other hand, it is true that without the pressure of any such external authority men can be united in devotion to a common cause, and that such devotion will itself create all needed unity of faith, then Protestantism has its permanent justification and its lasting task. Whatever the modernists' actual attitude toward Protestantism may be, it is this latter alternative for which they stand. They, too, like many modern Protestants, believe that all needed unity of purpose and of effort may be attained without the pressure of an external authority and without such theological agreement as an external authority alone can dictate.

Another reason why modernists cling to Catholicism and find Protestantism so little to their liking is because they interpret Protestantism as teaching the absolute and permanent authority of the Scriptures, and so as preventing all real freedom and development in religious thought.¹⁹ They stand, over against this narrow and external interpretation of religious authority, for the rights of the religious experience of Christians of all ages. It is because Protestantism is too conservative and too authoritarian that they find themselves out of sympathy with it; Catholicism they believe is essentially progressive and modern in this matter. Their attitude is very instructive. It is identical with the attitude of many modern Protestants, of whom the great theologian Schleiermacher was the most eminent and influential. Indeed, the identity of interest and of emphasis at this point, as at many other points, between Schleiermacher and the Roman Catholic modernists is very striking. It is simply another indication of the oneness of spirit which largely controls modern men of all communions.

Still another aspect of Protestantism that makes it uncongenial to the modernists is its unhistorical character. It is divided from the larger part of the Christian world not only locally but temporally. In the Catholic church the Christian feels himself one not merely with a great company of his own day and generation but also with the saints of all the past.²⁰ Here, too, the modernists, like Catholics in general, exaggerate the isolation of Protestantism. Particularly with the revival of the historical spirit and interest in our own times there has grown up within Protestant circles a sense of solidarity with the Christianity of the ancient and middle ages such as our forefathers knew nothing of. And yet the difference is real, and the historic continuity of Catholicism, to which Catholics point as of the very essence of the system, is justly regarded as a possession of great value.

And, moreover, it must be admitted, and this is another fact of tremendous value which Catholics are justified in emphasizing, that hitherto Catholicism has conceived its task much more clearly and given itself to its accomplishment much more

¹⁹ Loisy, *Autour d'un petit livre*, pp. 205 f.

²⁰ Williams, *l. c.* p. 297.

consistently and unitedly than Protestantism. In the Middle Ages the Catholic church actually set before itself as an ideal the Kingdom of God on earth, and labored manfully for its realization. Its interpretation of the ideal may be criticised. A Kingdom such as it conceived, the dominance of the whole of life by the Roman Catholic church, may seem far from desirable; but at least it was a clear and consistent ideal. Protestantism, on the other hand, has never had any such single ideal, and it is chiefly because of this that its history has been one of controversy, division, and disunion. It is not to be wondered at that the modernists should see in the Roman Catholic church a power for the promotion of the Kingdom of God on earth incomparably superior to any or all of the Protestant sects. The genius of Catholicism is union and coöperation, a common purpose and common labor for its accomplishment. This has been its great strength in the past and continues to be its great strength in the present. This is above all the reason why it binds even the most radical of modernists so closely to itself.

But it is equally the genius of Catholicism to hinge eternal salvation upon dependence on an external institution and submission to its authority. The modernists would separate the one from the other. They would interpret Catholicism as unity but not as authority. If the word Catholic be taken by itself, of course their interpretation is justified. But from the second century down to the present it has had both meanings, and the Roman Catholic church is built even more definitely and explicitly upon the second than upon the first. It may at times have ceased to be a union of all Christians and have gathered into one communion but a pitiful minority. But it remained always, however small in numbers, the one divine institution endowed with saving grace and infallible truth, dependence upon which and submission to which were necessary to salvation.

It is an ideal Catholicism of which the modernists are dreaming—a Catholicism which antedates not only the Middle Ages but the age of the Fathers as well, and carries us back even beyond the Apostle Paul to Jesus himself, just where so many modern Protestants are seeking their Christianity. Whether

one shall call it Catholicism or simply Christianity is perhaps of minor importance. In any case it is neither the Catholicism nor the Protestantism of the past. It is something essentially modern. There are those, both Catholic modernists and Protestant liberals, who believe that it is the Christianity of Christ, and there, if they are indeed right in that belief, lies the great promise for the future—the promise of a wider unity and a more general coöperation than have yet been known, and so of the speedier and better accomplishment of the common task.

PANBABYLONIANISM

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In the year 1794 Charles François Dupuis brought out his *Origine de tous les cultes, ou religion universelle*, a work that made a great stir in its day. His object, he explains, was not to express his own religious views, but simply to describe the opinions of the ancients.¹ The religion of antiquity he represents as the recognition of the divinity of the universe, the heavenly bodies playing the chief rôle; all ancient cosmogonies, with heaven and earth, all the apparatus of religion (ritual, processions, images), and all myths were derived from sun, moon, planets, and constellations. The beast-forms and plant-forms of the Egyptian deities, for example, were copied from the constellations into which men had divided the starry sky; the zodiac was associated with the sun as a cause of mundane phenomena, and the division of the sky into twelve parts gave vogue and sacredness to the number twelve among Egyptians, Hebrews, and Greeks; the sun was the chief god—it was called the right eye of the world, and the moon the left eye; from the victory of the sun over darkness and winter sprang the idea of a Restorer of the world, a Saviour. He remarks also that the ancient Chaldeans were distinguished for their achievements in astronomy, and that from them the knowledge of these sciences was carried to the West.² They taught that the heavenly bodies controlled mundane destinies, and, according to Diodorus, that the planets were the interpreters of the will of the gods.

Dupuis's description thus involves the two points that in the ancient world there was a single religion, and that the ideas and

¹ He drew his material from all the sources available in his day—from Chaeremon, Plutarch, and Macrobius, from Athanasius Kircher, Contant d'Orville, and others; he cites Anquetil's translation of the Avesta, but does not mention Sanskrit.

² He regards Egypt, however, as the leader of ancient civilization.

forms of this religion were all taken from nature and particularly from the heavenly bodies. A revised edition of his work appeared in 1834, but not long after this date fresh discoveries turned the attention of scholars to other points in religious history, and Dupuis was almost forgotten. The study of Sanskrit revived the pursuit of solar myths, an investigation that held supremacy for a time and then gave way to the attempt to find the origin of myths in the conditions of savage life. In all these inquiries was visible the purpose to discover unity in the religions of antiquity.

It was not unnatural that fresh attempts to establish such unity should be suggested by the recent great enlargements of our knowledge of the religions of Egypt and Babylonia. In the learned world these two lands became rival claimants for the position of leadership, and in particular the origin of Old Testament customs and ideas was often referred to one or the other of them. We are not concerned here to follow the arguments of the rival schools, but we may note the work of Eduard Stucken, which paved the way for a serious attempt in our own day to make Babylonia a prime centre of all ancient religious thought.³ In the title of his volumes he announced a study of the astral myths of the Hebrews, the Babylonians, and the Egyptians,⁴ but his comparisons include India, Persia, Greece, China, Japan, Finland, the Slavic and Teutonic peoples, Polynesia, and America. In the course of his investigation he came to the conclusion that all sagas of all peoples go back to the creation-myth (p. 190), which passed, not in its original form but with local variations, to all lands. He adds—and this is a characteristic feature of his theory—that it was not the individual forms or types of sagas that thus migrated, but the motifs; a type, he says, is variable, a motif is often wonderfully persistent. In a given story, which appears in many places, the central personage may be man or woman, friend or enemy, while the kernel of the story remains

³ A similar attempt at unification is Professor Jensen's derivation of all ancient myths from the Babylonian Gilgamesh story.

⁴ *Astralmythen der Hebræer, Babylonier und Aegypter*. The five parts, devoted respectively to Abraham, Lot, Esau, Jacob, Moses, appeared 1896–1907.

unchanged. He seeks, therefore, to identify situations rather than persons, and so far as this point is concerned he is right. He is convinced that similarities in myths, however far apart in space their loci, are to be explained only as due to transmission; he denies the possibility of independent origination in various places. In proof of his identifications he offers only collocation of stories, whence the identity, he holds, is obvious. The narratives concerning Abraham, for example, are traced by him to two Babylonian myths, the Etana saga and the descent of Ishtar to the underworld. In the former he recognizes four motifs: that of the wild ox (the snake, complaining of the eagle to the sun-god, is advised to hide in the carcass of a wild ox to which the eagle will fly down); that of the plant of delivery (Etana asks for the plant to assist his wife's delivery); the "see, my friend" motif (to Etana, carried up to heaven by the eagle, the earth far below looks like a garden); the fourth motif is too obscure to be usable. The analogies with the material in Genesis are the following: to Lot (Gen. 13) the Jordan valley looks like the garden of Yahweh; Sarai is sterile; in Gen. 15 birds of prey come down on carcasses; compare the sterility of Samson's mother, and the carcass of the lion in Judg. 14. Light, he adds, is thrown also on Deut. 32 11-13 and Isa. 14 12-14. Passing now to Ishtar, the rôle of the goddess is taken by Sarai, by Rebecca, and by Tamar: Sarai's descent into Egypt, like Ishtar's descent into the underworld, is followed by sterility; Rebecca and Tamar, like Ishtar, receive jewels and other adornments; Tamar, like Ishtar, is fatal to her lovers. Other comparisons are produced to show that Abraham, who is Tammuz-Adonis (that is, the spouse of Sarai-Ishtar), corresponds to Osiris-Orion; it is added that the identity of Samson with Orion is obvious. The other Biblical figures are treated in the same way. Their histories are held to embody motifs found all over the world and derived from the heavenly bodies; the histories are mythical in form, but Stucken does not say whether or not he regards Abraham and the rest as historical characters. He has in common with Dupuis the view of the unity of ancient religion and the theory of the astral origin of myths, but he treats the latter point at greater length, and, as is remarked above, defines

myths by their motifs. Apart from his theory his collection of mythical material is interesting.

Stucken's work attracted the attention of Hugo Winckler (whose pupil Stucken was) and its main features were adopted by him. In Winckler's hands, however, the investigation has received wider scope and a more definite theoretical form; "pan-babylonianism" he represents as a system of thought with its rules and methods universally known and applied to the treatment of history. His positions have been adopted (with the exception of a few minor points) by the Lutheran pastor Alfred Jeremias, who has applied it in detail to the early Hebrew religion. Jeremias prefers to treat the material under the designation "ancient Oriental lore" instead of "panbabylonianism"; the reasons for this change will appear below.

The theory, as elaborated by Winckler and Jeremias, may be stated as follows: In the ancient Oriental world there existed one conception of the world, that is to say, one religion, which, having its roots in the beginnings of human society, had been developed through many generations till it appears fully formed in the great civilizations. Essentially one (Winckler calls it "the system"), it took different shapes in different lands, expressing the fundamental ideas under forms determined by the conditions of the various nations. Examination of most ancient religions, it is said, reveals the fact that the astral content of their myths is not in accord with their general grade of culture, their forms of worship, and their conceptions of gods and of the world. It follows that their astral lore was borrowed, and its source must have been Babylonia. For it was in Babylonia that the universal system found its closest expression, and for this reason it may be called "panbabylonianism." It was an astral system: it conceived that the starry sky was the revelation of the will of the gods, the book in which their designs were written; the stars were regarded not as gods but as the abodes and manifestations of gods. Babylonia was the home of astronomy and astrology, the centre, therefore, of this ancient religion. It was in Babylonia that the observation of the heavenly bodies was most carefully carried on and its results formulated with most precision; and in historical times the scientific Babylonian astronomy passed

to other countries, and the Babylonian religious ideas became predominant—that is to say, Babylon became the expounder of the one great Oriental system of the world.⁵ This system sought to explain the origin of things, to trace the history of the world from its emergence out of a chaos to its present form and into the future to the time of renewal. It is identical with religion, has the form of latent monotheism, and is characterized by the expectation of a saviour of divine origin, who in the course of the aeons will overcome the powers of darkness. There are indications that the diffusion of this system through the entire world occurred in the Taurus period, which began with the time of Sargon I and Naramsin, about 3000 B.C.

The theory thus assumes the existence, in historical times, of a well-defined "system," astral in character, prevalent in all the great nations, the basis and explanation of all the religious ideas and customs of the ancient world. It is admitted by the expounders of the theory that certain customs attach themselves to mundane phenomena (darkness and light, heat and cold, summer and winter, sowing and reaping), particularly in the Canaanite communities, but these phenomena, it is held, are regarded as dependent on astral conditions. In this scheme there is an obvious element of truth. The initial assumption of similarity among the ancient religions has long been recognized as borne out by investigation. Customs (such as festivals, sacrifices, prayers), apparatus of worship (priests and temples), spirits and deities, myths and legends, are everywhere constructed after the same pattern. The modes of approaching and propitiating the supernatural powers are copied from the modes of approaching human potentates, and the divine powers themselves are endowed with the intellectual and moral qualities of their worshippers; and as men are everywhere psychologically the same, and their general social organization is the same, therefore their religious conceptions do not differ materially. This identity exists not only in the religions of civilized peoples, but also in savage communities; here, too, it results from

⁵ "Babylon" is taken by Jeremias to mean the historical Semitic civilization of the Euphrates valley, without reference to the question whether or not it was preceded and influenced by a non-semitic (Sumerian) civilization.

the sameness of human organization, which arises from the psychological unity of the human race. In this sense it may be said that there was only one religion in the ancient world.

It is also generally recognized that the heavenly bodies have played a great part in religious life. With the exception of certain of the lowest tribes that regard them merely as curious facts to be accounted for, the mass of peoples have looked on these bodies either as gods or as the abodes of gods; revered as in themselves powerful or as the seats of powerful beings, they have been held to stand in some relation to human life. Unusual occurrences and appearances in the sky (notably eclipses and comets) have been regarded as signs of some disturbance among the gods or of anger on their part. Such things were matters of common observation, and it was inevitable that explanations of them should be worked out. Astronomical observations began early in the history of man, and have been carried on continuously to the present time. Explanations of astral phenomena at first took the form of imaginary stories, and later were merely records of fact. It is doubtless true, as Winckler says, that Babylonia was the home of what may be called the scientific astronomy of the ancients down to the time when the East succumbed to the West; the developed astronomical systems of India and China (and later of the Moslems) appear to have been derived from the Babylonian. How it came to pass that this study was especially pursued in Babylonia it may not be possible to explain, nor is an explanation necessary for the purposes of the panbabylonian theory; it is enough that such was the fact. Astrology naturally followed the fortunes of astronomy; the formulated interpretation of astral phenomena was dependent on an exact knowledge of them.

So far the theory under consideration does not differ from the commonly received view. But, starting from the facts mentioned above—the similarity of the ancient religions and the religious importance of the heavenly bodies, its authors go on to affirm that all religious myths and customs are related to astral phenomena. They begin with some relatively simple propositions. Religion and the conception of the world, it is said, are for the

ancient Oriental one. The gods, who govern the world, are held to incarnate and reveal themselves chiefly in the stars, which thus become the book in which all human history may be read. Necessarily there is harmony in the world; the same law governs heaven and earth; every earthly place has its correspondent in heaven.

In these propositions, again, we have to recognize an element of truth, but also an extreme of generalization that may be misleading. Religion, in its content of thought and custom, may be said to be identical with the conception of the world, provided this conception includes the whole of the world and all that is involved in the relation between the human and the divine. In the earliest form of religion, says Jeremias, are found these three elements: a tendency toward monotheism, the belief in the control of man by gods, and the belief in continued existence after death. Without pausing to inquire into the precise nature of these early conceptions, which would carry us too far, we may accept the general statement that in fact, not only for the Oriental but also for all others, religion was coextensive with the theory of the world. But there is no evidence that these fundamental convictions were connected especially with astral phenomena, and in fact both Winckler and Jeremias confine themselves to the attempt to demonstrate astral influence in the formation of myths and in the external organization of religion. The other proposition stated above, that heaven is a copy of earth, embodies a very old conception. All savage tribes regard the arrangements in the sky as similar to those on earth: the landscape in the other world is like that of this world; the gods have their family life, their places of abode, and their occupation, like those of men; no other scheme is or has been conceivable to men not scientifically trained; the framework of religion has always been anthropocentric and anthropomorphic.

According to Winckler, as is observed above, the "one religion" of the ancient world had its roots in the beginning of human society; it was in the prehistoric period that the germs were planted whence later sprang the developed cults of ancient life. If this be so (and it amounts simply to saying that all early communities had religious conceptions), then there is no need of the

supposition of borrowing. Every people, possessing certain fundamental ideas, would work them out in accordance with its gifts and surroundings, and there would result a general substantial unity with local differences, just such a picture as we actually have in the ancient world. Jeremias, however, apparently aware of this difficulty, lays stress on the assertion that the borrowing contemplated by astralism has reference to the great civilized nations only. In this case it is incumbent on him to show that not only the astronomical and astrological systems of the outlying nation, but also their mythologies and their dominant religious customs and ideas, were taken from Babylonia; and this is nowhere shown. Stucken maintains a thorough-going theory of borrowing.⁶ He sets aside lightly the difficulty of supposing that there has been a transmission of ideas to remote savage regions; "we will be bold enough," he declares, "to affirm distinctly that myths have migrated not over a limited district only but over the whole earth." Here again, without affirming or denying, we ask for proof. The general conclusion from recent decisions of migration of myths is that when a myth may be explained naturally as arising from local conditions, it is to be regarded as native unless there is documentary evidence to the contrary. Borrowing may be inferred when similarities are too minute and numerous to admit of independent origination.

In proof of his astral scheme Winckler cites the sacredness of certain numbers. Number, he says,⁷ like every phenomenon of the material and spiritual world, is (in the Oriental view) an outflow of divine activity, and therefore prescribed in heaven and thence transferred to earth, and the doctrine of numbers, mathematics, likewise is a part of the science revealed in the heavens and communicated to humanity by a divinely directed tradition; but the preference for certain numbers is not original; it is a survival or relic of the "ancient Oriental lore," which teaches the sacredness of all numbers, and finds them in the heavens and in the organization of the universe; the choice of a particular number by a people depends on the local and temporal conditions of the people; no number has in itself any claim to sacredness,

⁶ *Astralmythen*, pp. 189 f.

⁷ *Himmels- und Weltenbild der Babylonier*, pp. 13 ff.

for the existence of "sacred" numbers is not due to any superstitious idea, but goes back to the old Babylonian science of the division of the heavens; and where a number, not appearing as sacred in Babylonian texts, is sacred in some other country (as nine among the Persians, Scandinavians, Romans, and Arabians), this country, nevertheless, has borrowed it from Babylonia, it has not arisen from universal human views or feelings. So far Winckler, whose contention that no number is in itself sacred may be accepted as obviously true. But whether, or how far, the recognition of sacred numbers in general and of our sacred numbers in particular is due to ancient Oriental lore as expounded in Babylonia is not clear. Certain standard numbers are connected with astronomical observation. Twelve, the number of new moons in the year, appears as a round number among the Israelites and the Greeks; it comes from simple observation and may have been widely employed, but it might easily have been adopted independently by different communities, and does not necessarily imply the existence of an Oriental "system."

The seven-day week has often been referred to the number of the moving heavenly bodies (sun, moon, and five planets); but this is by no means clear, since a substantial division of the month into four parts is found in communities (for example, the Hawaiians) who cannot be shown to have had any relation with Babylonia, or any astronomical knowledge beyond that derived from the simplest observation. The year and the day are fixed by the sun, the month is fixed by the moon; the number of months in the year by the sun and moon, and the moon's phases give about four seven-day weeks. All this calls for no great astronomical knowledge. The derivation of the five-standard from man's five fingers (and of the decimal system from twice five) seems to the panbabylonianists incompatible with the dignity of astronomy and religion—but why not accept as a wonderful thing the development of human science from crude observations to broad and organized knowledge? The origin of the Babylonian sexagesimal system, which has been so widely adopted, is doubtful. The simplest explanation would be that the number sixty was obtained by doubling the number of days in the month, and was adopted because of its convenience; it

contained the numbers three, four, five, ten, and twelve, but lent itself readily to arithmetical computations. However, it was not properly a sacred number, and does not concern us here. As for the number three, it is involved in so many natural human relations and ideas (beginning, middle, end; father, mother, child; sky, earth, sea, etc.) that its employment in religious construction calls for no astronomical explanation; and in regard to the panbabylonian theory it is to be observed that this number is more prominent and important in the Egyptian theistic system than in the Babylonian. Further, all these numbers appear to have been originally used for convenience in reckoning time and in other computations; that is, they were at first secular, and became religious or sacred only when they were brought into connection with religious ideas. Thus the number twelve, which had at first merely a chronological and astronomical significance (the months of the year, the signs of the zodiac), was at a relatively late period, in the time of literary construction, adopted by the Israelites as the number of their tribes (and the number of the sons of Jacob), though as a matter of fact this number cannot be made out from the Israelite history. The number seven becomes religiously prominent only in the later Biblical writings (the seven-branched candelabrum, the seventy years of exile, the seven times seven of the year of jubilee, the seventy year-weeks of Daniel, the seven lamps and the seven seals of the New Testament Apocalypse).⁸ The same thing is true of the number four, which is given by the natural directions in space. Religious ideas were formed from ordinary human thought, independently of numbers, and these latter were incorporated in the systems in periods of scientific construction.

The great religious festivals of the ancient civilized world are arranged with reference to the seasons, including the beginning of the month and the beginning of the year; a few in relatively late times, like the Jewish feast of dedication, commemorate events in national history, those of the earlier time relate to the ordinary social life. The festivals of spring, summer,

⁸ The Zoroastrian septad appears in the Avesta and may be very early; it is, however, not $2+5$ (sun, moon, and five planets), but $1+6$, which is not an astral combination.

autumn, and winter correspond to the most important agricultural periods, and also to important positions of the sun; the festivals of new moon and new year depend on positions of the moon and the sun. Omitting these last (which are based on simple observations requiring no scientific knowledge and no borrowing from Babylonia or other place), we have the two familiar explanations of origin, the astral and the agricultural. The arguments for the latter are given in many recent works, as those of Tylor, Frazer, and others, and cannot be detailed here; the arguments for the former are given in the various expositions of the general astral theory. As there are no explanations of the origin of customs in the records of remote antiquity preserved to us, we are dependent, for a solution of the question at issue, on the indications furnished by a comparison of usages the world over, including the customs of the earliest stages of civilization. A certain relation to the seasons is so clearly visible in many festivals (in Palestine, Rome, China, and elsewhere) that it is recognized by advocates of the astral theory, with the remark that the seasons are dependent on the heavenly bodies, to whose movements the origin of these observances must go back, though their astral origin may be forgotten by the peoples who still maintain the festivals. In many cases, as is remarked above, the astral and agricultural motives exist together in civilized times. The midwinter festival commemorates the lowest heating-power of the sun and also the productive decline or the deadness of the soil. The mythical representation of this fact is the descent of a deity (as Tammuz or Proserpine) to the lower world, and the deity is now variously interpreted as representing the sun or the spirit of vegetation. It is the latter character that is indicated by the simplest winter festivals with which we are acquainted, those, namely, that have survived in European popular customs;⁹ here the conception is mundane, and the spirit may easily be regarded as the kernel or forerunner of the developed god. The conception of the astral character of the winter situation is later in the progress of thought. This posteriority is involved in the account of Tammuz¹⁰ given by Jeremias.

⁹ Described by Mannhardt and Frazer.

¹⁰ *Das Alte Testament im Lichte des Alten Orients*, 1904, pp. 114 ff.

"Tammuz," he says, "stands for the double life of nature (Marduk and Nebo) . . . he represents the revolution of nature, sinking into the underworld and rising to new life, and as such he may bear the character of sun, moon, or Venus (Attar, Lucifer, Phosphoros), combining with this also the phenomena of Marduk (the light half) and Nebo (the dark half), or, more exactly, of Ninib and Nergal." This portraiture of the elastic Tammuz as the representative of the course of nature suggests that the god was originally not astral but agricultural, and therefore that his essential character was formed prior to the rise of Babylonian astronomy. What is true of Tammuz may be said also of Osiris. To those two gods correspond the goddesses Ishtar and Isis. In the complete myth each of these couples (the male deity and the female) sets forth the decline and restoration of the world of nature; and in the Babylonian poem, "the Descent of Ishtar to the Underworld," the consequences of the withdrawal of the goddess from the upper world go beyond crops and winter cold and include the marriage-relation and the perpetuation of human beings and the lower animals—a fact that is satisfactorily explained by the character of the goddess as the patron of fertility.

A point in ancient religion not discussed by Winckler and Jeremias is the recognition of unlucky days and seasons—days and seasons on which it was unfortunate and forbidden to engage in certain ordinary occupations. Some lists of such days are given in Babylonian and Egyptian documents.¹¹ The developed theory was that for some reason the supernatural powers were angry or unfavorable during these periods, and that therefore it was the part of prudence to refrain from work at such times. They were essentially periods of restriction. The origin of many of them lies far back in prehistoric times, so that it is not now possible to explain with certainty the conditions under which a particular day was set apart as taboo. But some late instances may give a clue to the beginnings of the custom. In Hawaii the ground was economic; it was forbidden to catch certain fish

¹¹ For the Babylonian see Jastrow, *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, pp. 373 ff.; for the Egyptian, Maspero, *Études égyptiennes*, i. pp. 23 ff., Wiedemann, *Religion of the Ancient Egyptians*, chap. 10.

at certain times; the motive is the same as in the modern restrictions on hunting and fishing. In Borneo also there is an economic reason for restriction; work in harvesting is regulated by law, and on certain days is unlawful. Other grounds doubtless existed in other cases, as, for example, the fact that a great calamity had occurred on a certain day. The known cases suggest that the reasons determining this sort of legislation were generally mundane; there is no ground for supposing that they were connected with a theory of the heavenly bodies further than the primitive observation of the relation between the agricultural seasons and the sun, and the widely diffused belief in the influence of the moon on vegetable and animal life. This latter belief appears to be a generalization from some supposed experience. The moon does not figure in the myths that relate to the decay and revival of vegetation. The supposed relation between her waxing and waning and vital laws may well be considered to be a naïve fancy, and her connection with lunacy may have been originally hygienic in origin. In any case no astral theory is here visible. The seventh-day sabbath was doubtless originally connected with the moon's phases, but only as a result of primitive unscientific observation.¹² It represents an organization of taboo periods. Such periods (as appears in the Egyptian scheme) were at one time scattered throughout the month; convenience, probably, suggested their consolidation, as in New England the various fast-days (originally times of restriction or taboo) were consolidated in one day. The method of consolidation naturally followed the division of the month by the phases of the moon into four parts. In Hawaii there were four periods of restriction in every month. In Yoruba there is a monthly day of rest, that is, of cessation from work. In a Babylonian inscription there is a trace, in one of the months, of a seven-day recurrence of prohibition of certain occupations. The Israelite advance in organization consisted in making every seventh day a period of abstinence from ordinary work, counting the days continuously without reference to the moon;¹³ the

¹² See my article in *Journal of Biblical Literature*, vol. xviii, 1899, pp. 190 ff.

¹³ But new-moon was a day of abstinence, and the number seven appears in the sabbatical year and the year of jubilee; in these the motives were economic.

word sabbath means simply 'cessation' from work. This characteristic feature of the day is not explained by the theory of astral origin.

When certain numbers, as three, four, seven, twelve, came to be prominent and familiar, they would naturally be employed in late historical and theological constructions and in literary representations. The Babylonian and Egyptian divine triads do not appear as cultic unities in the earliest times. In both countries the collocations of gods at the leading religious centres were of various kinds, and seem to have arisen from political and social unions; a community would adopt all the deities worshipped in its constituent parts, and thus pantheons would be formed. In Assyrian royal inscriptions twelve great gods are commonly invoked; a divine triad rarely appears in Babylonian or Assyrian inscriptions; the Egyptian triadic and enneadic constructions are more definite.¹⁴ These combinations arise naturally out of the social conditions. Anu, Bel, and Ea may represent sky, earth, and sea, but these characters do not involve scientific astral origins; and the same thing is to be said of Ra, Amon, Thoth, Osiris, and other Egyptian gods. Early Babylonian poems deal with seven spirits, and very late Jewish works recognize seven heavens; in the representation there is nothing that betrays great astronomical knowledge. Psalm 139 refers to the four points of the compass, and Ezekiel's great vision describes four throne-bearers, each with four faces, but neither in the Old Testament nor elsewhere is there any hint that this number is derived from the four "critical points," the two highest and the two lowest, of the moon and sun.¹⁵

The advocates of the panbabylonian theory reject with scorn the supposition of fetichistic and totemistic elements in the development of divine personalities. The gods, they hold, together with their emblems, represent heavenly bodies or the natural phenomena that are dependent on these: the Egyptian

¹⁴ Erman, *Handbook of the Egyptian Religion*, p. 27; Maspero, in *Revue de l'histoire de religions*, 1892; Wiedemann, *Religion of the Ancient Egyptians*, chap. 5.

¹⁵ *Jeremias, Das Alte Testament*, pp. 24 ff.

divine beast-forms are derived from the constellations;¹⁶ the frog and the tortoise represent respectively the male and the female procreative power; "the scarabaeus, according to the Oriental conception, is the representative of the underworld, and thus is the world-bearer, for out of the underworld the worlds arise. Dung is the element of the underworld. The view that the ball in which the beetle lays its egg and which it pushes along was the disc of the sun was a secondary fancy."¹⁷ The question of the origin of gods is too large a one to be discussed here, and a discussion is the less called for because the arguments for the astral origin of the ancient theistic system recently offered are of a vague character; it is presumed that the astronomical facts stated carry with them the demonstration of the theory. Two obvious remarks may be made on the lines of argument of Winckler and Jeremias. The first is that, though they regard astralism as having begun early and passed through a continuous development, they make no serious attempt to define the origin and nature of early theistic conceptions. Jeremias observes¹⁸ that the interest shown in the starry sky by uncivilized peoples is well known, and he cites a couple of recent articles on American mythology; he adds that our knowledge of such peoples is fragmentary, and that it is possible that they have forgotten the astral foundation of their myths and have come to lay the stress on the natural phenomena that are dependent on the heavenly bodies. But—with all respect be it said—this sort of argumentation is a begging of the question. The panbabylonianists cannot afford to neglect early religious history. The second remark—a corollary to the first—is that incidentally and unavoidably they do often assume that natural phenomena have influenced theistic thought. This influence they pass lightly over as something whose basis is astral; but, from the point of view of scientific investigation, it behooves them at least to try to draw the line between astral

¹⁶ Jeremias (op. cit. p. 92, n. 2) remarks that the question why the constellations were given beast-forms belongs to prehistoric times. It might have been well for him to look into this question. Compare Dupuis, *Origine*, i, pp. 117, 131.

¹⁷ Jeremias, *Die Panbabylonisten*, p. 32, n. 2.

¹⁸ *Die Panbabylonisten*, pp. 16 f., 10 f.

and mundane facts, and to show why and how the former in so many cases have, as they hold, been ousted by the latter.

The theory under consideration lays great stress on the relation of secular Periods or Ages to the ancient conception of history. These Ages, which are often named from metals, are determined, it is said, by the position of the equinoctial point in the zodiac, and come in the chronological order: Gemini, Taurus, Aries. They are identified also with the three ruling bodies of the zodiac, the moon, the sun, and Venus, and are named in the order silver, gold, copper, when the moon has precedence, and in the order gold, silver, copper, when the sun has precedence. "The golden age is naturally that of the bright sun; the Romans called it the age of Saturn. This was because the rôle of Saturn was similar to that of the sun."¹⁹ The existing age is that of iron, the astral origin of which is doubtful. The change of astral ages is held to be set forth in various myths; especially at the beginning of any age stands a prominent man having the traits of the astral deity who corresponds to this beginning. As examples Jeremias²⁰ mentions for the Taurus age, with the motif of mysterious origin, Sargon I, Moses, Buddha, Zarathustra, corresponding to the Marduk-Osiris myth; for the Gemini age, Romulus, Cyrus; the Aries motif appears in Alexander, who had himself painted by Apelles as Jupiter. Sargon II, Sennacherib, and other Assyrian and Babylonian kings love to represent themselves as the initiators of a new age, and so prophets, as Elijah and Elisha, are depicted.

So far the theory of Ages, which contains much that is obvious, but also something new. It is true that a great man represents a turn in human history, and, conversely, that a fresh historical departure is commonly the work of a great man or of a group of great men. Around such persons in the course of time legends and myths are likely to gather, and this legendary and mythical material is not invented, but springs naturally out of the ideas of the time in which it originates. All commu-

¹⁹ The gods show great facility in changing their relations to the heavenly bodies; thus Marduk may be the sun or the moon or Jupiter, as the exigencies of the case may require.

²⁰ *Das Alte Testament*, p. 71.

nities like to invest their founders with mystery and wonderfulness. Exactly how the legend of Sargon I arose, the documents do not inform us, but it required no great effort of imagination to conceive that a child was exposed, rescued, and brought up, and became a great king. Such revolutions of fortune were not uncommon in the ancient world. It seems unnecessary to trace the legend to the Taurus equinoctial point and the god Marduk, and there is the further difficulty that it does not appear in the adventures of Marduk, so far as these are now known; "but," says Jeremias, "it was certainly there," his ground being that the general motif is found in the Osiris myth, which is identical with the Marduk myth—the very question at issue. So also Romulus and Remus are twins, and Cyrus and Cambyeses, and Harmodius and Aristogeiton, form couples, but for the assertion that their stories arose under the influence of Gemini we desiderate more definite evidence than this fact. Alexander may possibly have taken himself seriously as Jupiter-Amon, but it is equally possible that he accepted the name as an honorary title, or as a compliment to the Egyptians.

The division of the world's history into periods may be explained by man's natural tendency to organize life, by the disposition to distinguish times by their relation to some great personage or some astral or mundane event, and by vague recollections or traditions of the past.²¹ What is not proved is the assertion that the great Ages in the Oriental system were determined by the position of the equinoctial point—follow, that is, the precession of the equinoxes. It is true that secular "ages" were recognized by various ancient peoples, Egyptians, Hindus, Persians, Greeks, Romans—determined sometimes by astronomical observation (as, for example, the Egyptian Sothis-period of 1460 years, the cycle of the heliacal rising of Sothis or Sirius), sometimes by millenniums, taking the number one thousand simply as a convenient round number, as in India and Persia. The gigantic Indian scheme of a succession of cycles, each of 12,000

²¹ Thus we have the ages of Abraham, Confucius, and Pericles, the Augustan, Elizabethan, and Victorian ages, the period of the Reformation, the Romantic period, and the like, and we speak of the "golden age" of some history or movement.

years, is an imaginary construction of the universe from the point of view of mundane development, absorption into Brahma, then a new era, and so on for ever and ever. Neither this scheme nor the Buddhistic series of aeons marked by the appearances of new Buddhas is dependent on astral phenomena. The two questions involved in the astral theory are, first, whether or not all of those issued from Babylonia, and, second, what the religious significance of the systems of Ages is. Those questions have already been touched on, and will be further considered below. For the demonstration of the universality of the astral system and the hegemony of its Babylonian form we desiderate an illustration from some ancient religion, and this Jeremias undertakes to give, in his *Panbabylonisten*, by an examination of the Egyptian cult.²² At the risk of some repetition an outline of his argument may be given.

The Egyptian cult, Jeremias holds, is merely one division of the general Oriental scheme. That Egypt belongs socially to Western Asia is shown by the lively intercourse between it and Babylonia and Canaan, and identity of thought follows social identity.²³ Much has been said about distinguishing between early and late conceptions, but the fact is that the Egyptian religious system appears fully developed in the earliest inscriptions. Like all other cults the Egyptian religion has a fundamental conception—it is the doctrine that the activity of the Deity stands in relation to the starry sky and the parallel natural phenomena (summer and winter, sowing and reaping, cold and heat, day and night). This conception is found in all ancient peoples, and its independent origination in every community is out of the question (the agreement in details is too great to allow such a supposition), but great variations occur in the different local developments, according to the differences in endowments and surroundings among nations. The astral character of the Egyptian religion was recognized long ago, for example by many Greeks, as is reported by Eusebius (*Praep.*

²² He takes his material from Erman's well-known work on the religion of Egypt, but rejects Erman's interpretation of the facts, which is the more generally received one of development from crude beginnings. He rejects also Hommel's attempt to prove by philological methods the identity of the Egyptian and Babylonian cults, preferring to rest his thesis on the similarity of ideas.

²³ Here it is obvious to remark that social identity and identity of thought do not prove borrowing; or, if there be borrowing, they do not show in which direction the borrowing was.

ev. iii.). A striking illustration of this character is found in a pyramid text ²⁴ in which a dead king is said to rise with Orion in the east and descend with it in the west—that is, the dead king is regarded as the incarnation of the Deity who reveals himself in the world, and especially of Osiris. “As Osiris lives,” says another text, “so will he live.” Here, as elsewhere, Osiris has a lunar character; the moon, which after three days bursts forth from the power of the underworld, is the planet of resurrection (the same representation is found in the Babylonian system). The female correspondent to Osiris is Isis, who stands related to the former as Ishtar to Tammuz. In Egypt Sothis (Sirius) appears in place of Isis, and Orion in place of Osiris.

The religion of Egypt of the earliest time known to us was influenced by the teaching of the priests of On, where the reigning cult was that of the sun,²⁵ while in Babylon at this time it was on the cult of the moon that the emphasis was laid. This contrast is in agreement with the grandiose conception that earthly lands reflect the heavens, according to which Babylonia bears the character of the upperworld and Egypt that of the underworld,—the full moon represents resurrection, while the sun, at the time of full moon, reaches its lowest point, and becomes an underworld star. The proof that Egypt was so considered is found in the great development of the conception of the future life by the Egyptians, and in the division of Egypt into forty-two districts corresponding to the forty-two judges of the dead (forty-two is the characteristic number of the underworld).

The essential identity of the Babylonian and Egyptian systems (the former being the basis of the latter) appears in the fact that both have the antithesis of light and darkness, with similar cosmogonies (a primeval ocean, for example), in both the sun and moon are twins, and both have divine trinities; in Egypt the trinity is the sun, the moon, and Venus²⁶ (and in the genealogy of the myths we have father, mother, son). Finally, the festivals (the dramatic presentation of dogma) are similar in the two systems (the new-year festival, for example), and all of them are astral.

²⁴ See Spiegelberg's paper in *Orientalische Literaturzeitung*, 1904.

²⁵ This doctrine is termed by Jeremias and others a “mystery.” It was not a mystery, however, in the proper sense of this term; there was no body of initiates and no intention to keep knowledge from outsiders; the fact was simply that the higher thought of the educated, priests and others, was not intelligible to the masses.

²⁶ Jeremias explains that the reason why the heavenly goddess (Hathor = Isis = Venus) is pictured in the form of a cow is that she is the female principle corresponding to the moon-deity represented as a bull. The first station of the moon was in Taurus.

This summary, with its astounding assumptions, gives fairly well the method pursued by Jeremias, which is in all important points that of Winckler. They do not distinguish between the illustrations of similarity in the religions of Egypt and Babylon and the elaborate astralism that is held to underlie all religions. They do not distinguish clearly between astronomy and religion (the fact that the calendar is astral seems to them to prove astralism in their sense), and they do not allow sufficient liberty to the gods to reveal themselves in other things than heavenly bodies.²⁷ They are right in recognizing the religious importance of these bodies, but they have organized the facts into a hard and fast system, with such unrestrained application to minutiae as often leads them into exaggerations and forced and sometimes fantastic interpretations—witness, for example, the thesis, abundantly introduced by Jeremias, that Egypt was regarded in the “system” as representing the underworld and Babylon as representing the upperworld. There is no documentary proof of this opinion; Egypt and Babylon are treated by each other and in the Old Testament simply as political powers, no symbolic values are attached to them. But, according to Winckler and Jeremias, as in the Oriental cosmographic system the North was the region of light and the abode of the gods, so the South was the place of darkness, the abode of the dead, and therefore—such apparently is the reasoning of Jeremias—Babylon as northern and Egypt as southern correspond to the two cosmic worlds. But such a leap from celestial and infernal relations to purely terrestrial is wholly improbable for the ancient times under discussion. Or, if this sort of ratiocination be disowned, then the identification of Egypt (or Sodom) in the Old Testament with the underworld must be regarded as an unfounded fancy.

The significance of the gods and the central points of religious conceptions undergo such kaleidoscopic changes that it is hard to recognize any system in them. Egypt, we are told, was devoted

²⁷ As is remarked above, the part played by natural mundane phenomena is recognized, but these are treated as relatively unimportant adjuncts to the stellar powers.

to the sun, and Babylon to the moon. We might, then, be surprised to learn that the great Egyptian doctrine of resurrection (expressed only feebly, if at all, in Babylon²⁸) was embodied in Osiris, who was the moon; we are, however, relieved by learning that life issuing from death, which is represented by Osiris as moon, is represented also by the overflow of the Nile and by the setting sun; "therefore," it is added, "the unity of the two luminaries and the life of Nature in the eternal cosmic round is represented by Osiris."²⁹ Throughout Jeremias's treatment of the Egyptian doctrine of the future life there is a noteworthy failure to distinguish between the origin of ideas and the forms in which they clothe themselves. The belief that the soul of the dead man goes to the West may have been suggested by the setting of the stars; but this direction of the journey by no means proves that the conception of the future continuance of life arose from the motion of the stars. In ancient times the movement of the soul after death varied with the local conditions of communities; it is not strange that some advanced peoples should have thought the stars to be the abodes of the departed or to indicate their paths to the other world. It is in the view of the future life that the Egyptians differed most strikingly from the Babylonians. There are great similarities in the theistic schemes and the cultic rituals of the two peoples. Both have the usual gods connected with sun and moon and with the arts of life, and the usual apparatus of temples and priests, and in both the gods were originally local and the special prominence of any divinity was due to the political predominance of his home. As is mentioned above, Jeremias agrees with Hommel in holding that the Egyptian religious system was based on or derived from the Babylonian. But, so far from this being the case, the early civilization of Egypt was superior in breadth and depth of religious thought to that of its neighbor and rival. Babylon developed astronomy, and very early (about 2250 B.C.) produced an admirable civil code; but at an equally early date an Egyptian philosopher (Ptahhotep)

²⁸ The restoration of Tammuz to upper earth by Ishtar signifies the revivification of nature after the winter decay; but this is not a general doctrine of resurrection, and neither Ishtar nor Tammuz is the moon.

²⁹ *Die Panbabylonisten*, p. 59.

issued an ethical manual which in moral elevation hardly falls below our best standards, and eight centuries later an Egyptian king established a monotheistic cult of a sort never reached in Babylon.⁸⁰ It is an ungracious task to put one great nation over against another,—the facts just cited are mentioned merely to show the weakness of one side of the panbabylonian theory, namely, its claim of complete religious hegemony for Babylon. Babylon's title to greatness does not need such a pretension. To return to the conception of the future, it is well known that the idea of a moral basis of the future life was current in Egypt from a very early time, while Babylon never advanced beyond the old-semitic conception of the underworld as a sort of death-in-life without ethical sanction or intellectual activity. Semites and Egyptians probably came from the same original stock, but the two races grew by different lines, developing primitive ideas each in its own way; what those primitive ideas were can be learned only from the traces of them in later civilized cults and from the study of the conceptions of the undeveloped communities known to us. The existence of crude traits in the Egyptian and Babylonian cults is certain, and it is no disparagement to these cults, so admirable in their later forms, to refer these traits to early savage social conditions.

It is the alleged similarity between the Egyptian and the Babylonian cults that the panbabylonianists have laid most stress on, but the demonstration of their thesis of an astral unity calls for a comparison of the cults of India, Persia, and China, also with that of Babylon. The general agreements between all these in theistic ritual apparatus are obvious, and need not be described here. The disagreements, however, are no less obvious; the exuberant supernaturalism and metaphysical constructions of India stand in sharp contrast with the neat dualism of Persia, the family organization of the gods in China, and the succession of local divine chiefs in Babylonia. The existence of such disagreements is recognized by Winckler, but he contends that above them is the fundamental belief that the gods reveal themselves in the movements of the heavenly bodies. Doubtless, the stars were and are consulted in these countries,

⁸⁰ Breasted, *History of Egypt*, pp. 203 ff., 355 ff.

but other things were regarded as more important. The enormous significance attached to sacrifice in India is pointed out in all modern works on the Brahmanic religion; the emphasis laid on the culture of land in the Avesta is obvious, as is the predominance of the worship of ancestors in China. These facts do not accord with the exclusive claims of astralism; they all point to other conceptions. It is true that the cosmological theories of all the ancient nations are intended to explain the origin of things, that they all lay more or less stress on the primeval struggle between light and darkness, and that in all of them a primeval ocean or watery chaos plays a part. This ocean (whence, says Jeremias, divine wisdom, in the person of Ea issues) is independent of the stars. The mountains, rocks, rivers, and trees of the earth, as also the sky considered in itself apart from its content of luminaries, are important elements of ancient religion. That is, the formal part of religion was derived from the whole apparatus of nature. Man is a part of nature, and the gods were made in the likeness of man. But to admit this—and it cannot be denied—is to reject the astral theory in the form in which it is held by Winckler and Jeremias.

Cosmogonies in ancient systems are connected with religious conceptions, but do not give the essence of religion. Myths embody, but do not create, religious beliefs. They are the science of early times, which sought its agents in superhuman Powers, and they thus entered into alliance with the procedures of religion proper. Some myths are stellar, as, for example, the explanation given by an American Indian tribe of the disappearance of the stars by day and of the changing phases of the moon (the stars, they say, children of the sun and the moon, are devoured by their father every morning and are mourned for by their mother, who thus for a time fades gradually away), or the belief that the sun, traversing the sky in a chariot by day, descends into the ocean, passes beneath the earth, and ascends the next day.³¹ In such stories as these the heavenly bodies are clearly the actors; the heavenly gods produce natural phenomena. But no such clear evidence can be adduced for the affirmation that the myths of Osiris and Tammuz are stellar, for these admit

³¹ For other early examples see Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, i, pp. 288 ff., 356.

naturally of other explanations. The expounders of the alleged Oriental "system" content themselves with putting side by side certain astronomical facts and late mythological identifications, by Babylonian or Egyptian priests, of deities with heavenly bodies. But a late learned identification of Tammuz or Osiris with the sun or the moon or some other body tells us nothing of the origin of these gods or of the fundamental religious conceptions underlying their worship. And the panbabylonianists ignore several groups of gods (as those of winds and fire) that are, to say the least, not obviously astral.

Mention has been made above of the importance attached by the astralists to cosmic Ages. If, it is said, these ages be not taken into account, a history of the ancient Orient is inconceivable; the heavenly bodies control the course of the times.³² Every age, it is held, is characterized by the appearance of a saviour, of divine origin, who meets and overcomes the powers of darkness. Now it is true that some ancient nations conceived of the history of the world as moving through secular ages, and this is a fact of interest; but whether, or how far, it had anything to do with the conception of human progress or redemption, or was religiously related to astral conditions, that is a different question. The most definite schemes of ages are found in India and Persia, and these are products of learned construction and non-semitic theological speculation, and are relatively late. The enormous Hindu chronological scheme referred to above, an interminable series of aeons, each of twelve millenniums, exhibits in each aeon a gradual degeneration through its four parts of three millenniums each, and then the reabsorption of the universe into the Supreme Spirit.³³ Here we have the equivalent of the four Greek ages of continuous decadence, with round numbers but no proper zodiacal religious significance,³⁴ with an idea of redemption in this form of absorption. A distincter idea of salvation is involved in the late theory of avatars or incarnations of deities. Occasional incarnations occur in many parts of

³² Jeremias, *Das Alte Testament*, p. 69.

³³ Hopkins, *Religions of India*, pp. 418 ff.

³⁴ The number twelve in this scheme may be connected with zodiacal signs, but not in the way supposed by the astralist theory.

the world; it was natural that a deity should take human form to accomplish something that interested him. Hinduism concentrated its avatars in the person of Vishnu; the number of avatars varied in different schemes (sometimes including even Buddha himself), and was not fixed by astral conditions. Buddhism adopted the avatar conception in its theory of the succession of Buddhas; and the Vishnus and Buddhas had religious significance, they appeared for the purpose of teaching truth and righting wrong. They are illustrations of the general human feeling that things tend to go wrong on earth and need some great force to set them right. The Hindu system of ages is arithmetically grand and symmetrical, and the Persian construction is similarly symmetrical but on a more modest scale.³⁵ The history of the world they comprise in twelve millenniums, divided into four periods; every millennium is under the control of a sign of the zodiac. The first period is that of the spiritual creation—there were no human beings on the earth; the second describes the material creation; the third gives the mythical and legendary history before the appearance of Zoroaster, wherein there is a temporary triumph of Angro-Mainyu; the fourth is ushered in by Zoroaster, and after him come three prophets, the third of whom is Saoshyant, the final saviour and reconstructor. This is an eschatological scheme similar to the Jewish and Christian conception of the End; it is the embodiment of the conviction that the supreme Deity will not give the world over to evil. The coördination of the twelve periods with the signs of the zodiac probably points to Babylonian influence; but it occurs in a late book, and is fitted into an artificial scheme: each zodiacal sign controls 1000 years instead of the 2200 of the precession of the equinoxes; a prophet is assigned to each millennium, not to each period of zodiacal control. Apparently it was only the astronomical fact of twelve zodiacal signs that was borrowed; the religious construction is native Persian. And a similar remark may be made in reference to the Hindu duodecimal system. It was astronomy, not religion, that passed from Babylon eastward.

³⁵ Given in the *Bundahish*, a work regarded by E. W. West as later than the seventh century of our era; comp. Spiegel, *Iranische Alterthumskunde*, i, pp. 502 ff., ii, 151 ff.

The Hindu saviours are deities or Buddhas who appear when there is need of them, without regard to zodiacal periods. The Persian Saoshyant is reserved for the end of the world, a rôle sometimes assigned to the Jewish Messiah; there is only one historical prophet, and he occupies a position like that of Moses, he is said to receive a law from the Deity. These are Aryan religious constructions, based the one on practical monotheism, the other on pantheism, conceptions not found among early Semitic and Egyptian communities, except in the evanescent movement of Amenhotep IV. We look in vain for these eschatological outlooks in Egypt and Babylon. As an example of the "Oriental expectation of a redeemer" Jeremias³⁶ cites one old Egyptian text, the prediction of the sage Epu to the effect that Egypt will be overtaken by a terrible catastrophe, and that there will be great suffering till there arise the Shepherd for all men in whose heart is nothing evil.³⁷ This is simply the anticipation of a clear-sighted statesman and patriot, and has nothing to do with a cosmic Age. He foresees evil and expects deliverance; the "Shepherd" is a king or other great man who will bring order out of chaos and give peace to "all men,"³⁸ that is, to all the people of Egypt; ³⁹ he is beloved by the gods, as all good men are, and he is "divine" in the sense in which the kings of Egypt were divine. For the statement that there was an Egyptian "scheme" of suffering and salvation there is no ground in the documents. There is a similar lack of evidence for a Babylonian dogma of this sort. In the cosmological poems Bel or Marduk conquers the dragon of chaos and elsewhere the mythical Gilgamesh slays the invader Humbaba. In the historical inscriptions any king or his god may be the deliverer of the land from enemies or the conqueror of foreign countries. But all these persons and events arise naturally out of local conditions and temporary needs, and are paralleled in dozens of modern situations.

³⁶ Die Panbabylonisten, p. 49.

³⁷ Taken from Erman, 'Die ägyptische Literatur,' in *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, I, 7, pp. 31 f.

³⁸ In a Babylonian inscription (4 Rawl. pls. 32, 33) the king is called "the shepherd of many nations"; see Jastrow, *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, p. 377.

³⁹ Just such predictions the Hebrew prophets make.

Among ancient peoples it was only the Hebrews who developed in a practical way the conception of national deliverance from misfortune by divine interposition. In the Old Testament the expectation of salvation always refers to a definite political situation, protection from some enemy. As a dogma this expectation first appears in the prophets of the eighth century, and is modified from time to time in accordance with the changes in the national life. At first the immediate agent of salvation is the national god Yahweh himself; then, from the sixth century on, attention is fixed on a political head, a king, the instrument of Yahweh, and finally, a supernaturally endowed Messiah is imagined, who is to usher in a new era of national peace and prosperity. In all this process, neither in the prophetic nor in the apocalyptic writings is there reference to zodiacal periods.

The application of the panbabylonian theory to the narrative of the Old Testament is made in detail by Winckler and Jeremias.⁴⁰ In estimating their Biblical work it must be borne in mind that they distinguish on the one hand between the composition of our present Biblical books and the substantial accuracy of their statements, and on the other hand between the historical validity of their cultural pictures and the dress in which they are clothed. They accept the results of the recent criticism of the Pentateuch and the rest of the Old Testament, but claim to look beneath and beyond this criticism to the historical kernel of the narratives; and, as regards the literary dress, they hold that substantial fact is presented under astral forms. Their confidence in the general historical verity of the Old Testament material is based on the accordance of its representations with the known conditions of the times involved, or, as they sometimes put it, on the harmony between those representations and the unitary ancient Oriental lore. Jeremias, further, falls back on his religious feeling; in the Old Testament, he says, the New Testament is concealed, and as Christian he accepts the former,—“the Israelite idea of God

⁴⁰ See Winckler, *Geschichte Israels*, ii, and the first half of Schrader's *Keil-inschriften und das Alte Testament*, ed. 3, and Jeremias's *Das Alte Testament*?. The two protagonists differ in some minor points, but agree in fundamentals. See also H. Zimmern, in Schrader, *op. cit.* second half.

and expectation of redemption is not a distillation of human ideas that grew up in various regions of the ancient Orient, but eternal truth in the variegated garment of the Oriental mode of thought, and the forms of this mode of thought belong to a unitary conception of the world which sees in earthly things and events copies of heavenly things that are typically set forth in the pictures and the course of the starry heaven." ⁴¹

We are not concerned here with the discussion of the historical verity of the early narratives of the Old Testament; we have to do only with the astral element in them. The close resemblance between the Biblical and the Babylonian accounts of creation and the flood is generally recognized, however it may be explained. According to one statement of the astralists the former is not borrowed from the latter, but the two give slightly divergent forms of the old Oriental tradition—a view held by many Biblical scholars; the stories in Gen. 1, says Jeremias, are neither sagas nor pallid myths, but a religious application of a conception of the world. There is no mention of a fall of man in the known Babylonian literature, but Jeremias refers to the Babylonian penitential hymns as showing a sense of sin. The myth of Yahweh's combat with the dragon, which runs through a considerable part of the Old Testament, ⁴² is supposed by Jeremias to appear in the curse pronounced against the serpent in Eden, but Winckler regards the passage as relating to the struggle between light and darkness.

The more definitely characteristic side of the astral theory appears in its application to the patriarchal histories and the narratives of the exodus and the conquest. These are interpreted as full of situations and expressions that reflect zodiacal movements and receive their complete illustration from Babylonian and other ancient mythologies.

Winckler's mode of procedure is based on his general scheme of the origin and interpretation of legends, which is as follows: Legend, he says, takes its material substantially from mythology. The deeds and the traits of the gods are transferred to the hero, the demigod, and thus receive a human coloring; the next step

⁴¹ *Das Alte Testament*², p. vi.

⁴² But it is found only in later writings, in none before the sixth century B.C.

is the saga or folk-story, which completely humanizes the legend, but preserves the air of unreality, and discards definite data of place and time. The legend employs a relatively small mass of material. The same fundamental traits, the "motifs," meet us in varied personal forms all over the world; the same thing is everywhere told of the *genius loci* or the god; every land is a microcosm which includes all myths within its own limits. The Semites, by reason of their inability to conceive things otherwise than objectively, never developed the folk-story. The old Semitic god is a *genius loci*, bound by local conditions, and therefore the pre-islamic mythology of the Semitic peoples could not have been indigenous; the theistic doctrine of their temples, literary and scientific in form, was borrowed from older cultures. It follows that their legends of heroes go back to these older civilizations, such as the immigrants to Canaan came in contact with. The Semitic hero belongs not to nomads but to a settled life; if an Israelite hero appears as a Bedawi sheikh, that is because the people had not lost all memory of their old manner of life. In the settled Israelite civilization two strata of legends must be recognized: those that the immigrants found attached to the soil, dealing with heroes who are copies of local deities (as Abraham domiciled in Hebron, and Isaac in Beersheba), and those that grew up in the land (connected with the judges and the earliest kings). Naturally, the legends attaching to the first stratum will be purely mythological, and those attaching to the second historical; and there is a transitional form (as in the stories of the judges), in which a really historical figure is so overlaid with mythical elements that the details cannot be regarded as historical. Both in these last legends and in the hero-legends historical material may be discerned. The creators of legends are the singers, who at the courts of princes recounted old histories dressed in the mythical forms that were supplied by current tradition. Royal annalists also employed mythical material for the glorification of kings, and later all this mass of quasi-historical material received formal literary and scientific exposition.

So far as this scheme sets forth the general tendency in ancient times to treat national beginnings mythically and to embellish

great personages with legend, it states what is commonly believed. Exception must be taken to certain particulars of the scheme, as well as to the way in which it is applied in the treatment of Hebrew history. The description of legend as always issuing out of mythology is arbitrary; it would have been better to adhere to the usual distinction that myth is imaginative explanation of phenomena, and legend the embellishment or distortion of historical fact. Further, in the criticism of ancient records much depends on the answer to the question whether or not a given figure is a hero in the sense of being a demigod, whether, that is, the stories about him are myth or legend, and here there is room for arbitrary judgment. It is, of course, assumed by Winckler that wherever myth is found it is astral, and thus the door is opened to the widest and wildest comparisons, inferences, and constructions.

For the interpretation of the patriarchal stories not only the Old and New Testaments but also the Talmud and the Koran are freely drawn on; while the Old Testament history, as we have seen, is accepted as substantially true, it is regarded as incomplete and as idealizing; for example, the scene of the proposed sacrifice of Isaac, it is said, was not Moriah but Horeb. Abraham is treated as an ancestor not in an ethnological but in a religious sense; the ancestors are the medium of divine revelation to Israel in the olden time, and he embodies the genesis of the Israelite theistic faith.

"The documents indicate that the beginnings of the religious community that was later called 'the children of Israel' are to be found in a migration from Babylonia, from Ur and Harran, where the worship of the moon-god prevailed. Abraham's forefathers followed this astral religion (Jqsh. 24 2); he embodies the monotheistic current of the time. It may be surmised that the migration was connected with a reform movement, which brought him into collision with the authorities.⁴³ The migration may have been a protest against the degeneration of the moon-cult, or against polytheism, or against the predominance assigned by Hammurabi to the wor-

⁴³ Jeremias, *Das Alte Testament*, p. 333, n. 1, thinks that the Jewish and Islamic legend of the persecution of Abraham by Nimrod is not a bare fancy but a religious and historical truth, legendary in form and dressed out with mythological motifs.

ship of Marduk. Abraham was a Mahdi; he was guided by God, and he had experience of God. As to the character of his religion, traces of it appear in the divine names mentioned in Genesis. The name Ya'u occurs in Babylonian texts; it is the Old Testament Yah (Jah), and 'Yahweh' is a solemn differentiation (for distinction from the 'heathen' name) which at Sinai became the expression of religious concentration. But the name tells nothing of the conception of God."

As to this statement it may be said that no evidence is cited by the astralists for the view that the Abrahamic migration was determined by religious reform-motives. There is no hint of such motives in the Old Testament or the New Testament or the cuneiform material.⁴⁴ Winckler suggests that the Marduk cult of Hammurabi was a retrogression from the purer religion of Ur,—a conjecture without documentary support and in itself very improbable. Equally improbable is the supposition that the establishment of the supremacy of Marduk at Babylon could drive men from the country. Hammurabi was a polytheist, his religious devotion was catholic, he did not interfere, so far as our records go, with the worship at Ur or with any other worship. If Ya'u was a recognized deity in Babylonia,⁴⁵ Abraham might have worshipped him with impunity. Further, the astralist theory lays too great stress on the supposed monotheistic strain in the thought of the ancient Orient, which thought the leaders of the Abrahamic migration are held to have brought over to Canaan. It is true that there was a tendency to monolatry in this ancient world, especially in Semitic communities; the tendency was a growth out of the old social constitution, in which every group had a special practically all-powerful deity whom it revered on local grounds. This sort of devotion to the local deity is apparent in Babylonia and particularly in Canaan (where the Baals, the divine lords, were numerous) and in Arabia. But, if we except the movement of Amenhotep IV in Egypt, there is no historical record of any ancient Oriental worship that was confined to one god. That Egyptian king seems to have been a religious genius; we have, however, no details of

⁴⁴ The Nimrod legend may be safely ignored.

⁴⁵ This is, to say the least, very doubtful.

his religious experience. His movement did not long survive him. In proof of the statement that the Abrahamic migration brought monotheism into Canaan, we expect it to be shown that the Israelite leaders in continuous line maintained the sole worship of one god. Jeremias affirms that they did so, but he ignores what is said of Jacob's people (Gen. 30 2), of Gideon (Judg. 8 27), of David (1 Sam. 26 19), and others, and fails to notice that the Decalogue does not deny the existence of other gods than Yahweh.

The panbabylonian theory maintains that the astral conception of the world and of religion was known in Canaan and expressed by Israelite writers; that, for example, the patriarchal histories, while containing religious and historical truth, are conceived by the editors of the Pentateuch under astral forms. Winckler weaves his description of these forms into his exposition of the general history; we are not here concerned with his radical transformation of the old history, but have only to note that on the legendary side his object is merely to establish the legendary character of a given occurrence, and not to trace the legend to its origin. He holds that Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are *genii locorum*. Each is a precipitate of the *numen* of the place with which he is connected. Abraham, whose original Canaanite locus was in Galilee (whence he was transferred by the Yahwist to the South), is a complete figure; he is one of the Dioscuri (Lot being the other), and he is the brother and consort of Sarai; she is Ishtar, and he is Tammuz-Adonis, and the father of both of them is the moon-god Sin. The proof is that Abraham comes from Ur and Haran, seats of the worship of this god, to whom his two names point; Abram means 'the father (Sin) is exalted,' and Abraham 'the father of a multitude' (Abraham as moon-god, the god of war);⁴⁶ so the moon-god Janus has two faces; his story reflects the myths of Etana and Ishtar's Descent.

Jacob likewise has two characters; in his mythical aspect he is Israel, in his genealogical Jacob. His moon-character appears

⁴⁶ His connection with Beersheba, Winckler holds, 'the well of Sheba,' points to a Canaanite god Sheba, the 'seven-god.'

from various facts: his father-in-law is Laban (the moon); he has twelve sons (the months of the year), and seventy-two descendants from five wives including Joseph's wife; and $72 \times 5 = 360$. His four wives correspond to the four quarters of the moon; Leah, weak-eyed, is the new moon, the beautiful Rachel is the full moon; Leah has seven children (the days of the week), one of them a daughter, Dinah, who is Ishtar (compare the "day of Venus," Friday).

Joseph is a genealogical figure, the representative of the Northern tribes, and as such he is an older creation than Israel, who represents the later unity of all the tribes; as belonging to Shechem he corresponds to the local god of that place, Baalberith (Judg. 9 4). As son of the moon-god, Jacob, he must be the sun-god (the Babylonian Shamash is the son of Sin), and he had therefore to be placed in Egypt, the chief seat of the cult of the sun—his stay in Egypt represents Tammuz in the underworld; his two sons are the two halves of the year, and Jacob's change of hands in Gen. 48 refers to the two reckonings of the year, the older, with the beginning in autumn, and the later, (Babylonian) with the beginning in spring.

It is unnecessary to follow Winckler into his discussion of Moses (Tammuz) and the judges; the method is everywhere the same. There is a wearisome iteration of sun and moon, Tammuz and Ishtar; the discovery of "motifs" usually requires no great ingenuity, but the exposition of the theory as a smoothly rounded whole sometimes calls for violent procedures.

Jeremias, while following Winckler in essentials, lays special stress on zodiacal Ages. Abraham (with Lot), he points out, is the founder of a new era (Gen. 12 3 f.).

"The Oriental historical narration assigns to the introducer of a new era the astral form that represents the beginning of the age. Abram lived in the Marduk age (devoted to the cult of the sun). The religious movement in which he was concerned will have been directed against the reigning cult. The preceding age was that of the moon or Gemini, and for this reason if old Canaanite documents dealt with Abram, they would have been led to introduce

into their narrative moon motifs or Gemini motifs. It must be noted that in this case the critical point is not in spring (as in the Marduk age) but at the solstice. Whether the author of our text understood the allusions is another question; perhaps in his combinatory work many such features were lost. The later Judaism (in the pseudepigrapha and the rabbinical sagas) recognized and revived the doctrine of motifs."

Here various questions occur to us. Marduk, it is true, became the chief god of Babylon, but was there a Marduk age? Were there old Canaanite documents, and were the Pentateuchal editors trained in the lore of ages and eras, equinoxes and solstices? And if certain points escaped them, can we trust the late Jewish writers to give the exact information that their predecessors failed to give. Affirmative answers to these questions are not to be found in the Babylonian and Hebrew documents.

Jeremias goes on to give the astral motifs in detail: 1. In names: Ab-ram, signifying 'the (divine) father is exalted,' points perhaps to a priestly character for Abraham. Sarah corresponds to the title (Sarratu) of the moon-goddess of Harran, and Milkah to an epithet (malkatu) of Ishtar. 2. Moon-motifs: the number 318 (Gen. 14 14) is the number of days in the moon-year in which the moon is visible; Abraham with his 318 companions fights the enemies, as the moon for 318 days fights the darkness. The number thirteen (Gen. 14 4) is lunar; twelve days the moon-year needs to equal it with the sun-year, and the thirteenth day begins the new year. The moon, like Abram, is a wanderer. 3. Gemini (Dioscuri) motif: Abram and Lot (like sun and moon) are the hostile brethren; as beginners of the new (Gemini) age, they show the Gemini motif. But, further (according to the Babylonian doctrine), both moon and sun and also Venus may assume the Tammuz form,—they sink to the underworld and rise to the upperworld. So Abram, cast by Nimrod into the fiery furnace, is rescued. Abram's journey with Sarah to Egypt is represented as a journey to the underworld and rescue therefrom. So Lot is rescued from Sodom, which is here the underworld; he is the sun, his wife the moon, both leave the lower world. Tammuz corresponds

also to Orion, which comes up in the summer solstice and goes below in the winter solstice,—so Abram and Jacob.

The story of Joseph is represented as sparkling with astralistic material; the kernel of the biography is true, but not the particulars,—the situation corresponds to Egyptian manners and history, but it does not follow that Joseph is an historical figure or that the particular incidents mentioned in Genesis ever occurred. He is himself saved and becomes a saviour, and therefore his history is framed in Tammuz motifs: 1. The sun, the moon, and eleven stars (the eleven constellations of the zodiac) do him homage; ⁴⁷ so Tammuz represents the course of the world through the zodiac, and before him sun, moon, and the eleven bow. 2. Joseph is thrown into the pit in the Southland and into prison in Egypt; Tammuz, as evening-star, sinks into the abyss of ocean. To this motif are attached also the baker and the butler; they correspond to the two ministers of Marduk-Adapa. 3. Joseph's coat has the same Hebrew name as that of Tamar (2 Sam. 13 18 f.), and this Tamar has the Ishtar character. Jacob's mourning corresponds to the mourning of Tammuz. 4. Potiphar's wife takes revenge on Joseph as Ishtar brings sorrow on her lovers. 5. Joseph marries a daughter of the priest of the sun-god, and Tammuz receives the daughter of the sun as reward for service rendered. 6. The blessing bestowed on Joseph in Gen. 49 22 f. contains the Bull-Marduk motif. 7. The twelve sons correspond to the twelve signs of the zodiac, or, more exactly, to the twelve months of the year. Benjamin, as twelfth, has the five epagomenal days, and therefore he receives five garments of honor and five times as much food as his brothers.

The blessings of the twelve sons of Jacob (Gen. 49) are said to refer to the signs of the zodiac: Judah is clearly related to Leo, and in Deut. 33 17 Joseph is a bull; Simeon and Levi form a pair (Dioscuri) and slay a man as Gilgamesh and Eabani slay Humbaba—their sign is Gemini; for Virgo Dinah may be taken.

⁴⁷ Why only eleven? asks Jeremias,—because one is hid behind the sun, or did they reckon only eleven? This question only the Hebrew writer could answer, and perhaps not even he.

For the others Jeremiah is hard put to it, but struggles bravely through the list: thus, Benjamin is a wolf, and Lupus is south of Scorpio; Asher yields royal dainties, and fish is a royal dainty, etc.

Moses is the saviour of the people from Egypt; the rescue is equivalent to a victory over the dragon. The inaugurator of a new period is provided with definite motifs that are either connected with the traditional accounts of his life or attached as embellishments, or invested with mystery in names, numbers, and paronomasias. So with Moses: 1. His origin is mysterious; the names of his parents are not given in Ex. 21, and Ex. 6 20 is an addition of the late priestly document; in Deut. 33 9 he is fatherless and motherless, like Melchizedek in Heb. 7 3, and so Elijah is described in the Talmudic tract Berakoth, 58a. 2. He is persecuted by a dragon (Pharaoh), and is exposed and saved in a vessel—so Sargon I, Abraham in late Jewish legend, Hathor, Osiris, Zeus, Cyrus, etc. 3. As Ishtar loves and saves Tammuz, so the Egyptian princess had compassion on the babe Moses and saved him. 4. The name Moses is perhaps Egyptian, but, considered as Hebrew, it signifies 'he who draws,' that is, as the story of Sargon indicates, the drawer of water, the gardener; and behind the person rescued stands Ea, the 'drawer of water,' the world-gardener (comp. Gen. 3, Yahweh as gardener). And, it may be added, as to the wilderness sanctuary, the ultimate origin of its title 'place of meeting' is the Oriental conception of the heavenly, or rather earthly, sanctuary in which the gods meet to determine fates.

For other such details we must refer to the writings of Winckler and Jeremiah. The sort of ratiocination assumed by the latter writer is illustrated by his above-mentioned treatment of the name Moses. By the scribe of Ex. 2 10 this name was supposed to mean 'drawn out'; that is, he took it to be a Hebrew past-participial form, which is impossible. The earlier constructors of history, those who conceived Moses under mythical forms, understood the name, so Jeremiah holds, to be of the

form of the Hebrew active participle; they were ignorant of its Egyptian origin, but they were so imbued with the Oriental mythical method of writing history that they could present Moses as a congeries of mythical motifs. This combination of ignorance and culture at such a time appears improbable.

Considered as an explanation of mythical forms, astralism must be judged by the principles of mythological science; its one-sided character, from this point of view, is referred to above. Considered as an exposition of Biblical personages and incidents, it is unscientific in that it provides no adequate canons of criticism, and in most cases leaves the play of fancy unchecked.⁴⁸ That the Canaanite religion resembled the Babylonian is universally admitted; that certain parts of the Hebrew religious material were derived from Babylonia is probable. The sun-god was worshipped at Bethshemesh; the name of the moon-god Sin appears perhaps in Sinai. The Old Testament cosmogonic material, including the contest of Yahweh with the dragon, is most naturally to be referred to Babylonia, though it may possibly be Old-Semitic lore. The story of Samson may contain solar myths, though this supposition is not necessary; his name points merely to the existence of a cult of the sun in Israel.⁴⁹ The character of Yahweh may have been developed in part through Babylonian and Assyrian influence. But all this is far from giving warrant for a thorough-going astralizing of Biblical stories.

Even if the theory in question were established, its value for religious history proper would be small. The demonstration of the unity of all myths and of their derivation from the stars would, indeed, be an interesting contribution to mythological science, but would leave the core of religion untouched. In fact the expounders of the theory do not make a serious examination of a single element of religious faith. They assume for the pre-historic time a belief in monotheism and immortality; they do not inquire how this belief arose, how it was developed, and

⁴⁸ A parallel is the allegorical hermeneutic applied by the Alexandrian grammarians to Homer and by Christian writers to the Old Testament.

⁴⁹ Such a cult seems to have continued long; see 2 Kgs. 21 5, 23 11, Ezek. 6 4, Job 31 26.

what effect it had on national and individual life. Babylonian thought is represented as the creator of the doctrine of bodily resurrection, which was never held by Semites till they came under Aryan influence. Conceptions of the gods, which must lie back of all myths, are left unaccounted for. The human demand for a saviour is brought into connection not with religious experience but with astronomy. For a fair estimate of astralism it must be borne in mind that it is simply a theory of the origin of myths.

The last remark applies, of course, to the treatment of the Old Testament by Winckler and Jeremias. Astralism is limited in its scope (besides being unscientific in its methods), but it is something more—it is positively hostile to the understanding of the Bible. The most noteworthy features of the Old-Israelite religious development are the sureness with which it moves and the way in which it springs from the national fortunes or the experiences of individuals. As we pass from Amos and Hosea to Jeremiah and his successors, and then to the psalmists and sages, we are aware of a natural advance of thought. Everything is wrought out by reflection in a simple human way, and we have before us the picture of a highly endowed people building up in successive generations a religious system destined to become one of the great achievements of the human race. The astral theory tends to turn the attention from this impressive spectacle and fix it on details that, if they were real, would have the value only of antique curiosities. The stories of Abraham and Moses as they stand exhibit human experience and have human interest,—they are dehumanized when they are made into reflections of the adventures of Tammuz and Ishtar. Even when a true religious fact is recognized by the theory—as the fact that Israel looked for salvation from its God—it is clothed in so bizarre a costume of extravagant mythical fancy that it fades into a dogma of the “Ancient Oriental Lore” and has no power to kindle the imagination or give comfort to the soul.

PRESENT RELIGIOUS CONDITIONS IN GERMANY¹

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In considering the present religious conditions and prospects in Germany, the main problem appears to be this: Can the church, which up to the eighteenth century had been the chief promoter and embodiment of culture, remain and be preserved over against a culture which has now become independent, or is this independent modern culture destined to sweep the church away? And if the latter be the case, what then will become of religion? This problem of the prospects of religion and church in the modern world has nowhere more significance than in Germany; for there, as nowhere else, an immensely rich and highly developed intellectual culture stands absolutely independent over against a strong and living church. Neither in France nor in England nor in America is the issue so burning as in Germany. In France secular culture faces no strong church filled with profound spiritual forces, but an outgrown institution governed by Roman spiritual tyranny; and therefore it has triumphed over the church. In England and America secular culture has not developed in opposition to the church, but is in the main friendly to it. In Germany, however, national culture since the eighteenth century has stood outside of the church and in a certain opposition to it; Goethe, who in his own person embodies our national culture, took a cool and unsympathetic attitude towards the church, and so have in a greater or less degree the other creators of our modern thought,—Kant and Schiller, the Darwinists and Karl Marx, the Naturalists and Nietzsche, the Liberals of 1848 and Bismarck. On the other hand the church made very great progress in the nineteenth century. German theologians—Schleiermacher, Strauss, Baur, Ritschl, Harnack—utilized for the church the best spirit-

¹ Two lectures delivered at the Harvard Summer School of Theology, July 12 and 13, 1909.

ual results of modern culture, and gave to German theology undisputed leadership in the Protestant world; piety in the church was profoundly deepened and enriched by Schleiermacher, Claus Harms, Löhe, Wichern, von Bodelschwing, Stöcker; while the external power of the church increased greatly in consequence of the restoration movement, the political leadership of the pious Hohenzollerns, and the establishment of a new and more democratic ecclesiastical constitution with synods and presbyteries.

Thus in Germany two strong and highly developed spiritual forces confront one another. Of course their mutual relation is not wholly one of conflict; the Protestant church knows very well that the best elements of modern culture are capable of rendering it service, and therefore tries to adopt them; and on the other hand secular culture, though developing independently of the church, cannot simply throw aside the religious educator of the people, for the representatives of culture feel that without religion culture would lose a great inner force, and that if the church were destroyed, their own chief means of access to the hearts of the people would be cut off. And yet there is a constant antagonism between the two forces; many representatives of the highest culture see in the church the main obstacle to a free development of modern civilization, and on the other hand there are in the church, particularly in the Catholic church, many who hold that Goethe is the chief enemy against which the church has to contend. This antagonism is not due merely to the backwardness of the church or the impiety of the cultured, but is a struggle between two principles, two philosophies. It can scarcely, therefore, be brought to an end in the near future, but will probably disturb the world for a long time to come. And yet the present time may be destined to bring the conclusion a good deal nearer, because both sides acknowledge more and more the necessity of such a conclusion, and many of the best men are consciously working to bring it about.

In the present discussion of the religious situation in Germany I shall first undertake to describe the German church and our institutional religion, then to consider the place of the church in the life of the German nation and the extent of its influence,

and finally to give an account of the antagonism between the church and modern German thought, with especial attention to those elements of modern culture which may be called religious, and which tend either to supplant the church or to make a reconciliation possible.

I

The German churches are established churches; and, unlike the churches of England, all German churches are established and national churches. In principle every German is by birth a member of a church, just as he is a citizen of a state. In 1871, when the German Empire was founded as a Union of states, the affairs of the church, like almost all affairs of culture, were left to the single states. Therefore each of the twenty-six German states has its own established church, and in Prussia even the provinces conquered in 1866 still have their own independent established churches. Luther had transferred the office of bishop to the sovereigns, so that they might govern the church by right not of authority but of love. Accordingly each state had one church, with a confession the same as that of the sovereign. That, however, could not last, for in the beginning of the nineteenth century Napoleon completely changed the boundaries of the German states, and moreover the freedom of migration brought about a mixture of the confessions. So it happens that today almost all the states have at least two established churches, one Protestant and one Catholic. The Protestant state-churches call themselves either Lutheran or Reformed (that is, Calvinistic) or United, and some states have both a Lutheran and a Reformed state-church. But these names mean very little, and in reality there is one Protestant and one Catholic denomination in Germany, while the special character of the single state-churches is not determined by the name of their confession, but by their history and traditions. Some churches are strictly Lutheran; in others, as for instance in Baden, Württemberg, and Hesse, the name of the denomination is almost completely forgotten, and only the Protestant and the Catholic church are known. All churches are ruled by consistories, appointed by the government of the state; besides

these consistories there are synods and presbyteries elected by the members of the churches. The consistories of all the Protestant established churches are united in the "German Evangelical Church Congress," which, however, has no executive power. Like the members of the consistories, so also the professors of the theological faculties are appointed by the governments of the states and not by the church. Accordingly, since every German minister (with the exception of the Catholics in a few states) must have graduated from a German university, the Protestant churches have no influence upon the education of their ministers. The independence of the single parishes is not very great; only a part of them are free to elect their ministers, while the order of the church, the number of services and the order of service, the texts of sermons, the religious instruction of the young, and the like, are all regulated, not by the single parishes or ministers, but by consistories and synods. The size of the parishes varies greatly, running from 300 to 100,000 members; in Berlin the parishes average 35,000 people, with four pastors to each parish, but within the last twenty years the need of more churches in such rapidly growing cities has been recognized on all sides, and much has been done to satisfy it.

The religious life in these churches and parishes is very different in the different states. It must be remembered that the great majority of the German people still live in the same state or even the same province where their ancestors have lived for generations. So, necessarily, local history and tradition plays a much greater part than in America; a great preacher or a pious sovereign or a religious movement may give to the piety of certain places its character for more than a hundred years. And yet we can say that the type of piety in all German churches has something in common; it is throughout a decidedly Lutheran type. Luther's confession at the Diet of Worms is the shortest expression of that which seems to the German Protestant the ideal of a Christian: courageous trust in God and a conscience free towards the world but bound by God. Luther's deep consciousness of sin and his pessimistic conception of human nature are characteristic for German piety and theology.

Luther's high appreciation of the Word of God determines the form of the German service of worship; German sermons are not free speeches loosely attached to a word from the Bible, but are primarily interpretations of the Word of God, direct applications of the Bible text. Luther's translation of the Bible lives in the memory of the German, Lutheran and Reformed alike; it has created for the Germans their religious language, even for the Catholics. Luther's catechism, or some other very similar to it, is learned by almost all Protestant children in the public schools, and together with the Bible stories forms the basis of all religious instruction. Luther's hatred of Roman servitude still unites German Protestantism; Luther's rich and deep family life is the pattern of the German home, above all of the home of the Protestant pastor. Except Bismarck there is no man who is revered with greater enthusiastic loyalty as the genuine German hero, even by those who have completely forsaken the church, than is that fearless, rough, and deeply pious founder of German Protestantism.

But Lutheranism not only means such a deep and free piety, it has also its faults. One of them is the lack of activity on the part of the laymen; the German church is much more than the church in America a church of pastors. That is, of course, largely due to the fact that the German churches are state-churches. Where the state takes the best care of everything, there individual activity always develops more slowly than where the state leaves all care of culture to private activity. The German is put to no trouble in order to become a member of the church, he is born a member. When the child comes to school, it receives religious instruction from two to twelve hours each week, from the first day up to the last class of the high-school. This is given at first by the teacher, later during at least two years by the pastor, who prepares the boy or girl for confirmation. Usually men of theological training also teach in the high-schools the Bible, church history, Christian theology, and ethics. The religious instruction is on the average very good, prepared according to the rules of modern pedagogics; all religious teachers are graduates from normal schools or divinity schools. Therefore one finds in Germany thousands of old men and women who still

know by heart Luther's catechism, many hymns, and hundreds of Bible verses; the preacher may assume that all his audience are well acquainted with the stories of the Bible.

But when the child has graduated from the high-school, and all religious compulsion has ceased, and participation in the life of the church has become voluntary, then the state's excellent care and Lutheranism show their defect. The layman, accustomed to having the state and the pastor do everything, is very hard to induce to take an active part in the life of the church. Even a large majority of those laymen who are deeply religious do not care for religious institutions. They want perhaps to be uplifted on Sunday by the Word of God, but they hold that apart from that religion should have its place in the heart and in the work of every day, in professional, business, and family life, and should not claim any special activity in a religious institution. This was Luther's view. He wanted the church only in order that it should teach the Word of God; all moral tasks were to be left to individuals or to the government of the Christian state. The Lutheran church has never had a Puritan Sabbath or Calvinistic church discipline or the Calvinistic ideal of a theocracy as in the Old Testament; it has never tried to exert a direct influence upon political life. That has all been regarded as Catholic formalism or Catholic aspiration after secular power. The church is to do nothing else than teach the Word of God through sermon and religious instruction to individuals, that they may have inner assurance of the forgiveness of sin and, as free and thankful children of God, may lead a Christian life in family, profession, and business. This Lutheran conception has given a great and fruitful power to the state governments, the states have assumed the promotion of all culture and civilization and have done wonderful work in all these directions. This Lutheran conception is also a main cause of the famous German conscientiousness in professional duty. In the eyes of the German people no gifts to the church could ever make up for the failure to maintain ethical standards in professional life.

Now this disregard for strong religious institutions as compared with piety of the heart and an honest life was well enough

so long as state and culture and public opinion were Christian, so long as Christian truth was generally considered as the only truth. But since the end of the eighteenth and especially since the middle of the nineteenth century that is no longer the case, and at the present day this disregard of the institutional church has become a great danger to religion. The modern state must be neutral towards all the different religious and philosophical views; art, social life, politics, public opinion, have developed their own values, an immensely rich literature and press, thousands of secular clubs and societies, bring those values to the people, who consequently do not feel the need of, and do not have the time for, seeking instruction in the church. But since the church has attracted its members by no other means than the sermon, more and more people after leaving school lose all contact with the church, and soon with all religion. This danger in Germany has long been recognized by the church, and, as pietism from the end of the seventeenth century gathered for specific religious activity small circles within the church, so during the last twenty or thirty years there has grown up among the ministers a strong movement which attempts to strengthen the church as a religious institution. More and more ministers and friends of the church begin to feel that our church, as it was up to the last decades, as a mere institution for preaching and teaching, is bound to die and to be dissolved into state and general culture. Prayer is performed in the closet, or in the small circle of kindred souls; instruction is sought from science and literature; public worship is supplanted by art; social wants are satisfied by many clubs; the care of the poor and sick is taken over by the state. If the church cannot offer something that no nation can dispense with, and that only the church can give, then it has no longer a place in modern life, it is a form which does not promote but hinders the religion of the heart.

This criticism and the splendid example of the churches in Calvinistic countries are leading many to a new ideal of the church. They believe that the church does possess such a unique and indispensable treasure, namely, religious nurture and education through fellowship and brotherhood. But if that be the task of the church in the future, then it must have a new

organization. It must no longer be a church of pastors, with parishes of 35,000 people, who can have no personal acquaintance with one another, but small parishes must be organized with definite common moral tasks and common education, with parish societies and meetings and activity, as these have long been established in Calvinistic countries. Many pastors in all parts of Germany have accepted with great enthusiasm this new ideal of the church, and have built up in hard struggle against the centuries-old customary passivity of the laymen a well-organized, rich, and vital parish life which will well bear comparison with that of the best American parishes, though the organization is very different. But in many places, especially in the country parishes, when no energetic minister has undertaken the new task, we still find almost the old state of things. And even where real parish life has been developed, the majority of those who have taken an active part have in most cases come from the middle class alone. This ideal cannot be completely realized so long as German churches are national and established, including as members believers and unbelievers, religious and irreligious.

There is another aspect to the problem. One of the best features of the German churches is that they contain all classes, that the educated and uneducated, the rich and the poor, are together in the same church, sit in the same pews, just as in our cities rich and poor live in the same streets, so that there are no slums and scarcely any exclusive quarters. Where the class spirit is so sharp and has such evil consequences as in Germany, the church must consider it one of its chief tasks to assemble all classes in the same church, and precisely the adherents of this new ideal of the church see in the reconciliation of classes an important part of the education through fellowship at which they aim. But on the other hand this diversity is the greatest obstacle to such a well-organized parish life. It is extremely difficult, even in the sermon, to speak at the same time to peasant-woman and professor, to employer and working-man; and it is still more difficult to keep these different people together in parish meetings, parish clubs, parish entertainments. The differences of class and education are so great in Germany

that the classes scarcely understand one another. They speak different languages, and therefore the new ideal of parish life can never be fully realized. Yet in a limited way it may be very valuable, and already in a thousand examples it has proved a fruitful means of reviving religion and church.

The most brilliant aspect of German church life is presented by the work of the Christian societies ("*christliche Vereine*"). This work shows that the provision made by the state for religious ends has not completely destroyed private initiative; for these thousands of Christian Societies, organized under a few great Associations, are, like the American Young Men's Christian Association, not immediately connected with the church. By far the largest is the so-called "Inner Mission," which Wichern started in 1848 by his inspiring address at the Church Congress in Wittenberg. In accordance with his programme this association today includes evangelization, Young Men's Christian Associations, Young Women's Christian Associations (both these have in Germany more local branches than in the United States and Canada together), care of the sick and infirm through 18,000 voluntary trained-nurses, care of the poor, the prisoners, the outcast, home missions, work against alcoholism and immorality, laborers' colonies, religious lectures to win the educated classes, influence upon the daily press, the publication of Christian literature, and, especially in the last decade, a national Christian labor-movement over against socialism. All this is organized, though very loosely, under one central committee of the Inner Mission, and the men and women working in these fields are trained in great Inner Mission schools.

Of the other great organizations may be mentioned the twenty-seven separate foreign missionary societies, and the two greatest and most popular religious leagues. These are the Gustav Adolf League with 2,000 local branches, ministering to Protestants living among Catholics, whether at home or abroad, but chiefly in Austria and South America; and the Evangelical League with 350,000 members, which aims to unite Protestantism and to protect its interests against the Roman church.

On the whole, it must be said that this work of the Christian

Associations, of which a hundred years ago almost nothing, and sixty years ago very little, was known, and which is carried on exclusively by persons friendly to the church, proves better than anything else that the church in Germany is not declining, but is a great living power with a strong hold upon the German nation.

The outlook is much less favorable when we pass from the practical religious life of the church to the theoretical, to the questions of doctrine. Here we come to the point where the unity and harmony of the Protestant church in Germany, so fruitful in practical coöperation, seems about to break down. The nineteenth century has introduced a marvellous change, and seems to have disproved the assumption of a continuous progress of humanity. In 1800 orthodoxy had almost disappeared in Germany; as far as there was any interest in religion at all, it was either rationalistic—a faith in natural religion, or pietistic—with a disregard of all doctrine. But after the wars against Napoleon came the great reactionary movement in politics and in the church as well, directed by very energetic and able men, and carried through by every means of persuasion and force. Pietism and orthodoxy, formerly enemies, now entered into a league against the common enemy, rationalism. It was indeed a revival of religion over against the indifference and superficiality of the eighteenth century, but at the same time it was a retrogression, which even today we have not yet made up. The old formulas and confessions of Lutheran orthodoxy were revived and forced upon the congregations by pastors and governments. After a hard struggle orthodoxy won the victory, and in 1850 rationalism was expelled from the pulpits and church governments. To be sure, in the circles of political liberalism, so far as they have not completely lost religion, there is still much of the old rationalism left; “God, righteousness, and immortality,” is still the summary of their creed. But the really religious circles, and above all those friendly to the church, are for the most part orthodox. The best church-attendants and the most loyal workers in the Christian societies are all of the orthodox pietistic type; here we find real Christian life, intimate knowledge of the Bible, readiness to give, and courage to confess.

On the other hand the universities teach a theology which has gone far away from the old formulas. At the time of the restoration there were many able orthodox professors in the theological faculties—Hofmann, Frank, Philippi, Thomasius, Beck—and the majority of the pastors of today have accepted their theology; but on the whole, German theology in the nineteenth century has never ceased to be influenced by Schleiermacher, the great liberal theologian, and today there is no professor in any German university who would hold to the Lutheran formulas of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Even the leaders of the so-called positive theology—Seeberg, Grützmacher, Theodor Kaftan—assert the necessity of a “modern positive theology,” or a “modern theology of the old faith,” and teach the old truth in new forms. But they constitute only a minority in the universities; the majority, and in particular the most able men, are completely on the liberal side, and have influenced many, chiefly of the younger pastors.

At present there may be distinguished four more or less organized parties in the German churches. First stand the genuine Liberals, the “*Protestantenverein*,” corresponding perhaps to Unitarianism in America. They started their organization in the sixties, and are mostly followers of Hegel, or perhaps also of the old rationalism; and they attempt to reconcile Christianity and modern culture in a higher, rational religion, earnestly contending against the restoration and orthodoxy. This party has decreased very much during the last twenty-five years, but at present is again increasing.

The second party are “the friends of the *Christliche Welt*” (a religious weekly bearing that title) who, once under the leadership of Ritschl, have won the majority of the professors and a great number of the ministers, including a large part also of those who formerly belonged to the *Protestantenverein*. They hold firmly to the established churches and to their history, but they stand before everything else for absolute freedom of theological scholarship, and for full personal freedom for ministers in thought and teaching. They think it possible for conservative and modern theology to live and work together in the unity of the Spirit in one church. This party admits every type

of theology, but in reality almost all "*Freunde der Christlichen Welt*" are liberals.

The third party is the "middle party," or "*Evangelische Vereinigung*." They stand for moderate progress, to be attained by the equipment and organization of the present churches. And, finally, the fourth party is the "Positive Union," or orthodox party, the smallest among the professors, the largest among the ministers. The great majority of the laymen who are friendly to the church, and consequently the majority in the synods and in the Christian societies, stand on this orthodox side.

It is easy to see that such a state of things gives rise to serious complications. The fact that a majority of the professors and of the younger pastors are liberal, gives rise to grave distrust among religious laymen, who try to prevent the ministers from working in the Christian societies, and denounce them before the consistories. So arise the continual heresy-trials which so much hurt the life of the German churches. Most of the consistories are broad and tolerant, willing to grant freedom of thought to the ministers, and anxious to avoid the condemnation of a pastor on account of heresy; but it would require more than human wisdom to avoid oppressing freedom of thought without, on the other hand, alienating the best and most religious members from the church by openly favoring modern theology. The situation for the ministers is indeed difficult. If they avoid all doctrinal preaching and teaching, as most of them do, they risk the accusation of insincerity, and it is one of the most discouraging aspects of the situation that so large a part of the people, church-attendants as well as non-attendants, are of the opinion that ministers do not believe what they preach. Yet if the ministers, for full sincerity, tell the people the results of modern theology, they repel the best members of their churches and induce them to go to the sects, besides running the risk of a heresy-trial, always harmful to the church.

In spite, however, of the disinclination for theological polemic and enlightenment, professors and ministers are coming to the decision that it is best to make known to the people the results of modern historical criticism, not from the pulpit but in public

addresses, popular literature, and religious magazines. The gulf between university and church would become broader and broader, and would lead to a fatal division, if such work of enlightenment were avoided. So a great popular theological literature has sprung up; the *Christliche Welt*, which is probably the best Christian magazine in the world, the *Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher*, *Lebensfragen*, *Religionsgeschichtlicher Commentar* to the New Testament—all of the highest scientific quality—are designed chiefly for laymen. In the cities public lectures are instituted for the educated, to discuss modern theological questions; these are not directly connected with the church, and intentionally avoid an ecclesiastical tone. But the more this work is done, although with the greatest caution, the sharper becomes the antagonism between scientific theologians and the pietistic conservative part of the laity. One is sometimes inclined to believe that at the very time when in America the separate denominations are tending to draw nearer together, in Germany the one church is destined to be divided. However, the German church has passed through several such crises; in fact the theological struggle has never stopped since the time of the Reformation; and we may hope that this present crisis will not dissolve the unity of the church, as long as the church can remain a state institution.

But the unity of the Protestant church in Germany is disturbed by another danger, namely, the influence of the English and American denominations. I have thus far spoken only of established churches, that is to say national churches to which their members do not belong through an act of joining them, but into which they are born. But this principle is no longer fully maintained. For sixty years there have been in Germany more and more persons who do not belong to the established churches. Their absolute number is still so small that in a general summary they might be omitted. To the established churches belong 99½ per cent of the German population, only ½ per cent are outside the national church. Of these ½ per cent about one-third have left any church, while two-thirds, that is to say 200,000 people, belong to free churches, or, as we call them, sects. A small part of these are of German origin, as,

for instance, the Free Church Lutherans in Prussia, who left the established church when the Lutheran and Reformed churches were united. Almost all the other sects have come from Great Britain or America—Methodists, Baptists, Irvingites ("Catholic Apostolic Church"), Adventists, Christian Scientists, Mormons, Darbyites, etc. They create a decidedly foreign element in German church life, chiefly on account of their evangelistic preaching, their emphasis each upon some rather subordinate point of doctrine or constitution, and their rejection of all modern culture, art, science, and literature. Although they have thus far won only uneducated people, we cannot help regretting their work in Germany, for these sects come over from England and America as if missionaries to the heathen, while in reality not the unchurched, but only church-attendants, chiefly pietists, are withdrawn by their work from the established churches. Their chief means of propagandism are the objections against the institution of state-churches, as containing good and bad, believers and unbelievers, and as even having "unbelievers," that is to say modern theologians, as ministers. Since all this is regretted by many religious people, it is not difficult for the sects to win by these arguments some of the less educated, but very devout, church-attendants. On the other hand, their methods, especially the extravagant evangelistic methods which are so foreign to the German philosophical and thoughtful mind, tend to estrange the educated classes from all religion.

It is, therefore, not surprising that the relations between the church, and especially the ministers, and the sects are strained. The enthusiastic minister in an established church has difficulties enough with the multitude of the indifferent, and he must doubly regret to find himself confronted with an earnest opposition to his work among the very best members of the churches. Since the seventeenth century the German church has always had separate pietistic circles within it, but these pietists have been, and for the most part are still, quiet persons, who attend church regularly and help the pastors, while in addition they maintain their own separate meetings for Bible-study and prayer. In the last decade, however, through the influence of the Evangelical Alliance, founded at Liverpool and supported

in Germany by the sects and by many pietists, there has grown up in some pietistic circles an aggressive attitude, unfriendly to the state-church, which has led to deplorable excesses. The sects will undoubtedly increase, because the essential irrationality of every established church fosters sectarian propagandism; and although we regret their progress, we may yet be glad that their competition forces the established church to greater and more intensive care of the religious life of its members.

Far sharper than the antagonism felt toward the sects is the hostility of German Protestants to the Roman church. One can say that the opposition to Rome is the single point in which all Protestants, friends of the church and indifferents, conservatives and liberals, are united. The two societies founded to protect Protestant interests against Romanism, the Gustav Adolf League and the Evangelical League, are the most popular of all religious societies, and many secular societies have as one of their aims to help in the struggle against Romanism. To be sure, at the meetings of Catholics and Protestants, and on all possible occasions, there is much talk about peace between the confessions, because most Germans feel that this confessional antagonism is disastrous to Germany; yet the situation is at present as far removed from peace as ever. It cannot be said that the Protestant religion in Germany is endangered by Rome, for in only two states are the Catholics in a majority, and in the whole empire only 35 per cent are Catholics, while the changes from Catholicism to Protestantism are more numerous than the losses of the Protestant established churches, and are constantly increasing. In the German-speaking part of Austria 65,000 people have left the Roman church within the last ten years.

But even if there is no danger from Rome to the Protestant religion, Rome yet does everything possible to disturb the peace in Germany. The "Centre," or Catholic party, which forms the largest part in the Reichstag, holds the balance of power, there, and its policy regards the wishes of Rome more than the welfare of the German nation. Through the confessional, the Catholics are hindered from joining any liberal party; art and science are branded and oppressed, the Syllabus of 1864 condemns the foundations of all modern culture as impious errors,

and rejects freedom of conscience and toleration; and these principles, more and more pervade the Catholic clergy. Luther, the greatest of heroes in the eyes of the majority of Germans, is insulted in the Catholic press and schools as the greatest of criminals. Mixed marriages, and all conditions in which Protestants and Catholics are living together, are continually disturbed by the fanatical interference of the Catholic priests, especially those of the younger generation. The intolerance of Rome is constantly increasing; since the new Encyclical of 1907 all reform in Catholicism is bound to fail; Rome knows no other alternative but recantation or excommunication. Among the German Catholics there is much genuine piety and sincere patriotism, but they are completely powerless so long as Rome's jesuitical spirit is dominant in their church; and therefore if Protestants should co-operate with pious and patriotic Catholics they would only strengthen the power of jesuitical Rome. How this increasing antagonism, which divides and hampers Germany in almost all questions of inner politics, science, art, and social work, is to develop and to be overcome, it is impossible to know. We can only say that the power of the Roman church in Germany has marvellously increased within the last hundred years, and that at the same time the Catholic church in Germany has increasingly retrograded in its inner life. Reason has been banished more and more, jesuitical formalism, casuistical morality, ultramontanistic striving for political power, superstitious cults, have more and more repressed the sound religious forces in German Catholicism. Without a radical revolution in the Roman church there can be no hope for a solution of the disastrous antagonism between the two confessions.

A few words must be added about the relation between state and church, and the future of the established church in Germany.

Since the time when Schleiermacher in his romantic enthusiasm declared the union of state and church to be intolerable, the question of separation has never ceased in Germany, and it is much discussed today. Separation of state and church was most in favor in 1848, when the reactionary ecclesiastical politics of the Prussian government estranged the liberals and the working-

men from the church, and the Frankfort Parliament announced separation of state and church as a fundamental principle. Today no parliament in any state would do that; universal separation is not to be expected in the near future. In some states, it is true, the church is almost completely independent, but nowhere is it really a free church. Freedom of conscience and the right to withdraw from the church and to establish a free church is everywhere granted, and so long as only one-half per cent of the whole population are outside of the established churches and most of these send their children to receive religious instruction in the public schools, one can scarcely say that the existence of a state-church creates an unjust discrimination in favor of one part of the population; any more than one could say that about the government support of theatres or art. The sects have distinctly failed to appeal to the people at large, and especially to the educated. The vast majority of the persons opposed to the state-church are much more opposed to the free churches.

The political reasons why no parliament today attacks the question of separation are various. The old liberal conception of the state as merely the protector of law and order, and of the free development of the individual, is completely gone in Germany; the German states, by their traditions and historical development, have taken into their hands all the tasks of culture, provision for education, health, science, art, industry, agriculture, the care of the sick, the poor, and the old, schools, post-offices, railroads, banks. But if the government so promotes all culture, shall it leave the most important part of it, religion, to individuals? Moreover, the matter is closely bound up with education. Shall the state, which selects with greatest care all other professors in the universities, leave the selection of the theological professors to the church, in spite of the fact that the education of the whole people depends so largely upon the quality of the pastors? Shall it tolerate the possibility that the most important part of education, the religious education of the children, may be given in a manner directly opposed to modern German culture and to the interests of the state itself? But this is what the Catholic church, even now, though itself

under state supervision, always tries to do. And a further political motive lies in the dread of an independent church. In France today there are many indications that the free Catholic church, although severely restricted by the Laws of Separation, will engender grave complications for the republic. So interest for German culture and for the education of the people, and fear of the power of an independent, unsupervised church, combine to make our governments and parliaments averse to the separation of state and church.

If we consider the question from the point of view of the church, we reach the same result. To be sure, much harm has come to the Protestant church through its connection with the state—from the ecclesiastical partisanship of autocratic sovereigns, from red tape and bureaucracy, from the necessary regard of the state for Rome; but on the other hand the German people by long tradition are so accustomed to have the state care for everything that a free church could be maintained only with serious difficulty. In the state of Oldenburg separation was once accomplished, but after four years there were so many financial difficulties, so many parties and quarrels arose, that the church asked the state to take it again under its care. The religious life of the people would suffer great harm, if religious instruction, which thus far has reached all children, should be banished from the public schools and from public institutions. Furthermore, a division between Conservatives and Liberals would be inevitable in the free church, and that would break up practical co-operation in the religious societies, and would give to the Roman church a very dangerous superiority. Liberal religion would have great disadvantages, because the majority of the religious laymen would go to the orthodox side, and would not tolerate liberal professors in their universities. The state is the best protector of freedom within the church; the synods as well as the free churches in Germany are mostly narrow and intolerant. The main objection raised against the state-church, that it necessarily contains good and bad, believers and unbelievers, cannot be considered valid, and contradicts the Lutheran idea of the church. Luther denied that a visible church could ever separate good from bad, believers from unbelievers,

converted from unconverted. If it does so, if the visible church undertakes to be a communion of saints, it must always apply a very external test of sainthood. Those who wish to see the church a separated body of the converted, such as our sects claim to be, follow in this respect what seems to us an unchristian individualistic principle. The task of the church is to be the salt of the earth, to educate all people for the Kingdom of God, not merely to uplift a few segregated converted Christians. The question of separation is one of practical advantage, not of principle, and, as we have seen, the state and the church alike have at present many good reasons for maintaining the union.

II

We have seen that the church in Germany has undoubtedly grown stronger during the last century, the Catholic church stronger chiefly in external power, the Protestant in respect to internal efficiency. One hundred years ago there did not exist in all Germany anything like a parish life, or vitally interested congregations, excepting in some pietistic circles; the Protestant church was almost exclusively an institution for preaching and teaching, and the preaching was mostly shallow rationalism. No important theologian was to be found in Germany during the eighteenth century.

Today we find a rich, well-organized, and busy life in many congregations; the work of home and foreign missions grows year by year, as does the willingness to give; sermons have become fresher and more appropriate to the modern world; the religious instruction of the young has made great progress, chiefly within the last ten years, and is undoubtedly better than that of any other country; in many great cities more churches have been built within the last thirty years than during the previous two centuries, and they are often splendid works of modern art. Theology, with men like Harnack, Herrmann, Seeberg, Troeltsch, Loofs, takes its fully acknowledged place in the universities; the results of modern research in theology are disseminated by the church more and more widely among the people; and evangelical work is carried on with greater

zeal than ever before among educated and uneducated. Certainly, we can say that the intensive power of the church is growing, that the church exerts a deeper influence upon the lives of its friends than was the case one hundred, or even twenty, years ago.

Much more difficult is it to decide whether the extensive influence of the church is growing or declining. We may distinguish in Germany four sections of the people, possessing about the same numerical strength, and representing four different philosophies, ideals, cultures: first, the conservatives; secondly, the liberals; thirdly, the ultramontanes (Romanists); fourthly, the socialists, or social-democrats. Three of these sections take a fairly distinct and uniform attitude towards the church. The conservatives are friends of the Protestant church, the ultramontanes are strict Catholics, the social-democrats reject all church and religion. Not quite so clear is the attitude of the liberal section; yet we may say that a majority of the liberals are either indifferent or hostile to the church, although perhaps not so to religion. Considering the statistics of these four groups, we find that of the whole German population about 35 per cent take a friendly attitude to the Protestant church, about 25 per cent to the Catholic church, and that about 40 per cent are completely indifferent or hostile to all churches. These proportions are reckoned by noting the number of votes cast in 1907 in the last election to the Reichstag; they show the political attitude of the men alone, and hence are not an adequate index of the attitude of the whole population. Yet we are probably not far from the truth, for in Germany the political parties do not merely represent different practical principles, but different philosophies, ideals, views of life; one might almost say that the political parties differ from one another as much in their views about religion and science and art as about politics. That is, indeed, a sign of the depth of German culture, which pervades the whole of a man's life; but it is a great calamity that the different groups of the German population have almost nothing in common. We have no Washington and Lincoln and Longfellow, whom the whole nation honors; those heroes who are worshipped with enthu-

siasm by one part of the people, like Luther or Goethe or Bismarck or Lassalle, are for another part objects of fanatical hatred or at least of great offence.

But we should have too favorable an impression of the conditions of the church in Germany if we regarded merely the fact that about sixty per cent of the population are friendly to the church. For although this sixty per cent may be willing to grant the means necessary for maintaining the churches and to send their children to religious instruction, yet only perhaps half of them attend church. The average attendance at the Lord's Supper is in Prussia thirty-seven per cent of the Protestant population, in one state ninety per cent, in Hamburg only eight per cent. Furthermore, we must consider that just among those who create public opinion, the authors and journalists, the majority are unfriendly to the church. If we look into German papers, magazines, or books, we find amazingly little real sympathy with the church, but much hatred and scorn. The situation in this respect is quite other than it is in America. In large circles it is a matter of good form to disparage the church. In many public questions of morality, or politics, or social reform, any interference by the church only does harm, because a great part of the men who influence public opinion oppose on principle policies which the church supports. It would be too much to say that ten per cent of the educated Protestant men are regular church-attendants. This is not surprising. The boy in school is first taught to love the Christian religion, the Bible, the church; later he becomes acquainted with the rich sources of modern German culture, he reads Lessing, Schiller, Goethe, Kant, and discovers that these and other men whom he is taught to revere as teachers of highest wisdom, were indifferent or opposed to the church. And so, although he may still believe, as did most of those heroes, that the Christian religion is the highest element in our civilization, yet he comes to think that the church is of no benefit to him. The sermon which must be adapted to uneducated listeners does not seem to offer anything to him, while the orthodoxy of many preachers repels him, and the caution of the liberals makes him distrust their sincerity. That the church has other purposes besides preach-

ing, that it should cultivate Christian fellowship, is an idea too new to attract him, and in any case the fellowship in one congregation of educated and uneducated, of the different classes, seems to him impossible. Hence many an educated person takes no part in the life of the church, although he may be willing to support it, and may let his children be baptized and taught the Christian religion. And all this is on the supposition that he does not become one of that great number of educated men, chiefly among the liberals, who consider not only the church, but also the Christian religion, to be old-fashioned and outgrown.

Is this unfriendliness to the church growing or declining? That is difficult to say. If we consider statistics, we might be forced to say that the estrangement from the church is growing, for the peasant and middle classes, whose members are the best church-attendants, do not grow in numbers, while the industrial class, and therefore the social-democrats, are increasing rapidly. The peasants move to the cities, and there become social-democrats and so hostile to the church. But over against this growing estrangement stands the certainty that the public influence of the church is actually increasing. Thirty years ago the conservative press took no notice of the church, and the liberal press attacked it bitterly. Today, through a change which has come about chiefly in the last decade, the conservative press openly defends and favors the Protestant church, and a large part of the liberal press has given up its blind hatred. Only the socialist press and some radical liberal papers maintain the old hostility. The old liberalism of the middle of the nineteenth century is everywhere dying out, and the new liberalism is very different, as in other matters so in its attitude to the church. Twenty years ago the church had not a single friend among the liberal members of the Reichstag, today two of the leaders of the liberal party in the Reichstag are former Protestant pastors. Since in Germany never numbers, but only quality, is decisive, it would not be just to say that the influence of the church is declining. Rather is it true that the position of the church is more satisfactory today than it has been at any time within the last sixty years. And, at any rate among church-

attendants, the number of persons to whom religion is an affair of personal moral decision is much greater than has been the case for a long time past. It is true, the number of persons abandoning the church-membership, although still very small (only one-sixth per cent), is increasing, and will probably continue to do so; but this cannot be regretted; on the contrary, it is the most hopeful sign of the present situation, for it shows that the old fatal indifference is disappearing, and that men are beginning to decide positively for or against the church.

What, now, is the present outlook for religion and Christianity in the four sections of the German population? Of the first two groups, the conservatives and the ultramontanes, I have already spoken. Conservative principles and philosophy are found in the nobility, in one part of the middle class, and above all among the peasants. All these classes are at the same time the best members of the Protestant church. Among the nobility and in some sections of the middle class the principle, "Throne and Altar together against Revolution," has still a strong hold. The peasants have come so little in touch with modern culture that they have no difficulties in believing the old orthodox formulas. We find among them much genuine piety and deep loyalty to the church, but since the majority of them are far behind the knowledge and ideals of the present age, their attitude can scarcely decide the future of religion in Germany. If the church remains as it has been up to the present, primarily a church of the conservatives, its influence on the life of the nation must decrease more and more.

The second group, the ultramontanes, is even more reactionary and backward in its philosophy than are the Protestant conservatives. Ultramontanism still follows the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas and the superstition of the Middle Ages. One hundred years ago its death was prophesied, but history has shown that Rome's power is immeasurable and is able to force mediaeval culture upon the twentieth century. Ultramontanism presents the most hopeless problem in Germany, chiefly because Germans can contribute nothing towards it, but must wait as passive spectators to see how Rome itself shall develop.

Of the social-democrats more remains to be said. A fourth part of the German population are social-democrats. Their programme, laid down at Erfurt in 1891, is purely economic and political; religion is declared to be a private affair. But, in reality, among the German social-democrats only the so-called "scientific socialism," that is, the doctrine of Karl Marx, is considered to be socialism proper, and that doctrine is incompatible not only with the church and the Christian religion, but indeed with every religion. The Marxian system is based on economic materialism in its most pronounced form, and leaves no room for independent spiritual forces and values. Accordingly, we find throughout the books of the German socialist leaders many sentences which predict the certain destruction of all religion. "We do not seek new religious forms, we deny all religion," says the great leader Bebel. And the other socialist leader, Liebknecht, declares that "the Christian religion is the religion of private property and of the respectable classes."

Now to this position of the socialist programme and leaders corresponds the attitude of the millions of German social-democrats, who constitute the overwhelming majority of the German wage-earning class. Religion is a private affair,—that means for most of them: As socialists, we are indifferent to religion and church. Some of the leaders have tried again and again to bring about a secession from the church *en masse*, but they have had little success. The vast majority have their children baptized, and are married in church and buried with Christian rites, and part of them pay church-taxes; but that does not mean that they are friendly at heart. That they do not leave the church is because they are absolutely indifferent, and because it is customary to have religious ceremonies at wedding and funeral; from their inner life religion has disappeared.

But this attitude of indifference pertains only to the great unthinking mass. All socialists who think a little deeper, including the whole socialist literature and press, are not indifferent, but display unbounded hatred of the church. "The church is an institution to stultify the people, the ministers

are fools or hypocrites"; this dogma characterizes the attitude of socialist literature. Science and religion are considered as presenting an irreconcilable contradiction; religion is but the tool of the rich to keep the masses in darkness, the rich themselves do not believe in it. Accordingly, social-democracy has undertaken through a great popular literature and by constant public lectures to enlighten the people, to preach materialism as the result of science, and so to destroy religion and faith forever. Socialist evangelists go from place to place and preach in this sense about religion and church, in socialist meetings the subject is treated at length, and the children are influenced against their religious teachers. The outward result of this agitation can be seen in the withdrawals from the church, which are mostly on the part of social-democrats. The number of social-democrats who ever attend a service on Sunday is almost nil; upon every workingman who goes to church his fellow-workers pour out tremendous scorn. Inwardly, the effect is a horrible pessimism; faith in ideal values, trust in God's help, hope in an eternal life is gone. There remains only the endless hard struggle for existence and in the far background the expectation of a future socialist state, which the present generation will not see, and the benefits of which are purely material. But besides that,—and here we come to the most critical point,—with religious faith moral ideals also vanish. Especially the demoralization of the young has made amazing progress, chastity is considered a ridiculous prudery by girls as well as young men. Morality, like religion, is scoffed at as an illusion, the political struggle instigates the basest passions, the accepted doctrine of the party condemns the best virtues and undermines the most holy institutions—family and fatherland. If the strong power of conscience, which is native to the German people, had not counteracted the party doctrine, this demoralization would have gone much farther. Pastor Göhre, who knows social-democracy most intimately, who has himself been a workingman and now belongs to the social-democratic party, gives this judgment: "The effect of the social agitation has thus far been much less disastrous for the political and economic ideas of the workingmen than for their religious convictions and moral char-

acter. In the destruction of the Christian religion, social-democracy has had its greatest success."

What are the reasons for this sad state of things? The main reason is the materialism of the socialist doctrine. Marx and Engels founded socialism in the years 1840 to 1880, that is to say, in the period when materialism was the predominant philosophy in Germany. Consequently, today, when materialism and theological hypercriticism have lost their place among scholars and students, the lower classes accept as gospels Strauss's *Life of Jesus* and Haeckel's *Riddle of the Universe*. As every spiritual movement comes down to the masses at about the time when it is outgrown among scholars, so it has been with materialism, and it would probably have been so, even if Marx had not made materialism the basis of his system. The attitude of the leaders can be further explained by the fact that by origin the majority of them were Jews who had lost their religion.

But all that can serve to explain only their indifference to the church, not their hatred of it. For this enmity the church itself must bear part of the guilt. During the last centuries the church has not been capable of educating the masses to real religion. It has retained old formulas, and renewed them in the time of reaction, and in so doing has brought it about that those for whom science and philosophy had destroyed the old formulas have lost all religion. In reading the criticisms of the socialists and in discussing religious problems with them, one finds that very few attack religion,—the life in and through God,—what they usually attack is certain dogmas, or alleged historical facts, or the attitude of some ministers. The real experience of faith they have apparently never known at all.

The second mistake of the church was political, and this was perhaps the greater mistake. At the time when Marx worked out his system, the dominant principle in Germany, and especially in Prussia, was "Throne and Altar together against Revolution," the church was used by the government for the support of its reactionary policies. And today the church is still in the main a conservative force; the newspapers friendly to the church are mostly conservative in politics. We have seen the reason for this in the materialistic principles adopted by both liberals

and socialists, and the consequent predominance in church affairs of the conservatives. But the accusation of the social-democrats that the ministers keep the masses down, is no longer justified, for today a very large part of the ministers are imbued with social ideas. As early as 1878 the court-preacher Stöcker founded the Christian Social party. Many ministers and friends of the church joined him; Christian workingmen's societies were started everywhere. But Stöcker was a very conservative man, he tried to solve the social question by paternal methods, and keeping to the orthodox formulas he was not able to bring religion nearer to the modern workingman. It remains, however, his great merit to have stirred the Protestant church and reminded it of its social responsibility. In the eighties Bismarck, and since the nineties Emperor William, both led by distinctly Christian motives, carried through the extensive German labor-legislation, and brought state socialism in Germany farther than it has gone in any other country. But through other governmental measures the socialists were driven further into opposition.

Since the beginning of the nineties, Pastor Friedrich Naumann has made a new attempt to solve the problem of social-democracy. He had formerly been an enthusiastic follower of Stöcker, and with marvellous eloquence had preached to the church and the pastors the duty of solving the social question through active participation in politics. He parted with Stöcker because he saw an obstacle in Stöcker's paternalism and orthodoxy; and he founded the National Social party, with the conviction that the social-democrats could be won for patriotism and the church, if liberalism would vigorously take up social problems and stand firm for labor-unionism. A deeply religious man and an enthusiastic orator, Naumann succeeded in winning many friends of the church, especially the younger pastors, to this new liberalism. In the years 1890 to 1894 there was a wave of social enthusiasm in the German Protestant church comparable with that in the United States at present. But the movement in Germany subsided, and for two reasons. First, Naumann did not succeed in winning over to his party a single socialist. The socialists scoffed at the

social pastor; they do not want to have their programme carried through little by little in a legal way, the theory of the inevitable increase of misery up to the final catastrophe has become with them an absolute dogma. So after four years the National Social party collapsed. Furthermore, Naumann himself has changed. He saw that, given the tremendous growth of our population, the first thing necessary for helping the social need in Germany is a great industrial development, and that this is possible only if Germany consciously adopts imperialistic policies, acquires colonies, and builds a navy. But that led to complications with Christian principles; indeed, Naumann came to the conclusion that politics, whether social or of any other sort, is primarily a struggle for power, and that it is impossible to derive the aims of politics from the Gospel. The Christian religion can put the struggle for power on a higher level, but it cannot solve the present problems.

This change in Naumann, and the failure to make converts from the social-democracy, have diminished the social enthusiasm of the friends of the church; more and more they have come to recognize that equally good Christians may hold very different opinions about the solution of the social question, and that therefore ministers who deal with political questions will necessarily be forced to enter into the struggle of parties. But the laymen justly ask that the ministers shall not be partisans, and so, especially because of the harmful political activity of the Catholic priests through the confessional, the demand has more and more prevailed that ministers shall not discuss politics. The "Christian social" enthusiasm has abated, but it has made the issue clearer, and has shown where the Gospel has its place and where not. The social spirit has at the same time extended itself in the church; in most cities the ministers have formed Christian workingmen's societies, which, with no party standpoint, take up political, social, religious, and educational questions, and in so doing infuse the Christian spirit into the discussion of social problems. The Protestant workingmen's societies have 140,000 members, the Catholic 400,000. Besides, there are two Protestant social congresses, one more conservative, the other more liberal, where ministers and economists

and manufacturers and Christian labor-leaders discuss and promote the solution of social problems. Not only within the church, however, but everywhere in Germany the social spirit, due in great measure to Naumann, is growing; the movement is no longer so enthusiastic as it was fifteen years ago, but it is more solid, sober, and thorough, an idealism which, we may hope, will at last win the victory over social democracy, and so open anew the way to religion for a great class of the people. But it must be confessed that thus far the growth of social-democracy has not been checked by all these movements; the social-democratic party is still increasing, though not in proportion to the increasing number of wage-earners, and more and more people are losing all religion.

The hope of victory must be based chiefly on theoretical considerations. First, materialism is definitely overcome in German philosophy and art, and this rejection of materialism must in time reach the masses. The overcoming of materialism in the laboring class will be a hard struggle, because the whole socialist system is based on materialism, but it will surely be accomplished at last. Germans are always primarily philosophers and thinkers, and in the social-democracy the philosophy of materialism has had a much greater influence than practical political and social doctrines. The German workingman is much more a philosopher than a politician, and in the end he will have to recognize the shallowness of materialism. For many of the best social-democrats even today their doctrine is something like a new religion, it is an ideal, a faith in the final victory of the good cause, and it leads them to the most unselfish devotion. They will learn how poor the world and mankind would be if its religion consisted only of material, economic, and political ideals. We may say already that Marxian socialism has reached its culmination. Although the numbers are growing, and the masses vote down all revision of the doctrine in the party congresses, yet the party will soon be almost like an army without officers, for the best and most intelligent members have revisionistic tendencies. And revisionism means not only the abrogation of the revolutionary principles, but also the abandonment of the materialistic foundation and of the

dogmatic attitude which scorns all idealism, all religion, and the church, as folly and hypocrisy.

III

If our confidence in a revival of religion among socialists is mainly theoretical, we can point out a more concrete basis for hope when we turn to the fourth or liberal group. And the attitude of liberalism is most important for our question, for it is decisive for the future of religion and the church in Germany. To be sure, liberalism comprises today very diverse elements. All those whom we call typically modern are here united,—a great part of the mob of the cities, the modern Jews, the classes who are moved by superficial sentiment, the apostles of immorality. These pseudo-liberals, who form a majority of their group, take much the same attitude to the church as do the socialists, an attitude of indifference or of blind hate. But to the class of modern men, to liberalism, belong as well the creators and representatives of real German culture, artists, professors, literary men, reformers, those whose attitude decides the future. For it is always true that what these men stand for today, will in the future become the common ideas of the people. Because one hundred years ago Goethe and Schiller turned from the church, and because fifty years ago science professed to have refuted religion, therefore today the masses leave the church and the workingmen scoff at religion. And if the men of art and scholarship turn to religion today, within one or two generations the masses will follow, even though no great reformer like Luther appears who can win the whole people by one stroke of genius.

So we come at last to the question which we asked at the beginning. Is the Christian religion possible for the modern man? Is the support of the church compatible with modern culture?

Since the latter part of the eighteenth century, when modern German culture began, the whole life of the educated German has been imbued with a rich culture completely independent of the church. In modern Germany, as nowhere else, all fields of culture have intimately co-operated; classicism, romanticism,

naturalism, impressionism, have put their impress not only on philosophy and literature, painting and music, but also on education, politics, and economics. At present no single new movement seems to be supplanting the old in all fields at once; the characteristic of today is rather that contradictory principles exist together, and often in the same persons. The older tendencies are not completely abolished by the more modern. One element alone seems to be common to all the tendencies of modern culture, the purely negative characteristic of Anti-supernaturalism. A supernaturalistic view of the world was self-evident for the church from its beginning and through the Middle Ages and at the time of the Reformation. By a positive revelation and an absolute miracle God has brought from the outside into the sinful natural world salvation for that part of mankind who with their hearts accept his revelation. After a short period of earthly life these persons will be led to their true home in heaven. This philosophy, which conceives all history as a drama played between heaven and earth, between the supernatural and the natural world, has completely disappeared from our modern thinking. Kant, the leader of modern German philosophy, and Goethe, the hero of modern German art, have destroyed it for the educated part of the German people. The classical German idealists—Kant, Schiller, Goethe, Fichte, Hegel, Schelling—were not atheistic,—on the contrary, most of them were pantheistic, and accepted all reality as a revelation of the divine; yet this idealism was in fundamental ways, above all in its anti-supernaturalism, opposed to what had up to that time passed for Christian religion, and the idealists were very far from the church. Since, according to them, all life and all human relations share in the eternal, they had no need for specific religion. The highest thing in life for Kant was morality; for the others it was rather philosophy, art, or science.

But in the middle of the nineteenth century, after a splendid period of predominance, this classical German idealism collapsed. The idealization and deification of reality appeared unjustifiable—a subjective transgression of the limits of experience, and a stronger feeling for the dark and gloomy aspects of life and the world caused the idea of the whole world as a

realm of reason and a revelation of God to seem a vast illusion. Since the middle of the nineteenth century, natural sciences, positivism, naturalism, have taken the place of idealistic art and philosophy; science no longer tries to understand things from their inner reasons, but only to investigate and order phenomena; art no longer aims to create a new world, but to copy as closely as possible the immediate impression of things; political and private life no longer strive for ideals and for universal harmony, but are a struggle for the physical, economical, and political fundamentals of existence. A new realistic type of culture has arisen, such as was never known in Germany before. The truest representatives of German idealism, Schiller, Fichte, Hegel, are neglected and derided; only Goethe, that universal genius, who in all his idealism had always a marvellously keen sense for real life, has maintained his place as hero, and of Kant only the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the philosophy of the caused phenomenal world, has maintained its acceptance. This realistic culture of the second half of the nineteenth century has made life immensely rich and refined, has not only created a politically united, strong empire, and produced enormous progress in industry and the arts, and in the standard of living, but has also sharpened our eyes for the realities of life, and taught us that to get truth is more important than to idealize things, that life and art are not a play or a toy, but serious hard work. The naturalistic art of poets like Ibsen and Hauptmann and of painters like Liebermann has revealed with inexorable sharpness the intricate complexity of the soul and the cruel mechanism of society, so that today no optimistic phrases or idealistic abstractions can make us overlook the realities of life.

But from the church and religion this realistic culture has departed still more widely than did the pantheistic idealism of the first half of the century. Religion, like metaphysics, can appear to such naturalistic thinking only as a beautiful dream or a foolish illusion. In philosophy agnostic positivism does not allow reflection on God and eternal things; materialism, or, as it calls itself today, monism, treats all psychic life, and so religion, as an accidental product of the causal physical mechanism, and rejects the idea of a personal God as unscientific. The few

thinkers who use the name of God venerate him as mere natural power pervading the world, to which any personal relation is impossible. Concepts like love and grace, faith and trust, are called anthropomorphic. Not a certain form of religion, but religion as such, seems outgrown. The somewhat vague conceptions of a transcendental world and spiritual values are contrary to the whole temper of a realistic age, which through the predominance of natural sciences and technique has come to unbounded admiration for exact empirical facts. Furthermore, the results of modern historical criticism, and the work of Strauss and Baur, have become known to the educated laymen, and have taken away their belief in the trustworthiness of the fundamentals of Christianity. So religion has vanished from the minds of the representatives of the highest modern culture; for many of them art has taken the place of religion, a realistic art which is supposed to be able to satisfy the longings of the soul.

The sad results of naturalism are seen not only in the attitude of the age towards religion, but also in its morality. It is true that a great part of the naturalistic philosophers and artists acknowledge the ideals of truth and goodness and beauty, but only as natural and necessary products of the social evolution of mankind, and therefore as possessing merely relative value. The complete determinism of the age allows no faith in free moral personalities. Moral weakness and cynicism pervade large numbers of the educated; and when in the later eighties and the nineties of the nineteenth century the old optimism in regard to technical and political success gave way to the painful discovery of the inner demoralization and shallowness of life, German culture of the so-called *fin de siècle* really became in many respects a decadent civilization.

All this still exists in German liberalism today. The zealous League of Monists under the leadership of Haeckel still preaches materialism to the people, realistic interests still control many of the educated, the spirit of decadence still produces in arts and literature abundant, and sometimes horrible, fruits, and the Christian religion and Christian morality still find their most dangerous enemies among the men and women of culture.

And yet we are justified in saying that the profoundest men of our time are no longer on the side of the enemies of religion, and that since the end of the nineteenth century naturalism has been continuously declining until it has nearly disappeared among the men of highest education. And what has taken its place? The new spirit is called neo-romanticism, or mysticism, or symbolism; in reality, we must confess that it is not a definite new type of culture, but only a great striving,—but this striving we may fairly call religious. The one great problem of the salvation of the soul, the question: How can the soul find the eternal? has driven all others into the background. The old broad faith in the sufficiency of secular culture is deeply shaken. Men had believed that this faith would make life rich and man great, and it turns out that on the contrary it has made our life small and poor.

As leaders of this modern movement, with its deep striving, may be named three great men, of whom only one is a German, but who have all found their greatest body of disciples in Germany: Ibsen, Tolstoi, Nietzsche. Ibsen was a naturalist in fundamental philosophy, but the problem of the soul in danger of perishing under the standardizing and mechanizing power of culture had laid hold on him, and he tried to solve it, although by purely naturalistic means which led to failure—a complete bankruptcy, of which his last book is the frank confession. Tolstoi has preached with the tremendous force of genius that our realistic culture is absurd and will ruin mankind. He has thereby expressed the dim feeling of thousands, and has attained to enormous influence. But the majority follow him only on his negative side, in his criticism of the present civilization; the way to salvation which he has shown, a radical anarchism of Christian brotherhood, has found few in Germany to accept it. Tolstoi is a John the Baptist, the forerunner, preaching the law and calling the men of his time to repentance.

A far greater influence than that of Ibsen or Tolstoi has been exercised by Nietzsche. He has aroused an interest and enthusiasm, chiefly among the young, which America can scarcely imagine. Although during the last twenty years an immense literature has been written about him, he is still the unsolved

riddle for Germany. In a language whose music enchants every artistic sense, he has preached, as a new Messiah, the great gospel of the superman. He has attacked the Christian religion and Christian morality as the one great fundamental lie which has made our culture sick and decadent; God is dead, sin never existed, truth we do not want, the will of the few to be mighty is alone God and truth and righteousness. This doctrine has caused a widespread agitation and confusion of mind. The decadents, especially the aesthetic and literary youth, have accepted it with enthusiasm, and preached brutal immorality with provoking frankness. Aristocratic tendencies have again come forward, and in many circles have driven out the newer democratic ideas; unbounded individualism, which since the days of romanticism has had a great hold on our people, claims the right to live its own life without restrictions. The "Congregation of Nietzsche," as they call themselves, have undertaken a campaign to overthrow the Christian religion.

So Nietzsche seems to have been a destroyer of Christianity. Yet this is surely not the place which he will take in the history of German thought. Quite the contrary. Nietzsche's philosophical ideas may temporarily confuse the minds of a great part of the educated, but they will soon be outgrown by reason of their own irrationality. Nietzsche was not a philosopher, he was a poet and a prophet, and he has made an end of naturalism in Germany. He saw that there is only one problem in life, the problem of the soul; and his whole life was one great longing after true idealism in contrast to realism and naturalism, his whole thinking was a seeking after God, after holiness, after eternal life. His solutions are, at least theoretically, wrong and confused, and through them he ultimately lost his mind; but his point of view, his attitude towards life, is the great and striking thing in him.

And that question which is the content of Nietzsche's life has deeply penetrated German thought in the years since he first won recognition. Our best books are no longer merely naturalistic, but deal with the fundamental and eternal questions of life. It is an unparalleled thing that a purely theological book like Harnack's *What is Christianity?* should have

five editions in one year. And it is almost unknown in the history of German literature that within a few months a book should find sale to the extent of 150,000 copies, and produce such an immense agitation as did Frenssen's *Hilligenlei*, a book whose only subject is the longing for truth and holiness, and which explicitly contains a life of Christ. Doubtless other causes helped to the great success of that book, and it may be admitted that the treatment of the subject was not at all satisfactory, but the hundreds of criticisms of the book clearly proved how deeply its subject, and in particular the religious aspect of that subject, had stirred German hearts. So it is with other popular modern writers and poets, Björnson, Tolstoi, Maeterlinck, Rosegger, Chamberlain, Lilienkron, Dehmel, who all treat religious questions. Schiller has come more into favor, and of Goethe it is no longer only his middle, and purely humanistic, period that is admired, in which he called himself a decided heathen, but also his later work, which tends much more towards religion and Christianity.

On the other hand, we must say that thus far this seeking is seldom friendly to the church, and that it has not yet reached any positive results which can be called distinctively Christian. Its character is more aesthetic than ethical; satisfaction is sought more from the great artists than from Jesus. The worship of Goethe has truly become religious, but as there are Goethe-congregations, so we find congregations of the followers of Tolstoi, of Nietzsche, of Ibsen, of Klinger, besides "Teutonic" and many other "religions." In one year thirteen such new so-called religions were propounded, all among the educated,—partly pagan, partly mystical, partly theosophical, partly merely aesthetic. Yet some of these new movements, none of which, of course, led to new religious institutions, are decidedly imbued with a deep Christian spirit,—as, for example, the great number of educated persons gathered under the influence of Johannes Muller.

On the whole, we may say that naturalism is outgrown in the best circles of German thinking, but that no distinct new ideal has taken its place. The age is disgusted with mere realistic culture, and is characterized by religious longing, but this long-

ing has not yet found a definite satisfaction. Will it find it in the Christian religion, will the church be able to satisfy it? Two things seem to me to be certain. First, the old orthodox form of Christianity cannot satisfy this longing of the age, for the older supernaturalism is gone forever; all philosophy since Spinoza would have to be annulled, all modern culture would stultify itself, if thought should return to the old supernaturalism. Secondly, the Christian religion stands and falls with the ethical concepts of sin and salvation, that is to say, with at least a relative dualism. Neither immanent idealism, which sees divine revelation in all things, nor naturalism, which knows no other reality than the phenomenal world, is compatible with the Christian religion. Here indeed lies the fundamental antagonism between the Christian religion and modern thought. If the two are to come together, if the religious longing of the present is to find its answer in the Christian religion, modern thought will have to abandon its purely immanent view of the world, that view which either takes God and world as the same thing, or else knows only the world and no God. Modern thinking has brought about its own destruction. The idea of a transcendental world was abandoned, and only then did this present world of immediate reality come into view as a realm of reason and ideals. But that mode of thought could only continue so long as the departed idea of a transcendental world was still casting its brightness upon this mundane scene. When the illusion disappeared, our world displayed its irrationality and meanness. In that aspect naturalism has viewed it. But naturalism has become disgusted with itself. Today men are again longing for eternal values, for a deeper reality and a higher aim of life than this mere immediate world and its happiness can offer. This longing, this incipient faith in an unseen depth of reality, changes the attitude towards religion. Men had before struggled against it as against an outside authority, now they are becoming aware that in the struggle against religion their own souls are at stake. Today, therefore, culture with its immanence and religion with its transcendence must try to come to an understanding. If they do not succeed, modern culture and the Christian church will separate for all time; if they do

succeed, there is a possibility of union. Only a possibility, to be sure; much depends upon whether the church of the future will be broad enough to accept the understanding. For there can be no doubt that it will be something new; a simple resumption of the old supernaturalism would be no solution of the problem. Only a new conception of transcendence, of God, of salvation, can settle it. The future we cannot foresee; if we look at the rigid conservatism of the friends of the church and at the fanatical anti-supernaturalism of the men of culture, we must be very doubtful whether without the appearance of some great creative genius such a change is possible. In Germany today such a man is awaited by many, who find intolerable the present hopeless confusion of ideas and dissolution of the very fundamentals of life.

Meanwhile, many are working steadfastly for a solution,—chiefly students of philosophy and theology,—and of these a word must be said. After the complete breakdown of the Hegelian philosophy in the middle of the nineteenth century theology was in trouble. Philosophy was either materialistic or agnostic or pessimistic or, since the seventies, neo-kantian in a purely critical form; and there seemed to be no room for religion in any of these systems. In this distress Ritschl appeared like a saviour. Taking up Schleiermacher's ideas, he defended the truth of the Christian religion by completely separating religion from culture, and theology from metaphysics, and by basing religion and theology exclusively on practical religious experience and on "value-judgments." He practically swept the whole field of liberal theology in Germany; his ideas were greeted with great enthusiasm by theologians; and today his disciples are still among the foremost of German theological scholars. In the last ten years, however, Ritschlianism has passed more and more into the background. Many have seen that the old problem of the antagonism of religion and modern thought cannot be solved by merely treating them as two independent things, and dividing man into two parts, but that an understanding and reconciliation between the two is absolutely necessary, and in the last fifteen years a new interest has sprung up in the philosophy of religion. This has proceeded

first from the side of the philosophers. The modern movement called "critical idealism," or "the idealism of freedom," cannot be described without a more detailed discussion than can here be given of the difficult epistemological investigations on which it builds. It is based on Kant, yet no longer chiefly on the *Critique of Pure Reason*, but on Kant as a teacher of the realm of freedom which is above the realm of nature. The world of ideals and values, in distinction from the world of causal mechanism, is presented as an independent, personal reality, indeed as the only certain reality. It is far less obscure to us in its existence than is the phenomenal world of nature, and the latter world only becomes definite reality to the degree that it is taken up into the world of ideals. In man both realms meet, the natural, including physical and psychic life, and the ideal; and so in man a struggle arises between freedom and necessity, that struggle which makes human life at once tragic and sublime.

The philosopher Rudolf Eucken has treated this idealism of freedom especially from the religious point of view, and in so doing has called forth a strong movement in theology. In the practical affirmation of the higher spiritual life which enters into our natural world of experience Eucken has seen the essence of religious faith. Religion is possible without faith in a God, as is shown by Buddhism, but religion without the dualism of life is an empty word. The religious problem for Eucken is nothing else than the problem of the transcendental life in us men, the problem of sin and of regeneration by the saving grace of God, who is himself the personal embodiment of the transcendental world. This philosophy seems to give a solution of the antagonism between supernatural religion and the immanent philosophy of modern thought. The old supernaturalism is given up, for the divine is not considered to be outside of the world but to have its reality in the ideals which pervade our world. And yet the dualism so necessary for religion is recognized; the eternal world, which we experience as Personal Spirit, lays hold on man as he is, in the chains of natural necessity, and lifts him up into the realm of freedom.

Whether this new movement in philosophy and theology will

be able to reconcile religion and culture remains to be seen. The main thing is that the problem is clearly recognized, and that the best men are trying to solve it. We are still far removed in Germany from a harmonious religious or Christian culture, and much farther from a culture united with the church. But we have no right to be discouraged. Where truth is sought with unwavering sincerity, where the best men of the church and of all departments of secular thought are working for the solution of one definite task, where so large a part of the people sincerely desire a revival of religion, there we are justified in hoping that the period upon which we are entering will bring nearer the final solution of the antagonism between religion and culture, and so will make a contribution of inestimable value to the religious thought and life of mankind.

CAN PRAGMATISM FURNISH A PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS FOR THEOLOGY?¹

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In order to establish a negative answer to this question, one would simply have to show either that pragmatism itself is not tenable, or else that it can afford theology no adequate support. To establish the affirmative, however, it would be necessary to show in the first place that pragmatism is in itself tenable, and in the second place that it is compatible with and gives some real support to theology. But for the would-be theological pragmatist himself neither of these positions can be readily accepted as established without the other. On the one hand he cannot say that pragmatism supports theology unless it is itself tenable, for, if untenable, so far from being the philosophical basis of theology, it cannot be a real basis for anything. On the other hand the person who finds religion essential cannot, on pragmatic principles, accept pragmatism, if it is not at least compatible with the fundamentals of religion and theology—unless, indeed, he needs pragmatism more than he needs religion. While beginning, then, by inquiring whether pragmatism is tenable or not, it must be recognized that a final affirmative answer cannot be given until we have considered the question of the bearing of pragmatism upon the essential affirmations of religious faith.

The investigation of the question, Is pragmatism tenable? involves, of course, the preliminary inquiry, What is pragmatism? To answer this question fairly is no small task in itself.

A common attitude toward the whole pragmatist movement is expressed in the criticism, "If it is new, it is nonsense; if it is old, it is obvious."² When it is affirmed that true judgments

¹ A paper read before the Baptist Congress, at New York, Nov. 9, 1909.

² E. E. Slosson, *The Independent*, Feb. 21, 1907.

must be ultimately satisfactory, and that none but true judgments can be really satisfactory as working principles in the service of legitimate human interests; that indeed all true judgments about reality are actually or potentially useful, so that the experienced usefulness of a belief indicates with more or less probability its truth,—most thinkers agree that this is obviously true. There is an intimate relation between the truth and the practical utility of judgments, but the truth, they say, is something to be established independently of the usefulness; we test the truth first and find it useful afterwards. Such a position may be called semi-pragmatism, but it is not pragmatism proper.

Many of those who criticise pragmatism seem to regard it as the doctrine that all satisfactory judgments are true, simply by virtue of their giving satisfaction to some particular desire; that all judgments found useful in the realization of purposes are, to the extent of their usefulness, true. Now it is undoubtedly true that much of the popular so-called pragmatism is of this sort. And Professor James himself often uses such unguarded expressions that he has to complain, in spite of his popular style, that he is very generally misunderstood as teaching some such doctrine. For example, in his book entitled *Pragmatism* he says, "Truth is only the expedient in the way of our thinking" (p. 222), and again, "On pragmatic principles we cannot reject any hypothesis if consequences useful to life flow from it" (p. 273). And yet in his latest work, *The Meaning of Truth*, he characterizes as "silly" and "an obvious absurdity" the view attributed to him "that anyone who believes a proposition to be true must first have made out clearly that its consequences *are* good, and that his belief must primarily be in that fact" (pp. 272f.), or "that whatever proves subjectively expedient in the way of our thinking is 'true' in the absolute and unrestricted sense of the word" (p. 231). Now this doctrine which Professor James seems at times to teach, but which he strenuously repudiates, is very evidently, as it has been characterized, nonsense. It is what the newspaper wit had in mind when he wrote, "The Eskimos would seem to have a strong natural leaning toward pragmatism." This may fairly be called

pseudo-pragmatism, for it would be a very superficial judgment which would identify the essence of the whole pragmatic movement with this absurd doctrine.

But if the essential nature of pragmatism consists neither in the doctrine that all true judgments are useful, nor in the doctrine that all useful judgments are true; if it must be differentiated from semi-pragmatism, which is obvious, and from pseudo-pragmatism, which is nonsense, just what, then, is it? What escape is there from the horns of this dilemma? Now it is the fault of the typical absolutist critic of pragmatism that he has a passion for expressing every movement and tendency in the form of a universal principle, and it is his mistake to suppose that when he has refuted the principle he has virtually annihilated the movement. And it may very well be that the proper pragmatist easily avoids both horns of the intellectualist's dilemma.

The fairest way to answer the question, What is Pragmatism? is to settle it pragmatically. In pragmatism, then, what is the practical attitude? What does it really propose to do? To this the answer is that it proposes, in any crisis in which a judgment is demanded, to take the most promising suggestion as a working hypothesis and test its truth by the way it *works*. If the hypothesis has been thoroughly tested and has worked satisfactorily, it is properly called not only useful but true. Thus usefulness is taken as a mark of truth, although it is not claimed universally that all judgments that are subjectively useful or temporarily satisfactory are objectively true. But further, pragmatism takes as its working hypothesis that every test there is for truth can be stated as a test of working, and that the results of speculation are problematic until verified in the experiences of life.

It will be seen, then, that pragmatism proper does not make for a greater laxity of thought, but rather for a more rigorous and extensive application of the principles of scientific method. Now in all scientific judgment the predicate is regarded as a mere trial-predicate and the judgment is made purely hypothetically at first, in order that by acting as if it were true it may be shown by the manner of its working whether the best hypothesis was

used, that is, whether the best trial-predicate was employed. And pragmatism, as we have intimated, does not propose to find a substitute for science in the study of nature or history, nor to change scientific procedure, nor to discredit in any way the results of scientific investigation. On the contrary it establishes scientific procedure as its model, and undertakes to make philosophy, with which it is chiefly concerned, more scientific. If there is to be thinking about any reality beyond the reach of the phenomenal sciences, that thinking must imitate those sciences as far as possible; it must refer to experience wherever it is able to do so and find truth only through some kind of verification of working hypotheses. This surely is a tenable position.

But pragmatism is young and vigorous, and it has exhibited a good many overgrowths and excrescences that will doubtless be pruned away in time. To some extent this is already taking place. Early pragmatism tended to discredit system, consistency, and the so-called theoretical interest. Schiller of Oxford was especially pronounced in this respect. But now it is more usual to find the practical set forth, not as opposed altogether to the theoretical, but as including it as a special type of the practical. Science was described by Professor Dewey six years ago as "just the forging and arranging of instrumentalities for dealing with individual cases of experience."³ But what shall we say about the pursuit of science as something interesting apart from its further application; what about the interest in truth for its own sake? This is now interpreted as an instance of the shift of interest whereby the process of securing means to possible practical ends becomes interesting and an end in itself, the original practical purpose being lost sight of, and this new purpose being now itself an active principle, organizing other activities into its service as means.

It is to be expected also that pragmatists will give up the somewhat dogmatic assertion that any particular truth has only temporary value. There is a manifest contradiction, as has been repeatedly pointed out, in stating universally that there is no universal truth, assuming that it will be permanently satisfac-

³The Logical Conditions of Scientific Treatment of Morality, p. 8.

tory to hold that no truth will permanently satisfy, that all things else are in a flux and only pragmatism has come to stay. To guard his position the pragmatist must say that it is simply his working hypothesis that all truths will prove ephemeral; but as a matter of fact he tacitly assumes that some truth at least will be permanently valid, and he might more consistently adopt as his working hypothesis that some human judgments will be abidingly true.

Again, there is a decided tendency among pragmatists to go beyond the hypothesis that the only way to test truth is by an experience of its working, and to assert that truth is a species of utility. Of course this does not necessarily involve the crass utilitarianism that has been charged against pragmatism, but which really belongs to what we have styled pseudo-pragmatism. And yet, for the following reasons, it is questionable whether pragmatists may not prematurely identify their position with this doctrine. In the first place the doctrine that truth can be accurately and adequately defined in terms of utility can be established, if at all, only after a thorough analysis of the psychology of meaning and of the judging process, and after an adequate examination of the representational theory of truth. Again, the statement lends itself very readily to misinterpretation on the part of critics, thus hindering the acceptance of what truth there is in pragmatism. In addition to this, when taken as a principle it tends to lead one into making statements which come dangerously near to pseudo-pragmatism. And, lastly, since one can set forth, as above, the essence of pragmatism without making use of this disputed principle, on the pragmatic ground that no difference should be recognized unless it *makes* a difference, the pragmatist should perhaps content himself with the irreducible minimum definition of pragmatism as the hypothesis that there is no test of truth which is not essentially a test of usefulness in some concrete situation. The necessary—that is, what man really needs to believe in order to live as he ought—is true. And this fundamental hypothesis of pragmatism is still a working one; it has not been shown to be scientifically untenable.

But even if one should accept the essential postulate of prag-

matism, it does not follow that he must accept all that can truly call itself pragmatism. For even in essential pragmatism wide is the gate and broad is the way that leads to theological destruction, and many are they that enter in thereby.

At the very gateway of pragmatism there is an obvious downward path whose finger-post points in the direction of animalism. It is undoubtedly true that originally consciousness and in man the judging process were valuable chiefly as means of better adjusting the animal organism to its environment, so that the physical life might be preserved and propagated. In that primitive situation the biological function of judgments, that is, the way in which they functioned in the service of the physical life of the individual and of the race, was, roughly speaking, an index to their truth. But when it is assumed that not only then but now and always the only test of truth is its function in man's struggle for physical existence, we have an animalistic pragmatism which cannot be adequate to the demands of man unless he is satisfied to live simply as an animal. In criticism of this type of pragmatism attention may be called to the notorious fact that in conscious life new interests are constantly developing, many of which are not centred in the fate of the physical organism at all. Moreover, these new interests peculiar to man as a spiritual personality may lead to a transvaluation of all former values, so that instead of life's being interpreted in its lowest terms, as the physical existence of the individual and of the race, it is interpreted in its highest terms, as the spiritual development and efficiency of the individual and society. Then, instead of consciousness and judgments being regarded as mere means for the promotion of the physical life, the physical life is regarded as simply or chiefly instrumental in the promotion of the conscious life in its spiritual aspects. The ideal interests no longer exist for the sake of the physical, but the physical life for the sake of the ideal. Or, as Professor Montague puts it, "Man began to think in order that he might eat: he has evolved to the point where he eats in order that he may think."⁴ Instead of the animalistic type, then, we are led to a humanistic pragmatism, in which the truth of judgments is

⁴ *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. vi, p. 489.

tested by their utility in the service of that life of the individual and of society in which all the peculiarly and legitimately human interests are recognized as being of primary importance. Once the ends in view are thoroughly accredited, it may be assumed that those judgments that are ultimately necessary for the achievement of these ends are valid. Thus, in the sense of what is humanly necessary, necessity remains the test of the truth of judgments.

But sometimes humanistic pragmatism presents itself in an extremely individualistic form. That Dr. Schiller does not entirely escape this is shown by his assertion that two men "with different fortunes, histories, and temperaments, ought not to arrive at the same metaphysic, nor can they do so honestly."⁵ But over against individualistic pragmatism which would make usefulness or necessity for the individual the sole criterion of truth, pragmatism is coming to state more clearly that it is the function of ideas in the social situation that is the test of their truth. For example, Professor A. W. Moore says, "When the pragmatist talks of attention and thought as arising at the point of a need for readjustment, this need must not be taken to mean the need of some one lone, marooned organism or mind only. The readjustment is always in and of a 'social situation.'"⁶ The humanistic pragmatism, then, to be defensible, must be of the social rather than of the individualistic type. It is not in merely individual but in social utility and necessity that truth is assuredly to be found.

But, once more, even this type of humanistic pragmatism may vary according to the interests which are recognized as genuinely and legitimately human. For example, there may develop on the one hand a positivistic pragmatism in which the distinctly religious interest is repudiated, and on the other hand a religious pragmatism in which, along with the social, scientific, aesthetic, and moral interests, the distinctly religious interest is recognized as essentially human and valid, so that judgments which are really indispensable to the promotion of the highest

⁵ *Studies in Humanism*, p. 18.

⁶ *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. vi, pp. 382-3.

type of religious life are regarded as validly claiming our acceptance as true.

Just here is the crux of the question as to the relation of pragmatism to theology. There are some with whom pragmatism is a methodological principle for accrediting the postulates of religious faith with regard to realities that transcend phenomenal experience. There are others who employ their pragmatism to discredit speculation and assertions about transcendent reality generally; they do not recognize as legitimate and significant for philosophy the religious interest which requires to express itself theologically. But theistic religion must accept, and, I take it, is ready to accept, the challenge of pragmatism. Any pragmatic philosophy which is to satisfy the whole man at his highest and best, and the race at its highest and best, cannot afford to ignore a religion which meets fundamental spiritual need with abiding satisfaction, and which necessarily expresses itself in a theology for which it just as necessarily claims objective validity.

Now pragmatism in alliance with religion is not a new thing under the sun. Exactly that which gave to the Ritschlian theology its vitality and appeal was its religious pragmatism. But the Ritschlian pragmatism was partial; it was applied to religious judgments only, leaving scientific and philosophical judgments apparently on an entirely different footing. In keeping with this absolute distinction between theoretical and value-judgments, it refused to mediate philosophically between its dogmatics on the one hand and the sciences and philosophy of nature on the other. Its pragmatism was thus dualistic in its tendency. It encouraged the impression that certain judgments were valuable and valid in theology, but not in philosophy. The outcome in many cases was that instead of being a thoroughgoing religious pragmatism to the exclusion of positivism, Ritschlianism became a partial and dualistic pragmatism, religious in theology and positivistic in philosophy. This ignoring of the logical principle of contradiction is a characteristic of pseudo-pragmatism. Ritschlianism began well in its pragmatic doctrine of religious value-judgments; it should have gone further and recognized the pragmatic character of all real

live judgments as opposed to fossilized propositions, and then, instead of keeping the religious value-judgments in unhealthy solitary confinement, it should have brought them out into the philosophical arena to try conclusions with other judgments about reality. In other words, Ritschlianism made its chief mistake in not seeking to mediate between the scientific and religious views of the world, taking the essential ideas of religion as working hypotheses in philosophy.

But it is not to philosophy alone, but to life generally, that we must look for the solution of our ultimate problems. The lack of finality in speculation is due to the limitations of philosophy when abstracted from life. With regard to the most fundamental convictions, what is lacking in philosophical demonstration is to be made up by the demonstration of life. Reflection can never furnish a philosophy of reality which can afford to dispense with its bearing upon the moral well-being of society as a test. And, indeed, a philosophy that settled all problems apart from life would be no servant of life, but a substitute therefor, such as mediaeval scholasticism often tended to be.

Still it must be equally emphasized that it is not to life without systematic reflection, such as philosophy is, that we must look. That would not be fulness of life which ruled out philosophy. Life is to be guided by reflectively developed hypotheses which subsequent life-experience either confirms or rejects. Or, to state it differently, the verification of consistency is to be regarded as an essential part of the verification of life, for, after all, the interest in consistency or rationality is the interest in harmonizing the various practical interests recognized as valid.⁷

Thus it will be seen that the kind of use one makes of pragmatism in philosophy depends upon the kind of interests and purposes one has, and so, ultimately, upon the kind of man one is. He who uses pragmatism—or pseudo-pragmatism, to speak accurately—in order to justify the rejection of scientifically obtained results in any department of human investigation, is dishonest at heart. And on the other hand, as Dr. Schiller

⁷ Cf. A. K. Rogers, *The Religious Conception of the World*, p. 71, a suggestive book in connection with our present topic.

significantly says, "A perfect and complete metaphysics is an ideal defined only by approximation, and attainable only by the perfecting of life. For it would be the theory of such a perfect life."⁸ And, we may add, philosophy must make room for a saving gospel for the individual and society, if it is to be pragmatically verified.

So much, then, may be expected to result from pragmatism in epistemology; religious knowledge must be integrated with other knowledge in the final philosophy. If we turn now to a very brief consideration of the bearing of pragmatism upon ontology, we find that the standing of ontology is in dispute among pragmatists; there are some who profess to dispense with it altogether as either unimportant or impossible or fictitious. Nevertheless it must be evident that wherever there is room for epistemology there is room for ontology; if there is knowledge, there must be reality known.

Professor Dewey has indicated what he conceives to be the pragmatist theory of reality in two articles entitled respectively "The Postulates of Immediate Empiricism"⁹ and "Does Reality Possess Practical Character?"¹⁰ In the former he says that if we want to know what anything is we must go to immediate experience and ask what the thing in question is experienced as. In the latter essay he says that pragmatism means the doctrine that reality possesses practical character; that knowing reality changes it; that, in fact, knowledge *is* reality changing itself in a definite way. Now it would be very easy to interpret this in terms of a solipsistic pragmatism, according to which reality would be just what the individual takes it to be, and individual psychology would be the only possible ontology.

But the charge of solipsism pragmatists meet with a vigorous disclaimer,¹¹ and we are given to understand that it is to social psychology that we are to make our ultimate appeal in order

⁸ *Studies in Humanism*, p. 21.

⁹ *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. ii, no. 19.

¹⁰ *Essays Philosophical and Psychological in Honor of William James*, pp. 53-80.

¹¹ See, for example, the article by A. W. Moore in *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. vi, no. 14.

to know what reality is. The ideas we use are social products; the realities we recognize are social achievements, and they are what they are to the social consciousness.

But are we to understand, then, that this exhausts their whole reality? What about realities which we know to exist, but of which humanity has never had immediate experience? What about the centre of the earth, the other side of the moon, and the south pole, for instance? Is their whole reality their existence in human minds as mathematically deduced hypotheses? It is evident that the postulate of immediate empiricism, while valuable as far as it goes, is not a sufficient criterion for the definition of reality so long as it does not recognize an experience which transcends not only the individual man, but all humanity. Common sense and pragmatism are both right in affirming that we know reality, and that we know it as it is, in immediate experience. But it is equally compatible with common sense and pragmatism to say that we do not and cannot know reality completely, because we do not experience it fully. But we have to think about this reality which transcends immediate human experience, and as a matter of fact we do think of it and have to think of it as it would be to some one to whose experience it was immediately present. Why not assume, then, according to pragmatic principles, that this necessary way of thinking of it indicates the true way, and that in reality although not present to immediate human experience it is immediately present to some experiencing subject?

To sum up, then: we have criticised pragmatism as it is, and attempted to depict it as it might be and ought to be. Our main results are two. Pragmatic epistemology, to be consistent, must make room in its philosophy for the essential postulates of the religious consciousness. Pragmatic ontology, with its postulate of immediate empiricism, to be consistent, must make room for an experiential (spiritualistic) philosophy of reality including but transcending all human experience. These are two points. Taking the shortest distance between these two points we get a straight line indicating that pragmatism can furnish a philosophical basis for theology.

THE HARVARD EXPEDITION TO SAMARIA

In the *Review* for January, 1909, an account was given of the excavations carried on by Harvard University at Samaria in the summer of 1908. The work of that year extended, with serious interruptions, from April 24 to August 21, and was confined mainly to the summit of the hill and to a building beside the threshing-floor near the village of Sebastiyeh. At the summit, and only a few inches below the surface, a paved platform, or floor, was uncovered, with a broad stairway of seventeen steps leading up to it from the north. On the stairway was found an inscribed stele, and a few feet in front of the foot of the stairway a large altar with another inscribed stele standing beside it. Near this altar lay a fine statue of heroic size, carved in white marble, representing a Roman emperor. Massive foundation-walls resting on the rock were uncovered on the south of the platform. Several periods of construction were recognized in these buildings, and one of these periods was believed to be that of Herod the Great.

For 1909 it was planned to begin work in April and continue until rainfall in the autumn. Digging did not, however, begin till May 31, although the explorers reached the place on May 7. The delay was due to the disturbed state of affairs in Turkey, and particularly to the late arrival of the imperial commissioner at Samaria. Once begun, the work was pushed with great vigor until rain came about the middle of October, and was not finally closed until November 14.

This campaign has been in charge of Professor George A. Reisner, assisted by Mr. Clarence S. Fisher, architect. The problems at Samaria are very complicated, owing to the disturbance of the site in successive periods of construction, to robbery of the older structures for building material, and to the terracing of the hill for agricultural purposes. For the solution of these problems Dr. Reisner's long experience in Egypt has given him an admirable training. Dr. Reisner took with him about thirty-

five of his experienced Egyptian workmen, and by their aid he has trained the local helpers to a degree of efficiency hitherto unknown in Palestinian exploration. The total working force has averaged about 285 persons.

As in the previous year, the chief interest has centred about the summit. On the southeast, south, and southwest of the platform a considerable tract has been cleared down to the rock. The plan of a temple, ascribed to Herod the Great, has been laid bare, and also the plan of a reconstruction of this temple, ascribed to Alexander Severus. Beneath the floor-level of these temples are remains of Greek buildings. Of particular interest are the massive outlines and a portion of the wall of a still older structure, which Dr. Reisner thinks is the palace of Omri and Ahab. The identification of these ruins as a Hebrew palace is accepted by Professor Hugues Vincent of Jerusalem, a leading authority on Palestinian archaeology, who has declared this to be the most instructive discovery yet made for the correct understanding of Israelite architecture. In a subterranean chamber beneath the palace, were found several fragments of pottery with Hebrew inscriptions, but, unfortunately, no royal name has been recognized on them.

Extensive digging has also been carried on to the south of the palace, partly on a lower terrace. A fragment of a cuneiform inscription with a Hebrew seal-stamp was found near the foot of a wall which seems to be in the Babylonian style. A massive Roman wall has been found which probably enclosed the temple-precincts, while a fragment of a fine Hebrew wall more than sixteen feet in thickness probably formed part of the palace enclosure. On the lower level was a vast complex of structures, Hebrew, Greek, and Roman.

At the gateway on the west side of the hill one of the two towers flanking the gate was dug out. It is a round tower of Roman masonry, resting on a larger square foundation of Greek origin, beneath which is a still larger cleared space of rock which gives the outline of the ancient Hebrew tower. The Roman city-wall running north from this tower was laid bare, also remnants of other walls recognized as Babylonian and Hebrew. Between the two towers Herod's gateway was identified, and the paved

Roman road leading up to it from the outside. It is hoped that next season the Hebrew road leading to the gate may be found below the Roman.

The building near the village has been further cleared, down to the level of its floor. It seems to be of Herodian origin, and to have been connected with the forum, which Dr. Reisner supposes to lie beneath the threshing-floor on the east, where many large fragments of masonry lie scattered about. In places the excavations have gone below the floor-level, revealing massive foundations belonging to earlier buildings believed to be Hebrew.

The small objects usually found in such excavations came to light in all of these diggings, such as coins, fragments of pottery, metal, bone, seals, lamps, and fragmentary inscriptions.

It is expected that a fuller report by Dr. Reisner will be published in the April number of the *Review*.

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CONCERNING MIRACLE

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Educated but uncritical thought finds the notion of miracle increasingly burdensome. Many reject it outright and others would gladly be rid of it. The current conception with such persons may be fairly described as follows: There is an order of nature from which it is hard, if not impossible, to show a departure. There may be apparent departures from the accustomed order, but they are always expressions of a deeper order and hence are natural. For instance, the freezing of water by the application of heat seems like a violation of the familiar laws of physics, but it is really an illustration. The science of today makes us familiar with many facts, which would once have been thought miraculous, but which we now see to be outcomes of law. Comets and eclipses were cases of this kind in the middle ages, and epidemics also were similarly regarded; but all of these things have been brought under the reign of law. The aëroplane and wireless telegraphy, and even the trolley car, would have been signs and wonders beyond ordinary thaumaturgy three hundred years ago, but they are not miraculous. The facts of witchcraft, faith healing, cures at shrines, were long denied because they seemed to affirm spiritual agencies of some sort; now we admit many of the alleged facts, but deny their supernatural character by including them under the head of hypnotism, suggestion, influence of mind on body, and so on. Considerations of this kind are making us increasingly hospitable to strange facts which once would have been thought miraculous, and increasingly indisposed

to admit their miraculous character. Thus the realm of nature and the realm of mystery are both extending, but the sphere of miracle seems to be approaching the vanishing-point.

The facts, as thus stated, appear decisive, but they are really vague and ambiguous. The true conclusion is that although the realm of law is growing, miracle is not excluded. The antithesis to law is not miracle, but disorder and chaos. Miracle in any religious sense implies a system from which a departure is made. It presupposes an established order and then assumes that God for some sufficient reason departs from it in such a way as to reveal his presence and purpose. The superficiality involved in opposing the reign of law to the fact of miracle is nothing less than pathetic in its irrelevancy, for the religious believer in miracles affirms the reign of law as much as anyone, but he also believes in a Creator and Administrator of this law and holds that this Creator may for good reasons depart from it.

Again, when we speak of the fixed order of nature we have a phrase of very uncertain meaning. It may mean the order of observable law on which we practically depend, and it may mean a system of absolute and universal determinism which denies all freedom and holds that all events in the universe, mental and physical alike, are the necessary resultants of their temporal antecedents according to inexorable laws. These two meanings are very different. The former is a harmless statement of what all admit, and the latter is a baseless and self-destructive dogmatism. It is no uncommon thing to find persons passing unwittingly from the former to the latter meaning under some such ambiguous phrase as "scientific method" or "the postulates of science." These phrases, as thus used, are arrant question-beggars, and usually cover an abyss of ignorance by a showy but baseless pretence of knowledge.

These considerations show that the question of miracle goes deeper than is commonly supposed and that it cannot be settled without recourse to philosophy. The debate can really proceed only on a theistic basis. Atheism could not deny the possibility of extraordinary happenings, but these would not be miracles but exceptions to law. They would be simply failing cases or faults in the accustomed order, and not indications of a supernatural

agency. They would be merely opaque facts of which we could make nothing. All systems of necessity, also, would be in the same condition. They would admit all manner of departures from the order, for we have no means of proving the observed order to be all-embracing and eternal. For all we can say, any number of departures from order might occur, but they would not be miraculous, they would be simply manifestations of the kaleidoscopic implications of the underlying power. Both of these views would logically reduce us to the baldest empiricism without the slightest warrant for expectation for the future or for surprise at whatever it might bring. It is only as we admit the existence of God that miracle in any intelligible sense is given, or that it has any practical importance. How, then, does the matter look from a theistic standpoint?

Historically the subject has been somewhat complicated by the use of miracles for the construction of technical evidences of Christianity, and the matter has been further confused by the deistic philosophy which has so largely ruled our thought. The actual difficulties mainly root in this deistic conception. On that view God made the world and set it going under the control of general laws, and since then he has rested from his cosmic labors, having no administrative function whatever in connection with the world of things. All events, then, that happen in this on-going are the products of these laws and as such are natural. A miracle on the other hand would be something that could not be accounted for by the laws of nature, but would be an interjection or interference from without by God. On this view God made a system which for the present runs itself, and anything that nature does is subtracted from his control. Thus we seem to have two agencies in the outer world, God and nature. Nature is the proximate agency, and God is needed, if at all, only to set nature going. Meanwhile nature runs its own mechanical course, producing a great variety of effects for which nature alone is responsible; and we must not think of referring anything to God until all the resources of nature are exhausted. So long as any natural cause can be found, or rather, until it can be shown that no natural cause can be found, we must not have recourse to a supernatural one. But as nature is ever growing

more vast and mysterious, it becomes practically impossible, it would seem, to demonstrate any event to be supernatural. Thus, beginning with belief in God, we tend by our absentee conception of him and by our thought of a self-running nature to make God less and less necessary, and even to return to atheism. In all this the underlying thought is that all events are natural and therefore undivine; that is, they represent no divine purpose or meaning. Only that is divine which is anomalous and unaccountable, and as the realm of the anomalous is growing less the realm of God is correspondingly decreasing. This inversion of all good sense is one of the standing features of the debate.

Before proceeding to the decisive criticism of this view, we may point out that so long as it believes in God at all it is inconsistent with its own principles. For if there was a divine purpose at the beginning, it must have embraced all its implications, so as to leave no place for mere by-products and unintended happenings in the system. Such a fancy would be a crude extension to God of our relation to our machines which are only to a small extent in our own power. If, then, we regard nature as an impersonal mechanism, we must say that the creative act implied all its products forevermore, even to the minutest details and most remote effects. For mechanism can only unfold its implications. There is a fancy in uncritical thought that mechanism can do a great many unintended things which were not originally implied in it. This is the fallacy of the class term. Our thinking is largely symbolic and short-hand, and thus we produce various simple conceptions which apply to a great many things without implying any of them. In the same way, when we think of the cosmic mechanism, we form such abstractions as matter and force, in which none of the details or particulars of the system are mentioned, and then we think that these two abstractions are capable by themselves of producing and maintaining the cosmic order. But as soon as we come to think concretely and exhaustively, we see that mechanism can make no new departures or produce factors and events not originally provided for. The world is not merely a system of general laws; it is also a great multitude of individuals and detailed happenings. Indeed this multitude is the concrete fact and the general laws are only our

abstractions from concrete things and happenings. They apply to the things, but they do not imply them. Now the creative act in such a system implies the whole set of consequences,—not merely general laws, but the concrete multitude of things to the remotest detail. If anything had not been provided for in the creative act, the thing would not have occurred, and, conversely, if the thing was to occur, it must have been provided for in the creative act. We must hold, then, that God in creating intended all that creation implies, for we can hardly suppose that he did not know what he was doing or that he could not help himself. Hence, if we allow nature to be at present a real mechanical system, we have no occasion to be religiously disturbed thereat as if it were a rival to God, for such nature could never do anything but what it was determined by its constitution to do; and there is nothing to forbid the thought that it may have been determined to work in human service and for the realization of the divine purpose. In that case mechanism would only be the instrument by which the purpose is realized.

At one time the view which made God and nature different and somewhat antithetical powers seemed fairly clear and, moreover, difficult to escape. In fact, however, progress in philosophical thinking of recent years has greatly modified the whole matter so as to give the discussion a very different form. The doctrine of the Divine Immanence, which is now so generally held in the higher speculative circles, is fast displacing the conception of nature as anything substantial and self-administering, and reducing it to the phenomenal form of the divine causality. Nature is nothing in itself and of course it does nothing of itself. Things and events hang together or come about in certain ways, but the ground and cause of them all must be found beyond them. Nature expresses an order of change, but never reveals its causal source. In this respect it is something like a series of sounds, as in a piece of music. The relation of the various notes might be described in their coexistences and sequences, but there would be no causality in them, and no passing up and down the tone series would ever reveal the causality. Causality is apart from the series in the composer and performer. In the same way the study of the natural order has led to a distinction between the space

and time world which can be presented to the senses, and the power world which is forever out of sight, the invisible ground of the spatial and temporal order. The space and time world, then, is regarded as an effect like the series of tones, and also like that series it has its causality outside itself. In that case nature as a system of spatial and temporal phenomena is but the continuous product of the invisible power or energy on which it forever depends. And as we regard that power as divine, we have to say that the entire system abuts upon and continually proceeds from the divine will. God is no absentee, but is rather the changeless power by which all things exist and by which all things stand or go. This is the view which is fast becoming universal in the philosophical world. Deism is dead; we must have a living and immanent God or none.

With this result, nature loses its substantial character and becomes simply God's continuous deed. It is throughout supernatural in its causality. All cosmic causality is divine. The most familiar event proceeds as directly from the divine will as the most extraordinary and miraculous. But the supernatural cause is orderly, that is natural, in its manifestations; and thus we come to the conception of a supernatural natural,—that is, a natural which forever roots in the supernatural; and a natural supernatural,—that is, a supernatural that proceeds in orderly and uniform ways. But whatever happens, be it the maintenance of the familiar routine or miraculous departure from it, happens not of itself or because of some inexorable and self-executing law or system, but because in the divine purpose and wisdom that is the thing demanded; and in all events alike God is equally present and equally near.

This result can be securely maintained on the basis of philosophic reflection. Nature is no longer a rival of God, but simply the form under which the divine will proceeds in its cosmic outgo. With this result we have almost all that religion really aims at in its insistence upon miracle. Religion seeks after God. It longs to find the Father and to know that he is near. But proceeding on naturalistic and deistic assumptions, we build up the phantom of nature which petrifies man's higher life, and then we look anxiously for breaks in the natural order and pin our faith on

miracles, mainly physical, as the sole indication of God's presence, if not of God's existence. But with the conception of a supernatural natural we can breathe freely even in the face of the natural order, and are much less concerned about miracle in the sense of a departure from natural law. The distinction between the natural and the supernatural in that case would not lie in the causality, but in the phenomenal relations. The causality would be equally supernatural in both. The natural and miraculous would be equally products of the divine will, but in the case of miracle there would be a departure from the familiar order so as to indicate to believers a divine presence and meaning. Miracles in themselves would be no more divinely wrought than any routine event. The only place or function we could find for them would be as signs of a divine power and purpose which men immersed in sense could not find in the ordinary course of the natural. They might be condescensions to human weakness, but they would root no more intimately in the divine will and purpose than the most familiar events. If this conception of the supernatural be allowed, the question of miracle loses much of its importance religiously and otherwise, for, as we have said, religion has interest only in finding God and has insisted so strenuously upon miracle because its deistic philosophy left no other way to find him.

In the traditional debates on this subject very little attention has been given to defining miracle so as clearly to indicate its character. There has been a strong tendency on the part of believers so to define miracle as to limit it to the original signs necessary for the establishment of the Christian faith, and Protestant theologians have largely taken this view. In this way they thought to reject the miracles of the Catholic church and also to secure material for the construction of evidences of Christianity. Frequently their definitions were made strictly with this aim. Thus a distinguished theologian of the last generation defined a miracle as

- (1) An event occurring in the physical world capable of being discerned and discriminated by the bodily senses of human witnesses;
- (2) Of such a character that it can be rationally referred to no other cause than the immediate volition of God;

(3) Accompanying a religious teacher and designed to authenticate his divine commission and the truth of his message.

Accordingly, writers of this class were not willing to allow that answers to prayer or special providences and the like were to be viewed as miraculous. Scientific writers, on the other hand, defined miracles as any departure from the order of nature such that the continuity of nature is in some degree broken, no matter how large or small the fracture may be. Hence they held stoutly to continuity and regarded any consideration of the size of the miracle as a kind of logical shilly-shallying which could not be too strongly condemned. Every event must be looked upon as the result of its antecedents, and special providences and answers to prayers involved miracle just as much as the most striking event. Here the assumption of an absolute determinism clearly appears.

Professor Tyndall, who was one of the ablest supporters of the naturalistic position, had considerable argument with Canon Mozley on this point. In his paper on "Prayer and Natural Law" he says that the notion of natural law is displacing the belief in volition. "One by one natural phenomena have been associated with their proximate causes and the idea of direct personal volition mixing itself with the economy of nature is retreating more and more." As to any effect of prayer on physical conditions, he rejects it. He tells of a young priest who came up every year to a town in Switzerland to "bless the mountains." "Year by year the Highest was entreated by official intercessions to make such meteorological arrangements as would insure food and shelter for the flocks and herds of the Valaisians." But Professor Tyndall regarded this as altogether unpermissible. "The Italian wind gliding over the crest of the Matterhorn is as firmly ruled as the earth in its orbital revolution around the sun, and the fall of its vapor into clouds is exactly as much a matter of necessity as the return of the seasons. The dissipation, therefore, of the slightest mist by the special volition of the Eternal would be as much a miracle as the rolling of the Rhone over the Grimsel precipices and down Haslithal to Brienz." (*Fragments of Science*, p. 39.) The same thought was continued by Professor Tyndall in the next paper on "Miracles and Special Provi-

dences," in which he argues that Mozley's distinction of the two is untenable. Here special providences are declared to be miracles, in that they imply a result which was not due to their natural antecedents, and, as miracles are not to be allowed, special providences, answers to prayer, etc., at least in the physical realm, must go with them. He adds: "She [science] does assert for example that without a disturbance of natural law quite as serious as the stoppage of an eclipse or the rolling of the St. Lawrence up the Falls of Niagara no act of humiliation, individual or national, could call one shower from heaven or deflect toward us a 'single beam of the sun'" (p. 39).

Here Professor Tyndall is strenuous for a continuity of natural law, and tacitly assumes that the antecedent physical conditions fully determine the consequent physical effect. However, this view is by no means self-evident when we recall the distinction already made between the space and time world and the world of power. In the space and time world we can now and then trace an antecedent into its consequent, but only when it is a case of the composition of motions as in kinematics. If a body is moving and is not interfered with, provided we know its rate and direction, we can tell where it will be at any later time, and if two or more bodies are moving together, it would be possible to compound their motions into a resultant motion. But this is possible only to a very slight extent in dealing with the actual changes of the physical world, as those changes are not due to antecedent movements alone, but to those movements plus some determination from the world of power. For example, in a period of dispersed matter under the influence of gravitation we could trace the condensation of the matter into smaller volume, but when the elements came near enough together to allow of chemical action, we should then have a change that could not be referred to the antecedent conditions of things, but which would be a manifestation of a hitherto unmanifested property of the elements, namely chemical affinity. Kinematic deduction here would find a break of continuity due to the manifestation of a new force. Again, we might conceive a world of diffused oxygen and hydrogen, and this world and its phenomena could be traced a certain way by our knowledge of the laws of gases; but

if a spark should pass through such a world, there would be a new manifestation of which the original state of things would give no hint. The elements would combine into the water-molecule and appear as water-vapor, and this again would suffer another break of continuity when it was condensed into water, and this in turn would once more transgress the law of continuity when it became solid as ice. Thus we see that in the actual physical world of experience we have repeated breaks of continuity due to the fact that the power world is continually manifesting itself in new departures. The phenomenal world, that is the observable world in space and time, is perpetually subject to irruptions from the power world. Ordinarily, we seek to reinstate the endangered continuity by gathering up these various forces into the notion of "the nature of things," without observing that of this "nature" we have absolutely no experience, and that it is simply an invisible and hypothetical metaphysical support for the series of changes in experience.

And here it must be pointed out that while it is perfectly clear that there is causality in the case, the nature and location of that causality are by no means plain. We might possibly seek to locate it in the form of central forces in the invisible metaphysical elements, or we might locate it in one all-embracing energy from which the course of nature forever proceeds, or by which that course is forever administered. We have here a metaphysical question of no small difficulty and one which cannot be settled by any observation or by off-hand thinking of any sort. Professor Tyndall in the passages quoted expressed the conviction that there is necessity in the case, and claims that we know we are dealing with necessary forces. To this the answer must be that no one knows anything of the kind. The forces, whatever they may be, are not open to observation, and their nature must be found by critical reflection. There is indeed an order in experience which, so far as we are concerned, is fixed, and which on that account we may call necessary, but of the necessity or non-necessity of the causality at work we know directly nothing. All that we discern in such cases is a certain uniformity in change upon which we can rely in experience, but of how the uniformity is produced no one has the slightest knowledge by inductive ob-

servation. This notion of necessity is one of the most specious and baseless of all the illusions that have misled speculative thought. There is a general assumption that the alternative is chaos or at least arbitrariness and caprice, whereas the fact might well be uniformity administered by free intelligence.

In one of the passages quoted from Professor Tyndall there is the suggestion, of continual recurrence in the literature of this debate, that the existence of these natural laws excludes the conception of any special volition entering into the order of nature. And to this the answer is, there is nothing whatever in the conception of volition which forbids that it should be rational and consistent. It is entirely conceivable that a supreme intelligence should administer the order of the world in uniform fashion for the securing of its own ends; and indeed, when we think the matter out, it appears that free intelligence is the only real basis of uniformity we can find. Necessity becomes such a basis only by assuming that it must be uniform, in which case all possibility of change would be excluded. As to the difficulty involved in the notion of special volition, that is merely a confusion arising from not understanding the relation between the universal and the particulars subsumed under it. Both volition and law in general are nothing in the concrete, and in order to effect anything whatever in the concrete world each must be specialized into particular form in application. A volition that was not a special volition of some particular thing would be an empty abstraction.

So, then, the space and time world remains open to observation. We may study its coexistences and sequences and find certain uniformities on which we can practically rely. This can be known apart from any metaphysics whatever, but when it comes to deciding the nature of the back-lying forces, we have a speculative problem which must be handed over to philosophy for solution. Moreover the experienced order, from which all our real knowledge must proceed, is by no means the hard-and-fast thing closed against all modification that the abstract theorist assumes it to be. Experience gives abundant illustration of the compatibility of law and purpose in the physical world. When we consider the relation of man to the system of general laws, we find that he

can use it for the production of a great variety of effects which the laws left to themselves would never produce. General laws, like those of gravitation or heat or electricity, would never weave a yard of cotton or make a steam-engine or drive a trolley-car. These laws and forces are continually receiving specific direction and application from human volition, which is ever playing into the physical system and producing a multitude of effects which could not be traced to antecedent physical conditions but only to human thought and purpose. A series of beings, for instance, speculative and scientific microbes, ignorant of human personality, and unable to find it among their objects, might study the order of physical nature on the supposition that physical antecedents determine all physical consequents, conclude that human personality is an altogether impossible notion, and reject as unscientific the thought that human purpose counts for anything in the on-going of the world. They might even wax eloquent and peremptory over "scientific method," the "continuity of natural law," and the general havoc that would be wrought in microbic science by such an admission, and their talk would not be unlike that of some human speculators. But, in spite of these rhetorical shudders and alarms, the error of their "postulates" is manifest. In fact, if there were any positive reason for thinking that a multitude of wills, supernal and infernal, are playing into our system, science could say nothing against it. And if such control of nature is possible to man, in spite of general laws, there seems to be no good reason why it should be impossible with God. Indeed Professor Tyndall in his paper explaining his famous prayer-test proposition admitted that as man can work through the system and produce multitudinous effects without breaking any general laws, it is possible that God also should do the same. But he did not always bear this in mind. When he was arguing with Canon Mozley, he was sure that physical effects must always be traced to physical antecedents only.

On account of this fact that man is continually modifying the system so as to produce faults in any purely physical deduction, Dr. Bushnell in his work, *Nature and the Supernatural*, characterized all human action as miraculous, so far as the physical system is concerned. It is something that cannot be deduced

from that system and can only be looked upon as a modification from without. The general order of law is indeed maintained, but the loom weaves a different pattern as the threads are manipulated by the unseen human spirit. There seems, then, not to be the slightest reason for doubting that God may produce a great many effects, not against general laws, but through them or in accordance with them; and those effects would be quite as specially created and specially willed as though they had been dropped out of the skies by fiat. They would be no more specifically designed or specifically created in the latter case than in the former. If it be said that in this case there would nevertheless be a point where the antecedents have a different consequent because of this supernatural determination, the answer would be that the same fact must be found in all human control of the system. Our human activity in what we call nature is of course chiefly directive. We do not produce the forces of the system, but we do direct them and determine their effects. In this way we control nature. But in order to accomplish this there must be a point, say in the nervous system, where some motion is initiated that is not the outcome of antecedent states of the nervous system, but due to the interaction of the invisible mind with the organism. To be sure, some persons of rigor and vigor have thought this would never do, and have preferred to hold that consciousness itself has nothing to do with the control of our bodies and with the various other physical changes thence resulting. But this reduces the theory to absurdity, implying, as it does, that the whole series of physical movements whereby the human mind has manifested itself in its historic and social life has gone on without any origin in, or control by, thought.

The physicists have been inclined to content themselves with eliminating miracle from the physical realm, leaving it undecided whether it might not be allowed in the mental realm. Physical miracle, we think, is unconditionally to be rejected, but psychological miracle may perhaps be admitted. Such a view aids the imagination a little. A psychological miracle involves no such seeming waste of energy as rolling the St. Lawrence up the Falls of Niagara, and therefore is not so great a shock to our ideas of law. It is curious how the size of a miracle comes into our thought

of the subject. Not infrequently it has been suggested that certain miracles, say the stopping of the earth in its rotation upon its axis, are impossible, because then the seas would rush over the land and drown out the continents, the idea apparently being that if God wrought a miracle of such size, he would not be equal to looking after all the details and might possibly wreck the physical system if he meddled. But the thorough-going, thick-and-thin rejecter of miracles will not allow any such half-way work as the admission of psychological miracle involves. He extends the realm of law into mind and society also, and insists on continuity until everything, physical and mental alike, is bound up in a rigid scheme of necessity, so that consequents succeed their antecedents everywhere with invariable uniformity. But here, too, we meet the same fact already mentioned. The reign of law may be universal, but it is subordinate. In some sense the laws of mind are continuous and we could not dispense with them, but in themselves they secure nothing. As we said of physical laws, they apply to all events in their realm, but they do not imply them. The law of gravitation runs a water wheel, but does not make it. The laws of physical nature are omnipresent in the human control of nature, but that control secures results which the laws of themselves would never reach. Similarly, the laws of mind are in some sense inviolable. They must be regarded in education, in society, in governmental action, and even in self-control, but in themselves they do not imply the results we reach through them. Here, also, we find, as in the outer world, an order of law at the service of intelligence, an order through which we work our will. We may, then, maintain at once the inviolability of law and its subordinate character, so that freedom may manifest itself through the law and not against it, yet in such a way that the results shall be as distinctly an outcome of purpose as they would be if produced by fiat. If we reject this general conception in favor of a universal determinism, then we have no longer a scientific doctrine based on experience and induction, but a dogmatic speculation which is the outcome of superficial reflection, and which overturns reason itself.

In some sense, then, we are in the midst of miracles all the time. As having a supernatural root, all things are miracles. Birth and

life and death, the springing of the grass, the growing of the flowers, the ripening of the harvest, the march of the seasons, and the shining of the stars, all are miracles in the sense that they alike root in the ever-living, ever-working will of God. They are also miracles in the sense that they cannot be deduced in their successive phases from antecedent conditions, but continually proceed from the activity of the Divine. They can be as little deduced from antecedents as the successive phases in a musical composition can be deduced from the antecedent ones, but they all continually depend upon a causality which is not in the series, but which produces and maintains it in due order and sequence. At the same time these things are natural in the sense that an order may be discerned in them on which we can practically depend. But this order is not to be extended into a dogmatic finality. These laws must always be restricted, as Mr. Mill has said, to a "reasonable degree of extension to adjacent cases." We must remember what a scanty insight we have into so-called natural laws and how limited is our scope at best. All that we really experience is a certain uniformity within narrow spatial and temporal limits,—that is, narrow in relation to the infinitude of possible existence. We cannot found these uniformities upon any necessity of reason, neither can we establish them as all-embracing even in space and time. We cannot say with any security that they constitute anything more than a limited order on which we can practically depend in the sphere of our present experience, and even here we discover a great deal that we are unable to reduce to order. There is very much that resembles weather in our cosmic experience. The weather may indeed be subject to law, but nevertheless its laws are so imperfectly known to us that we regard it as one of the symbols of inconstancy. Now when we take long stretches of time and great ranges of space, for all we know, the whole order of nature, so-called, might be a species of cosmic weather with little uniformities here and there, and now and then, but never to be extended so as to become all-embracing necessities. If we should have a series of students of nature among very short-lived beings, some might report that it was always winter and some that it was always summer. Others might report that it is always day and still

others that it is always night. They could easily find these little uniformities in their experience, but if they extended them to take in all the possibilities of the world, they would certainly be very much mistaken.

Considered, then, as a speculative proposition, the difficulty is less to establish the possibility of miracle than to prove the necessary uniformity and universality of law. It is an altogether possible proposition that experience does not admit of being reduced to an all-embracing uniformity, or that uniformity and non-uniformity divide the field of experience between them. It is an equally possible proposition that the uniformities in our experience are relative to ourselves and even transitory in their validity. But these high considerations belong to the deeper problems of knowledge. We descend then from these heights and are met by the question, Is it not the clearest dictate of science that we are never to look for supernatural causes until we have exhausted the natural ones? Is not science itself compelled to exclude all miracle and all supernaturalism? Some truth, but more confusion, appears in these questions. The realm of science as a study of the uniformities of experience is confounded with the question of causality, which belongs to philosophy. Certainly science is not compelled to eliminate miracle in the sense of a cause outside the phenomenal series, any more than it is compelled to exclude man from all control of the physical series. Science is compelled to exclude miracle in the same sense that our hypothetical physicists among the microbes would be compelled to exclude man from the causal factors of the universe. The space and time order we have seen to be subject to continual irruptions from the invisible world of power. In this space and time order we admit no supernatural causes for the reason that we admit no causes of any sort. All we aim to do in this field is to arrange the events in groups and rows according to their observed spatial and temporal relations, and for this we need no assistance from metaphysics in any form, natural or supernatural. Science, as thus understood, is entirely neutral to the question of freedom or necessity, natural or supernatural. The continuity of law can be maintained along with complete openness to purpose. But when we affirm natural causes in any other sense than

that of observed phenomenal antecedents, we are really talking obsolete metaphysics, not science. Certainly we must look only for natural causes in the phenomenal world, but such causes are not causes at all; only uniformities of phenomenal relation. Science, then, never tells us what is possible or not possible in reality, but only how things hang together in experience. Whenever it assumes to do more than this it is no longer science, but dogmatism. As to what science can recognize or not recognize, or what scientific method requires, it is plain that any conception of science that does not permit it to recognize any fact whatever ignores the very first aim of all thinking, namely, to know the facts. The microbes in that gas or water world could have dogmatized with equal profundity and justice about the possible and the impossible.

So much for general laws themselves, supposing them to exist. For us of course they do exist as orders of being and happening to which we must adjust ourselves. In so far they constitute a datum for us. They are not indeed much of a limitation even for us, as we are able to use them, and we should not be able to do without them. But God himself as the absolute source of all finite being is bound by nothing but his own wisdom and goodness. What they dictate, that he does. If they call for uniformity, there is uniformity. If they call for change, there is change. God never acts against nature because for him there is no nature to act against. His purpose, founded in his wisdom and goodness, is alone law-giving for his action, and all else, whatever it may be, is but the expression of that purpose. Nature conceived as a barrier to God, or as anything with which God must reckon, is a pure fiction, a product of unclear thought which has lost itself in dogmatic abstractions. From the standpoint of the Divine, then, there are no "interventions," "interruptions," "interferences," and that sort of thing. There is simply the continual working of the Divine Will to realize the divine purpose.

We may sum up the results thus far reached in the affirmation of the universality of law, and also its subordination. There is, indeed, considerable faith in admitting such universality, but still the general tendency of thought is to this affirmation. At the same time, as we have seen, the system of law as anything ex-

perienced is entirely compatible with the equal universality of purpose so that law serves as the form under which purpose realizes itself; and when we come to the question of causality, we have to affirm a universal supernaturalism, not indeed a disorderly, capricious, and chaotic supernaturalism, but one which proceeds by orderly methods and in consistent ways. The attempt to construe the world of power in mechanical terms critical reflection clearly shows to be impossible. It commits us to barren tautologies and endless regresses, and when made universally brings reason itself to hopeless bankruptcy. We have now to inquire how this universal supernaturalism bears on the question of miracle.

It is plain that this conception of the immanence of God in all cosmic on-going deprives the question of miracle as a departure from the natural order of very much of its importance. As we have before said, the great interest of religion in miracle has been due to the current deistic philosophy, according to which miracles seem to be the only way of finding God and the only way in which God could manifest his living presence. This interest in miracle is set aside by our insight into the fact of the supernatural character of the causality of the world, for now, instead of finding God with difficulty anywhere, we are permitted to find him everywhere. All of those arguments against miracle based upon anti-religious grudges are also set aside by the insight into this universal supernaturalism. There is no longer any division of labor between nature and God, as if nature did the bulk of the work of the world and God came in to do the rest when nature proved inadequate. There is rather, and only, an orderly working of the divine in all things, miraculous and non-miraculous alike, and the only place which could be found for miracle in this view would be, as already said, as a sign to call the attention of men who were immersed in sense to a divine presence and meaning which it is important they should discern and which they would otherwise miss.

In the traditional discussion of this subject the miraculous and the supernatural have not been distinguished but have been treated as identical. They must, however, be distinguished. The result of our study thus far is to affirm a universal supernatural, but we have not touched the question of technical miracle,

in the sense of a manifest departure from experienced law. This question we have now to consider.

From the standpoint of theism the order of law first becomes a rational thing and furnishes ground for rational expectation. For the theist, too, there is a decided presumption against miracles, at least of the striking sort, and the presumption arises from the nature of intelligence itself. But this debate can lead to no result when abstractly taken, for then it becomes a shuffling of abstract notions which make no connection with real life. Thus Hume's argument against miracles was little more than an academic puzzle or riddle, and he recanted it by his own admissions. After opposing uniform experience to testimony and concluding that the balance must always be in favor of experience, he limits the statement by saying "that a miracle can never be proved so as to be a foundation of a system of religion, for I own that otherwise there may possibly be miracles or violations of the usual course of nature of such a kind as to admit a proof from testimony." On the other hand believers have held that testimony could prove anything. One has only to pile up the testimony long enough to have it overcome all opposition. But this, too, is academic. Abstract and unrelated wonders might conceivably be proved by abstract testimony, but such suggestions have no concrete value. If these wonders happened or did not happen we should be equally indifferent, and however much evidence might be offered for them, they would inevitably fade out of rational belief until at last no one would take the pains even to deny them. In a rational system miracles without moral meaning and religious bearing would have as little credibility as the stories of Jack the Giant Killer and Aladdin's lamp. We should not believe them, we should not even disbelieve them, we should ignore them. For the theist the presumption against any showy thaumaturgy is so strong that he rejects it at once. Some adequate reason for miracle must be shown to secure it any consideration. And in deciding what is an adequate reason the personal equation will turn the scale. If we are irreligious in our disposition, and think that the supreme and only sacred thing, of course there will be no faith in miracle. But if, on the other hand, we believe that God's deepest purpose in our life is a moral

and spiritual one, and also believe that we are continually in the hands of God who is seeking to build us into his spiritual children, we shall not be hostile to any conception of miracle that fits into this view. The miracles that may have been necessary in the earlier times of ignorance to introduce a new order of thought and life will not necessarily disturb us; and all those facts of prayer and spiritual communion which point to the continual rooting of the inner life in God will be accepted as a matter of course. These, however, will never admit of anything approaching demonstration. The miracles of Biblical history are at best too far away to make any strong impression on us today, apart from their connection with the Christian system in which we already believe. And the touch of God in the inner life will always be more of a secret to the believing soul than a thing that could be put into a psychological court and cross-examined. Here, as said, the personal equation and the general impression made by the religious history of our race will decide our historical faith or unfaith, while for the inner life of the individual only the soul's own experience can be final. Our general world-view, our sense of fundamental and eternal values, our own most sacred and secret life, are determinate here. It is more than idle to refer these questions to a committee of chemists or other worthy people to decide.

It is altogether credible that in the early stages of human development, when both knowledge and religion were very crude, God found his way more directly through signs and wonders to the human mind than is necessary today. That which was needed was to guide men on the upward road, not to satisfy a committee of Sadducees. Such condescension to human weakness would not have been unworthy of God. Indeed from a pedagogical standpoint it is not easy to see how humanity could well have been started in any other way. In our own times God's pedagogical methods have changed. We are able to see God in his works, and our intellect has been developed so that we no longer need the kindergarten methods of the early years of our race. For us there is no objection to finding God in prodigies, if there be such things nowadays, but it is far more important to find him in the normal life of man and the unfoldings of history. Prodigies are vanishing quantities in any case, compared with

the historic life and development of humanity. Here alone does the divine presence have abiding and universal significance. It is religious illiteracy to seek God only or mainly anywhere else. That is to overlook the moral and religious aim of the whole human movement, and to degrade God to a mere thaumaturgist or sleight-of-hand performer. Physical miracles in any case are instrumental only and have their use in what they help us to. But the end of it all is the knowledge of God and spiritual likeness to him. The slow moralization of life and society, the enlightenment of conscience and its growing empire, the deepening sense of responsibility for the good order of the world and the well-being of men, the gradual putting away of old wrongs and foul diseases and blinding superstitions, these are the great proofs of God in history and life; in comparison with these all physical miracles sink into insignificance, and except as related to these higher interests have no value whatever. For us, then, the physical miracle is becoming less and less important and the spiritual miracle of the redeemed and transformed life, redeemed and transformed society, the spread of reason and righteousness in the earth, are the perennial miracles always possible and ever to be insisted upon.

For the sake, however, of those who may be disturbed over alleged physical miracle, say that of the resurrection of Jesus, I quote a passage from my work *The Immanence of God* which may be worthy of consideration by both parties:

When we ask what is real and what unreal in objective knowledge we commonly fall back on sense perception as the sole mark of reality. That is real which is there for the sense of all, and all else is illusion. For the routine life of everyday fact this test is all-sufficient, but it becomes very doubtful when made absolute and universal. There is not the slightest speculative warrant for saying that the range of perception must be the same in all. If there were persons otherwise sane and normal who professed an awareness of things beyond the common sense-range we should have no good reason for questioning the fact. There might be visions and voices for the spirit and in the spirit beyond all common seeing and hearing, and they might carry with them the same conviction of independent reality that we have in our common sense life. Or, since voice and vision are too suggestive of sense organs, let us say that there might be a spiritual awareness of reality beyond sense, which would

be a revelation that could never be judged or tested by sense. The conditions of such perception might also be a certain preparedness of spirit, as the sea can reflect the heavens above it only when its waters are at peace. But the gist and test of all perception is the conviction of reality that accompanies it. This can never be deduced from anything else or referred to anything else, and if there were such awareness of things beyond sense, it could be described only in sense terms and would thus be liable to misunderstanding. We should try to judge it by sense when it might transcend sense altogether. Reflections of this sort might lead both the believer and the unbeliever to see that the sense test is not certainly final.

We might apply these considerations to the miracle of the resurrection, a miracle without which not much of the Christian faith would be left, and one having which we can dispense with most of the rest. The thing that was essential was that the disciples should be convinced that their Lord still lived and that in his glorified existence he was still their Master and the head of his Kingdom. This was secured by what we call his resurrection and ascension, and it is really indifferent whether these constituted a fact which the Sadducees could have perceived, had they been in the neighborhood, or not. The important thing is that the minds of the disciples were so impressed with the fact that it became the corner-stone of their faith and of the Christian Church. How this was done does not matter much, provided it was done, and the miracle was equally great in any case.

Thus we have seen how complicated the question of miracle really is, and what deep root it has in our philosophy and our religious conceptions of the meaning of life and the world. It is infantile to suppose that science can prove or disprove this faith. If the Christian life be strong within us, and if the devils of greed and pride and selfishness are now being cast out, we shall not be very seriously disturbed by the stories of ancient miracle. And on the other hand if these spiritual miracles are not being wrought today, it will matter very little what happened two thousand years ago.

In the past this debate was carried on chiefly between religion and irreligion, but now it is going on to some extent among believers themselves. For them a double warning seems to be

in place. On the one hand, we must bear in mind the distinction between the supernatural and the miraculous. The former can be maintained against all adversaries, and this is the thing of chief importance. Signs and wonders, as we have said, are only means to an end in any case, and their function today is practically ended. We have come into a better stage of religious development, where we no longer need them, and where they may easily be a hindrance to faith rather than an aid. One can but sympathize, therefore, with those who wish to emphasize the fact of law in all life, as the condition of mental and spiritual soundness and sanity. They insist that all religious growth must depend on using the means that God has placed in our power instead of hoping that the laws of mental and spiritual life may be set aside. This fact cannot be too strongly urged, but it must be done with wisdom. When we reject miracle, we must make it clear that we do not mean to reject God and the supernatural, but only the thaumaturgic. We should look well to the scope of our language and the drift of our logic. There is much of the old rationalistic dogmatism masquerading as science and pursuing its old trade of undermining the higher faiths of humanity, and we must be careful not to aid it by using its specious but treacherous phrases. It is well to remember that nothing is gained for religion by minimizing its supernatural claims. The just claims of science can be fully recognized without infringing on the equally just claims of faith. We should also deal with the subject from the Christian point of view and the central Christian conceptions. Matters of detail decide nothing, whether for attack or defence. One who holds the central, the supreme, the stupendous miracle of the incarnation of the Son of God could hardly fail to see that the resurrection and ascension are an integral part of it, and he will not much concern himself about the withered fig-tree or the fish with the coin in its mouth. As for the Sadducees, I have spent much time with them and doubt if they can be convinced, and I am not even sure that they wish to be convinced. The Gospel was not made for Sadducees and professional doubters, but for men and women as they have been and are, weary and heavy-laden and in great need of finding God, and quite unable to find him in ways that would satisfy the critic. Something had

to be done for these people, and really that something has proved more effective than any of the improvements that have been offered. But both these terms, miracle and supernatural, have become so infected with unpleasant associations that we should do better to drop them altogether, and talk rather about God and set about doing his will in the full faith that our times are in his hands and that he is working in us and for us to will and to do of his good pleasure. We are not in a machine world, but in God's world, in a world of persons with God, the supreme person, at the head. And in such a world it is permitted to see visions and dream dreams, and to keep the soul open to the heavenly vision. To some Sadducees this will always be a stumbling-block, to others foolishness, and life must answer them. Perhaps it may still be true that some things are revealed to babes which are hidden from the wise and prudent. But if the Sadducee will continue this discussion, he should learn that philosophy has progressed since his traditional arguments were fashioned, so that they are now largely obsolete. He must carry the matter deeper and treat it more systematically, if he would reach any results worthy of consideration. It might also be well for him to master the difference between science, as the fruitful study of the order of experience, to which we owe so much, and "Science," that product of crude dogmatism and great question-begging term of the half-educated and hearsay thinker.

THE THEOLOGY OF WILLIAM NEWTON CLARKE¹**WILLIAM ADAMS BROWN**

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Fifteen years ago there appeared a volume of some four hundred pages, which bore the modest title, *An Outline of Christian Theology*. It had originally been prepared by the author, a professor in Hamilton Theological Seminary, for the use of his seminary classes, and, after circulating for some time in the form of typewritten notes, was privately printed for the greater convenience of the users. No attempt was made to advertise the book, but in due time it found its way into the hands of one and another who was interested in theological questions, and when in 1898 it was issued by the author through the ordinary channels, it received from the public an instant and hearty welcome.

Three qualities explain the success of Dr. Clarke's theology. In the first place, it was written in a clear and simple style. Technical theological terms were as far as possible avoided. While it gave evidence of wide and careful reading, there was no parade of learning. The author was evidently concerned to tell his story in the most direct fashion possible, and content to rely for his appeal upon the inherent interest of his subject-matter.

The spirit in which the book was written was moreover one of singular serenity. The author approached the vexed questions of theology with a quiet confidence which at once disarmed criticism and allayed fear. He contemplated the changes wrought in our view of the world by modern science with calmness, as if they were a matter of course. He was untroubled by biblical criticism. The theory of evolution was accepted without question; the traditional eschatology so courteously dismissed that one scarcely realized that it was gone. Where many writers, like the chief captain in Acts, had obtained their freedom with a great

¹ The Christian Doctrine of God, by William Newton Clarke, D.D. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1909.

price, Dr. Clarke wrote as one free born. He seemed as much at home spiritually in the modern world as he had been when a boy in his father's house.

And yet he was none the less Christian. Indeed, the striking thing about the book was its militant and aggressive Christianity. The author was evidently one who had communed deeply with Jesus, and had drawn from his communion convictions which had so laid hold upon his spirit as to demand utterance. He believed that the Gospel of Christ was a message which the world had not yet outgrown, and it was his endeavor to justify this faith by showing its adaptation to the present needs and problems of men.

A book which presents a positive message in a form which is at once lucid and convincing is sure to find readers, but these qualities alone would not have explained the success of Dr. Clarke's theology. It appeared at an opportune time and met a want which was widely felt by laymen as well as by ministers. Many who had broken intellectually with the doctrinal statements of the past still felt themselves at home emotionally in the religious values which they sought to express, and they welcomed this new statement of old truths because it made it possible for them to preserve their continuity with the Christian past, without the sacrifice of intellectual consistency. This fact gave the book a representative character. It was an index registering the presence of deep currents in the religious life of our time, and, as such, it deserves the attention of all who are interested in the study of contemporary religion.

In the present article we propose to review Dr. Clarke's theology with a view to discovering wherein its representative character consists. We shall take for the basis of our discussion his most recent book, the *Christian Doctrine of God*. In this closely printed octavo of some four hundred and seventy-five pages, he gives a systematic exposition of the fundamental principles of his theology. The same qualities which we noted in his earlier work reappear here. The book is at once lucid, modern, and Christian, but the treatment is fuller, and the reasoning more rigorous. Much that the earlier discussion implied is here fully developed. More than one untenable position has been abandoned. No recent book by an English-speaking theologian

reveals more clearly the prevailing tendency and controlling spirit of modern theological thought.

The aim which the author sets himself can be stated very simply. It is to present a conception of God which shall be at once Christian and credible. This is indeed no new thing; it is what Christian theology has always been attempting. The originality of Dr. Clarke's treatment consists in the way in which he solves his problem in detail.

In the first place, then, the idea of God which he presents is Christian. By this he means that it is consistent with the spirit and teaching of Jesus, the founder of Christianity. It is not an idea of God which we gain through modern science primarily and then baptize with the name Christian for the purpose of convenience. It is an idea which in its essential features grows out of the historic revelation recorded in the Bible and which, as such, can be scientifically defined and tested. A considerable part of Dr. Clarke's introduction is devoted to the study of the historic sources of the Christian doctrine, as they are found in Jesus' life and teaching. This does not mean that our author undertakes to reproduce Jesus' teaching concerning God in detail. Such an attempt, even if successful, would not accomplish the purpose which he has in mind, which is to present an idea of God which shall be intelligible to modern men. The language in which Jesus expressed his faith in God is very different from that of Dr. Clarke's theology. It is the language of popular religion, not of scientific thought. It has for its background the world-view of the older Judaism, a view in which the earth was regarded as the centre of the universe; where the existence of spirits, good and evil, was everywhere assumed; where human history was compressed within a few thousand years, and the final catastrophe with which it was to close was believed to be imminent. This view of the world necessarily affected Jesus' method of stating his doctrine; but it must not be identified with it. Jesus does not give us a metaphysical theory of God which stands or falls with a particular philosophy of the universe. He describes him in moral and religious terms, capable of application to very different intellectual surroundings and needing to be constantly reinterpreted, in view of the changes in contemporary science and

philosophy. Such an interpretation Dr. Clarke undertakes to give. "By the Christian doctrine of God," he tells us, "is meant, in the present discussion, the conception of God which Christian faith and thought propose for the present time, in view of the Bible and of history, and of all sound knowledge and experience, interpreted in the light of Jesus Christ, the revealer. It is a doctrine concerning which we can say at the point at which we now stand, that it is true if Jesus Christ does reveal God truly" (p. 4).

The position here assigned to Jesus illustrates a prevailing tendency in contemporary religious thought. In a sense far higher and truer than was the case with the older theology modern theology makes the person of Jesus normative for its thought of God. The old theology constructed its doctrine of Christ's person in the light of a preconceived conception of God. Jesus was two persons in one nature, a God who for the time had assumed the form of man, but whose real nature was unaffected thereby. Modern theology thinks of Jesus as a man, but a man through whom God's spirit has found such complete expression that it is possible to see in his character the perfect revelation of the heart of God. To believe in God, as modern theology conceives of him, means to extend throughout the range of universal experience that same gracious purpose and consistent character which Jesus has revealed within the conditions of a human life.

Two consequences follow from this principle. The first is, that theology must take its departure from the character of God rather than from those metaphysical attributes which express his relation to the universe, and which are therefore necessarily affected by changes in contemporary thought. The second is, that it must seek to conceive this character in a way that is consistent with the moral and religious teaching of Jesus.

Both these conclusions Dr. Clarke draws. Unlike the older theologians he begins his exposition of the idea of God by a description of his character, and then goes on to develop God's relation to men and to the universe. In his picture of the divine character he gives the central place to the qualities which Jesus himself made central in his own thought of God. Like Jesus he emphasizes the out-going love of God, the Father who is ever ready

to receive the prodigal, and whose gracious purpose anticipates the need of his children. Like Jesus, he emphasizes the extent of God's mercy, a mercy which reaches the outcasts whom the law has rejected, and finds more joy in the repentance of one sinner than in ninety and nine just persons who need no repentance. Like Jesus, finally, he emphasizes the consistency of God's character, the God who maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the unjust and the just.

I say, he emphasizes the consistency of God's character. It is at this point that his departure from the older theology appears most clearly. The terms which Dr. Clarke uses are those familiar to historic Christian theology, holiness, wisdom, and love, but the meaning which our author puts into them is in many respects new, and the relations which they sustain one to another have undergone significant change. To the older theology holiness and love represented independent elements in the divine nature, each requiring its own appropriate gratification. The former expressed the opposition of the righteous God to sinful man, an opposition which required the punishment of all unrepented sin; the latter expressed his gracious purpose to redeem his elect through the forgiveness of their sins. Here we have to do with two apparently inconsistent, if not contradictory, impulses, and the chief problem of the theologian was to discover the way in which this inconsistency could be overcome, and the love of God gratified, consistently with his holiness. This, as we all know, was accomplished through the atonement of Christ.

Dr. Clarke is conscious of no such problem. To him holiness denotes simply the moral excellence of God, and love is the method in which this moral excellence comes to its completest expression. There is no inconsistency between them, for there is no independent end which the holiness of God sets for itself, as distinct from his love. God is not holy when he punishes and loving when he forgives, as in the older Calvinism. God is holy in his love, and loving in his holiness. He is not gracious to some men and just to others, but always and everywhere both just and gracious. His attitude toward every man is that of the father in Jesus' parable of the prodigal. As man's father, truly akin to him in spirit, it

is his supreme desire to conform his child to himself, and this desire is the explanation of all that he does. Whether he punish or forgive, it is but a step in his supreme purpose of redemption.

This conception of God's character gives unity to Dr. Clarke's theology. It frees it from the inconsistency and exceptions which meet us so frequently in the theology of the past. The dualism which was so characteristic a feature of the older Calvinism, and which expressed itself in the contrast between reason and revelation, nature and the supernatural, law and grace, has disappeared for Dr. Clarke. To him revelation is not the disclosure of an aspect of God's character, otherwise unknowable, but only the clearer manifestation of that which God has always been and of which, from the first, men have had more or less clear anticipations. As a spiritual being, man is fitted by nature to receive the divine revelation. Revelation is not the impartation by supernatural process of mysteries transcending the reason of man; it is the manifestation of spirit to spirit, and the recipient recognizes in the disclosure which comes to him from God not simply the revelation of the divine nature, but also the complete satisfaction of ideals of which he has long been conscious within himself. As the book which gives us the revelation of Jesus, the ideal man, God's complete self-manifestation in humanity, the Bible is indeed a unique book. But it is not God's first or only revelation, even on the side of God's love. From the beginning God has written his gracious purpose in the heart of man, and the disclosure which he has made of himself in Christ is recognized by those to whom it comes as the fulfilment of their own inner prophecy.

Redemption, in like manner, is not to be conceived as an exception to God's ordinary working, but rather as the normal method of his activity. It is not confined to a group, larger or smaller, whom God has arbitrarily chosen from the rest, that he may make them the subjects of his redemptive activity, but concerns all mankind alike, though in different order and degree. All history is part of a single process, in which God is training men for membership in his kingdom. In other words, all history is the history of redemption. Dr. Clarke does not indeed explicitly state that all individuals will be saved, but that is

the natural implication of his discussion. If any one is lost, it will be because of his own free choice. But the libertarian limitation which alone can avoid the conclusion of universalism is unacceptable to the author. Hard as it may be for us to understand, man's freedom must somehow be consistent with the divine determination. By moral means, to be sure, yet in the end, God must control, and we may be certain that he will have his way with every child of man.

This desire for ethical consistency appears instructively in Dr. Clarke's treatment of the trinity. To the older Protestantism, as is well known, the trinity had to do with inner distinctions in the nature of God himself, distinctions rendered necessary in order to overcome the fundamental ethical dualism to which we have already referred. According to Calvin, God is able to harmonize the conflict of the claims of justice and mercy in his own character, because as the second person of the trinity, the representative of mercy, he is able to bear the penalty inflicted by himself as the first person, the representative of justice. These ontological distinctions have lost their meaning for our author. The trinity is a truth of the Christian experience. The distinctions with which it deals concern man rather than God. They express different aspects in which God manifests himself to us as we contemplate the different phases of his redemptive activity. He manifests himself in the order of nature, the natural processes which are the necessary presuppositions of the religious experience. He manifests himself in historical revelation and supremely in the person of Jesus Christ, our Lord. He manifests himself, finally, in that personal experience through which we apprehend Jesus as the revelation of the God of all the world. Here we have three types of religion which correspond in a measure to the three historic doctrines: natural religion, "or the religion of God as he is known in the order of the world; historical religion, or religion which finds its support in the historical manifestations of God in events of time; personal religion, spiritual, experimental, mystical, that knows God in the soul" (p. 247). In all three aspects, it is the same gracious God who is revealed. The tragic contrast between the demand of justice and the appeal of mercy, which gives

dramatic interest to the older doctrine, has completely disappeared.

Such, then, is Dr. Clarke's God, a God ethically consistent in all that he does, committed with all the intensity of his moral nature to the redemptive purpose which Jesus has revealed, and strong enough and wise enough to insure the realization of this purpose in spite of every obstacle.

I say strong enough to insure the realization of his purpose in spite of every obstacle. With this we touch a second aspect of Dr. Clarke's view, which needs emphasis, namely, the fact that he attributes to this idea of God universal validity. According to our author Jesus' God is the God of the universe. When we raise philosophy's ancient question as to the ultimate explanation of the varied phenomena of the world, we find the only satisfying answer in the Christian idea of God. The so-called metaphysical attributes of God—infinity, eternity, omnipresence, and the like—are only so many different ways of asserting this simple truth.

Dr. Clarke's proof of this thesis occupies the last two sections of his book. The first, which treats of God and the universe, is expository in nature. It explains in detail what is the relation between God and the world which Christian faith assumes. The second gives the reason for believing that this faith is justified in fact.

It is not possible for us to follow the argument in detail. In substance, it reduces to this, that the qualities which we find essential in the Christian idea of God are so inwrought into the structure of the universe that it is natural to assume that it has the Christian God for its author. The universe is not something alien to man with which he connects himself, as if it were an existence of a different kind. "The human race is part and parcel of the universe, for it has grown up out of the life which was before it on the earth. . . . We have to do not with a late born race planted from the outside in a little world, but an ancient race which is of one substance with the universe, while its true life is in the powers of the spirit which reach out to that which is above" (p. 371). "It is plain that if this conception of the relation between man and the world be true, no partial idea of

God can satisfy humanity. We cannot think of him except as universal in his relations. He must be one God equally related to all souls and to all existences" (*ibid.*). Clearly, then, if the Christian idea of God be true, we should expect to find evidence for it not only in the spiritual nature of man, but in the universe, which is at once its home and its school.

Such evidence Dr. Clarke believes that we find. It is of two kinds, rational and spiritual. The former consists in the response which the universe makes to our efforts at rational explanation. The second, in the satisfaction which it yields to the demands of our moral and religious nature.

These arguments have a familiar sound. They seem to be only the well-known teleological and moral arguments in a new dress. But closer examination shows that this is only in part true. The older theologians used the evidence from design and the argument from conscience to establish the existence of a rational and a moral God, but they were persuaded that these arguments alone were inadequate to establish faith in a God of love; hence they supplemented the rational arguments by supernatural revelation. The dualism already referred to in connection with the idea of God reappears in the proof of his existence. Dr. Clarke, as we have seen, is unwilling to accept this limitation. Since the God in whom he believes is everywhere loving as well as holy, we should expect to find evidence of his love wherever his activity extends, and this Dr. Clarke believes to be the case. The argument from reason does not lead us to the door of Christianity and then stop; it is valid all along the line. The demand which we find within ourselves for a rational explanation of things finds its satisfaction only in the kind of God that Jesus Christ reveals. When we have come to think of God as Jesus did, and turn back to the universe, we find that all its elements fall into place as parts of the consistent plan, and mysteries which would otherwise baffle our reason find in him their solution.

The uniformity of nature, with its results in undeserved suffering becomes the means which the Father uses for the training of his children in courage and faith. The spiritual aspirations of man which seem so often in irreconcilable conflict with reality

are to the Christian evidences of a divine sonship which finds in God, and in God alone, its complete satisfaction. So the Christian idea of God proves everywhere a unifying conception. It harmonizes all the unrelated elements in our thinking and in our feeling. It gives us, for the first time, a consistent universe, and there is no other idea which does this with the same success.

Here, too, the position taken by Dr. Clarke is typical. In rejecting the dualism of the older apology, and relying for his proof of the Christian God upon evidence similar in kind to that of which we make use in other fields of experience, he is in touch with the prevailing spirit in contemporary theology.

But at this point our author is confronted with the fact of evil, that baffling and mysterious experience which has made shipwreck of so many philosophies. The test of every theology is its treatment of this problem, and Dr. Clarke's method is characteristic of the man. There are three possible attitudes which one may take to the problem of evil, no one of which satisfies our author. One may minimize its importance, question the account which it gives of itself, explain away its apparent harshness and cruelty, cloak its seeming vice in the garb of an unsuspected virtue, and thus by a process of ingenious reinterpretation bow it politely out of the world. Or one may recognize evil for what it seems to be, something real and terrible, and account for its existence through the hypothesis of a rival power, limiting and—to a greater or less degree—thwarting the purpose of a good God. Or, finally, still taking it at its face-value, one may yet subject it to God's power and find place for it within his purpose. This was the method taken by the older Calvinism. Calvinism, as is well known, saw in sin the means through which God's justice found an expression possible in no other way, and because the manifestation of justice was inherently excellent, whatever was necessary to make this manifestation possible could be ethically justified. This is the philosophy of Jonathan Edwards's famous sermon on "Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God."

No one of these solutions satisfies our author. Evil in each one of its three great forms, pain, sin, and death, is to him some-

thing real and terrible, something to be shunned and fought and ultimately overcome, but it is not independent of God, nor an intruder in the universe which he has made. Evil is a part of the structure of the world. It is inwrought into the nature of things. It will have its place in the life to come, as well as the life here, for it is here with a purpose, and, as the older Calvinism rightly affirms, it ministers to the glory of God. But the purpose, as Dr. Clarke conceives it, is very different from that discovered by Jonathan Edwards. It is a purpose of redemption. Evil is here because without it man cannot be trained in the highest moral excellence. A world in which evil had intruded against the will of God would be intolerable to Christian faith, but a world in which God uses evil for his wise and beneficent purpose is a world in which the Christian can feel at home. Our difficulty consists in the fact that the training is so incomplete. There is so much evil which seems to yield no outcome in character. If every cross were a Calvary, the burden would be lightened, for we should see then what we only suspect now, the end which it is designed to serve. "If we could confidently include the vast movement of sin between a Godworthy origin and a Godworthy outcome we might still sadly wonder on the way, but we could rest in hope" (p. 461).

It is at this point that Dr. Clarke's position is most certain to be attacked. Most readers will be ready to admit that the idea of God which our author presents is Christian in the sense in which he makes the claim. The difficulty arises when we attempt to reconcile the idea of such a God with the facts of life as we find them. Those who demand logical demonstration before they are ready to believe will naturally find the evidence for Dr. Clarke's thesis unconvincing. Calvin's doctrine of God was easy by comparison. He saw all things in the world tending to a double issue, and he affirmed what he saw to be final truth. But to believe that our entire universe, filled as it is with countless miseries, with ruthless cruelties, with diabolical perversities, is really under the control of a being in character like Jesus; that this supreme power will some day guide it to an end which is good; that some day all mankind shall be organized into one great brotherhood; that service shall be the universal

law, and ministry the test of greatness,—this is indeed to make an heroic venture of faith. “Dr. Clarke,” caustically remarks a recent reviewer, “has succeeded in drawing a picture of God to which we feel no moral repugnance. But there is one most important attribute which he has omitted from the sketch, and that is the attribute of non-existence. Experience of the world does not lend the slightest plausibility to the theistic hypothesis as to its origin.”

Such an objection altogether misconceives the kind of evidence upon which religion relies for its proof. Religion is the child of faith, and faith is never confined to the present. It reaches out for that which is not yet, and affirms that it shall yet be true. Heroism is its native atmosphere, adventure its vital breath. To believe in God means everywhere and always to identify one's own highest ideal with ultimate reality. It means to rise above sense to the spirit, which is only in part revealed through it, and to be persuaded that this partial revelation shall some day be complete. Every man who has really believed in God has made such a venture. He has assumed the reality of the ideal and lived in anticipation of a future only in part revealed. He has dared to believe that the world that now presents only the raw material of goodness and truth shall become a fit habitation for reasonable and moral beings. He has done it because he could not help it, because without such an assumption life would not have seemed worth living, and because, when it was made, facts otherwise inexplicable fitted into place and the world became unified and consistent.

Is it reasonable to do this? From the individual point of view it is certainly most reasonable. Those who, like our author, hold the Christian idea of God because it satisfies the deepest needs of their own souls have no option but to assert its ultimate validity. Such a faith brings harmony into life where it would otherwise be discordant by promising ultimate victory to those ideals which seem supremely worthful. It assures those who are giving their lives to ministry to human need in all its various forms that their labors will not be wasted or their energies mispent. If the Calvinistic idea of God satisfied those who held it, it was because the age in which they lived was an age of bat-

tle, when men were on trial for their lives and for that which they held dearer than life, the truth of God. If this idea no longer satisfies us, it is because other virtues hold a more prominent place in our horizon. Our ideal is one of peace, not of war. We are less concerned to conserve than to impart, and the God who cares for the downcast and oppressed of every race and tribe is the only God who can satisfy an age which has witnessed the birth of modern philanthropy and of modern missions.

Are we, then, shut up to purely subjective evidence? Can nothing be said for this idea of God but that it satisfies the individual need? Is there no objective standard by which it can be judged, no social argument in favor of its validity?

The missionary activity of the Christian church is the best answer to this question. It is the expression of the conviction held by every sincere Christian that the response which the Christian idea of God calls forth in his own soul is not a purely individual matter, but is the answer to common social needs which can find their satisfaction in no other way. To the extent to which this faith shall prove justified in fact, the weight of the argument for the Christian God will be transferred from the experience of the individual to that of the race.

For those who look at the subject from this point of view there is much in the outlook that is encouraging. In spite of all that is dark and selfish in human life, it is yet a fact that the altruistic virtues are being more and more developed, and the ideals of war yielding place to those of peace. The Christian message of brotherhood and service is, as a matter of fact, finding response in the hearts of men. The very dissatisfaction that we feel at our shortcomings, the seriousness of the criticism to which our social order is being subjected, is the best evidence of the fact that the old selfish and particularistic ideals of an earlier age no longer satisfy us. The subjective response which the Christian idea of God calls forth in individuals is itself the result and evidence of a far-reaching social change which constitutes no small argument for its objective validity. It is, of course, always possible that this faith may prove mistaken. It is possible that Calvinism is right in its conception of a divided universe, and that we may be obliged to renounce as an idle dream our faith in the

good God whose love embraces every child of man. But, if this be true, it will introduce an irreconcilable discord into our inner life. If our ideals are to be justified in the real world, it can only be through the Christian idea of God. It is reasonable, therefore, in default of convincing evidence to the contrary, to act as if it were true.

And when we decide so to act, we find that reality answers our expectation. It is not simply that we ourselves find satisfaction in our faith, although that is true, but that the action which results from that faith changes the social environment for the better. Every man who believes in the Christ-like God and who acts out his conviction is increasing the amount of altruism in the world and making faith in such a God easier to those who have not yet believed. In other words, he is increasing the sum total of evidence in favor of the truth of the Christian view.

*THE RELIGIOUS ENVIRONMENT OF EARLY
CHRISTIANITY*¹

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Opinions as to the nature and origin of Christianity have been profoundly modified during rather recent years by the increased attention that has been given to the circumstances of the society within which its work was to be done. It is fortunate that these inquiries have been undertaken by scholars whose primary interest has not been to defend Christianity, but only to understand the conditions that necessarily determined its forms both of organization and of faith. Into their studies Christianity entered only as one element among many others, and it is this fact that gives to their results their peculiar value for the history of Christianity itself.

Approaching their problem from different points, the several writers here in review have had certain common lines along which they have sought to trace the movement of serious thought and the gradual growth of effective organization within Christian limits. These lines of study may be grouped for our purpose under four heads. First, the attempt has been made to understand the precise value of the existing Roman religious system

¹Ludwig Friedländer. *Roman Life and Manners under the Early Empire*. Translated from the 7th edition. 3 vols. 1906-1909.

Gaston Boissier. *Cicero and his Friends; a Study of Roman Society in the Time of Caesar*. 1897. *La fin du paganisme*, 2 vols. 2d edition. 1898.

Franz Cumont. *Textes et monuments figurés relatifs aux mystères de Mithra*. 2 vols. 1896-1899. *The Mysteries of Mithra*. Translated from the 2d edition. 1903. *Les religions orientales dans le paganisme romain*. 1906.

Samuel Dill. *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius*. 1905. *Roman Society in the Last Century of the Western Empire*. 2d edition. 1906.

T. R. Glover. *The Conflict of Religions in the Early Roman Empire*. 2d edition. 1909.

W. Warde Fowler. *Roman Society in the Age of Cicero*. 1909.

Paul Wendland. *Die hellenistisch-römische Kultur in ihren Beziehungen zum Judenthum und Christenthum*. 1907.

in so far as it followed the conventional forms. Then the singular phenomenon of the imported religions has been studied with the view of determining the cause of their extraordinary popularity and fixing, so far as possible, their relation to the official faith. Next, the multitudinous prevailing philosophies of the day have been examined to determine their contribution to the growth of new religious conceptions and their share in satisfying the demand of thinking people for a satisfactory solution of the most pressing problems of the spiritual life. Finally, the moral aspects of this over-civilized society have been considered, both in their relation to the prevailing philosophies and by themselves as indications of what kind of remedies were being suggested for the obvious ills under which this society was gradually sinking into a universal impotence.

The mere enumeration of these several points of view is enough to remind us rather forcibly that this society, upon which and within which Christianity was to work, was as far as possible from a dead society. Activity, in countless forms, is the first suggestion that meets us as we approach it. Even the conventional ancient religion had its phases and its periods of compelling activity. The foreign emotional religions can be compared only to the most active of modern Christian missionary undertakings in their fresh and vigorous appeal to those sides of the religious life which the religion of the state seemed least to cultivate. Philosophy appeared under such numerous and such widely popular forms that from time to time there was nothing to do but actually to forbid its profession by law as dangerous to the peace of mind of the community. And again if we single out the purely moral teaching of the best minds from Cicero to Marcus Aurelius, separating it as far as we can from the purely speculative content of the philosophical literature and making every allowance for the professional critics of social evils, we shall be equally impressed with the extraordinary energy of the moral appeal. We may not agree with its standards, but we cannot deny its sincerity or its value.

With these several aspects of the general subject in mind we are prepared to examine in somewhat greater detail some of the conditions which Christianity had to face in its attempt to re-

place all the religious forms prevailing in the Empire of the first three centuries by its own simple yet all-sufficient scheme of approach to the universal mystery. First of all, we are constantly reminded that this Greco-Roman society we are considering was profoundly divided by the distinction between religions of authority and religions of the spirit. On the one hand there still existed within the vast scope of the imperial rule a number of religious systems which, with whatever deviations from their original forms, still relied for their support upon the appeal to immemorial tradition. Such a religion, for example, was Judaism. No doubt the ancient worship had been profoundly modified by contact with other faiths and by the development of a wider outlook within the body of the Hebrew people themselves; but still the strength of Hebrew loyalty was called forth, as it ever had been, by the summons to preserve the faith of the fathers unspoiled by foreign admixture or by philosophic doubt. So it was also with the ancient historic faith of Persia. There the early absorption in the eternal problem of evil had fixed upon the race a form of religion in which the continuous antagonism of the principle of light with the principle of darkness gave the key-note to every phase of religious experience. So it was again with the still more ancient but far less easily definable religion of Egypt. There, under the government of Greek princes, the formal tradition of three, four, and we know not how many more millenniums, went on, exciting the attention, but baffling the understanding of philosophic inquirers, defending itself by constant reference to what it believed to be its original sanctions, and resisting as best it might the insidious attacks of speculative re-formations. And then, coming into contact, but hardly into rivalry with these other religions of authority, we have the official religion of all-conquering Rome, interfused at every point with the closely related but loftier and more spiritual cult of Greece.

This is the remoter background to every picture of the religious life of the late Republic and the early Empire, this group of ancient race religions, each one sufficient for the formal religious needs of its own people, each still acutely conscious of its great historic past, each resisting as best it could the encroachments of specula-

tive thought within and the manifold influences of foreign contact without. What strikes us most impressively in this aspect of our subject is the mutual exclusiveness and with it the mutual toleration of these diverse systems. No one of them makes conscious efforts to dominate the rest. That is indeed a part of the very character of a race religion. It is differentiated from others of its kind precisely as the race itself is differentiated from other races. What makes a race is this assumed fact of a different blood that cannot be shared by the members of another race, and, even though the purity of its stock may be violated in many ways, the theory of its inviolability is maintained in every race-manifestation. Its religion is a part of this inherited quality as a race. In strict theory it may not be shared by men of an alien race except through some device whereby they enter as by adoption into the race-compact. This exclusiveness may appear as hostility, but not of necessity. The gods are hostile only as the races are brought into hostile relations. Otherwise they are honorable strangers having the same right to exist as the races themselves. The missionary idea, that because we find our gods useful and agreeable to us, we ought to persuade or compel our neighbors to accept them for themselves,—this whole conception is obviously entirely foreign to the idea of strictly race-religions. In other words, the strict racial religions are by their nature tolerant of each other. There is no excuse in the nature of things for an attempt to impose one of them upon the others.

They are tolerant to each other, but not in the least through any conscious devotion to the ideal of religious toleration. Their toleration goes no further than a blind recognition of similar sanctions. Our especial interest in this phase of the question is with the attitude of Rome as the universal conqueror and sovereign. That attitude is defined in what we have just been saying. Rome was concerned primarily in securing the submission of the civilized world to her military power, her system of taxation, and her law. If these demands were satisfied, she had no further concern with the private lives of the conquered. She had her religion and they had theirs. They were as much entitled to their ways of dealing with the gods as she was

to hers. Even after the conquest, therefore, there was no significant change in the mutual relation of the traditional religions in the Empire. We shall, of course, be reminded of one apparent exception to this general statement. The worship of the emperor, foreshadowed already in the time of Augustus and made universal by later decree, seems to be an encroachment on the idea of universal toleration. A more careful consideration, however, will, I think, show us that the exception is only apparent. We shall approach this point by another and very instructive way.

Not only were the several religions of the world at once exclusive and tolerant; they were also to a great degree mutually translatable, one into terms of the other. When a Greek or a Roman, for example, came to inquire into the religion of another race, he was struck, as a foreigner trying to understand the life of a people always is, with resemblances, generally superficial, but to his mind indicative of common origin or common character. In the figure of the Hebrew Samson, he thought he recognized the familiar Hercules. In the Egyptian or the Persian sun-god, he found again his own Apollo. In the Magna Dea of Pessinus or in the Egyptian Isis he had no difficulty in recognizing the type of a universal goddess of fertility and prosperity. It seemed to him on the whole that after all these strangers were approaching the gods much as he was, and that the essential thing was that the gods should be acknowledged, not that this acknowledgment must have any one best mode of expression. The maintenance of the traditional worships was thus to the Roman one of the chief securities for that order and permanence in the community which was to him the all-important condition of a firm hold upon the vast complex of peoples brought together under the *pax romana*. Rome was willing to apply to the conquered peoples the same principle it applied to its own proper subjects: that the regular and orderly worship of the ancestral gods was all that could properly be demanded of a well-disposed community. Whatever was beyond this, passing over into the nebulous region of individual religious experience or learned refinement upon the simple forms of the past, was outside its interest or its control.

This prepares us to understand the Roman attitude in regard to the curious phenomenon of emperor-worship. The Empire was a complex of different peoples, each with its own traditions of race and religion: but it was more than that. It stood for a great idea, the idea of the unity of all races under a government that claimed to be, not an oppression, but rather an immense privilege and blessing. It insured to these hitherto warring and mutually repellent nations the gift of peace under law. It made plain the ways of civilization throughout the Mediterranean world. It welcomed to its capital city every form of human activity. Rome became the great world's clearing-house, into which entered every fruitful idea, only to be made practical and go out from there into wider regions of utility. If, now, the religion of a state was a necessary part of the national life, it must follow that this new national ideal should have its own peculiar religious expression. It was not enough that the ancient faith should be maintained for the benefit of the Roman by blood or by adoption. There must be added to it a something new to correspond to this latest manifestation of the universal Roman spirit. The introduction of the Genius of the emperor into the family of the gods supplied this need. The process was a familiar one. It was the same that had been continuously employed in the creation of new divinities, as new demands in the life of the individual or of the family or of the community as a whole had been formulated. That was one of the charms of polytheism, that it lent itself in such easy and picturesque ways to the varying needs of humanity. The elevation of the emperor into a deity was only a more impressive illustration of a widely prevailing tendency. It was not that the emperor became a rival of the other gods, or became in his own private person other than a fallible human being. It was only in the diseased imagination of an occasional individual mad with the drunkenness of power that such a notion could find place. In the normal understanding of thoughtful men the thing deified was the idea of the Roman unity and Roman power, exercised as divine unity and divine power were exercised, for the blessing of mankind.

And if this adoption of a new divine figure into the already well-peopled pantheon of Greece and Rome was a tolerably

easy process, its extension to the religions of the subject peoples was in one respect easier still. Certainly to the oriental races the identification of a supreme earthly ruler with the sovereign of the universe was one of the most familiar religious ideas. There was nothing essentially contradictory in their acceptance of the Genius of the Empire among their gods. It expressed to them in dramatic form the imposing fact of their incorporation into the Roman family.

But now these ancient and intensely localized religions had all been undergoing a subtle transformation. While their official forms and their traditional sanctions were being preserved apparently with little change, there had been growing up within the sphere of their nominal control other groupings of ideas that had led to various but curiously related manifestations. Let us take for instance the Egyptian as the most remarkable illustration of an apparently unchanged and unchangeable religious tradition. Alexander the Hellene died in the year 323 before Christ. The sovereignty of Egypt passed into the hands of the Greek Ptolemies. Alexandria, to all intents and purposes a new city, Hellenic rather than Egyptian, became henceforth the melting-pot of the ancient world. Into it was poured every ingredient that was to go to the making of that singular complex of ideas in the midst of which Christianity was to make the struggle for its life. Into it went the ancient religion of Egypt and out of it came profound modifications of that religion, stripped almost entirely of all that had made it peculiarly Egyptian, adapted to the new demand for a something universal that should take the place of the local, the traditional, and the racial. The worship of the ancient gods, Isis and Serapis, became separated from the traditional mythology in which they had borne a part, broke through all barriers of place and nationality, and went forth to conquer over the whole Mediterranean world.

A similar phenomenon is to be noticed in the case of Persia. There, too, the Alexandrian conquest had left its mark, not merely nor primarily in the destruction of the ancient Persian empire, but in the widened influence of Greek life and thought throughout the regions of western Asia. The essential feature of the Persian religion was, of course, its emphasis on the eternal conflict of

the principles of Good and Evil, embodied in the supreme personalities of Ahuramazda and Ahriman. This dualistic solution of the problem of the universe has never been permanently satisfying. As soon as the mind begins to work upon it, it is tempted on inevitably to seek a way out of the hopeless antagonism it implies. Somehow, at some time, there must be a reconciliation of the manifold oppositions of the dualistic world. If such a resolution of the problem cannot be reached from above downward through the teachings of philosophy, it will be tried from below through the instinctive feeling of the suffering masses of mankind. Some such origin as this seems probable for the very remarkable outgrowth of the Persian religion which attached itself to the subordinate figure of Mithra. The Mithraic worship appears to have developed gradually, chiefly in the region of Asia Minor and to have had a useful function there in spiritualizing the thought of widely scattered communities long before it began its westward movement and thus came into rivalry with Christianity. Like the Alexandrian worship, Mithraism represents dissatisfaction with the conventional religion out of which it grew. It is an appeal to the individual, resting not upon the traditional basis of a religion of authority, but upon the response it may find in the heart of the religious man. In other words, it is a religion of the spirit. Like the Isis worship, too, it passes the bounds of race and country, and becomes a conquering force throughout regions that had so far never felt the touch of any similar appeal.

A similar line of reflection may be followed in regard to the conditions of the Jewish religion in the same period. Judaism had been carried bodily into every corner of the wide empire of Rome. Jews had gone as merchants and men of science out from the narrow conditions of their little province into the larger horizons of the Hellenic culture. More spiritual in its original form than any other of the religions of the ancient world, it lent itself more readily to purely speculative treatment. It was inevitable that Greek philosophy should react upon it with exceptional effect. The outcome was twofold: first a new religion, Christianity, as another type of a secondary oriental cult entering at once into competition and co-operation with the rest in the

spiritualizing of religious thought and second, a new philosophy, which was to prove one of the most effective agencies in bringing men to a realization of the Christian message. In that same great melting-pot of Alexandria especially through the work of the hellenized Jew, Philo, there was evolved a system of thought which in place of the multitudinous deities of the ancient world put one single mediatory idea, the idea of the Logos, the utterance of God, the expression of divinity that was itself divine. It was an evolution eminently in harmony with the best traditions of Hebrew thought. It helped to retain the primary idea of the indivisibility of the divine being, while at the same time it mediated between the abstractness and remoteness of this absolute deity and the limitations of the human mind. Some mediation the mind demanded. The great polytheisms had met this demand with their multitude of sympathetic creations moving in that half-world of the emotions, of fear and dread, love and hope, wherein the religious instinct has its natural atmosphere. The dualistic solution had reduced the range of these images of the divine, but had still left room for manifold encroachments upon the principle of unity. Here, in the combination of Hebrew unity with Hellenic powers of imagination, the idea of mediating agency was reduced to its lowest terms. The Logos, at once a divine reality and a result of human speculation, offered a way out of the ancient entanglements. Without any machinery of gods or demigods, this one sufficient Revealer of the divine plan was to enter vitally into every attempt to make Christianity acceptable to a polytheistically minded world. Philo was a contemporary of Jesus and of Paul, but there is no indication that his work was in any way affected by theirs or theirs by his. The two lines of effort are only so many illustrations of that universal tendency towards a spiritualizing and rationalizing of religious conceptions which we are trying to make plain.

The dominant religion of Rome thus found itself confronted, not merely by a group of traditional race-religions, but also by a new family of offshoots from those ancient faiths. The ancient worshipers were still going on. Their priesthoods were still committed to maintaining them, as far as might be, in the old ways.

From time to time revivals of enthusiasm for them showed that they were still powers to conjure with. But, from the point of view of the Christianity of the future, they were of far less importance than these new phases into which they seemed to be resolving themselves. The attitude of the Roman authorities toward these two phases of the great subject religions was distinctly different. Toward the original, traditional forms it took the position already described as the normal one among equal members of the great family of religions. It respected them because it understood them. Their sanctions were ultimately the same as its own. Their gods were only other representations of the same powers familiar to their own experience. It translated their names easily into those of its own pantheon. If these religions had remained as they were, there would have been no cause for alarm or for hostility. Indeed, since a stable religion was one of the first conditions for a sound national life, it was obviously for the advantage of Rome that her subject peoples should keep the gods of their fathers in undiminished reverence. When, however, we come to the newer and more spiritual religions, we find the situation quite different. Here were new groupings of men into units no longer definable in terms of race. The worshipper of Mithra was no longer necessarily a Persian; the follower of Isis was almost certainly not an Egyptian. The votary of the Magna Mater might belong to a patrician family of Rome or of any provincial city.

What, now, in the light of all we have been saying, must have been their reception as soon as their nature came to be understood? Would the traditional tolerance of the Roman rule be extended to them, and on what grounds? In speaking of this principle of tolerance, we omitted reference to an idea that was to be of decisive importance here and probably also in the final determination of Rome's attitude toward Christianity. We emphasized the notion of mutual ethnic tolerance on the basis of a common principle of religious life. The ethnic religions respected each other, we have said, because there was no basis in an ethnic religion for the idea of superiority of one religion over another in any such sense as to warrant or even to suggest persecution. When, however, one nation became the conqueror

of another and was obliged to find ways and means of ruling over it, then a new suggestion must obviously occur. After all, the gods of the conqueror, his *numina*, had triumphed over the gods of the conquered. There was no question here of true gods or false gods. The subject deities were none the less real powers because for the moment they had not been able to resist a superior force. They were no more to be exterminated than were the people who worshipped them. In any dealings with the people the gods were to be reckoned with. It would never do to lose whatever favor these respectable but unfortunate *numina* might be able and willing to show. They must be placated as well as disciplined, a combination of ideas familiar to every student of religious history. This consideration had doubtless weighed heavily in determining the policy of Rome toward the established religions. It could not apply, certainly not in equal measure, to these recent and less authenticated cults. In their case there was not only lack of prestige, but, by the same token, there was less cause to fear the anger or propitiate the favor of their offended deities. And here comes in the full force of that distinction between religion and superstition which meant so much to the Greco-Roman mind.

The appeal of these new religions was to nothing traditional or institutional, but directly to the individual and, worst of all, to the emotional. They were not philosophies that might have been regulated in their schools. They were not merely associations, that could be controlled under the law of colleges. They were invasions into the field that had hitherto been occupied by the accepted cults of Rome and her subject peoples. What should Rome do with them?

To this question there is no one answer that applies to them all or to the same one at all times. In some cases the action of the government seems to have been determined by some immediate impulse, as, for example, a sense of public danger, making it advisable to conciliate every possible element of the population and to secure the favor of every divine power. That would seem to be the motive for action in the case of the Magna Mater, the popular deity of western Asia Minor. It was in the midst of the stress of the Carthaginian war, in the year 204 B.C., that

the Roman Senate decreed the introduction of her worship into the city. Favorable results were almost immediately reported, but it is curious to note how jealous the official religion still remained towards this most attractive of invaders. It was to be generations yet before any Roman citizen was permitted to become a priest of the Great Mother. Not until the height of that great ferment out of which Christianity emerged do we find her votaries belonging to the leading families and her worship becoming distinctly one of the most fashionable varieties of religious excitement. A similar history meets us in the case of the worship of the Egyptian, or rather Alexandrian goddess Isis. Perhaps at about the same time, the beginning of the second century before Christ, her votaries had wandered into Italy with merchants or with public embassies from the capital of the Ptolemies. From that time until the middle of the first century B.C. there is a series of outbreaks of persecuting zeal altogether similar to those of a century or two later against Christians. Again and again the worship of Isis was prohibited, her temples destroyed, and her priests driven out. But after every such demonstration there was a prompt renewal of the fascination which her appealing personality excited, and soon the circle of her votaries was again complete. The government, following in this as in other matters the lead of popular movements, now became as eager to recognize what promised to be of value for its control as it had been to persecute what seemed hostile to its most precious traditions. Emperors and senators vied with religious fanatics and hysterical women in paying divine honors to a deity who seemed to encourage them in all the most captivating indulgences of an over-refined civilization.

Quite otherwise, however, is the story of the reception of the Mithra worship in official quarters. So far as our records go, there is no evidence of official persecution. To whatever cause this may be owing, whether to its identification with other familiar forms of worship, whether to the universality of the central conception of the sun-god as the source and centre of all life, which seemed to withdraw it from any possible hostility to the accepted deities of Rome, or whether, possibly, to its deep moral appeal and comparative freedom from fanatical elements,

the fact remains that it was able to make a slow but triumphant progress over great parts of the western world without exciting the kind of enmity that followed Christianity from the start. An ingenious attempt has been made by the scholar above all others fitted to make such an attempt to show that this exemption from persecution by the emperors was owing to two elements in the Mithraic cult derived from its Persian origin. One of these was the identification of the notion of the Roman Fortune represented in the person of the emperor with a curious idea in the Persian religious system of a similar personification of the Destiny of Kings as a something apart from, yet inseparably connected with their earthly career. The other is the notion that the Sun, the spirit of light victorious over darkness, was identified with the idea of the emperor as the victorious embodiment of supreme rule on earth. These are attractive theories, but they serve rather to illustrate the fact of a certain sympathy between imperial Rome and absolutist Persia than to explain the immunity of Mithraism from the fate which overtook the other oriental claimants for western recognition.

We have not so far made use of a word which one is sure to meet in every treatment of this subject, the word "syncretism." It is a very convenient term, partly because it may be made to mean much or little as occasion demands. Perhaps we have already caught a glimpse of its useful meaning in our reference to the readiness with which the several established and polytheistic religions could translate, each into its own terms, the ideas and personalities of all the rest. It was quite natural, for example, that the Roman historian Tacitus, trying to give an intelligible account of the religion of the Germans, should say that they worshipped Mars, and that Hercules had made a journey through their country. This same ready interchange of religious formulas passed on then to those other new religions which we studied as offshoots of the older faiths. As new candidates for popular favor, it was but natural that they should be criticised and more or less explained away as only new-fangled ways of telling the old things.

But then followed another stage of the process, to which the word "syncretism" gives us a clew. Not only was each of the

new religions to be thought of as a novel way of putting the case for the older one from which it had sprung, but, taking them all together, new and old, a philosophic and unprejudiced mind could look at them all at once and see in them after all numerous likenesses. Hence to such a mind it came to be possible to build up out of them all a kind of eclecticism that answered in place of undivided devotion to any one. That, so far as I can understand it, is what we mean by syncretic tendencies. One who sets out with this object in view, comes soon to the conclusion that in the midst of this apparently hopeless confusion of religions and superstitions and philosophies and mysteries there was, after all, a perfectly recognizable striving after one common end, and that end was the reduction of these multitudinous varieties of religious expression to some simple formulation that should replace them all and prove sufficient for the clearer vision of a new time. What we may safely call the universal demands of the religious instinct were coming out into clearer light, as the merely decorative, or merely institutional, or merely conservative elements were being recognized as unessential. The unity of God, the fact of sin, the necessity of a redemption, the demand for an individual future life and the insistent call for some mediatorial being or beings between the supreme deity and the world of men and things, these are the broad, simple outlines of a theology to which all the phenomena we have been considering were making their several contributions. Syncretism represents a state of mind that made it possible to approach the whole subject without prejudices and with a receptive attitude towards all truth as it should commend itself to individual reception. It is a state of mind that ought to be easily understood by us. Never, since that time, I suppose, has there been so great a readiness as there is now, to come to the subject of religion in a similar attitude. Once more, in the light of new scientific and philosophical methods, religion is undergoing a critical examination as to its acceptability to the individual conscience. It is not enough that men point us to authorities or assure us that these things have been good for the men of the past. We demand that they shall respond to the insistent needs of the present and of ourselves who are called upon

to live in the present and do its work. It is impossible to read the highest thoughts of those first Christian centuries without feeling the instant kinship with much of our present day experience. As in our own day, the anchors of the ancient faiths were lost, and men were groping about for new guarantees of safety.

Illustrations may be found, for example, in the great popularity of the worship of Aesculapius, the ancient parallel to the modern "religion of health," and also in the Mysteries that had grown up as expressions of the emotional life within the circle of Greco-Roman religious forms. It is conceivable that through the elevating and refining of these semi-official attempts to approach the ultimate source of divine truth a way might have been found that would have led into the simplicity and clearness that proved the chief recommendation of Christianity. Such, however, was not to be the solution.

Not through any native development, but through the group of foreign cults, all of them oriental in their origin and each of them representing a development out of an older formal race-religion, was this craving after a higher spirituality and a simpler form of expression to be satisfied. These are the group of secondary religions already briefly referred to. Two among them, the Mithra and the Isis worships, illustrate best the tendencies we are here following. Our knowledge of the Mithra worship in detail is a thing of very recent date. Numerous references to it in the time of its greatest expansion in the second and third centuries and later left no doubt of the profound impression it had made in the western world. Scattered remains of Mithra shrines were found long since in many parts of Europe. But it was reserved for a Belgian scholar, Franz Cumont, not more than a dozen years ago, to make such careful researches into these monuments that we are now in possession of material for a really comprehensive view of the subject. As a result it has now become a necessity for every rational attempt at a history of Christianity to take into account the extraordinary achievement of this its most dangerous rival. We are able to see now, as never before, first, that Christianity was called upon to contend, not only with the formal, official religion of Greece and Rome, but with a competitor quite on its own lines, and second, that in this competitor

it found not only a rival that at one time threatened to be successful, but also an ally. For in so far as Mithraism succeeded in replacing the official religion by a more spiritual and personal cult, just in that degree it was preparing the way for the still more spiritual and equally personal appeal of Christianity itself. It is this study of Mithraism, more than anything else, that has once for all freed us from that fancy-picture of the earlier historians, in which Christianity appears in a prolonged grapple with a hopelessly irreligious, depraved, and unspiritual world.

Mithraism is an obvious derivation from the ancient Persian faith. That faith, we have already had occasion to observe, was essentially a dualism, in which two supreme powers were always contending for mastery over the universe and the soul of man. It was a dualism, but it had added to this simple notion of a dual government of the universe an abundant decoration of polytheistic elements. It had found its satisfaction in personifying powers of nature, and then had ranged these as best it might under its dualistic scheme. Mithra represents one of these additions. He is the god of the light, the radiant being through whose benign influence life is carried on in all its varied forms. He is the sun-spirit, whose light and warmth stimulate fertility and bring prosperity to the people. Nothing can resist his victorious march, and as he conquers all obstacles, so the people he loves shall overcome their enemies. His most frequent title on the inscriptions is *sol invictus*, the unconquered Sun. Like his Grecian prototype, Apollo, he has his own mythology. The central myth represents him as a mighty hunter going out to the chase of a wild bull. To a nation of herdsmen the bull stood for the idea of power, the wild bull for the notion of power unrestrained and needing to be brought under control for the service of man. In the course of his chase Mithra overtakes the bull, mounts him, and rides him at furious speed. He is thrown from his seat, but clings to the bull's horns and holds on until the bull is tired out. He then throws him to the ground, takes him by the hind legs, tosses him over his back, and drags him to a cave. Here he is visited by a crow which brings him a divine command to slay the bull. The bull escapes and leads Mithra another chase, but is finally overtaken and thrown to his knees. Mithra half

seats himself upon his back, seizes him by the nostrils, draws his head backward and plunges his knife into his neck. The powers of evil instigated by Ahriman, send a dog, a serpent, and a scorpion to prevent the beneficent effects of the sacrifice. The dog and the serpent try to drink up the blood that flows from the wound, and the scorpion fastens upon the vital organs of the conquered bull. In spite of these efforts of the evil one, however, the blood flows down upon the earth and becomes the source of fertility to the fields of man. The vital strength of the bull engenders all the animals useful to man. Mithra is represented as performing this sacrifice unwillingly, in obedience to a higher command. The myth presents him thus as the agent of beneficent creation. All good things are made by him. He is the *demiourgos*, the worker for the people, a figure familiar within Christianity in the Gnostic systems, identified there with the creative Jehovah of the Jews and easily recognizable in the orthodox descriptions of the Christ as the creative agent in the process of world development.

I think we can understand the appeal of this figure to the allegiance of men groping after a tangible expression of the divine idea. In the general disruption of the Persian state following the Alexandrian conquest, groups of Mithra worshippers seem to have formed themselves in the eastern parts of Asia Minor and to have become established there long before the westward movement of the worship began. The agencies for the expansion toward the West were furnished by the Roman conquest. The precise process is unknown to us, but there seems every reason to believe that there were three of these agencies, the army, trade, and the circulation of slaves.

Through these natural channels the new religion found its way especially along the great Roman roads over into the Balkan countries, up the valley of the Danube to where its upper waters almost touch those of the Rhine, down the Rhine valley, spreading out over the Agri Decumates, the angle between Rhine and Danube where colonies of Roman veterans had long been settled, and so on down to the Low Countries, across the Channel and up into Great Britain as far as the wall that held Roman England against the Scot. By other roads it passed over most of Italy

and France and found a resting-place here and there in Spain. It has been possible to make a map of this distribution, indicating only those places in which actual remains of Mithraic buildings have been found, that is most impressive in its completeness. It gives a kind of proof not attainable in equal measure for any other of the imported religions, of how thoroughly the work of these Mithraic missionaries was done. There is, however, one striking exception to the completeness of this conquest. In the whole of Greece there has so far been found but one positively authentic Mithraic shrine, and that is at the Piraeus, the harbor of Athens, a place famous in antiquity, as it is today, for the conglomeration of nationalities that made up its population. It appears quite certain that this one temple was built by orientals, who brought their religion with them and formed a little community of their own. The same is true almost as completely of the western coasts of Asia Minor and the islands of the Aegean Sea. How shall we explain this phenomenon? Is it owing to something repellent in the Mithraic worship to the native Greek mind? Perhaps; but there is another suggestion certainly plausible. If we compare this map of the Mithraic distribution with another showing the probable distribution of Christianity at about the same time, we are struck by the evident fact that it is precisely these regions of least influence of Mithra that show the most powerful effect of Christianity. The conclusion seems almost irresistible that where Christianity had already come to satisfy the demand for spiritual religion it offered an impassable barrier to the work of the Mithraic mission. This conclusion is further strengthened by the exemption of the whole north coast of Africa as far west as Carthage.

The remains thus certified to are singularly uniform in character, with sufficient diversity to show a certain freedom in the use of a common body of ideas. They establish beyond all question the nature of the Mithraic temple, the conventions of Mithraic art, and the cycle of legends that formed the chief possession of the worshippers. This monumental evidence leaves us in no doubt whatever as to the territorial expansion of the faith of Mithra. More important for our purpose, especially

in relation to the parallel development of Christianity, is the inquiry into the special attraction of this new cult for the society in which it worked. This inquiry opens out naturally into two: first, why did Mithraism appeal as strongly as it evidently did to the religious sentiment of the Roman or Romanized populations, and, second, why did it fail to hold its place in the face of the advance of Christianity? In the first place, Mithraism shared with the other new religions the advantage of concentrating the thought of the worshipper on one central divine figure. It answered to the demand we have already considered for some way out of the confusion of the world's polytheisms into the clearer light of some one sufficient expression of the divine idea. Again, its appeal was, so far as our monumental evidence goes to show, mainly to the religious sense of the common man. Then, the organization of the Mithraic community appealed to that sense of mysterious union in a mystical bond which is so evident in connection with the ancient mysteries of Greece. A ceremony of initiation, with personal tests of courage and devotion, gave an added value to the more purely doctrinal aspect of conversion. If the word "church" seems too elaborate for this association, we may perhaps picture it to ourselves more accurately under the word "lodge" or even "club." There is, I believe, no evidence that the Mithraic organization as a whole had any central organ or representation. Its priesthood may have implied a separate or professional character, but on this point we are not clearly informed. Membership in the association was divided into several, perhaps seven stages, each represented by some symbolic figure of man or beast, suggesting a possible analogy to the totem groups of many other religions. It appears quite clear that full membership was open to every grade of social standing, but it is of importance that women were excluded from all participation in the privileges of initiation.

As to specific doctrines, the one all-pervading thought of Mithraism is the idea of struggle between the powers of good and evil, light and darkness, derived from its ancient Persian origin. Mithra is the ever-present power aiding men in their constant effort to overcome the forces of evil. Life is a conflict, and it is only to the victorious in that human struggle that the highest

rewards of the future are reserved. In other words, Mithraism was a profoundly moral religion. Its ideals were those of purity, courage, hope. It had as a natural consequence its suggestions of ascetic restraint as a means of clarifying the spiritual vision. It had its doctrine of redemption. In the fulness of time Mithra is to reappear on the earth. A divine bull, the counterpart of the original victim, is to be ready for the sacrifice. The dead are to arise from their graves in their former shape, are to recognize each other, and then all are to be subjected to a final judgment by the God of all truth. Mithra is again to sacrifice the sacred victim and from his fat mingled with wine is to prepare a miraculous beverage, a draught of which insures to the righteous immortal life. The wicked are to be destroyed by fire from heaven, the Spirit of darkness shall perish with them, and the whole universe shall enter upon an eternity of bliss.

The resemblances to Christianity suggested by this outline of the Mithraic system are too obvious to need any considerable emphasis. Concentration of thought upon a single divine personality. Membership in a wide-spread association to which admission is procured by personal conversion and the due performance of prescribed rites of initiation. A theology in which the individual soul is presented in the closest relation to the divine being. A morality insistent upon the highest standards of personal self-control. A doctrine of the future life, simple and vague enough to leave room for wide individual interpretation. A doctrine of redemption dependent upon the righteousness of the life that now is. It seems almost as if there were nothing left for the religious consciousness to ask, or for any religious system to supply. And in fact, in the course of the third century, while Christianity was being subjected to the most cruel test in the general persecutions, Mithraism was enjoying a popularity that seemed likely to secure for it a permanent hold upon the religious need of the western world. It had made its way upward into the highest circles of Roman society. Emperors had lent it the countenance of their patronage, and the dread of it as a dangerous rival is reflected in the apologies of the most ardent defenders of the Christian faith.

Let us now notice in a similar way the other of the more impor-

tant imported faiths of the early period. Like Mithra, Isis was a subordinate figure in the mythology from which she was selected for especial honor. In the Egyptian religious system the dualistic idea of conflict between the powers of good and evil is present, but it is distinctly subordinated to the notion of the supremacy of a group of beneficent beings. In the several provinces into which the elongated territory of the Nile-civilization naturally fell, these beneficent powers were represented under various names, but they were usually grouped into triads, or trinities, in which the principle of sex has its not unimportant part. Of these triads the most nearly universal was that of Osiris, Isis, and their offspring Horus. It is idle to attempt too precise definitions of the characteristics of these several personalities. They cross each other, replace each other, assist each other according to the circumstances of the moment. The analogy with the speculations about the several persons of the Christian Trinity, their individual characters, their relations to each other and to the universe of men and things, is too obvious to need pointing out. The difference is that while these Christian problems were discussed in the schools of theologians, the Egyptian ideas were expressed in the plastic imagination of a people who thought in pictures and translated their thought into elaborate and picturesque mythologies. Taking for our guide the Greek Plutarch,² who wrote in the first Christian century, and who was as anxious as we can be to reach the larger truths that underlay the myth-making instinct of mankind, we can come to a reasonably clear and simple interpretation of the myth of Osiris and Isis. It seems quite clear that Osiris had come to stand in the Egyptian imagination for the primal conception of the sun as the lord of all being, the creative and energizing source of life and prosperity for the sons of men. Isis stood for the receptive and directly productive agency in being. If Osiris was the river Nile, with its fertilizing flood bringing life to the whole world of Egypt, Isis was the cultivated land bearing in its season the fruits and cattle on which the people were to live. If Osiris was the life-giving sun, Isis was again the earth that received his rays. But the sun dies

² "Of Isis and Osiris," in Plutarch's *Morals*. Translation edited by W. W. Goodwin, vol. iv, 1870.

every day, conquered by the inevitable night. We need not dwell upon the immense preoccupation of the Egyptian mind with the idea of death and a life beyond it. It was only natural that a deity who should come to have the supreme place in the regard of Egyptians should become also and especially the deity of the underworld. And that is what happened. Osiris dies, but in death he does not disappear. He only becomes so much the more an object of absorbing devotion. The death of Osiris is the subject of the elaborate myth which Plutarch tells, assuring his readers that he is giving only such parts of it as will serve to make plain its meaning.

The cause of the death is the malice of Seth, whom the Greeks call Typhon, the spirit of evil, desiring above all things to destroy the source of life for the universe. After Osiris had brought mankind up from a savage to a civilized state, Typhon laid a plot against him. He gave a grand banquet at which he exhibited a very beautiful casket, promising to give it to any one who should find it just fitted to his body. Osiris tried the experiment, but as soon as he was nicely inside, Typhon clapped on the cover and set the box afloat in the river. It had many and strange adventures, but the substance of it all is that the faithful Isis never gives up her efforts to find and protect this body of her spouse against the wiles of the evil one. At one point Typhon succeeds in recapturing it and cuts it up into fourteen parts which he throws about in all directions. Plutarch explains this as a mythical representation of the fact that Osiris was worshipped at a great many places, each of which claimed to be his proper burial place. Isis busies herself with hunting out and collecting these scattered members and putting them together again. Osiris, therefore, dies; but it is only as the sun dies, to be renewed in undiminished glory with the new day. He is resurrected from the dead, and it is this risen Osiris who commands the reverence of the people and gives them the assurance that because he lives they shall live also.

It is interesting to notice that Plutarch, born within a few years after the death of Jesus, writing this account to a lady who was a priestess of Isis, immediately adds:

If, therefore, they say and believe such things as these of the blessed and incorruptible nature (which is the best conception we can have of divinity) as really thus done and happening to it, I need not tell you that you ought to spit and make clean your mouth (as Aeschylus speaks) at the mentioning of them. For you are sufficiently averse of yourself to such as entertain such wicked and barbarous sentiments concerning the gods. And yet, that these relations are nothing akin to those foppish tales and vain fictions which poets and story-tellers are wont, like spiders, to spin out of their own bowels, without any substantial ground or foundation for them, and then weave and wire-draw them out at their own pleasure, but contain in them certain abstruse questions and rehearsals of events, you yourself are, I suppose, convinced (c. 20).

Plutarch, that is, himself a man of the transition age, is trying to get out of these stories, which he sees to be absurd, the inner truth which he is sure lies beneath them, and distinguishes them from mere fanciful fabrications of human imagination. His syncretism is here abundantly illustrated. He takes great pains to show that the names of the gods are mere accidents, purely local in their origin, while that which constitutes the nature of the god in question is universal.

And those are not some in one country and others in another, not some Grecians and others barbarians, nor some southern and others northern; but as the sun, moon, land, and sea are common to all men, but yet have different names in different nations, so that one discourse that orders these things, and that one forecast that administers them, and those subordinate powers that are set over every nation in particular, have assigned them by the laws of several countries several kinds of honors and appellations (c. 67).

It is out of this curious mingling of truth and fiction that the later worship of Isis emerges in the form it was to take in its triumphant progress westward. Unlike the Mithra worship, that of Isis seems to have moved first along the waterway of the Mediterranean and found its best reception in the great centres of western life. It was a cult that appealed especially to the jaded senses of the more refined classes of the population. Like Mithraism it concentrated attention upon one central figure, and this figure was one easily recognizable as corresponding to

an ideal already familiar to the religious traditions of the West. Our readiest way to understand the attraction of this new candidate for popular favor is to follow the most complete account left to us of the experience of one of her votaries.

Apuleius of Madaura in northern Africa, writing in the second Christian century³ interpolates into his amusing and amazing farrago of magical tales an account of a conversion and initiation into the mysteries of Isis which has always been accepted as in the main an authentic reproduction of the mental and spiritual states involved in such a process. Apuleius was a type of the restless, inquiring spirit of his age. A wanderer over the earth, he interested himself especially in the numerous forms of religious excitement that were claiming attention from the dissatisfied multitudes. In one famous passage he describes the antics of certain travelling priests of the *dea Syria*, a troop of vagabonds who combined the functions of priest and magician to the scandal of the rural communities on whose credulity they played. The scene is a vivid presentation of the corruption of one of the most widely popular of the oriental imported cults.

The eleventh book of the *Metamorphoses* is entirely devoted to the description of the Isis ceremonial we are here considering. Up to this point Apuleius has been following the fortunes of a fictitious Lucius, who, early in the book, has been turned into an ass and under this unhappy disguise has been able to see and hear many things not always accessible to ordinary mortals. Finally, escaping from the last of his human tormentors, he lies down to sleep on the shore of the sea, and is there blessed with a vision of heavenly sweetness. The goddess Isis appears to him in splendor and promises him an early release from his penance and restoration to his human form. The eloquent description of her person corresponds quite precisely to the representations preserved in monuments. A part of her address to the amazed and delighted Lucius is specially interesting to us here. She begins:—

Behold me, Lucius; moved by thy prayers I appear to thee; I, who am the source of the universal order, the mistress of all the elements, the primordial offspring of time, the supreme among divinities, the

³ The Works of Apuleius: translation in the Bohn Library, 1853.

queen of departed spirits, the first of the celestials, and the uniform manifestation of the gods and the goddesses; who govern by my nod the luminous heights of heaven, the salubrious breezes of the ocean, and the anguished silent realms of the shades below; whose one sole divinity the whole orb of the earth venerates under a manifold form, with different rites, and under a variety of appellations. Hence the Phrygians, that primeval race, call me Pessinuntica, the Mother of the gods; the Aborigines of Attica (call me) Cecropian Minerva; the Cyprians in their sea-girt isle, Paphian Venus; the arrow-bearing Cretans, Diana Dictynna; the three-tongued Sicilians, Stygian Proserpina; and the Eleusinians, the Ancient Goddess Ceres. Some call me Juno, others Bellona, others Hecate, and others Rhamnusia. But those who are illumined by the earliest rays of that divinity the Sun, when he rises, the Aethiopians, the Aarii, and the Egyptians, so skilled in ancient learning, worshipping me with peculiar ceremonies, call me by my true name Queen Isis (Apuleius, *Met.* xi, p. 226).

A more positive declaration of the syncretism we have been trying to understand could not be desired. This is Isis, the supreme Deity. She is best known to the Egyptians, but is none the less worshipped by the rest of mankind, only under different names. She can have no hostility to these stranger gods, for she is fully aware of their real identity with herself.

The goddess disappears, the day, the fifth of March, begins to dawn, and with the earliest rays of the sun appears the pageant which is to celebrate the opening of a new year. It is charmingly described by Apuleius, the narrative taking form around the restoration of Lucius as the central moment. The grateful suppliant now devotes himself wholly to the service of the goddess, passes through the required initiatory stages of self-denial, and is finally admitted to the divine presence. His prayer, as he approaches her image, is a rapturous invocation to the supreme embodiment of the divine idea.

Thou, O holy and perpetual preserver of the human race, always munificent in cherishing mortals, dost bestow the sweet affection of a mother on the misfortunes of the wretched. Nor is there any day or night, nor so much as the minutest particle of time, which passes unattended by thy bounties. Thou dost protect men both by land and sea, and, dispersing the storms of life, dost extend thy health-giving right hand, by which thou dost unravel the inex-

trically entangled threads of the fates, and dost assuage the tempests of fortune, and restrain the malignant influences of the stars. The gods of heaven adore thee, those in the shades below do homage unto thee; thou dost roll the sphere of the universe, thou dost illuminate the sun, thou dost govern the universe, thou dost tread the realms of Tartarus. The stars move responsive to thy command, the gods rejoice in thy divinity, the seasons return by thy appointment, and the elements are thy servants. At thy nod the breezes blow, the clouds are nurtured, the seeds germinate, and the blossoms increase. The birds as they hover through the air, the wild beasts as they roam on the mountains, the serpents that hide in the earth, and the monsters that swim in the sea, are terrified at the majesty of thy presence (Apuleius, *Met.* xi, p. 241).

Here is monotheism suggested in every line. This deity does not exclude others; she absorbs them. They are all but broken lights of her, the supreme being. She unravels the threads of the fates. The mind that could reach this height is certainly feeling after God, if haply it may find him.

Such, in some of its most striking manifestations, is the world of thought and feeling into which Christianity was born, and within which, during at least eight generations of men, it was making its struggle for life. If we compare its course with that of the two popular religions we have just been considering, we find, in spite of many resemblances, certain fundamental differences which may help us to understand why the outcome of this rivalry was to be the victory of the cross and the final defeat of the bull-slayer and the queen of the heavens, protector of men upon the sea and of women in the house. Christianity shared with these other cults the concentration of thought upon one single redeeming personality. But the immense and decisive difference was that this personality was, in the Christian scheme, not merely a divine abstraction, requiring to be represented by symbols and sacrifices, but also an absolute and perfect historical human being. That was the one fundamental fact, which not all the speculation of all the theological schools could obscure. It was ridiculed by enemies, played with by friends, repudiated by authority, but there it was, and out of every encounter it emerged once and again in more and more convincing form, until, after one last death grapple with the whole combined force of the

Roman state it found its champion in a ruler clever enough to see that it was the winning cause.

Again I think we may fairly credit a large share of the triumph of Christianity to the elevating and purifying of religious thought that the other faiths as well as itself had gradually brought about. As one reads the Christian apology, one feels continually the effort to strip away all that was mechanical, material, of the earth earthy, idols, sacrifices, elaborate formulations, all that insistent half-world of magical dealings with the unseen, and to bring the religious consciousness of the world face to face with the great simplicities of the early teaching of the Master and his first disciples. Enough of the beggarly elements were left, in all conscience, enough to bring reproach upon official Christianity from that day to this, but the victory was won, when these great simple outlines of the faith had made themselves clear to the spiritually awakened multitudes. To believe in one God, who was a Father, in one revealer, who was at once man and God, and in a Holy Spirit about which might cluster all the highest things the mind could compass,—this was a faith at once so broad and so compact that it needed none of the mechanisms of the ancient systems to commend it to the devout and kindled imagination.

Other explanations are abundant and easy. It is true that in the onrush of the Germanic invaders from the North, precisely those regions along the frontier where the altars of Mithra had been most thickly planted, were those that had to bear the fiercest brunt of the attack, and there is little doubt that this furious border-warfare sealed the fate of Mithraism in those parts forever, but we may fairly ask why it was that these wild invaders were not won over to a form of religion that seems to offer so many more points of attraction than the more spiritual appeal of Christianity. In the case of the Isis worship, it is easy to see the excesses into which it quite naturally led, and to ascribe its failure to these; but none of the charges against it are worse than those brought against Christians by their enemies, and in both cases the defence must be the same,—that such extravagances were no true expression of the real spiritual service that both were able to render.

It is fair to ask what would have happened if Constantine

had seen fit to adopt the militant religion of Mithra instead of the lowly service of the cross as the support of his usurped power. Is it likely that he could have carried it to ultimate triumph as the prevailing religion of the Empire? I think there can be little doubt that such an attempt would have resulted in disastrous failure. It was not the support of government, welcome as that doubtless was, that gave to Christianity its convincing power over the lives of men. It was its answer to the riddle of the ages, its solution of the eternal problem of mediation between the human and the divine, through the idea of an essential union between them. No matter how that idea might be expressed, whether in the accepted creeds of the church or in the more individual interpretations of independent thinkers of all ages, the idea itself remains the permanent contribution of Christianity to religious thought and the secret of its triumphant progress.

NEW FORCES IN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

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I

In 1866 a certain clergyman in New York wrote a discourse to which he gave this characteristic title: "Christian Education the Remedy for the Growing Ungodliness of the Times." The production won in its day sufficient fame to be preserved as a pamphlet in the Harvard Library; but there it has long remained unsought, its presumptions of finality dependent at last, for even a bare reading, on some whim of historical curiosity. One need not so much as glance at the discourse to know why it lies, with many a like effort, quite forgotten. The title tells the story of its dogmatic temper, its easy ignorance of ends and means, its lack of insight into childhood. The point of view is naively, comfortably, loftily external: it recognizes no great problem in its subject, no need for new data, new thought, new purposes. Discourses of that sort are not written now—or, if written, not preserved.

With every year, to be sure, far more is printed on the same general topic than was ever printed in the sixties. Even the inattentive lay reader cannot escape contemporary discussion of religious education; but the modern discourses are of a new kind. The *Poole's Index* list of magazine articles under Religious Education shows this growth and change with striking concreteness. Beginning in 1802, the *Index* for eighty years includes only fifteen references to the subject, all of which are serenely general in character. "Religious Education for the Masses"; "The Religious Education of a Family"; "The Religious Education of Children," these titles fairly represent the kind of treatment which this topic inspired during the nineteenth century. The record in the *Index* for the four years beginning in 1902 offers a sharp contrast. There are thirty references under Religious Education, and of these a large majority bear titles which

show that they are scientific in temper. They are intensive studies in the history or the principles of religious education, or formulations of definite problems in its theory or practice. These titles are characteristic: "Religious Education before the Reformation"; "The History of Religious Education in the Public Schools of Massachusetts"; "The Need of a Professional Consciousness in Religious Education"; "The Philosophy of the New Movement for Religious Education"; "The Place of Action in Religious Education;" "Scientific Aspects of Religious Education"; "The Relation of Religious Education to Science."

Here is a strong current of popular expression; and beside it runs a slighter but increasing stream of more technical production. The source of both lies probably as far back as 1882, when G. Stanley Hall brought out in the *Princeton Review* his article on "The Moral and Religious Training of Youth." Since that time the scientific study of religious education has progressed slowly, but steadily. *The Pedagogical Seminary*,¹ a Clark University publication, has produced from time to time studies such as Barnes's "The Theological Life of a California Child," some of which have been very profitable. In 1904 President Hall founded *The American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education*, which is now in its ninth issue and which has already had occasion to welcome to its field a German magazine of like character. Although the *American Journal* has published more studies in religious psychology than in religious education and has been throughout somewhat too narrowly the organ of a school, it has performed the important service of bringing before educators, in a dignified way, the problems of religious development in the child. A certain number of books devoted wholly or chiefly to the scientific study of religious education have also appeared: in Hall's *Adolescence* (Appleton, 1907), Horne's *Philosophy of Education* (Macmillan, 1904) and *Psychological Principles of Education* (Macmillan, 1907), the theme is central; and it is the exclusive concern of Coe's *Education in Religion and Morals* (Revell, 1904), Crooker's *Religious Freedom in American Education* (American Unitarian Association, 1903), Haslett's *The*

¹ See vol. i, no. 2; vol. ii, no. 3; vol. iii, no. 3; vol. vi, nos. 2, 3; vol. vii, no. 2; vol. viii, no. 4; vol. xv, no. 2.

Pedagogical Bible School (Revell, 1903), Burton and Mathews' *Principles and Ideals for the Sunday School* (University of Chicago Press, 1903), Dawson's *The Child and his Religion* (University of Chicago Press, 1909), and of two collections of essays, *Principles of Religious Education* (Longmans, 1900) and *The Child and Religion* (Putnam, 1905). There are besides a few books of less importance on the general subject, and a number of Sunday-school guides and manuals which have a temporary practical interest; but the books here named present the deeper problems of religious education and point the direction of its future progress. Professor Coe's volume is by far the most profitable of them all.

The chief record of recent advance in the study of religious education, however, is yet to be mentioned, namely, the *Proceedings*² of the Religious Education Association. In these we have five volumes of constructive discussion covering every phase of religious nurture and teaching, the worth of which it would be difficult to appraise too highly. They present the views of leaders in the school, the church, the Sunday-school, the university, and in life, and they offer at once a body of invaluable data as to problems and tendencies and a collection of workable programmes for practical education in religion. Under the quickening influence of the Association, other bodies, such as the Unitarian Sunday-school Institute at the Isles of Shoals, report yearly more and more profitable discussions.

It is plain that men are thinking more earnestly about religious education than ever before, and in a new way.

This renaissance is not, however, a mere matter of study and discussion. There is increasing evidence of larger and more effective practice and of a new attitude and new purposes in the work. Half of the twenty-four million children of school age in the United States are enrolled in Sunday-schools, and if this in itself signifies little, the wide-spread effort to improve the work of the schools signifies much. That effort is not hard to illustrate.

² The Improvement of Religious Education; The Bible in Practical Life; The Aims of Religious Education; The Materials of Religious Education; Education and National Character. (The Religious Education Association, 72 East Madison St., Chicago.)

Within a brief period and in various quarters, the items which follow have successively borne witness to some new aim or some new method in the practice of the Sunday-school—and the number of such concrete details could be multiplied almost indefinitely: the Church of the Disciples in Boston pays all its Sunday-school teachers; President George A. Coe of the Religious Education Association has been called to a new chair of religious psychology and religious education in Union Seminary, New York; the Cuyahoga Sunday-school Association of Cleveland, Ohio, has issued an announcement of plans for the training of teachers; St. Paul's Universalist Church, Chicago, although small, has undertaken a good programme of graded activities and courses; the Senior Course of the Bible Study Union (Blakeslee) series of lessons deals with missions; the Committee on Religious Education appointed by the Presbyterian General Assembly favors, among other things, a comprehensive scheme of educational activity for the churches, to include "courses in missions and courses in civic problems and service"; vacation Bible schools were conducted five days a week last summer in Boston, Providence, Albany, and Pittsburg.

These are random gleanings from a single field, signifying a new mode of attack and greater accomplishment. From the work in other fields one gains a like impression. Much educational activity outside the Sunday-school has always been essentially religious in spirit and purpose, as, for example, the work of the Young Men's Christian Association and kindred institutions. In this work of late the broader outlook and the greater zeal have been plain to all. There is about it a new freedom and a new practicality based on a new approach to its goal in the religious life. The religious training given in colleges and private schools, whether denominational or not, has shown the same changes. From all sides comes the evidence that religious educators are dealing at last with the whole problem of human development, struggling at close range with the dynamic forces of human nature, in order to unify them in religious insight, faith, and devotion. This is the very essence of the new movement.

One great means of making religious education more effective is as yet, to be sure, hardly more than foreshadowed in practice.

When the new forces shall have done their full work, the simplest and most convincing mark of their presence will be this, that all secular training will be turned to account in the religious life. The public school is now avowedly secular, and the home has given up much of its responsibility for religious development in the child; but these facts will mean to the new religious education only an added opportunity. The religious teacher will see that specialization of functions has merely given to him the larger task. It is his to lay hold of all that is elsewhere accomplished for good and to organize it into an inclusive religious consciousness centred in a devoted will. For so important an educational duty a special institution will always be needed, but more than any other institution it must secure, and know how to use, universal coöperation.³ The Sunday-school is actually attempting to make itself worthy of this central place; but the more difficult task remains of securing in every agency for secular education a sense of its duty to the ideal of religious development. School subjects can be so taught, school discipline can be so administered, that the dominant spiritual attitudes demanded by religion shall be reinforced, not weakened.⁴ Every phase of the child's nurture and the youth's training can contribute something toward the development of a religious consciousness, and this without warping education from any of its normal channels.⁵ Much may be done by clubs and associations not directly affiliated with either church or school,⁶ and many distinctly secular agencies (for example, the library, the college fraternity, the social settlement, the playground) may help by special means to give physical, intellectual, and social training their due value as parts of the larger education of the spirit.⁷ Here is a great practical problem of coördina-

³ Cf. G. Stanley Hall, "Relation of the Church to Education," *Pedagogical Seminary*, vol. xv, no. 2, and William D. Parkinson, "School and Church," *School Review*, September, 1905.

⁴ Cf. P. Hughes, "Types of Religious Attitude," *American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education*, vol. ii, no. 2.

⁵ Cf. L. H. Gulick, "Religious Aspect of Group Games," *Pedagogical Seminary*, vol. vi, no. 2.

⁶ Cf. W. B. Forbush, *The Boy Problem*.

⁷ Cf. the numbers of *Religious Education* for 1909-10.

tion, towards the solution of which only a little has here and there been done.

But that anything has been done at all—or even that the ideal has been so much as conceived—is an indication that religion and education stand now in a new and promising relation. Their aims have been so broadened that they harmonize and interpenetrate. This is the meaning of the new movement: religious education has been redefined in terms of human development. Educational institutions and activities whose aims once seemed indifferent or even repugnant to religion are now seen to be pursuing the very purposes of religion itself;⁸ and institutions and activities once so religious as to ignore or slight education are now pursuing educational ends in the conviction that only thus can religious ends be attained. Thus missions, always wise in this respect, are more than ever placing their religious work on an educational basis and conceiving their religious task in educational terms.⁹ And the church itself begins to recognize that the religious life it fosters must needs include every worthy aim of education. In short, the modern practice of religion everywhere implies and includes education, and in the modern practice of education it may no longer be said that any part shall not be in effect religious.

It is evident that men are working more earnestly for religious education than ever before, and with a new outlook.

These facts have a possible significance of the very highest importance. In themselves they are encouraging; but seen in their relation to the traditional modes of the religious life they become even prophetic. Too often one hears it said that the church is losing its power over the lives of men. Fewer candidates present themselves for theological training; congregations do not grow as they ought; there is an excessive expenditure of effort and an almost shameful ingenuity of appeal in securing financial support; new sects and faiths are evidence of religious unrest, etc., etc. But in the face of these doubts about the older

⁸ See the address by Professor F. G. Peabody in *Religious Education* for April, 1909.

⁹ See the survey by Professor E. C. Moore in *Religious Education* for October, 1909.

forms of religious activity, men are interested in religious education to an extent hitherto unknown and in ways that are altogether new. The church as a whole may need to readjust itself to changed conditions; in its educational department it does not need to readjust itself so much as it needs to recognize and use its own new power. And this fresh life is not induced by fears for the church; even if the church were proved to be in danger of instant dissolution, this movement could not be ridiculed as a frantic attempt to revive it. The leaders here are not all churchmen, and even the churchmen approach the work quite as often from the side of the school, the home, the state, or the child, as from the side of the church. Times have been ungodly before this without any such result. There have been great revivals through appeals to the adult conscience, such as the Methodist revival of the middle of the eighteenth century; there have been mighty schemes for religious education established in the interest of the church, such as the opposing systems of Luther and the Jesuits; but when has there been any such disinterested concern in the child himself as a religious being, and in his complete religious development? The dream of Comenius, of Francke, and of Froebel seems almost ready to be realized.

Who can limit the part this new interest shall play in the divine comedy? If the church is destined to come successfully through her present trial as a social institution, may she not owe to the new forces in religious education no small part of her victory? And if that far dearer triumph of the religious ideal is ever to be won, wherein the daily lives of men shall prove at last that a common faith in God can make us brothers, to what forces will that moving faith be due so largely as to these? Never before, at any rate, has religious education promised the results it promises today.

II

To speculate about these larger effects of the new movement would by no means be a waste of time. But although ultimate ideals must always be our final standards in education and the remoter outcome of our effort becomes in consequence the source of our chief inspiration, the data for judging the worth and the

direction of our actual work lie nearer home. I turn rather, therefore, to the immediate causes of the new movement, its present alliances, its most salient characteristics, and its nearest aims.

Important reforms cannot be explained by reference to changes in the external conditions of life; their deepest causes lie in the hearts and minds of men: but no movement is quite an unrelated occurrence, and to understand the special features of a change in one field we must often take into account the changes in fields that seem perhaps remote. The half-century just preceding the rise of the new movement for religious education was marked by great changes in many fields, with a general tendency towards specialization of social functions and unification of social purposes. A few of these changes, it is clear, have affected very directly, and still affect, the progress of religious education.

The first of these is the change in the position and power of the home. Without any attempt to retrace the steps in this process, which elsewhere have been fully described,¹⁰ it is sufficient here to recall the fact that the American home has given up one after another of its specific responsibilities. The home undertakes fewer tasks than ever before. By this I do not mean that there are more homes of wealth and leisure, or that the amount of work to be done in support of a home is less; I mean that no home has the variety of concerns it once had. Specialists do the work that used to be done by the parents in the home, and parents in turn are specialists outside. Economic details are too obvious to need recounting: what home today is independent of the department store? Nor need I do more than mention the weakening of home responsibility in many of the more personal concerns of life, such as health and education. Our whole social organization, indeed, has become less genetic, more individual: churches no longer count their membership, as a matter of course, by families; the state no longer, as in early colonial days, leaves education to the family; we are beginning to take away from the family the responsibility for the very condition of its children's eyes and ears and teeth.

¹⁰ See chapter i of *The School and Society*, by John Dewey, University of Chicago Press, 1900.

The resulting problems, all important, range from manual training in the school to the economic and political status of women. Of course religious education has not escaped unaffected. Religious nurture is not carried on in the modern home to that extent and with that skill which Horace Bushnell, half a century in advance of his time, saw to be desirable. The temper, the conditions, and the limitations of the modern home are all against it. Accordingly, the new religious education is based at the outset on the admission that the specialist must undertake religious education, as he has undertaken secular education, and must bring to it a professional consciousness equally trained.¹¹

This requirement is even now not totally unfulfilled, as some of the facts cited above may show, and causes other than the one just described combine to strengthen it; but another requirement, seemingly dissimilar, has arisen in intimate connection with this one. With many voices proclaiming that home responsibility has been generalized unduly, or even disastrously, has come the attempt to restore to the home some of its old specific obligations.¹² The Third International Congress for Home Education, for example, meets this year at Brussels under the auspices of the Belgian government. The discussion and activity due to this reaction have not, however, been directed against specialization as such. No one has tried to make us forget that division of labor means a better product. No one has denied that we are better in health since we have given up dosing at home and rely wholly on doctor's orders; that we are better educated since the state has taken full responsibility for our schooling; nor that similar effects should follow from expert leadership in religious education. Everyone admits that the work of religious education is complex and difficult; that it demands organization, skill,

¹¹ The Proceedings of the Religious Education Association continually emphasize this need. In May, 1908, the Council of the Association issued a call to colleges and universities to provide in their departments of education special training in religious pedagogy.

¹² Coe, *Education in Religion and Morals*, p. 282 ff.; Proceedings of the Religious Education Association, vol. i, pp. 108, 117, 122 ff.; vol. ii, pp. 21, 46, 51 ff.; vol. iii, pp. 67, 333 ff. Also, on the general question of home responsibility, Joseph Lee, "The Integrity of the Home a Vital Issue," *The Survey*, December 4, 1909.

material, and above all a direct and powerful social imperative which the home, lacking numbers, cannot supply. The real object of the reaction and its best result has been the recognition that an important part of the expert's work must be the stimulation and conservation of home influence as a specific contribution to religious development. The centre of effort has shifted to the Sunday-school and allied institutions; the home has less to do and is no longer the leading power: but the final burden of support still rests upon the home, and there can be scant success if the home does not coöperate.

Modern religious education, then, must do outside the home much that was once done in it, and must, besides, secure the intelligent coöperation of the home itself. These requirements are indeed correlative, and they point to a principle of unity in religious education which is highly important. It is fatally simple to educate children by parts. Because a skilful Sunday-school teacher can keep a class comparatively quiet through a prayer and some responses, and can get them to learn some Bible stories and a text, the school may rest content with a superficial success which hinders in the end that wholeness of life which vital religion prescribes and produces. Religious education must aim to affect life deeply throughout its whole extent; it cannot be a matter of the mind alone, nor of the heart, nor of good deeds; it cannot confine itself to a single institution nor to a narrow range of habits. Its only success is in the enthusiastic, intelligent, active dedication of all human powers to the divine purpose expressed in ideals. The necessary conditions of an achievement so profound are the central position of the agency that attempts it and its ability to coördinate to its uses every influence that bears on the child's development. If in this matter the new movement has almost everything yet to do, at least it sees clearly the direction in which it must work.¹³

It is natural to consider next a process which may be called a direct influence on the development of the present status of religious education, viz., the evolution of the public school. For this discussion, the great outstanding fact about the public school

¹³ See almost any number of Religious Education, but especially the issue for April, 1909.

is that it is thoroughly secular. Practically speaking, the problem of explicit religious instruction in the state-supported schools of America is settled. It is still discussed, and ably,¹⁴ but the discussion affects practice hardly at all. Whatever the public school may yet do for instruction or training in morality, officially, at least, it can do nothing towards the teaching of religious belief and very little towards engendering religious emotion or religious habit. That it can do its own work in ways which strengthen the hands of the teacher of religion I have already intimated; and that the teacher of religion must in turn endeavor to utilize secular instruction and training I have urged as essential: the fact to be noted here is that the secularization of state schools has rendered only the more inevitable the result brought about by the weakening of home responsibility,—specialization and expert leadership in religious education.

A second change in general education during the last fifty years has affected religious education more deeply, if less obviously, than the secularization of the schools. The early nineteenth century saw a radical reconstruction in educational theory, which has since had the most momentous results in educational practice. The "New Education," to be sure, has been lightly ridiculed, idly condemned, and ignorantly attacked; and it has also been sincerely misunderstood by those who are loyal to older ideals and would judge by these the product of the new. And the reform has suffered much, besides, from injudicious friends. But no one who has traced its rise through sincere thinking and eager self-sacrifice can treat it lightly; no one who has followed in its development the interplay of the great insights and enthusiasms of the century can condemn it idly; no one who knows the story of its gradual but certain triumph can be satisfied to judge it from without or by measure. Its inspiration is of that same source whence modern democracy and modern science draw their power: it can no more fail than they. Problems of many sorts it has left, to be sure, unsolved; but it has set us in the right way to solve them, and one central principle, at least, it has established beyond attack.

¹⁴ Pro: The California Prize Essays on Moral Education, Ginn, 1908. Contra: Crooker, Religious Freedom in American Education. The German system is frequently reported and discussed in educational magazines.

That principle is best called, I think, the principle of development. The somewhat barbarous term "self-activity" was applied to the central form of it by Froebel, chief expounder of its pedagogical applications, but the word development shows more clearly its manifold relations. For this doctrine in pedagogy is but one aspect of a many-sided conception, as the reform in which it has been applied is but the educational phase of a far more comprehensive change. It represents in education a mode of thought that has come into possession of the whole field of human interests. The scientific doctrine of evolution represents, of course, its most conspicuous triumph, and through the theory of recapitulation has had direct bearing on educational thought. But the habit of thinking in terms of development did not originate in science, and has not been confined to science. Montesquieu, Winckelmann, Lessing, Herder, foreshadowed in the eighteenth century and in non-scientific subjects our present evolutionary point of view; and long before the scientific theory had been established, a developmental mode of thought had been introduced into philosophy and theology through the doctrine of the immanence of God. In our day psychology, including the psychology of religion, has profited most by the conception of development. The historical method of study in every field, with the whole apparatus of research, is also one of its outcomes. Nor is it difficult to trace the influence of this mode of thought in the victory of democracy: Rousseau's cry, "Back to Nature," little as it indicated a correct conception of a natural state, did indicate a great new faith in the forces which guide the life of man, and in this faith the whole principle of development is implied.

For the principle of development everywhere forbids an external point of view. It demands of us with respect to human life that humility which the scientist displays towards nature. Not that it asks us to accept human life as it is;—our own ideals, themselves the strongest of all factors in the development of man, are of the highest significance for our guidance: but it asks us to study human nature as it is, begin with it as it is, trust its essential forces, and guide them to worthy expression rather than attempt to repress them or substitute others. It

insists that progress cannot result from conformity to outward standards, but must come finally through new sensibility to values, through new purposes, through insight and ideals.

The point of view of the new education, therefore, is always from within. It studies children to determine their normal powers, their normal interests, their normal processes of growth; in formulating its programs of study it endeavors to do no injustice to the natural life of childhood. And it teaches children by inductive, active, and inspiring methods; it does not try to make instruction interesting in order to make it easy or agreeable, but it tries so to gauge the work to the child that the possibility of real achievement and the successful exercise of creative power shall engender self-sustaining interests and permanent purposes.

Towards this point of view the schools have been progressing for over half a century, until at last it begins to dominate their work. And this point of view religious education has now adopted. When one remembers the Calvinistic opinion expressed by Jonathan Edwards that "young children are vipers and worse than vipers" in the sight of God, it is not surprising that religious education should have been tardy in adopting the idea of development; nor is it surprising that religious education should now be even more insistent upon it than secular education is, seeing that the fundamental principle of the divine immanence has at length won general acceptance in modern theology. Be that as it may, the new religious education finds the primary sanction for its work in its belief that there are in children natural impulses which may be guided into religious expression, natural needs which may be satisfied in the religious life, natural tendencies which may be developed into religious purposes. It accepts the necessity of graded instruction, inductive methods, and continuous expression of religious motives, feelings, and ideas in forms appropriate to each successive stage of growth. Modern religious education believes that the religious life can be fostered only by progressive development from within.

One corollary, perhaps I should say one aspect, of this principle has sometimes escaped even its most ardent advocates. Froebel

made it as important in his educational philosophy as "self-activity" itself, but the adequate recognition of it in the schools is a matter of the last few years, whereas "self-activity" has been recognized for at least a generation. I mean the social aspect of development. When one conceives growth as a process of accretion, the individual may readily be conceived as a collection of powers or faculties and society as a collection of individuals; but when one grasps the idea of development, it is no longer possible to avoid a more organic view both of the individual and of society. The result is at once a more social view of the individual. The development of the individual is seen to depend upon his entering into the great relationships of life. Education becomes, therefore, preparation for effective and significant living as a member of society; it has in view at every stage the social use of knowledge and power; it teaches languages, literatures, arts, and sciences not as bodies of dead fact to be acquired for personal adornment, nor merely as products of individual genius to be mastered for private enjoyment, but as social products, media of social communication, to be mastered and acquired by methods which will strengthen social-mindedness, to be known and enjoyed in ways that will not prejudice social living, to be used for social ends. There are many indications that this point of view is becoming steadily more effective. It is prominent in modern educational writings¹⁵ and such movements as that for industrial education are signs that the modern school is fast becoming an institution for the social direction of individual development.¹⁶

Of course the public school is not the only field in which the social aspect of development has been applied, nor is educational theory the only subject in which it has been recognized. The comparative study of religion, of art, of literature, of law, all mark a recognition of the fact that no man liveth unto himself alone, that no nation liveth unto itself alone. And that no man shall live unto himself alone, even as much as he can, is the avowed

¹⁵ Witness such recent titles as Henry Suzallo, *The School as a Social Institution*; Colin A. Scott, *Social Education*; Paul Natorp, *Sozialpädagogik*.

¹⁶ For a survey of progress from this point of view see the "Report of Educational Progress," *Proceedings of the Harvard Teachers' Association for 1909*, *School Review*, May, 1909.

purpose of a host of modern organized activities, charitable, civic, cultural, political, religious. Religion shows the social spirit of the time perhaps as strongly as any interest of man, for whereas it once appealed to each man to save himself, it now appeals to him to save others; whereas it was once satisfied with negative, individual holiness, it now demands an active social purpose—devotion to the kingdom of God on earth.¹⁷ It is not surprising, therefore, that the new religious education recognized the social aspect of development as soon as it recognized the principle of development at all. Once our theology had regained the idea of an immanent God, it was not long before our religion began to regain the social purpose of Christ; and when theology and religion were found to be in accord with pedagogy and with life, religious education was bound to set for itself a social aim and adopt a social method.

As the new secular education proposes to prepare the individual for fuller and more serviceable membership in the family, in civil society, and in the state, so the new religious education proposes to prepare him for fuller and more serviceable membership in the mightiest community of all, the brotherhood of a divine humanity. Religious education is preparation for conscious and effective membership in the church invisible to which all inevitably belong, whose service is service of the common life through loyalty to ideal causes. As the larger relationship includes the smaller, so must religious education include secular education; in other words, it must strengthen the social influences of secular education and give them final sanction and direction. Further, it must make the ultimate relationship effective by means of all the others, and in turn effective in them; in other words, it must use loyalty to the family, to society, to the state, as stepping-stones to loyalty to God, and must see to it that loyalty to God means increased devotion to every lesser human duty. Modern religious education takes as its aim the complete and effective development of a social consciousness in the individual.

¹⁷ A. C. McGiffert, *How may Christianity be Defended Today?* Hibbert Journal, October, 1908.

III

The main features of the new religious education, viewed in the light of the influences that have affected it, are, then, these: it is to be an education under special and expert leadership, but it is to be widely inclusive in the scope of its interests and activities; it is to base its whole effort on the natural characteristics of children and is to guide their growth by self-expressive and creative methods, but it is to take its direction from a thoroughly social aim. In outlining the influences which have contributed to these results I have made central certain marked changes in the home and in the school, which from a pedagogical point of view seem, indeed, to have been especially important; yet it has been impossible to avoid references to science and government, to literature and art, to philosophy and theology, for the changes in these fields have also had important effects on the new movement. Of continued influences from the field of theology the rest of this discussion must take still further account, since the bearing of theology on religious education is closely connected with the topic I propose now briefly to consider, viz., the relation between the Sunday-school and the church.

It is not too much to say in general that the Sunday-school has oftenest been considered as a mere adjunct to the church, its function that of a recruiting station. If other views of its place and office have now and then found expression, none have been widely accepted. It will readily be supposed that the new movement stands on the contrary for a far broader view of the Sunday-school. The Sunday-school, it declares, is to prepare children for a religious life, and in a religious life church observance is only one element.¹⁸ The church and the Sunday-school must be conceived as integral parts of a single educational institution,¹⁹ the power of which will be conditioned, to be sure, by the number of persons it can reach, but the success of which

¹⁸ G. A. Coe, *Religion as a Factor in Individual and Social Development*, reviewed in the *American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education*, vol. i, no. 3; also in *Proceedings of Religious Education Association*, vol. i, p. 45.

¹⁹ See E. M. Fairchild, "The Function of the Church," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. ii, no. 2.

must be judged eventually by its effect upon their lives. The church exists for the Sunday-school, as well as the Sunday-school for the church; and both exist for the religious life, which extends far beyond either.

In the practice of the Sunday-school the consequences of this view of its place and function are varied and important. The curriculum must be graded; extra-biblical material must be freely used; there must be more hand-work, more active and dramatic expression, and more concrete embodiment of religious ideas and emotions in deeds; hymns, prayers, and responses must be adapted to the pupils, sometimes chosen by them or even composed by them; in short, every detail of the work must be such as will aid in the development of a religious life that is real, powerful, inclusive of every spring of action and every worthy relationship, progressive, and self-sustaining.

It is obviously impossible to discuss all these points here. I turn instead to a problem, not named above, which involves the relation of theology to religious development, and which at the same time brings up in a new light the whole question of the bond between the church and the Sunday-school. It is the problem of teaching a creed.

If creeds have been almost universally disparaged in our day, they have not suffered a lonely martyrdom. Every product of the pure intellect has been humbled. "This voluntaristic age" has taught ideas their place: they are instrumental. Evolutionary psychology, social psychology, pragmatism, and the American temperament have combined to give final worth to the concrete, to deeds. Religious psychology has lisped in its infancy what the elder psychologies have more maturely spoken, and our faith in the human efficacy of creeds, especially as agents in religious development, has been severely shaken.

Now much that religious psychology has accomplished must be conceded to be permanent. The conception of religious development worked out by one school of religious psychologists²⁰ is to most minds so much more comprehensive, searching, stimulating, and practicable than anything else we have

²⁰ I mean such writers as Coe, Starbuck, and Oosterheedt. They do not form a school in any literal sense.

had, that it is likely to stand at the very least as our best working hypothesis. This conception makes religious education no training of a special sense or faculty, nor an initiation of youth into an esoteric experience, nor the expression of feeling and desire through isolated and unusual channels, nor the attainment of a strained and unnatural view of the world. It looks upon religion as a life lived with reference to an inclusive relationship. As filial piety is the product of the family relationship and may be expressed in any one of the ways in which men express themselves at all; as patriotism is a product of the state-relationship and may engage the whole range of a man's powers,—so religious thought, religious emotion, and religious purpose are expressions of religion as the relationship of man to God. If this relationship has characteristic modes of expression, it is none the less inclusive of all others and regulative of them. The religious psychologists who decide from the returns to a *questionnaire* that religion is the special interest of a limited class are performing a somewhat misleading service. It has been known for some time that a good many people are not religious, as it has been known that a good many are not patriotic, or dutiful, or cleanly. The question that interests us is, Can they be made so? Of course, if sense experience does really exhaust the truth, and God is not the universal father who commands us through our own ideals, then we shall be wise to look upon religion as an interesting psychological phenomenon occurring functionally in a limited number of people, and we shall not waste time in the endeavor to develop every child's "religious nature." But if we are willing to risk our lives on the belief that "things are not what they seem," we shall insist that religious insight, religious sentiment, and religious loyalty are eternally valuable to every individual; that the religious attitude is essential to individual and social development; that the religious life is normal. This is the conclusion of the only religious psychologists who have done much practically helpful work.

It is evident that this conclusion makes the value of a creed in religious development depend upon the general value of intellectual conviction in life. The dictum that religion depends

but little upon creeds is thus only one way of saying that life depends but little on thought; and it seems probable that this view has been more or less over-emphasized of late. No doubt men have set too great store by intellectual systems—particularly false ones; no doubt they have too easily regarded them as established; no doubt, above all, they have been mistakenly zealous to force them ready-made on the mind of youth: but all this does not lessen the value of thinking as a means of interpreting life and so of guiding it. If ideas are only instrumental, at least they are that. As very highly valuable instruments we must continue to use them, in religious education as everywhere else. Thinking is a fundamental mode of living, and theologizing a fundamental mode of thought. If its products must be tested by life, they are not the less precious; and the church that really believes in its creed will not consider its educational aim accomplished until it has convinced its pupils of its important truths.

Yet the attitude of the modern church towards its creed is, of course, and must be, very different from the older attitude. Today the church emphasizes essentials and broad practical consequences, not special doctrines and fine theoretical differences; it urges the faith as a support and an incentive, not as a duty; it bids men take it with them into the world and live by it, but it does not condemn them if they cannot believe. And in expounding the creed it takes to heart the ancient psychological insight—he that doeth the will shall know of the doctrine. It tries to keep the formulated belief fresh and meaningful and vital by uniting it with such depths of experience as originally gave rise to it, and by applying it concretely to the guidance of life.

This view of the modern church with respect to the uses of formulated belief in adult life has made easier of acceptance the new view with respect to the teaching of creeds to children. Catechisms can no longer be dogmatically taught and mechanically memorized with the expectation that the ideas they contain will discharge the high office of interpreting experience and guiding conduct. Doctrines, the church admits, must help in the organization of life; a creed must be central, organic, re-

freshing itself forever as it illuminates and is illumined by the moving forces of the heart and mind. That no creed can be thus held whose truth is not whole and clear and compelling is here beside the mark; the important thing to be noted is that the modern view of the creed makes it absolutely essential that it be properly taught.

Here, then, is the crux of the matter: How shall the creed be taught so that it shall be vitally held? Has the new movement a well defined message here? Apparently it has, but not an exhaustive one. No one can lay down the whole law on the teaching of religious truth, because the problem has not yet been solved. A few principles, however, the new movement has made clear, and of these one at least brings out in a striking way the relation which the new movement proposes between the Sunday-school and the church.

In the first place the new movement believes that dogmas as such should not be taught to young children at all. The beliefs which an adult can grasp intellectually must be presented to children by means of symbols, which touch the imagination. And even so, the greatest care must be exercised in choosing the symbols, so that literalism shall not spoil their imaginative appeal nor fable be taught as fact.²¹ In the second place the new movement has made it clear that children must be led to act in the spirit of a belief long before that belief is presented to their understandings. And their action must be as varied and as significant to them as it can be made, so that it shall really establish the predisposition which the creed is later to crystallize in formulas. Finally, the new movement insists that when doctrines are eventually taken up as such, they be presented not as fixed and unshakable truths, but as vital problems with which every youth must struggle in his own mind and which he must ultimately solve for himself. Although the embodiment of these principles in Sunday-school practice is far from complete, and even unanimity of opinion upon them is not quite attained, they yet represent the main trend of thought and effort in the Sunday-schools of the new movement.

²¹ There is an admirable discussion of this point in Blow's *Educational Issues* (1909), chap. iii.

And they mean, especially the last one, that the church must risk its creed for the sake of making it effective over the whole range of life. The sort of instruction in the creed which cramps and narrows the intelligence, binding it to forms, producing faithful but unreasoning followers, must be abandoned. The church must not seek primarily to increase through the Sunday-school the number of its adherents, but to make life more significant to those it now trains and to render them more intelligently loyal to ideals. If it will thus deliberately lose its own life, can it be doubted that it shall find it?

RELIGION AND SOCIALISM

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I

That a coöperative commonwealth is on the way, it would be rash to assert; but that forces tending in such a direction are gathering strength is even more evident in England and on the continent of Europe than with us. While discussions of socialist theory on economic and political lines increase and multiply, another line of thought suggests itself to people preëminently interested in the spiritual rather than in the economic conditions of the race. Supposing a socialist organization of society realized, what would be the reaction on the ethical and religious consciousness,—on creed, on worship, on conduct?

It is the purpose of this paper to suggest a few points on the second of these themes,—the probable future of religion under socialism. The subject is less remote from present interests than appears: hypothetical though it be, the attitude of many people toward socialism itself will depend on their conclusions on this point.

Many spectators of the modern drift can see in socialism only "the party of progressive materialism," or, at best, an insidiously dangerous desire to realize brotherhood by machinery. One hears them reiterate the conviction that an inner change alone can help and heal the sorrows of humanity, and that all who care for the Spirit, yet range themselves on the socialist side, are victims of a delusion all the more dangerous for its loftiness, dupes of that very materialism which they think to fight. It is in vain to plead with these critics the obvious identity of the ethics of socialism with those of Christianity. The very fact seems to them a snare to the unwary; for they tell us that the effort to make these ethics function, as it were, automatically,

would, if successful, deprive them of all vitality and power. They see, as Father Hugh Benson saw in his amazing and disconcerting story, *Lord of the World*, an impending conflict in which the forces of evil shall appear under the banner of humanitarianism and freedom, while the armies of the Lord apparently endorse all the sordid miseries and futile strife of the civilization we know, on the plea that the soul can best find itself in a world whose very horrors lead it to distrust the life of nature, and to flee from the temporal to the refuge of eternity.

In the rising struggle that we all must share, critics of this type are persons greatly needed by the socialist fellowship. And this, both because their antagonism helps to prolong the hesitation of the religious world over its bearings, and because the socialist world, as one must freely confess, too often justifies their strictures by confusing the ideologist and the idealist in a common condemnation. Direct argument and prophecy are likely to avail little against this mode of thought; yet, while we wait for experience to do its work, the testimony of those socialists who care supremely for spiritual values, and their groping thoughts on the nature of the new charter which, as they believe, will be presented to religion by the social democracy, ought to be worth giving.

And we have to acknowledge, as a preface, that we face a situation which seems to deliver the case at once to the adversary. For, despite perfunctory statements to the contrary, born of political exigencies, socialism of the more materialistic type habitually implies that it is in itself the religion of the future. Certainly, a large number of its adherents get the effective elements of religion—a power that impels, a hope that sustains, and an emotion that purifies—from their socialist creed. Impatient of the long generations that preached a smug heaven to a proletariat in chains, they are inclined in reaction to deify the flesh and to coin religion from revolt. That ideal of a pacific and fraternal order which socialism holds steadfastly before a civilization helplessly subject to the dominance of licensed greed, is indeed so grateful that we cannot wonder if people contemplating it confound their deep sense of relief and release with the peace that passeth understanding. Though the Roman church

has often proved short-sighted, her flair is keen. Her attacks on socialism mean more than the mere distaste for a party that happens today to be fighting the hierarchy: they imply perception of a rival at the centre, whose promises to satisfy the ageless hunger of the secret heart may prove more alluring than her own.

Yet how evident it is that the promises bear really no relation to the hunger! True, socialism derives part of its strength from the prospect it holds forth of realizing in a measure here on earth that "Civitas Dei" toward which human vision ever strains. True, its power is reinforced by the fact that it first supplied the need for ideal passion in a century when theological and mystical interests were driven into far recesses by the ardor of scientific advance, and the quest for outward prosperity. But no theory nor system of purely human relations can, in the long run, offer a religion. In vain did Leigh Hunt say to Shelley that humanity would find its true religion when charity supplanted faith as a working force. In vain does that fine spirit, John Spargo, writing on *The Spiritual Significance of Socialism*, tacitly assume—with how many others—that fraternal feeling translated into life is the Omega as it is the Alpha of the religious consciousness. The burden of proof rests on the school of these thinkers, not on those of us who follow the evidence of all human history in holding that the love of the brother seen does but spur man on to the love of the Unseen God. Beyond the Alps lies Italy. The listening ear of the race can never cease to hearken to a Voice that speaks out of the silences beyond the range of time and sense. The relation of economic and social forces to the travail of the soul is, we freely admit, more intimate and fundamental than pre-modern thought surmised; yet spiritual activity is the blossoming of humanity's garden,—at once the end of all enrichment of soil and culture of root, and the promise and parent of what fruit the race has to present.

As our thought continues, let us mean by religion the conscious relation of man to a Life and Love "present and yet Beyond"; "sustaining the world by the immanence of His Will, and transcending the world by the glory of His Being."¹ The twentieth

¹"Credo," Hibbert Journal, April, 1909.

century is assuredly bringing reinforcements to the convictions of those who believe that religion in this sense will always be essential to peace and progress. The brief interval of indifference, lasting a trifle of two centuries, is over: at its height it was partial. Did not the eighteenth century produce William Law and the Wesleys? Is not Chesterton right in claiming that the doubt of the Victorian age was as faithful as its faith was doubtful? As this new century sweeps us on with one of those accelerated movements in history of which the pace is dizzying, we cannot ignore the fact that religious passion plays an essential rôle among the forces that lead toward the future.

II

The path on which society is impelled is the resultant of complex forces; no one who isolates a single phenomenon, even so great as socialism, can rightly apprehend its direction. Intelligently to enquire into the reaction of the rising social democracy on religion, we must view the situation of the Western world as a whole. If we do so, we find two other phenomena, equal in dramatic quality to the impending economic change. One is the advance of Western science, the other the influence of Eastern thought.

Sixty years ago science was, to the popular mind, endorsing materialism; today, it is enhancing mysticism. As the modern scientist presses nearer the ever-fleeing realities, the regions into which they lead him look awesomely strange. Material and immaterial are terms that threaten to lose significance; we may venture to say that the theological dogmatizing of our grandfathers was no farther from our more generous religion than the instinctive scepticisms of nineteenth-century science from the reverent expectancy of science today.

Meantime, the treasures of the Orient and of the Occident are blending. Racial immobility is at an end. The East opens her arms, perforce or no, to the eager onrush of the West, and, while she zealously studies our scientific acquirements and tries to adopt our scientific methods, we, on our side, begin to meditate

in amazed humility upon that ancient philosophic wisdom which she has preserved intact.

The rising passion for social reconstruction, the advance of science, the new fellowship between East and West,—is it by accident that these three forces are at play on Western civilization at the same time? It seems more likely that the future will discern among the three some necessary relation. Sixteenth-century scholars absorbed in Greek manuscripts were probably not over-much concerned with the reports of adventurers from far untraversed lands; nor were men of either type necessarily excited over the struggle for religious freedom in Germany. Yet scholar, discoverer, reformer, were parts of one movement of expansion, and we see today how the revival of letters combined with the new geography and with the Reformation to produce that bright new civilization before which feudalism fled like a vanishing cloud.

Many are pointing out the significance of the new alliance between Western science and Eastern philosophy; the bearing of both on social reconstruction is less in evidence. Yet in regard to the relations of science and socialism, it is in the first place a truism to recall that only when evolutionary law was applied to social progress could the modern socialist theory arise; and it is obvious in the second place that the tormenting problems of providing for the physical welfare of the race could only be solved in a socialist sense in an age that was swiftly subduing natural forces to human service. In other finer ways also science delivers us from the utopian and reactionary temper common to earlier socialists. Building on Plato, these noble dreamers invented imaginary communities to be arbitrarily imposed on a natural order unrelated or antagonistic. That spiritualizing and refining of our conception of the natural world, that intuition of unity between outward and inward with which science is now busy, gives us a new point of view. It reconciles us to nature; and so helps us to form the ideal of a socialist state which, because it will be in a sense a natural product, will prove an appropriate vehicle of expression to a race whose intimacies with the visible universe are to be closer and more subtle than the past has known.

And, if we are wise, we must begin to discern a still more startling meaning in the thirsty gaze which men begin to turn toward the founts of Eastern wisdom. Can it be without significance that even while the Western world suffers the birth-pangs of the new coöperative order, it begins to realize for the first time the spiritual treasures harbored by civilizations which through long ages we have despised?

“The East bowed low before the blast
In patient, deep disdain:
She let the legions thunder past,
Then plunged in thought again”—

not alone for her own sake, surely. In the great Providence that rules the destinies of the peoples, East and West are meeting at the exact moment when the vista opens of a society gradually evolving so high a degree of industrial peace and social justice that spirit may seek for Spirit, driven back no longer on pressing anxieties or clamorous compassions. The great gift of the Orient is an ever-present sense of the Eternal. The heyday of competition, intoxicated with its own unlovely successes, would have scouted this gift as absurd. In a community in which material production, being socially organized, no longer absorbs attention, its influence may well be healthful, pertinent, and deep. We can easily imagine the religious historians of the socialist state noting with delight the special preparation of the West, by drastic changes in the social order, to receive what the more contemplative races have to offer.

Does some ingenious person threaten us at this point with the danger of sinking like the Orient into an ageless dream? It is amusing to picture Europe and the United States in this connection! We may trust to the very temperament of the West, to the growing call to the adventures of science, to the unrelaxing industrial disciplines of the socialist state, for our protection. Indeed, the passion of the new society for activity and efficient achievement is likely enough to need supplementing. What social order has ever yet offered equal incentive to vigorous interest in the phenomenal world and ardent search for the reality behind phenomena? Noble action and noble contem-

plation have seldom indeed flourished together. Yet both are essential to fulness of life. In the thoughtful words of Baron von Hügel:² "The movement of the Christian life is not a circle round a single centre,—detachment,—but an ellipse round two centres, detachment and attachment. And precisely in the difficult but immensely fruitful oscillation and rhythm between the two poles of the spiritual life, in this fleeing and seeking, and not in either of these two movements taken alone, consists the completeness and culmination of Christianity." And, we may add, of religion. We have good reason to hope that the new society will offer the most favorable conditions yet found for this "fruitful oscillation." The socialist state, intent on far-sighted organization of the greater industries, and on conquest of the material resources of the globe, is not likely to weaken in that "attachment" which has always marked civilization in the West; yet the release from nervous strain, and the tranquillity that it should ensure, may well foster the correlative increase of those powers of detachment which have been the specialty of mystics in those ancient lands where the spirit gazes, more fixedly than we are wont to do, on the countenance of Truth. No one can calculate the depth and worth that may accrue to the influences of the East in a socialist state. To these influences we well may look to counteract the temptation to a new hedonism, to acquiescence in a natural life all too pleasant to lure the spirit on, which we may predict as the special peril of a social democracy.

III

A coöperative Society, gaining a continually greater insight into natural law and greater control over natural forces, while at the same time it is free from racial or national provincialism and is open to influences from all quarters of the globe: here, then, is the scene in which the spiritual drama of the future must be played. But before we try to forecast the drama, let us pause a moment more to consider the contrast the atmosphere of that time will present to our own.

² *The Mystical Element in Religion.*

Were it ours to read the secrets of that vast psychical activity which is coextensive with history, we should not be surprised to find that religion in the sense in which we have defined it, the direct experience by the spirit of man of the Spirit of God, has been fainter during the last two centuries than at any preceding time in Christian story. If we may trust the records of the inner life, an immediate consciousness of God—let us use the great term in all simplicity—was far more common in the twelfth, thirteenth, or seventeenth, century than it is today.

Such a statement must of course be hazarded with full knowledge of its unverifiable nature. But even very devout people who live much in prayer now habitually confess with sorrow that this consciousness is rarely attained. The sense of loss so common among the Victorians pointed to a real desolation:

“He is not risen, no!
He lies and moulders low!
Christ is not risen!”

For one who expressed it, many must have felt, many continue to feel, this hidden tragedy. “Doubtless thou art a God that hidest thyself,” is the deep cry of the age.

This prevalent blindness and blankness has been assigned to various causes. Is it fantastic to ascribe it in part to the miasma that rises from the industrial condition of the masses, crushed and stifled under the brutalizing influences of the competitive system? Religion, with all its privacy, is not only the most personal, but the most social, of phenomena: the spiritual atmosphere is as all-pervading as the physical, and is equally sensitive to social pollution. The spiritual exhalations of our vulgar and cruel democracy have accurately corresponded to the physical, and are equally noxious. Where there is keen economic distress, religion is always overclouded. Some men will be drawn to sheer revolt, others dominated by physical depletion. Others still, including the finest spirits, will find an all-engrossing religion in the service of the sick and sorry. But between all men and the heavens will rise a dim and vaporous pall, impalpably thin, impenetrably dusked, like the veil of smoke belched forth by the myriad chimneys of a manufacturing town. To be sure, the

stars can be discerned through the murk. Even the dweller in a modern city may rejoice in the ceaseless pageant of day and night that silently envelops our shrieking human activities. But let him escape from the town, and rest on some low headland, over the lapping waters of the Atlantic, where the breeze blows salt and clean, and shadows lie purple on the green shallows of the bay,—where the sky is the real blue that nature meant, softened only by low lines of half-invisible cloud-pearls at the horizon; he will rediscover a new heaven that will perhaps give him a promise of a new earth. It is not in cities that modern astronomers build their towers.

We modern folk are likely to be increasingly a race of city-dwellers; but good hopes are held out to us that the cities of the future may be smokeless. There are equally valid reasons for believing that the social democracy will clear the spiritual air. The firm disciplines which will press on all men may not in themselves tend to heavenly-mindedness; but they must develop such serviceable qualities of self-subordination and regulated capacity as should form an excellent preliminary to the graces and activities of the soul. The noble emphasis on the charities and the sympathies, which now distracts men from higher religious aspirations, will fall into subordinate harmony; and the race we seek to create, heirs of a fine liberty social rather than individualistic, freemen because bound in ordered service, will possess powers no longer preëmpted by lower needs. Doubtless, the relief from the sharp pressure of the economic struggle will afford a snare to the spiritually indolent; just as surely it will afford an opportunity to those who are spiritually inclined. No sensible man looks forward to a time when religion will be easy; the perils that the soul must encounter will be no less dramatic and dangerous in the future than in the past. But the struggle will be carried on under clearer skies than now. Already we can discern a rift in the vapors; and perhaps it may be granted to our children, or, if not to them, to our grandchildren, to see the whole sullen fog-bank that blocks our vision, roll triumphantly away.

IV

We may without fatuity, then, regard that comparative social justice, to attain which all our best powers today are bent, not as an end in itself, but as the preface to a higher religious evolution. And we are ready to ask,—What types of religious life are likely to obtain in the socialist state?

To English readers, at least, the question presents itself under three aspects: the future of religion at large; the probable future of Christianity; and the possible fate of the forms of Christianity, in particular of the two great divisions, Protestantism and Catholicism. The present paper deals with the first of these, only, the other two being treated elsewhere. To be of any value the discussion must be frankly personal. One can only present these matters from his own angle of vision, basing his answers carefully on his perception of the new spiritual life already pushing its restless way toward the light, no less than on forecasts of growth in the new order.

The larger religious future is inevitably bound up with three questions. Will religion be a matter of dogma, or of intuition and unformulated sentiment? Will it hold to its belief in a personal God? What will be its attitude toward death and immortality?

1. The present reaction against dogma is a very complex affair. Our wide-spread distaste is determined somewhat by our pleasure in our own escape from bigotry, somewhat by a genuine broadening of sympathies and a quickened perception of the degree to which religion is conditioned by social growth and of the relative nature of religious formulae. But with these healthy and right instincts blend others which might inspire us with less complacency. A certain haziness and laziness in thinking have been the natural concomitant of that deep and subtle materializing of our inner life consequent on our commercial civilization. The blight that has rested on the general religious consciousness during the modern epoch, may be, at least in part, responsible for the reluctance of people to adhere with any ardor to old creeds or to evolve new ones. For, after all, religious dogma only rep-

resents man thinking, and thinking on those high themes concerning which indifference is unnatural. His thoughts have not been tedious nor puerile nor empty: they have been noble, lofty, and profound. If it is unfortunate to cling to one's thought on Unseen Mysteries and our relations to them as final, it is also unfortunate to refuse to think at all. Victorian agnosticism only too often masked its indolence or discouragement as reverence, and represented simply an intellectual cowardice where it thought to achieve a philosophic depth. The dogmatizing ages were great and glorious ages in the history of the mind. We may hope to have escaped permanently the evil by-products of their ardors, —religious persecutions and spiritual arrogance; but in times of greater intellectual leisure and freedom it is quite probable that, while retaining the precious heritage of broad sympathies which the closing age bequeaths, we may also revive that passion for high spiritual adventure, that audacious yet worshipful endeavor to translate the elusive experiences of the spirit into terms that shall fix them as social possessions, which marked the great ages of faith and of the creeds.

Will these creeds be the old creeds, rediscovered, reasserted? Will they be new ones, inconceivable to us at present? Such questions no one can answer. We notice on the one hand in all modern religious movements, Catholic and Protestant, the striking revival of an instinct of continuity. Iconoclasm is no longer valued for its own sake; the escape from old shackles intoxicates no more. It is safe to predict that reverence for tradition will continue to increase, and that the creeds of the future will bear an organic relation to those of the past. Yet while the religious consciousness is, in one sense, permanent, it is, in another, constantly progressive. To press on bravely, reverently, seeking to reconcile loyalty with courage, in the new reaches of life that await us, is a duty arduous enough to preserve the future race from complacency, and to stimulate that ceaseless labor of the mind which is at once agony and life.

One guiding principle is plain. Thought is constrained today, whether it will or no, to place new emphasis on the human side of religious evolution, and to perceive the large measure of control exercised by social and economic conditions over religious

formulae. Disinterested scholarship has no more vital task before it than to analyze and follow this control. To call faith the mirror of life would be inaccurate; but at least that far glory on which the eyes of faith are ever fixed is seen by men through the life they share and of which they are the product. The time has come for even the most orthodox to accept this point of view boldly, and to recognize that, whatever happens to formulae, concepts change from age to age, such change being largely, though obscurely, determined by the characteristics of the social structure. Now humanity has never yet realized itself as a social democracy, and we may be sure that whatever may be the fate of religion in the socialist state new experiences are awaiting it.

In thus acknowledging the power of social institutions to control, if not to generate religious ideas, we must not be thought necessarily to imply a purely human origin for religion. Religion itself is not born from below, but from above. Of this that ultimate criterion of knowledge, the experience of the race, assures us even more clearly than metaphysical enquiries. All positive definitions and intuitions of spiritual truth have pointed to a great Reality. This confidence protects and reassures us in days when thoughts of process too often overpower those of ultimate origin. Formulae alter, theologies change, determined largely by the phases of social growth; yet they are all alike attempts, not to give a body to illusion, but to portray experienced fact. Once assured of this, the soul can rest secure, however winds may strain and waves may rage. Religion has from the first been no mere translation of desire into metaphor; it has been the progressive effort, less crude as the generations pass, to describe experience. This experience deepens and widens through the ages, and formulae slowly follow experience, but the "God, Creation's secret Force," is forever, "Himself Unmoved, all motion's Source," and through all groping and temporary obscuration we move ever nearer to the Uncreated Light.

2. A profound religious transformation must then accompany every social transformation. Nowhere is this law more evident than in regard to the greatest of all objects of human thought,

the conception of Deity. We see with increasing clearness that the great word, God, greatest that mankind has ever uttered, connotes a different concept in every age. The God of nomadic tribes is a tribal chieftain. The God of feudalism, as imaged in the superb mosaic that overlooks ruined Messina from the fallen glory of its shrine, is a masterful feudal overlord. That this conception of ultimate being will be deeply, if subtly, affected by the social forms of the future till it assumes a character which we can only dimly predict, is indubitable. How then are men likely to think of God in the socialist state? Shall we be able still to use the dear forms and emotions of childhood? May we retain the idea of Personality as an attribute of the Informing Spirit of the world?

No question is more crucial, none more unanswerable. Yet we may gain pregnant hints from the life we know. For democracy is already affecting as deeply as it is unconsciously the general conception of God. Looking within, we are aware that to us the Final Reality that controls the secret thought is no distant Monarch, the natural Ruler of a world aristocratically organized, but a pervading Spirit, so manifest in the life of Nature and the social whole that it is easy to confuse Him with that very world which He inspires. Immanent rather than transcendental ideas of Deity have proved the natural product of modern life. They rose unmistakably coincident with the rise of democratic feeling, its earliest correlative and its crowning glory, overpowering formal creeds in the mind even of so orthodox a poet as Wordsworth, and supplementing all other religious conceptions to a Shelley or a Rousseau; and they are rising still to ever greater dominance. Now socialism is simply democracy coming to its own, and is certain to strengthen rather than to weaken the intuition of the Immanent God. This intuition, native to our social forms, is already emphasized by the influx of pantheistic ideas from the East and by the recent suggestions of science. Realizing how deeply the civilization to be will be penetrated by these influences, it is safe to predict that in the socialist state, an intensified form of the modern faith in a God revealed through His universe rather than apart from it, manifested in all that we in our ignorance call impersonal as well

as in our human consciousness, will be a vital, illuminating, and sustaining mode of thought among the devoutly disposed.

If even in the individualistic democracy we know, despite the image of scrambling egotisms which, taken in the mass, it presents, immanential ideas of God thus keep pace with the growth of mystical feeling for the social whole, we must believe that these ideas will increasingly prevail as democracy becomes slowly transformed from an individualistic to a social type, and shows an harmoniously ordered unity in which thought may easily discern the reflection and working of a Divine Life. Yet we must beware of thinking that this is the whole story. The conception of a God "sustaining the world by the immanence of His Will" is certain to grow clearer: it would be rash to assert that the other conception of One who "transcends the world in the glory of His Being" will necessarily fade away. For we cannot question that in modern society the sense of personality is constantly growing more acute. Democracy from its birth had a marvellous perception of the glory and significance of the individual; this perception is starting-point and foundation of that collective ideal which is coming to dominate our thought. At the outset of the democratic period the piercing accents of Blake, summing up all that the most daring anthropomorphism could express, leave us breathless:

"Thou art a man: God is no more:
Thine own humanity learn to adore."

From Emerson to Browning the lesson has been reëchoed in exaltation. As democracy develops, this feeling for the miracle of personality is likely to deepen. If socialism, by enhancing the common consciousness and emphasizing collective action, withdraws, as it well may do, some props round which the separatist ideal of life has twined, it will, none the less, if only from the fact that it will mark the highest stage yet of social evolution, teach us to value and experience the mystery of our own being as never before. The larger freedom for individual development toward which we look when our brutalizing conditions shall have yielded to a more generous fostering of human aptitudes, will inevitably bring with it a growing delight in that diversity of

character which is, so far as we know, the last triumph, as it is the last mystery, of the universe. However much farther the analysis of multiple personality may be carried, the man must always remain one, and finally the only, actor in his own inner world. Self-consciousness, which has become infinitely deeper and more intricate since the days of Homer, will become continually more intense and subtle: known by each man in himself, inferred by him in others, it will remain while he lives, if not when he thinks, the surest fact on his horizon. Now, no matter what wide reaches of unsounded being alien or akin to his own man may dimly discern in the Infinite, he can never exclude from that Infinite the highest and surest mode of existence that he knows. Still spirit will seek to meet with Spirit; and, after all, to protect the possibility of that meeting was all which the theologians ever meant with their insistence on the much-battered, largely misunderstood, highly unsatisfactory, and wholly indispensable term, a personal God.

That the very conception of personality, whether human or divine, is, however, to be immensely enlarged and enriched, partly through the advance of psychology, partly through a widening social experience, partly through new insight into the spiritual life of nature, we cannot doubt. Not without meaning is symbol the synonym for creed. The symbol for Infinite Reality cherished by the coöperative commonwealth must contain a wider majesty than is known today. We are not likely to apprehend God more intensely than the Psalmist or St. Augustine: in dwelling on the evolutionary aspects of religion we must not forget that it is in one sense the most static of phenomena, enabling us more than aught else in history to measure our own littleness and the slowness of our advance. But though we may not feel more intensely, that which we feel will be more in accordance with the depths of the riches of the unsearchable Being of God. Forms of religious thought are the final test of every civilization: in the new society, the Voice of the Beloved, speaking to the disciple as it has spoken from the beginning, will rise from regions of consciousness before unsounded, and echo from a range of experience coextensive with a universe ever more holy because ever more alive. Those social conceptions

which are already so intimately affecting the springs of thought, must, when perfected, lead to religious conceptions in which ideas of transcendence and immanence may be at least partially fused, and which will be as far removed from the empty monotheism of the eighteenth century or the lower ranges of Unitarianism as from the crass tritheism of current orthodoxy. Orient and Occident will contribute to the idea. The God of the East is perceived from the vast silences of Nature: the God of the future democracy must rather be the God of them that dwell in cities. Yet if we are really to build "in England's green and pleasant land" a nearer image than heretofore of the "Civitas Dei," it may well be that the heavens and He that dwelleth therein shall be as well discerned from its streets thronged with comrades as from the lonely sweep of the desert or the peaks of farthest Himalay. Of one thing we may be sure: no ideal that bearing the test of time and social change has proved permanently life-giving, will ever be discarded from religious concepts. And among such ideals we must give first rank to faith in a God who forever assures his creatures that before they call he will answer, and while they are yet speaking he will hear.

3. What, let us ask in brief conclusion, will be the attitude of the future toward Death and Immortality? One foresees men divided into varying groups and schools. As life grows sweeter and this world more dear, horror of departure may be intensified and Death may play with new poignancy his rôle as King of Terrors. Modern theories, however, if verified, offer help and consolation. For longevity may be prolonged till the signal to depart is grateful. When the term of natural life, which we are told is now never reached, shall be generally attained, cessation may be as gentle as the fall of the leaf, as much desired as sleep after a long and joyous day.

But how imagine men incurious concerning the awakening? Surely no development or refinement of resources can ever make this world other than an inn, a resting-place, to the nobly tempered soul. Many motives interplay to create the desire for immortality. Among these it is quite conceivable that the mere longing for physical continuance, now natural to a healthy organism, may weaken; but revolt against separation from loved

ones, hatred at leaving unfinished tasks, and indeed the sheer dramatic passion for living, are not likely to fade. An impulse different from all these is, however, at the heart of the craving for immortality. This is the desire of the God-intoxicated for the unveiled vision of Him seen darkly here through the glass of nature and humanity; but there, if the Apostle be trusted, face to face.

It is strange and startling to note how currently the craving for a life to come is discussed today apart from any question of faith in God. Even so reverent a thinker as Mr. Lowes Dickinson speaks in his Ingersoll lecture as if the desire that the Good may be strengthened and more knowledge attained were our noblest incentive to hope for immortality. But thought of this type can never satisfy. It follows the disastrous advice of the Boyg to Peer Gynt, and "goes round about," till the very point and centre is never reached. If separated from interest in our relation to a living God, speculations concerning immortality would have run a course quite different from the fact. The noblest Christian men and women have always desired to survive death chiefly that they might see his countenance. What are all other desires compared to this? It is no verbal invention; it has been, to chosen spirits, a controlling fact for nearly two thousand years. True, not all men experience it; but neither do all men respond to the motives of Mr. Lowes Dickinson. What reason is there for supposing that it will weaken as time goes on? No quickening intuition of the divine present in the natural order, no rise of pantheistic passion, can ever satisfy the longing for unhampered and perfect fellowship with Him who was "before all worlds." As Herbert Spencer pointed out, our contact with unknown mystery constantly widens with the increase of the circumference of our knowledge. The more the circle expands, the more will be our need to escape from all relation to "the wheel" of phenomena into conscious union with the Uncreated and the Unconfined. The craving for the beatific vision will never die. If reincarnations must multiply before it be attained,—and this view is sure to gain vogue as Eastern influences increase,—why, death will be the portal to another stage in the long pilgrimage. If

the older Christian orthodoxies persist, death will be the signal for the plunge into those purifying fires which, as believed by Dante, by Catherine of Genoa, by the Catholic world at large, do darkly reveal to the soul the light of the countenance of God. Shrinking from death and longing for death—variously motivated, functioning on various planes—will then coexist in the future as they do today. Speculations concerning immortality may quite conceivably be merged in a clearer knowledge than we now possess; but however this may be, the “Vera Patria” will always shed its light upward from beneath the horizon, and the dream of its glories will continue to summon men to nobler and sterner living in the midst of the allurements of a world fairer than the one we know.

**THE HARVARD EXPEDITION TO SAMARIA
EXCAVATIONS OF 1909¹**

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I. IDENTIFICATION OF THE ISRAELITE PALACE

The excavations of the Harvard Palestinian Expedition at Samaria in 1909 have revealed for the first time the plan and the masonry of a royal Israelite palace. The view thus given of the material resources and technical skill at the command of the kings of Israel is so enlightening for the history of Palestine that the identification of the palace becomes the point of paramount interest. It must be recorded at once that we have not found a line of Hebrew inscription anywhere in the building, nor have our excavations given us the name of any of the kings of Israel. The identification rests entirely on archaeological grounds; but these, though simple, are direct and clear.

The hill on which stands the modern town of Sebastiya² is quite certainly the hill of Samaria bought by Omri from Shemer for two talents of silver. The chief events in the history of the hill, which are linked together by references in historical documents to complete the identification, are as follows:—

Israelite Period

1. Purchase of the hill by Omri and construction of a town called Shomerôn (Samaria). This presupposes the construction of a royal palace. Ca. 900 B.C. 1 Kings 16 24.
2. Construction of a temple to Baal and of an "ivory palace" by Ahab. 1 Kings 16 32, 22 39.

¹ Abridged from a fuller preliminary report which, it is expected, will soon be published with plans and illustration. For an account of the work of the Expedition in 1908, see HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW for January, 1909.

² The local pronunciation is *Sebústi*.

3. Continued occupation of the site as the capital of Israel down to 722 B.C. 1 Kings 22 to 2 Kings 18.

4. Capture of Samaria by Sargon and transportation of 27,290 of the people of Israel to Assyria. The rest of the people left in Samaria under an Assyrian governor. 722 B.C. 2 Kings 17 6, 18 9. Sargon, *Prunkinschrift*, 23-25; *Annals*.

Babylonian Period

5. Establishment of Babylonian colonists at Samaria by Sargon and Esarhaddon. This presupposes the building of houses and fortifications. Ca. 720-670 B.C. References as in preceding section.

6. Capture of Samaria by assault by Alexander the Great. 331 B.C. For references to Diodorus Siculus etc., see Smith, *Historical Geography of the Holy Land*, p. 347.

Greek Period

7. Establishment of a Syro-Macedonian colony and reconstruction of the fortifications.³ 331 B.C.

8. Destruction of Samaria by John Hyrcanus. 109 B.C. Josephus, *Antiq.* xiii. 10 2, 3; *Wars* i. 2 7.

9. For the rest of the Seleucid-Maccabaeen period the town remained a ruin and apparently nearly uninhabited. 109-60 B.C. Joseph. *Antiq.* xiv. 5 3.

Roman Period

10. Restored to its inhabitants by Pompey; rebuilt and resettled by Gabinius. 60 B.C. Joseph. *Antiq.* xiv. 4 4, 5 3; *Wars* i. 7 7, 8 4.

11. Rebuilt by Herod and named Sebaste. 30-1 B.C. Josephus, *Antiq.* xv. 8 5; *Wars* ii. 21 2.

Thus the site has probably never been entirely deserted, and it has lain in ruins for only two short periods, the first just after the Assyrian deportation and the second during the forty-nine

³ The walls appear to have been broken thrice and rebuilt between 332 and 306 B.C.

years subsequent to the destruction of the city by John Hyrcanus. The name Samaria clung to the place until Herod changed it to Sebaste, and the name Sebaste is still that of the native village on the eastern flank of the hill. Furthermore, the known data as to the occupation of the hill of Samaria give us six periods of construction, from the purchase by Omri to the works of Herod, for the principal buildings on the hill.

Of these periods the last, the magnificent city built by Herod "for his own security and as a monument of his magnificence,"⁴ is easily identifiable. The forum, at the modern threshing floor, with its basilica and other buildings not yet excavated; the road of columns leading around the hill to the forum; the ornamental gate, oriented, unlike the underlying older gates, to lead straight into the road of columns; the great outer wall "twenty stadii in circumference"; and the hippodrome in the hollow on the north of the forum,—all are coherent parts of the same unified plan, and show the same masonry and architectural forms. The inscriptions found, the coins, the pottery, and the architectural forms show conclusively that this group of structures belongs to the period of the early Roman Empire and must therefore be the city of Sebaste built by Herod; that the buildings were repaired and altered about the time of Septimius Severus; and that they ceased to be used soon after the death of Constantine the Great. To this group of buildings must be added the great temple which stands on the top of the hill and agrees exactly with Josephus's description of the Herodian temple to Augustus:—

Now within and about the middle of it [Sebaste] he built a sacred place, of a furlong and a half [in circuit] and adorned it with all sorts of decorations, and therein erected a temple, which was illustrious on account of both its largeness and its beauty.⁵ . . . In the midst of this city, thus built, [he] had erected a very large temple to Caesar Augustus.⁶

Here the great marble statue of a Roman emperor, the dedicatory stelae, the coins, and the details of construction tell the same story of Herodian origin and later Roman restoration.

Thus the Herodian structures, clearly identified, form the point

⁴ Josephus, *Antiq.* xv. 8 5.

⁵ *Antiq.* xv. 8 5.

⁶ *Wars* i. 21 2.

of departure for dating all the underlying older structures. These underlying older structures are themselves so built one over the other that their relative order is beyond dispute, as follows:—

1. The latest pre-herodian buildings appear to be the miserable cave-dwellings on the southern edge of the lower terrace at the summit (dated by coins) and the outer, square, retaining wall at the gateway (dated by position relative to Herod's gate).

2. The uppermost pre-herodian buildings under the temple form a complex of houses dated to about 125 B.C. by coins found above and below the floors. These are, no doubt, houses of that Samaria which John Hyrcanus destroyed in 109 B.C.

3. Underneath the houses just mentioned are remnants of at least two older complexes of houses which are thus clearly previous to 125 B.C. in date. Beyond the temple area on both sides and on the lower terrace, the same two or three older complexes are clearly distinguishable. Here fragments of red-figured ware and other Greek pottery carry the date back to about 400 B.C. At the gateway, under the towers of the Gabinius-Herod gate, lies a gateway of known Greek form—two square towers with a circular building behind, probably the gate built by the colony of Alexander the Great.

4. At the summit, underneath the Greek walls, there are traces of mud-brick structures and of a very thick fort-wall of stones, the same fort-wall being found also at the gateway. This wall, in spite of the great number of large stones available in the ruins of older buildings, is built of small stones in a manner characteristic of ancient, in fact of Babylonian, brick-work. In the filling of the construction-trench in which it is built were Israelite potsherds and a fragment of a cuneiform tablet.

5. Below the Herodian walls at the summit, even where they are carried to the greatest depth, below all Greek walls, below the Babylonian walls wherever found, there is a series of massive walls beautifully built of large limestone blocks founded on rock and forming part of one great building.

Thus we come to the other end of the chronological series of buildings on the summit—a single great building founded on the rock. This building, consisting of great open courts surrounded by small rooms, comparable in plan and even in size with the

Babylonian palaces, is certainly royal in size and architecture. The rocky slopes of the hill are scarred with quarry-cuts in some of which the blocks of stone remain undetached from the rock below. These blocks are identical in size and in stone with the blocks used in the palace. The rock has everywhere been dressed to receive the palace walls, and there is no trace of any sort of earlier buildings. The site is the very summit of the hill—the foremost building site—the only conceivable site for a palace-fortress such as Omri and Ahab must have built. A royal building, the first built on the primary building site of the hill of Samaria, can only be the palace of the Israelite kings.

This palace shows three distinct periods of construction. The latest, poor in every way, is represented by insignificant alterations which cannot at present be further identified. The second period is represented by a very great increase in the size of the palace down the western and southern slopes of the hill where we have found the outside walls. The masonry of this period shows finer joints, smoother surfaces, and better building than that of the first period. This extension is built against and joined with the earlier palace, and in places covers its quarries. The earliest part of the palace occupies a knoll of rock at the very summit, whose western side has been cut away to a vertical face about two metres high, and, extending eastward under the part of the hill still unexcavated, is as yet of unknown extent. The masonry is more massive and less finished than that of the second period. I think there can be no doubt that this central core of the palace was built by Omri; and provisionally, until further proof is available, I have ascribed the great addition on the west and south to Ahab. There is no mention in the Book of Kings of any other ruler of Israel who built great buildings at Samaria.

On the surface of the rock, in some cases under the walls of the Omri palace, there are oil cups, circular receptacles, and shallow troughs such as are found all over Palestine. These are pre-Israelite and show that the hill-top was probably a bare rock when Omri bought it.

II. THE EXCAVATIONS

The arrival of the expedition at Sebaste was delayed by the reactionary revolution in Constantinople which broke out on April 13. On May 1, however, Mr. Fisher and I with thirty-five trained Egyptian workmen left Egypt for Palestine, and we arrived at Sebaste on May 7. After further delays the work began on May 31 and continued steadily until November 4, six days' holidays, a few rainy days in October, and the weekly day of rest being the only interruptions.

Efforts to secure a classical archaeologist or another architect having failed, the entire direction and registration of the work was carried on by Mr. Fisher and myself. The photographic record was made by my staff of Egyptians, one of whom, assisted by a local Christian schoolmaster, relieved me of a great part of the work of time-keeping and accounts, while the efficiency of others made the work of oversight comparatively easy. The commissioner of the Imperial Ottoman Museum, Mahmud Shawket Effendi el-Khalidi, of Jerusalem, was of the greatest service, and exerted himself in every way for the success of the work.

The local force consisted of from 230 to 260 persons, men, boys, women, and girls. A higher rate of wages was paid to these people than is usual in the district, with two objects, to secure the same persons day after day and so train them to the work, and to make it possible to demand more work of them than was customary. The results more than justified this measure.

The workmen were divided into nine gangs varying in size from twenty to thirty-five persons, and each gang was in charge of three Egyptians who worked with pick and hoe alongside their men. Other Egyptians were detailed to look after the lines of carriers and direct the dumping, and a special gang of twelve men was told off to move stones and build retaining walls. Any area marked for excavation was divided into sections about seven by ten metres in size, and each gang was assigned a section, the Egyptians being made responsible for the proper excavation of the section.

The registration of the work was made by means of the following records: (1) A journal, with additional notes written up at intervals. (2) Plans and sections on a scale of 1 : 50, with notes and drawings of details. (3) A photographic record of each stage of the excavations, showing details of masonry, and the objects found. This record contains about 1200 negatives, of three sizes, all numbered and registered in a book with full details. (4) A card catalogue of objects found, with a card for each object, giving number, provenance, date, and full description of material, size, and condition, a photograph, and, when desirable, a drawing as well. For the season this catalogue contains 2027 cards.

At first an attempt was made to remove the *débris* layer by layer, but this was soon found to be impossible, for beneath the cultivation stratum there were no regular horizontal strata. The *débris* of each period had been disturbed during the construction of the next architectural period in the search for stone for building material and in the effort to place the new foundations on rock: hence foundations of all periods rested on the rock and stood mixed together—a wilderness of walls. Moreover, certain areas, in one case over 100 square metres in extent, have been disturbed in Christian-Moslem times in the search for building material, the holes in many cases being cut down to solid rock and most of them being subsequently filled in to restore the ground to cultivation. These filled holes are clearly marked, as the dirt thrown in from one side forms a continuously advancing gravity slope with the stones and pebbles in a series of pockets at the bottom and the finer dirt in thin sloping strata above. In other parts, however, the successive deposition and disturbance of strata proved easily traceable. The undisturbed geological dirt, which remained in places on the rock and in crevices, was the same reddish gravelly soil seen at present on the surrounding hill-tops. Above this a layer of decayed yellow limestone *débris* contained the limestone walls of the Israelite period. The yellow *débris* was cut through by the construction-trenches in which were built the Babylonian and Roman temple walls, and these trenches were filled with black *débris* belonging to the deposits above the yellow. All these deposits above the yellow

limestone débris were dark-colored and indistinguishable in character except that the lowest levels frequently contained patches and pockets of coals, ashes, and burnt material (iron or copper slag). The only means of separating the different periods of the black stratum was to find the floors of the successive structures, but those of the last Seleucid houses (destroyed 109 B.C.) were practically the only floors preserved, and, leaving aside the small objects found, the black débris below them did not differ in constituency from that above. Where a Roman floor was found, as in the temple portico and certain houses on the lower terrace, there was only a cultivation stratum above. This was like all the other black débris—only a little softer and drier.

Once it was clear that regular horizontal strata were not to be expected, the plan was adopted of clearing steadily downwards along the walls until we found an existing floor level or the foot of a superstructure wall; then we cleared along this level. After the first few weeks, the filled holes were completely cleared along with the top stratum from which their filling had come. Finally, with a knowledge of our deposits, which permitted an almost instant recognition of the character and date of the débris, we were able to clear with great consistency—removing cultivation stratum, registering any late field-walls found in this, clearing to the first floor-level, then to the next, and so on, down to the upper surface of the yellow deposit. Lastly the yellow débris was cleared away, and the underlying red earth, where found. On the summit this process was repeated strip by strip over an area of about 6000 square metres.

The excavations begun in 1908 consisted, for the main part, of a series of trenches on the very summit of the hill and at the building which was visible west of the threshing floor. As the main attention was devoted to the summit, the trenches at the "lower temple," as it was temporarily designated, never reached a point which could reveal either the character or the plan of the building. At the summit, the Trench G as originally laid out was intended to cut across the very top of the ancient hill, but we now know that the ancient top lay some metres south of the apparent top. Trench F therefore, instead of cutting across the Israelite palace, laid bare the front part of the large building

identified as Herod's Temple of Augustus. A large marble statue found in front of the temple stairway was recognized as a statue of Augustus. To the west a large vault was found and to the south the trenches revealed certain walls—some of the temple and others not understood. It appears now that the wall of the palace at the summit was laid bare for several Israelite metres, but its importance was scarcely to be recognized at the bottom of a narrow trench.

Coming to the site as it was left at the end of the first season, we decided to continue the attack at these two points, but by clearing large areas, not by trenches. Certain gangs left free at various times were also employed in excavating the gateway known to travellers as the "Lepers' Gate." Thus the work was carried on at three points:—the summit, the basilica or threshing floor, and the gateway.

The summit work was carried out in a number of contiguous sections known as Strip 1, etc. On May 31 work was begun on Strip 1, adjoining the Herodian temple on the east. Here a scrap of mosaic pointed to a floor level, and when this level had been cleared so far as preserved, it was seen to belong to a large bathing establishment with furnace, cold and hot baths, and water-closet. These floors in turn were cleared away. About 60 to 100 cm. below there were several trodden surfaces, made by the tread of feet during the construction of walls, but no floors and only foundation walls. The débris was black and mixed with red and black potsherds and other Seleucid fragments. Just above the rock was a thin layer of yellow limestone débris so hard packed that it was mistaken for decayed surface rock. The bath-house, whose floor was two metres below the temple floor, was temporarily assigned to the Roman period, but it was seen later to belong to the Seleucid town destroyed by John Hyrcanus in 109 B.C., and the lower walls were still earlier.

Embedded in the yellow débris were massive walls, founded on the rock, whose importance immediately sprang into notice. They were clearly part of a large and important building. The rock was dressed to receive them, which shows that they were the first walls built on the site. Beside them, the rock bore only the oil cups and other small rock-cut receptacles so common

all over Palestine. If this hill is the hill of Samaria, these walls can only belong to the Israelite period.

On the southern half of Strip 1 everything was in the greatest confusion. There were remnants of Herodian and later Roman walls as well as Greek and Israelite walls, and across the whole ran a heavy wall 4.30 metres wide, built of small stones and called the "Babylonian wall." These had all suffered from the removal of stone and from agricultural terracing.

On July 2, having finished our detailed examination of Strip 1 and the removal of such walls as stood in the way of clearing up the Israelite building, we began cutting out the top stratum of Strip 2. A floor was already visible on the eastern face, and we followed this across the strip from east to west. There was no floor preserved higher than this one, which was 2.75 metres lower than the pavement of the temple-portico excavated last year. It was soon clear that the temple had been built over a group of houses of earlier date, although the foundation walls of the temple cut through the walls of these houses to bed-rock or to the Israelite walls, which were treated by the Herodian builders as equivalent to bed-rock. These houses are the latest pre-herodian buildings on the spot, and they can only be the houses of the Seleucid city destroyed by John Hyrcanus in 109 B.C., for the restoration by Gabinius in 60 B.C. was certainly a very incomplete and poverty-stricken thing. As a matter of fact, coins found on their floors are of about 110 to 125 B.C., while those found under the floors are earlier.

Along the southern edge of this strip ran a great wall 7.61 metres high and 2.1 metres thick, which acted as a retaining wall for the great platform on which the temple stood. The details found indicated a rectangular enclosing wall about 310 metres in circumference, a size which agrees very well with Josephus's statement that Herod built an enclosing wall one and one-half stadia in circumference (*Wars* ii. 21 2).

On August 11 work was begun on the lower terrace. The great points revealed here were the Israelite city (or fortress) wall along the edge of the cliff, the paved open space, the southern face of the Israelite palace, the terracing for Greek and Roman houses, and the great enclosing wall of the temple area. Strips

3 and 4, both west of Strip 2, were begun on September 20 and October 18 respectively. In the first of these were again Israelite walls, the continuation of the great Babylonian wall, a Seleucid street with earlier Greek houses underneath, and, high up in the surface débris, remnants of Roman foundations. The eastern part of Strip 4, which is to the north of Strip 3, was occupied by a big Seleucid house. Over the western part there were no walls in the higher levels, and we cleared straight down to the Israelite walls, the rock, or the yellow débris.

The clue to the whole situation at the summit lay in Strip 2, which ran south from the temple-portico found last year to the edge of the summit plateau. It was the exact width of the temple, and gave us first of all the plan of the Herodian temple, consisting of a stairway, a portico, a vestibule, and a cella with a corridor on each side. The temple showed a very definite later reconstruction, and had manifestly been partly destroyed for its stone before this restoration. The restored building approximated the plan of Herod's building, but the wall between vestibule and cella was about 2.50 metres further south and the vestibule itself showed a continuation of the two inner cella walls with thickened ends as if to support pilasters. The older wall showed the characteristic masonry which appears in all Herod's foundation walls, both on the summit and at the basilica, and which differs entirely from that of the reconstructed parts of the temple.

The pavement, as it was found, was certainly post-herodian. The stairway was manifestly built against the portico and was in good condition. The offering stones about the altar all appear to belong to the Severus period and show the floor level of that time, but the floor of the altar is lower, and is in fact 70 cm. below the lowest step of the great stair. It is therefore probable that the altar itself is Herodian, and the stairway of the reconstruction period, but a final decision must await a cut through the stairway.

The reconstruction of the temple was almost certainly made in the time of the Roman legionary colony settled in Sebaste by Septimius Severus about 200 A.D. When the district became Christian, this Roman temple was, no doubt, a place of abhorrence. It is certain that the great Christian buildings were all

at the east of the forum, and that the stone used in them came from older buildings. It is equally clear that the reconstructed temple has been destroyed down to its foundation-walls and lower by the removal of stone. Apparently the summit was never used as a site for large buildings in early Christian times.

On June 1 half the force was put at work on the "lower temple." Here three strata of earth were distinctly visible, all sloping to the east. These were removed, and the plan of the building thus laid bare was seen to be neither a temple nor a church, but a true basilica, consisting of a large open, stone-paved court surrounded by a colonnade with a mosaic floor. On the north was an apse-like amphitheatre. This basilica adjoined the forum, and was connected with it by a wide doorway through the eastern side of the court. Of the forum itself only the adjoining northwestern corner was laid bare. It also was surrounded by a colonnade, but with smaller columns. The basilica is clearly part of the city of Sebaste built by Herod, having the same masonry and architectural details as the forum and the road of columns. The inscription in Greek on the architrave found in the court-yard mentions the name of Annius Ru[fus], and proves that the building was in existence in his day (ca. 12-15 A.D.). It has been repaired or partially reconstructed at least twice. The latest reconstruction was after 350 A.D. and an earlier and better one was previous to 270 A.D., as is shown by the dates of coins found between the two floors.

The plans of the walls underneath the Herodian basilica could not be fully made out. Their importance therefore lay in the evidence they gave of the existence of different buildings and different periods of construction. One large building of massive construction showed three periods, all apparently Greek. There were also at three points remains of walls on the rock, which appeared to be Israelite. Thus we have at the basilica the same periods as at the summit, with the exception of the Babylonian.

On June 9 two gangs were put at work at the gateway, clearing between the two round towers and about the northern one. The excavations at this point are incomplete, but the present results are important and, as far as they go, conclusive. The Herodian gate is an ornamental, well-built structure just inside the two

towers. The connection with the Herodian structure is established by the masonry, architectural details, and orientation. The axis of the two round towers and the underlying square towers shows that up to Herod's time the roadway from the gate went up the hill. Herod's road of columns follows a gentle ascent around the southern slope of the hill, and the gate under discussion leads straight into this road. Its axis therefore makes an angle of about 35° with that of the older gateway. A roadway paved with rough stones leads steeply up to the floor of the Herodian gate.

The two round towers with the outlying western round tower and the connecting walls belong to a city wall which can be traced around the whole site, giving a length of nearly 4000 metres. According to Josephus, Herod built the great wall of Samaria twenty stadia (or about 4000 metres) in circumference. It would thus appear that the present round towers with connecting walls were built by Herod, probably as the first and most necessary part of his work at Samaria, and the ornamental gate with the road of columns was added later.

As to the restoration of the city by Gabinius referred to by Josephus, it is hardly probable that this was of great importance, since Herod is said to have re-peopled the city (Joseph. *Wars* ii. 21 2), but there are traces here of a weak system of fortification, such as might be expected as a result of Gabinius's orders.

A Greek gateway of square towers and adjoining circular structure behind, one of the known Greek forms, lies under the Herodian gate. It probably belongs to the city destroyed by John Hyrcanus in 109 B.C., and goes back to the early days of the Syro-macedonian colony. The city wall belonging to it is not yet identified.

A huge wall, built partly on rock and partly on Israelite masonry, identical in size and structure with the so-called Babylonian wall at the summit, plunges under the Roman masonry just north of the northern tower. No tower is visible corresponding to this Babylonian wall.

The square Greek tower is built in a square cut in the rock, but it does not fill this cut. At the northern corner of the cut, under the Babylonian and other walls, six huge blocks of stone

are visible, a fragment of a wall of Israelite masonry which completely filled this cut. In other words, the square cut in the rock represents the place occupied by the northern Israelite gateway tower, and, in fact, the place of the northern tower of Omri's gateway. The masonry still in place is of the rough, massive Omri style.

Thus at the gateway we have practically the same periods of construction as on the summit and at the basilica.

III. HISTORICAL REVIEW

1. *The Herodian City.* The city built by Herod was surrounded by a great wall four kilometres in circumference, at least ten metres in height, and strengthened by round towers at frequent intervals. The wall was 3.25 metres thick, and like the towers was built of heavy bossed stones. The chief gate lay on the site of the earlier gates, on the brow of the steepest part of the western end of the hill, at the top of a winding roadway which is still in use. Inside the strong round towers which defended this entrance, Herod built an ornamental gateway oriented to lead into a magnificent road of columns which led around the southern slope of the hill to the eastern end of the forum. This road consisted of a broad chariot road with a roofed colonnade on each side. The northern wall was broken by a series of deep niches, each the width of the space between two columns, possibly used as shops.

The forum was a large open space about 100×60 metres in size, also surrounded by a roofed colonnade. On the west a broad doorway led into a basilica (court of law). Below the forum on the north but inside the city wall the remains of a hippodrome are visible.

On the top of the hill Herod built the great temple to Augustus. This consisted of a stairway, a portico with immense columns, a vestibule and a cella with an inner row of smaller columns. It was surrounded by a great enclosing wall which also served as a terrace wall for the temple-area. Outside the enclosure on several lower terraces are traces of Roman houses oriented parallel to the temple. There are certainly other great public build-

ings in the city of Sebaste, especially in the northwest, between the Herodian wall and the earlier wall.


The date of these buildings is fully established by the great marble statue, by Herodian and Roman coins, the inscription of Annius Rufus, and three Roman stelae, not to mention pottery, lamps, and other small objects.

2. *The Seleucid City.* The Greek city destroyed by John Hyrcanus in 109 B.C., so far as recovered, consists of the gateway, on the old site, the temple under the basilica, and the complex of houses at the summit, which are all private houses, on three streets. The only great public building is that represented by the massive walls under the basilica, which appear to be part of a temple. The bronze statuette of Hercules found in a cistern may be from this temple. On the lower terrace are houses built to suit the abrupt slope, with stairways leading from one level of rooms to another. The dates of the houses rest, aside from their position, on a Greek stela of King Demetrius, an abundance of Seleucid and Ptolemaic coins, household altars, pottery, etc.

3. *The Babylonian City.* The remains of the Babylonian settlement are the most fragmentary of all. The only structure of importance certainly pre-greek and post-israelite is the great wall which runs east and west across the southern slope of the upper summit and appears again running north and south at the gateway. It is a filled wall, both faces of which are built in receding courses of small stones about 50 cm. high. The filling contains a heavy layer of mud plaster level with the top of each facing course. These are the methods of brick masons unfamiliar with the possibilities of stone as a building material. The date of this wall is certainly between 722 B.C., when Sargon destroyed the Israelite city, and 306 B.C., when the struggles between Alexander's generals in Palestine had ended. The masonry seems to point to people fresh from Babylonia. I am inclined to ascribe these walls directly to the colonists settled in Samaria by Sargon and Esarhaddon, and to date them between 720 and 670 B.C.


4. *The Israelite City.* Of the Israelite city we have at present the palace on the summit, the city wall on the edge of the lower terrace, and the western gateway. As indicated by these remains, it lay on the summit and on the more gentle northern slope of

the higher part of the hill. The southern wall appears to run along the top of the steep southern slope down the ridge to the gateway. As might be expected, the palace-castle on the summit is the dominant feature of the city. With the high, sheer castle-walls rising behind the huge city-wall, the hill was impregnable to assault by ancient arms. This unapproachable nest it was from which the Israelites conquered Moab, fought Damascus, and even for a time defied Assyria. Siege after siege by the Damascenes and the Assyrians reduced the garrison to starvation and thus finally to submission, but otherwise no hostile force could break the defence.




Basilica and western edge of the Forum, looking south.

Plate 1.



Basilica and western edge of the Forum, looking south.

Plate 2.




Basilica and western edge of the Forum, looking north, showing massive older walls (Greek) under floor of central court.

Plate 3.




Gateway excavation, looking southeast. 2 = Herodian city wall and tower. 3 = Greek.

Plate 4.




Gateway excavation, looking southeast.

Plate 5.



Looking west on south of summit. 2 = Herodian; 2a = Herodian wall enclosing temple; 3a = Greek walls enclosing Seleucid street; 4 = Babylonian wall; 4a = block of yellow debris left intact among the later walls.



Looking south over Temple and Seleucid houses. 1 = reconstruction of Septimius Severus; 2 = Herodian Temple; 3 = Seleucid house-walls.

Plate 7.



Israelite rooms at summit, looking southwest. 1 = Septimius Severus; 2 = Herodian; 3 = Greek; 4 = Ahab; 5 = Omri.

Plate 8.



Israelite walls with superimposed Seleucid walls. 3 = Seleucid; 4 = Ahab; 5 = Omri.

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IS CHRISTIANITY A MORAL CODE OR A RELIGION?

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The answer to this question comes with great readiness from a host of those who tell us that the meaning of Christianity is summed up in a code of ethical principles. The endless strife of theological tongues has led weary souls to take refuge in the apparent simplicity of the moral law; the stress of the modern social problem has prompted others to fix their exclusive attention upon the Christian rule of conduct as offering the final solution. And so we hear from all sides the many voices that unite in the swelling chorus, whose burden is the lofty ethical precepts of the Sermon on the Mount or the noble utterances of the Hebrew prophets as the sum and substance of all essential Christianity: "Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them"; "Do justly, love mercy and walk humbly with thy God,"—Christianity means this and nothing more.

The assertion of an essentially moral Christianity comes to us backed with the authority of high scholarship. In the *Hibbert Journal* of October, 1908, in an article entitled "How may Christianity be Defended Today?" Professor McGiffert tells us that "to promote the reign of sympathy and service among men was the controlling purpose of Christ Himself," that "modern study of Jesus has made this very clear, and we are recognizing with a unanimity never reached in other days that it was for this Jesus labored and for this He summoned men to follow Him." The fact that this article, in spite of its confused reasoning and its inconclusiveness, is said to have been translated into several foreign languages, proves the strong hold which the moral interpretation of Christianity has obtained.

It is the purpose of the following pages to examine this view. We ask: What do the records teach? Do they permit the interpretation of Christianity as a set of moral laws? or do they imply something else, the religious or spiritual?

We have nothing to do with miracle, nor with any historic occurrences as such. Our inquiry is into the nature of that particular truth, or set of truths or principles, touching human life which Christ placed before the world and which the Church accepted as the Christian interpretation of life. It is perfectly possible, and it will serve a good purpose, to separate the historic events as such from the spiritual or philosophical teaching, and the reader will remember that our task is thus strictly limited.

In addressing ourselves to the subject, we are first of all impressed with a certain confusion of ideas. When we hear all this talk about Christianity being intended to regulate the social life of man, we are led to suspect a certain lack of reflection upon the essential difference between morality and religion. Let us clear our minds upon this point. Morality needs no definition. But, while the moral truths are addressed preëminently to the will, religious truths are for the reason. They concern the mystery of life; their subject-matter is God and immortality. Upon these they give or pretend to give a revelation. "Thou shalt not steal" is a moral law; "God is love" is a religious truth. The two are dissimilar. The nature of their relation is one of the fundamental questions of life; but they may be kept theoretically and practically dissociated. There are men who are moral but not religious, others are religious but not moral. Christianity offers no novelty to the moral sentiment of mankind except an example; its ethics are the same as those of other systems. What is new in Christianity belongs rather to the religious sphere.

This religious element is now to be ruled out. If we are to believe the apostles of the new Christianity, most of what eighteen centuries have innocently believed of Christ, his conception of a life in the spirit, was based upon an illusion. Christ thought of none of these things. At least he cared very little about them. What was ever on his mind was the welfare of "society." What he did was to affirm or reaffirm the maxims upon which life,

especially the social life, should be built. He gave to the world (to use the modern jargon) the dynamic of social evolution.

Is it possible to form a reasonable picture of the historic Christ upon the basis of a purely moral Christianity? Let us see. We should have to conceive of a Christ whose mind was filled with moral ideas and ideals. Religious conceptions were wholly secondary—the sediment perhaps of the Jewish traditions of which he had not quite divested himself. We should think of Christ somewhat as we do of the author of the Epistle of St. James, whose interest centred in moral and social questions, to whose mind “pure religion and undefiled” meant simply “to visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction and to keep himself unspotted from the world,” but whose moral Christianity was garnished by certain religious principles: “Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above.”

Such a Christ—a Christ whose ideals were wholly moral, to whom religious ideas were secondary—is indeed not the Christ whom his followers have pictured for us. They were therefore misled. We may perhaps imagine that this misleading was due to certain currents of thought prevalent at the time. We know that ideas distinctly religious or spiritual had come into the empire and were very wide-spread in the first centuries of the Christian era. These ideas gathered about the cults which had been introduced from the East, of Cybele, of Isis and Serapis, and of Mithra. Few pages of religious history are more interesting than those which describe the nature and the prevalence of these ancient forms of Oriental worship. They were intensely spiritual. They carried with them and made prominent such spiritual ideas as New Birth, Mediation, Immortality, Fellowship with the Divine.

You may conceive the followers of Christ to have come under **their** influence. They may have been carried away by this spiritual wave, and so Christianity may have become tinged with a foreign coloring. They therefore let go what was essential in Christ's teaching and seized what was merely accidental and traditional. This they magnified and passed off as the kernel of Christianity. All subsequent generations continued to cherish the error, and it was reserved for the wise men of the nineteenth

and twentieth centuries to discover and correct the mistake and to restore the Christian religion to its pristine significance as the religion of moral and social progress.

Such is at least a thinkable hypothesis, equal in probability to other modern reconstructions. But does it correspond to the facts?

We have two assertions to examine: (1) that Christ's essential purpose was a moral one, (2) that his followers misunderstood him. Let us begin with the second of these.

If such a misunderstanding actually took place, it must have been immediate, at the very beginning; it must have taken place among the personal disciples of Christ, among the very men who knew him in the flesh, who sat at his feet and listened to his words and witnessed his actions. The spiritual or religious conception of Christ did not come in slowly and gradually displace the moral idea of him. Our records know nothing else but that from the very beginning Christ was acknowledged and believed in as a spiritual leader and teacher.

The proof is not difficult. In all the uncertainty which criticism has thrown around our New Testament records there are certain facts which every candid man must accept as genuinely historic. The first and foremost of these is St. Paul. Sober criticism has not questioned the historic character of St. Paul or his authorship of at least the four great Epistles. With him we stand on firm historic ground, and he is a witness whose character and sanity commend him to our confidence.

The theory which was once made the basis of a reconstruction of early Christian history, that St. Paul, representing gentile Christianity, stood irreconcilable over against the Jewish Christianity of the Twelve, has long been abandoned. We have learned to realize how closely identified was the Christianity of the Apostle with that of the original Twelve. The man who after his conversion went to Jerusalem and lived fifteen days with St. Peter (Gal. 1 18), who later again entered into conference with the apostles, to whom the "pillars" gave the right hand of fellowship (Gal. 2 9), who for a year lived among Jewish Christians at Antioch (Acts 11 26), who had the companionship of such men as Barnabas and Mark and others "of the circumcision" (Col. 4 10 f.) must

have been, in all essentials, in close agreement with the original apostles. But St. Paul's conception of Christianity is spiritual through and through. (To most minds this will appear self-evident; we shall return to the subject later.) We may therefore gather that the twelve apostles shared St. Paul's belief in a Christianity essentially religious or spiritual.

This conclusion is confirmed by the testimony of the Acts of the Apostles. The historicity of this book has lately met with strong indorsement, and in regard to many of the main facts can hardly be disputed. Thus we cannot doubt that the manifold witness of the Acts to the preaching of the resurrection as the burden of the apostolic message is true to history. The Christ, whose rising from the dead—however they came to that belief—they announced whenever they spoke, who was to St. Peter a "Prince of Life" (3 15), a "Prince and Saviour for to give repentance to Israel and forgiveness of sins" (5 31), who was "ordained of God to be the Judge of quick and dead" (10 42), this Christ was, in the minds of the apostles, something more than a moral reformer.

There is no avoidance of the conclusion that the apostles believed in Christ as a spiritual leader or revealer, not merely as a moral reformer. If this belief represents a misunderstanding of Christ, then it was the apostles who misunderstood him. But that the apostles who had lived familiarly with Christ, who had been his co-workers, should have so radically misconstrued his meaning or allowed themselves, after Christ's death, to be swept away by any wave of religious thought or feeling,—this proposition most men will find it difficult to accept.

But suppose the seemingly impossible to have taken place,—and historical research warns us to make large allowances,—suppose that, in those mysterious years after Christ's resurrection, which hide so many secrets, this misconception did somehow creep in, that Christ's mission came to be misunderstood, we should in that case confidently expect that the real Christ, the moral reformer, should somewhere have left some traces of himself and of his real mission. There must somewhere have been some who understood Jesus, and in the literature that has come down to us we shall surely discover some remains of the

original conception, some trace, however slight, of the existence of the correct valuation of Christ as a moral reformer.

But the closest examination of the Christian literature covering about one hundred years after Christ's resurrection, whether canonical or extra-canonical, discovers no remains of a supposedly original moral conception of Jesus. The emphasis upon morality in a few of the writings, in the Epistle of St. James, in the Shepherd of Hermas, the Teaching of the Twelve, and later in the Apostolic Constitutions, does not in the least invalidate this conclusion.

We pass to the other of the two propositions made at the beginning of this paper: that Christ's essential purpose was a moral one. We take up the records of Christ's life and try to discover the ideas of human life embodied in Christ's life and teaching.

And here, we may suspect, we have come to the source and fountain-head of the statements, so far as they proceed from professed critics, claiming for Christ's mission an essentially moral character. For in the gospels we are no longer on the same firm historic ground, such as the epistles of St. Paul afford. The Synoptic Gospels are compilations. Many, as St. Luke tells us, had "taken in hand to set forth in order a declaration of those things which have been fulfilled among us." From these many efforts at writing the story of Christ our evangelists culled what approved itself to them, sometimes giving to the original statements of their sources the individual coloring of their own minds, and we are led to look back from the revisions to the sources.

Here we have a free field and open course for the analytical faculty. The critic takes up his task and the gospel story is dissected. In this process the personal equation of the critic is quite as important a factor as the scientific principles of investigation, and the results vary in accordance with personal mental and moral idiosyncrasies. The latter in their turn are influenced by the spirit of the age, and so it may happen that in an age of intense social striving like the present, the critic, losing his hold upon the great religious principles that outlast all ages, and carried away by the gust of present-day enthusiasm, may think he discovers in Christ a great moral reformer.

The problem of the Synoptic Gospels has for many years been an object of inquiry. We are not called upon to enter into the intricacies of this problem. We only refer to some of its salient features in the present state of the investigation.

It has been the ambition of scholars to discover and reproduce the sources of our gospels, and a large amount of success has in these latter years crowned their efforts. Thirty-eight years ago Professor Bernhard Weiss, in a work whose acute and thorough criticism has perhaps never been surpassed, made out the text of what he called the "Apostolic Source." Others have carried on the task, and the latest worker in this field, Professor Harnack, today reproduces the "source" of St. Matthew and St. Luke in a form which he calls "Q." At the same time strenuous efforts are being made by scholars, by means of comparisons and by the aid of patristic quotations, to ascertain the *ipsissima verba* of Christ.

An intense desire for historic accuracy prompts the efforts of New Testament criticism. But while scholars are doing their best to get back to the original and trustworthy substance of the gospel narrative and to the assured words of Christ, they seem all unconscious of another and larger problem which their praiseworthy efforts make importunate.

This problem may be briefly stated thus: Where is the plain Christian man to go for his knowledge of Christ?

We are not dealing with an ordinary human life, whose record may be very interesting no doubt, but interesting only to a small group of intelligent and educated people. It is certainly an object worth considerable effort to ascertain the exact facts of Caesar's life. But how many are interested in Caesar compared with those who are interested in Christ? What is the vital concern in the life of Caesar, compared with that which makes the Christian world cling to Christ as the world's Master?

What, then, are the prospects for the countless multitudes who want to know of Christ? Shall they patiently wait until the critics issue a new edition of the gospel? We have little hope of such a revised gospel. Not even on the principles which are to govern the revision are the doctors agreed. We may be sure that the Christian world will not accept its

gospel from the exponents of modern criticism. Biblical criticism has achieved great results and will continue its appointed task, but it is a very specialized function of theological activity, and critics have too often been influenced by prejudice and lacking in sympathetic imagination, when they have attempted to rise above their specialty, and the world will not acquiesce in their dicta upon questions which involve a delicate appreciation of larger issues.

Shall we then accept the suggestion (which we remember seeing somewhere made by an eminent scholar) that every individual should investigate the authenticity and credibility of a text before he makes use of it? How few are competent to do this! This principle would surely make of Christianity an esoteric religion and the glorious boast of its democratic character would be a thing of the past. To suggestions of this nature, which would remove the gospel of Christ beyond the reach of all but the specially trained, we are bound to oppose a decided negative. The Christian world must have an open gospel accessible to the plain man.

But this does not remove the difficulty which the suspicion cast upon the gospel record has made, and we are bound to find a way out. In attempting to do so, it will perhaps become evident that the difficulty itself is caused by a misunderstanding. We shall therefore suggest three propositions which seem to us to embody the truths necessary to enable us to see our way more clearly through the cloud of uncertainty which the analysis and criticism of our records have brought down upon the great religious problems.

(1) The fundamental question of fact in the Christian religion, the resurrection of Christ, as a question touching an historical event, must submit to a strict historical investigation. While it is true that belief in this fact will depend largely upon the spiritual discernment of the meaning and value of Christ's life, yet the intellectual appreciation of the historical conditions must always be fundamental to an assured judgment.

(2) Only very few religious truths are vital for our life. There are few things in the religious sphere today more important than the realization of this simple fact; and yet the simplicity of

religious truth is often grievously misunderstood. Professor Henry Sidgwick, in speaking of trust in God's fatherhood as expressed in one of Tennyson's stanzas, called this trust "the indestructible and inalienable minimum of faith." It was a strange misapprehension for so clear a thinker. Trust in God is surely the maximum of Christian faith. It marks the very topmost summit of conviction to which the human spirit can attain. Whoever in this world of contradictory phenomena attains to a faith in God needs little else. You may add just one more article, the belief in immortality, and you may say, It was to establish and make firm these two foundation-pillars of human life that Christ came, taught, and died. These two alone are vital.

(8) Finally, we are called upon to carry out to its logical conclusion the one assured result of modern criticism, the destruction of all human infallibility. The doctrine of an infallible Word, which never had any logical foundation, is by the work of the critic made quite untenable, and this negative principle must be accepted with all that it implies.

The implications of this principle are of the utmost importance in our practical religious life. It cuts the ground from under a certain easy-going attitude towards modern criticism. It is not uncommon to hear it said that criticism has really made little difference with the Bible, that it has rather strengthened our belief in the Bible. With such vague assertions the fears of the timid are quieted.

As a matter of fact, it would be difficult to exaggerate the revolution which the new attitude to the Bible is bringing over the church. We are only at the very beginning of the change. Only a few scholars today realize what it means; "the general public," as a recent writer has said, "is still unable to recognize any middle ground between the acceptance of the teachings of the Bible as authoritative 'from cover to cover' and the 'rejection' of the Bible." The process from a Bible-religion to the historical conception of Christianity will doubtless be a painful one. What strange forms religion will assume no one can guess, and one might well view with alarm the coming development, were it not for the conviction that the guiding hand of Providence shapes the destinies of the church and in the end the truth will be vindicated.

The practical conclusion of what criticism has achieved is just this, that there can be no certainty of any detail of our gospel story. We cannot say that a given proposition is true because Christ said it, for the reason that we are never sure what Christ really did say. We shall never be able to say of any detail of his life, It happened so and so. Careful research may increase the likelihood of the authenticity of certain passages, but we can never be sure. Who can tell whether the source underlying the common passages of St. Matthew and St. Luke reported correctly? Who can tell what degree of authority St. Peter gives to the Gospel of St. Mark, whom Papias calls Peter's "interpreter"? To this ultimate conclusion, then, of practical uncertainty of details we come as the one assured result of modern criticism.

Fortunately, the details of Christ's life and teaching are not of the most vital importance to the practice of the Christian religion. When we realize that Christ brought no new law, that Christianity is not a code of ethics and the Bible is not a collection of oracles, when we remember that Christianity stands for a few great vital truths, we are ready to let the details go.

For if each detail is uncertain, the same is not true of the mass of details. If no single word or sentence is lifted above doubt, that cannot be said of the whole of all the words and sentences. As regards the general impression of Christ's life, we stand on ground totally different from the evidence for single words or events. We may not be able to trace with accuracy the position and direction of each line, but the picture as a whole is perfectly clear. The figure of Christ, the impression of what he was and meant to be to the world, has stood before mankind these eighteen centuries, and no criticism can destroy that impression. It is here, therefore, in the large features of that unique life, that we find our certainty. Neither can one say, as we trust will become evident in the sequel, that the picture of Christ which the Christian world has enshrined in its heart, is that of the Fourth Gospel, and is therefore faulty, or at least questionable.

The reader will again call to mind what was said at the beginning of this paper: we have here nothing to do with the miraculous

as an element in the life of Christ. We set that quite aside for our present purpose. What we desire to gain is the knowledge of one aspect of what Christ stood for, and we find it not only in what he taught, but in the principles which he embodied in his activity and in his habits of thought. We are far from denying, indeed we strenuously affirm, that the supernatural is an essential element in our conception of Christ, but we claim that Christianity as a religion may be, in theory, separated from Christianity as embodied in certain events in history. The two stand as separate interests of theological inquiry.

And so, guided by the principles as we have stated them, we shall examine the other of the two propositions which we found to underlie this theory of a purely moral Christianity, the proposition that Christ's essential purpose was a moral one.

In order to test this statement we shall endeavor to extract from the gospels a formula which shall express Christ's attitude to life. If we can do this, we shall have satisfied our immediate purpose and shall be able to judge of the correctness of the opposing theory. We shall then go a step further and examine more carefully the leading principles such as they were received and held by the early Church. We shall endeavor to ascertain how far these principles, which we have so far assumed to embody a spiritual as opposed to a moral conception of Christianity, agree with Christ's attitude towards life.

Let us first take the direct teaching of our Lord. Whoever studies this must be impressed with the fact that there is really little direct moral teaching in the record of Christ's activity. Almost all of it is comprised within the Sermon on the Mount. More significant, however, than this is the fact that behind the moral there is usually the recognition of the spiritual. Christ's morality almost invariably has a spiritual coloring or bearing, which leads us to understand that in his mind religion is inseparable from morality.

A few illustrations will make this clear. A modern secular moralist might say that purity of heart is a noble and exalting virtue: Christ says, "The pure in heart shall *see God*." Our social reformers might say that peaceableness is a highly "social" and therefore commendable virtue: Christ says that

peacemakers shall be called the *children of God*. And so with most of Christ's moral exhortations, they have a spiritual point or reference: persecutions shall bring great reward in heaven.—He tells us what sort of righteousness is requisite for admission to the kingdom of heaven; God's love is the measure for ours; God's perfection is the standard for ours. And so on, through the rest of the Sermon, as any one can read. Everywhere we see the traces of Christ's habit of mind, the turning from the earthly to the heavenly, that heavenly-mindedness which is so strikingly expressed in this same Sermon: "Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth, where moth and rust doth corrupt, and where thieves do break through and steal: But lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven, where neither moth nor rust doth corrupt, and where thieves do not break through nor steal." It is a hasty judgment that finds in the Sermon on the Mount the kernel of Christianity, and conceives of that discourse as a set of moral aphorisms.

It is undoubtedly an easy task to pick out from Christ's sayings those which appeal to our preconceived ideas of what he represented, and proclaim, Here is the true and genuine gospel. Thus we find it written that Christ said, "As ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them likewise," and "I will have mercy and not sacrifice." These and other expressions like them are put forward, and it is claimed that these express the mind of Christ, that this is Christianity.

We call attention to a few other words outside of the Sermon on the Mount, expressing direct moral teaching, which show the same spiritual references. So in the warning against idle words, of which account shall be given in the day of judgment (Matt. 13 36), in the commendation of childlike humility, which makes a man great in the kingdom of heaven (18 4), in the warning against giving offence, where it is better to enter into life halt or maimed rather than having two hands or two feet to be cast into everlasting fire, etc. (18 8 f.), in the insistence upon self-denial, where Christ contrasts the material and the spiritual, the world and the soul (Mark 8 36), in the reference of the divorce question to God's intent at the creation (10 6), in the warning against those who lay up treasure for themselves and are not rich towards God (Luke 12 21).

The conception of a morality without religious sanction is in fact wholly out of place as applied to Christ. It attributes to him what is quite foreign to his mind. The Hebrew Wisdom-literature does indeed show us that a secular morality was not unknown among the Jews of Christ's time; but our Lord was certainly untouched by it. To Christ's mind the ethical life was simply the doing of God's will. This is his definition, given with a good deal of distinctness: in Matt. 7 21, "Not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven, but he that doeth the will of my Father which is in heaven"; in the Lord's Prayer, "Thy will be done"; in Matt. 12 50, "Whosoever shall do the will of my Father which is in heaven, the same is my brother and sister and mother." The rule of right living was to Christ not an abstract law, a command appealing to the ethical consciousness of the individual, it was the will of a living Father appealing to the obedience of his children.

All moral relationships are determined by this consideration of man's attitude to God. If right-doing is obedience, wrong-doing is sin, and the gospels know much of sin. Christ began his ministry by preaching repentance and enforced the necessity of repentance, he taught his disciples to pray for forgiveness, he forgave sinners, and in one instance, that of the lame man let down from the roof (Mark 2 5), he seemed to recognize the forgiveness of the man's sins as the necessary preliminary to the recovery of bodily health.

Sin is the offence against a living God, the will of man opposing itself to the will of the heavenly Father, which must be repented of and be forgiven. These ideas are indelibly impressed upon the gospel record, but they have no place in a purely moral system, and one is at a loss to know how their presence in the gospels can be explained by those to whom Christ is no more than a moral reformer. No man could speak of sin, repentance, and forgiveness as Christ did, who was not penetrated through and through with the belief that man's attitude to God is the constitutive principle of life.

Christ's teaching of faith comes within the same category, as arising from a spiritual view of life. The emphasis which the

gospels place on faith is very significant. Faith is recognized or demanded as a condition of healing: in the centurion (Matt. 8 10), the man sick of the palsy (Mark 2 5), the woman with the bloody issue (Matt. 9 22), the blind man (9 29), the woman of Canaan (15 28), the leper (Luke 17 19), the father of the lunatic boy (Mark 9 23), whom Christ tells that "all things are possible to him that believeth." The disciples are rebuked for lack of faith (Mark 4 40) and are taught that faith may remove mountains (Matt. 17 20, 21 21), the woman who was a sinner is commended for her faith (Luke 7 50), and Christ is said to have opened his ministry with a call to repentance and faith in the gospel (Mark 1 15).

What power of faith must there not have been in the mind of him who could calmly say (Mark 11 24) "What things soever ye desire, when ye pray, believe that ye receive them, and ye shall have them." What sense of the spiritual strength of faith is there not in the words to the distracted father (Mark 5 36) "Be not afraid, only believe."

One more reference: there is a melancholy recognition of Peter's moral weakness in our Lord's words to him near the end (Luke 22 31), "Simon, Simon, behold Satan hath desired to have you, that he may sift you as wheat"—and what follows? A hope or prayer that Peter's weak will may be strengthened, his moral nature fortified? Not at all. He who had a true insight into human nature went deeper: "I have prayed for thee that *thy faith* fail not."

Here we find the same evidence as in the moral teaching of the temper of Christ's mind. It is the temper of one who dwells chiefly on the things not seen, who believes in the vital power for human life of spiritual forces.

We have seen that the direct moral teaching is a small element in our gospels. A large proportion of the story is taken up with the accounts of Christ's healings and with the parables, which convey a variety of teaching including the moral and explain the nature and the future of the kingdom of God. Then there are the prophetic discourses.

Among other subjects taught is the infinite value of the human soul, trust in Providence and the love of God: not even a sparrow

falleth to the ground without the Father, and the prodigal son returning is clasped in his father's bosom. These are spiritual, not moral, teachings.

Finally, we read how Christ prayed (Mark 1 35, 6 46, Luke 6 12, 9 18, 23, 11 1, 22 41), how he taught his disciples to pray and enforced his teaching by a parable "to this end that men ought always to pray" (Luke 18 1), and warned them in the Sermon on the Mount against mechanical prayer.

Christ's teaching by parables—interesting in itself as perhaps a unique example of this form of teaching—gives us a most instructive insight into his habit of mind. Their significance is that they show how Christ saw everywhere in the material world types of the spiritual. To interpret the parables as allegories is to misunderstand them. The parable of the Sower has often lost its power, because like an allegory its meaning was supposed to hinge on a translation of each detail, each kind of soil, each feature of the process, into its meaning. Rather, it brings before us a law of the natural world by which Christ would make us understand the analogous process in the spiritual world. And so with the other parables: they show that Christ's mind dwelt in the region of spiritual truths, that to him the things that are seen were but the types of the things that are not seen. All that he saw on earth pointed to heaven. In the ways of men and of things he saw a visible embodiment of what obtained in the other world, invisible but to him most real.

Christ began his ministry with the announcement that the kingdom of God was at hand (Mark 1 15) and to establish the kingdom of God was the great object of his endeavor. It represented, if we may say so, our Lord's philosophy of history. We moderns have heard much of the "onward march of civilization"; "social progress" is on every tongue; "evolution" is a commonplace of our talk. All these represent modern ways of thinking. Christ too had his views of society, his notions of progress. They differed from those of our professors of sociology chiefly in that they were religious. The kingdom of God takes its beginning on earth, its consummation is in heaven. God is the directive power in this conception of society, and the moving forces in its realization are spiritual.

Finally, we may consider one more fact in Christ's mental life. There is one passage in our gospels which opens to our view an insight into our Lord's mental attitude towards the beauties of nature. The reference of course is to Matt. 6 28: "Consider the lilies of the field how they grow; they toil not, neither do they spin: and yet I say unto you, that even Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these." As the passage is unique of its kind, it is worth while to observe that it occurs in substantially the same form in St. Luke (12 27) and therefore must have been derived from the source underlying St. Matthew and St. Luke and shares whatever authority attaches to this document.

Christ claims for the common wayside flower—our daisy or dandelion—a beauty which casts the greatest earthly glory in the shade. Such an appreciation of beauty is rare. It requires the high soul of a Wordsworth to open modern eyes to the beauty of every-day things; surely here is where the poet learned his lesson.

We have in our own time opened once more the book of nature and we are learning to know nature's beauty. In the literature that has grown up around this topic there is no more deeply cut dividing line than that which marks off the mere physical from the spiritual appreciation of beauty. There is a world's remove between those souls who rejoice only in the richness of coloring and the perfection of outline and those in whose eyes color and form are the mysterious adumbrations of that which is beyond the veil. Where did Christ stand? The next verse tells: "*If God so clothe the grass of the field, which today is, and tomorrow is cast into the oven, shall he not much more clothe you, O ye of little faith?*" From the lily his mind rose to the creator of the lily, earth's beauty pointed him to heaven. f

In searching the records for that which was uppermost in the mind of Christ, we have, except in the last instance, disregarded the question of authority for each separate quotation. This is in accordance with the principle which we laid down. Not one of the sayings of Christ comes to us with the seal of surety, each stands under question as to its authenticity. But there can hardly be a doubt, when so many indications point to the same conclusion, when such a multitude of references, so many lines of in-

quiry, lead to the same result, that the features of Christ's mental life are and remain fixed and determined.

We have seen the many-sided testimony to the spiritual in Christ's mind and intention, against which can be set, as arguing a purely moral Christ, only a few ethical aphorisms, some of the beatitudes, the golden rule, and a few other sentences. It is impossible to account for such a consensus of testimony to the predominantly spiritual character of Christ's views and his habits of thought, unless behind the testimony lies the fact. For that Christ's words and acts should have been so laboriously falsified with the intent of making him out different from what he was, or that a picture so harmonious in its details should have been the result of fortuitous accretions,—either of these theories is for sober historical research simply out of the question.

Is it possible—we now ask—to express this spiritual element in Christ's revelation in a single phrase? In answer to this question we venture to suggest that *the spirituality of life* expresses that for which Christ stood, both in his teaching and by every other manifestation of his mind.

Mankind has found in Christ the hope and promise of a future life. He has "brought life and immortality to light." But we recognize that Christ's attitude towards the question of immortality is very different from that which we moderns occupy. Christ did not make the distinction between the present and the future life as we do. Our notions of "another life" were alien to him, and when he was asked a question about the "resurrection" such as we might ask him, his answer shows that he was not at home in that way of thinking: "As touching the resurrection of the dead, have ye not read that which was spoken unto you by God, saying, I am the God of Abraham and the God of Isaac and the God of Jacob? God is not the God of the dead, but of the living" (Matt. 22 31 f.).

The difference is that our views are secular, Christ's were spiritual. To us the physical universe, what we call the hard facts of life, are the substantial realities; to Christ the deeper realities were the life of the soul, the groping for the higher, the desire for divine fellowship, all that part of human nature which testifies to a something more substantial, more abiding, than

what we know with our senses. It is this spiritual appreciation of life, with its endless outlook, an appreciation which carries with it the full acknowledgment of moral obligation, but which lifts morality into the higher sphere, where it is obedience: herein we find what is distinctive in Christ's attitude towards human nature, and such we believe is in the main the impression of Christ which the world's best instincts have accepted.

We pass on to inquire whether to this picture which the gospels draw of Christ there is a correspondence in the belief of the first Christians. Do they agree with Christ? Is the Christian conception of human life in the New Testament outside the gospels the same as that recorded of Christ?

There could hardly be a perfect agreement. If we remember how the light of religious truth is always broken by the prism of individual minds, how the quality of faith varies with personal characteristics, with the disposition, with the needs of the individual soul, we shall realize how impossible it is to expect an exact agreement between the conceptions of Christ and the conceptions of the first Christians. But when we have recorded the variations, we shall see whether essentially the same estimate of life does not underlie the other conceptions and that of Christ alike.

The first History of the Church gives us little help in defining the Christianity of the first generation. We have already seen that the Acts of the Apostles, in the early chapters, before the author turns to the history of St. Paul, records the announcement of the resurrection as the burden of the apostolic message. This was the one overwhelmingly important fact to those who had just become aware of it, and it was natural that it should fill their minds and leave little room for reflection as to its meaning. Christ had risen: that one great fact was the first to be proclaimed to the world and it wins our confidence in the Acts that it tells the story just as we should expect it to have happened.

We turn to St. Paul. We have already spoken of the theory which isolated St. Paul and made him antagonistic to the original Christian faith. This theory represents an aberration of modern criticism. A good deal of the apostle's reasoning is doubtless peculiar to himself. It is also true that St. Paul had his enemies

while he lived, that he was bitterly assailed in a later generation, and that the Church at large perhaps never rose to his high level. Yet in the spirituality of his teaching he stands by no means isolated, and we may certainly take him as one of the representatives of the Christianity of the first church.

In St. Paul we have to separate between the reflective theological reasoning and the record of his personal intimate spiritual experience. St. Paul's theology has been an important factor in the history of Christian thought. But it is not so much through his theological reflections as by his spiritual experience that he has so profoundly influenced the spiritual history of the world, and it is in these spiritual experiences, not in the reasoned deductions from them, that we shall find what Christianity was to St. Paul.

For our purposes therefore we must consider such passages as these:

Rom. 8 35 ff.: Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? shall tribulation or distress or persecution or famine, or nakedness or peril or sword? . . . Nay, in all these things we are more than conquerors.

1 Cor. 15 57 f.: Thanks be to God, which giveth us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ. Therefore, my beloved brethren, be ye steadfast.

2 Cor. 5 17: If any man be in Christ, he is a new creature: old things are passed away; behold, all things are become new.

Gal. 5 1: Stand fast in the liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free" [if this is the correct translation].

Phil. 3 8, 13 f.: I count all things but loss for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus my Lord. . . . This one thing I do, forgetting those things which are behind, and reaching forth unto those things which are before, I press towards the mark for the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus.

1 Tim. 1 15: This is a faithful saying and worthy of all acceptance, that Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners.

If we compare St. Paul's spiritual attitude, as these and other like quotations bring it before us, with that of our Lord, we shall see that the two are not altogether homogeneous. Between the mind of Christ and the mind of St. Paul there is a great difference. Two new factors enter and differentiate St. Paul from Christ. The first is his personal relation to Christ. The

fact that he had found a saviour in Christ, that Christ had become to him the heaven-sent means to a new life, filled his soul. The second factor in St. Paul's religion was the consciousness of deliverance from the weight of sin, the sense of Christian liberty.

And yet, underneath these individual variations, the groundwork of St. Paul's conception, that which was deepest and underlay all else in his soul, was the same as that which was in Christ's mind. There is everywhere the same pervading sense of the spirituality of life. He had found the new life, the life of the spirit. The consciousness of a heaven, which had lain smothered under the killing weight of the Pharisaic system, leapt into flame at the touch of Christ. Like his master he found his home in the larger world, in which death is but an episode and in which the law is a loving obedience. He was "a new creature in Christ," his "conversation was in heaven," he "walked not after the flesh but after the spirit," he walked in "newness of life," and served in "newness of spirit," the "high calling of God in Christ Jesus" beckoned him, the law of the spirit of life in Christ had made him "free from the law of sin and death," he knew "the glorious liberty of the children of God."

We have made no difference between the traditional thirteen epistles. They all share essentially the same spiritual conceptions, and if some are from other hands, there is added so much more testimony to the spirituality of early Christianity.

The writings of St. Paul have had a striking history. That, with all the opposition to him and the lack of appreciation, so many of his writings should have found their place in the canon, to be a perpetual witness to the true nature of Christianity, is surely a mark of providential guidance. And his influence throughout the centuries at the turning-points of Church history is most impressive. We learn how it was the recurrence to the religious principles of St. Paul that caused the better mind of the Church to return once and again from a Christian legalism to the spiritual appreciation of Christianity. For it was the deep spirituality of St. Paul, together with his proclamation of freedom in the spirit, that became the mainspring of religious reformations.

If, in the present uncertainty of the question, we may not accept the Fourth Gospel as a source for the study of Christ's life, yet the writings which go under the name of St. John serve as embodying a conception of Christianity current at the close of the first century. For our purpose we include the Apocalypse, with this reservation that, if it is by another pen, its spiritual view of the Christian life throws another weight into the scales in behalf of our contention.

As with St. Paul, so with St. John: we see at once that a certain factor enters in and colors his conceptions. For, although we may not hastily subscribe to the ready assumptions of many critics of the Fourth Gospel, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that some of the recorded words bear witness to the influence of Hellenic thought.

With other differences between St. John and the Synoptic Gospels, differences in the mode of presentation and the light thrown upon Jesus, we have here no concern. What we have to deal with is his conception of the Christian life, modified as it is through the influence of Hellenic ways of thinking. But if we abstract this alien ingredient, if we allow for the emphasis placed upon truth and knowledge, we find in the Johannine writings an intensified insistence upon the spirituality of life.

In the Synoptic Gospels the governing tendency of Christ's mind is betrayed by many unconscious indications. In St. John's writings the spirituality of the present life is expressed in direct and decided language: "This is eternal life that they might know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent" (17 s); "He that heareth my word and believeth on him that sent me hath everlasting life, and shall not come into condemnation; but is passed from death unto life. . . . The hour is coming, and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God: and they that hear shall live" (5 24 f.); "I am the resurrection and the life; he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live: and whosoever liveth and believeth in me shall never die" (11 25 f.); "We know that we have passed from death unto life because we love the brethren" (I 3 14); "He that hath the Son hath life" (I 5 12); "I will give unto him that is athirst of the fountain of the water of life freely" (Rev.

21 6); "Whosoever will, let him take the water of life freely" (21 17).

Neither here nor in St. Paul does the spiritual exclude the moral, but both in St. Paul and in St. John the controlling conception of the Christian life is spiritual, and the spirituality of St. John is only more emphatically expressed than that of Christ according to the Synoptic Gospels.

We next take up the First Epistle of St. Peter. The freshness and spontaneity of this writing are most naturally explained by assuming the correctness of the tradition which ascribes it to the apostle. If the difficulties which it presents forbid this conclusion, it must have come from one who stood very close to the original source of the Christian revelation. As all other writings, so this epistle reflects the conditions of the times. Persecutions turned the eyes of the suffering Christians to the future rewards, when the trial of their faith "might be found unto praise and honor and glory at the appearing of Jesus Christ" (1 7). There are moral exhortations, advice to servants, wives, and husbands, and admonitions to the elders. But throughout there runs the same ground-tone, the joyful recognition of the new life in Christ. They were elect "in sanctification of the spirit, unto obedience and sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ" (1 2); they were "born again" (1 23), were "built up a spiritual house" (2 5). Morality, as in the gospels, is obedience to God; they were to live, not "in the flesh to the lusts of men, but to the will of God" (4 2).

The Epistle of St. James stands by itself. As has already been indicated, its preponderating interest is moral, the spiritual is secondary.

It is not necessary to dwell upon Second Peter and Jude. They doubtless belong to a later time, and their polemic shows an advanced tendency, perhaps justified in all but its bitterness, away from the early simplicity towards a desire for orthodoxy. Otherwise their tone is not alien to the atmosphere of spirituality of the other writings.

In the Epistle to the Hebrews, finally, we meet with another very marked tendency of the early times, which somewhat later found a leading exponent in the Epistle of Barnabas, the ten-

dency which looked upon the new religion as the perfection of the old, which dwelt upon prophecies and types and their fulfilment. But apart from this the Epistle to the Hebrews presents the same spiritual Christianity. Christ delivers "them who through fear of death were all their lifetime subject to bondage" (2 15); he "became the author of salvation" (5 9); Christians are "partakers of the heavenly calling," "partakers of Christ" (3 1, 14), are bidden to "come boldly unto the throne of grace" (4 16); they "have tasted of the heavenly gift" and "the powers of the world to come" (6 4, 5); Christ has "obtained eternal redemption for us" (9 12), and we have "boldness to enter into the holy place by the blood of Jesus" (10 19).

We need not go beyond the limits of the New Testament in our present examination; the canonical books are sufficient to make known to us what were the motive forces of the new religion. We have learned that each writing shows a personal factor, but that underlying this personal element there is, with one possible exception, the common recognition of the spirituality of life, and that in this they are in agreement with what we found to be the mind of Christ.

This conclusion—as must be evident to all unbiassed minds—but confirms the estimate in which the sober sense of men has commonly held the New Testament, especially in these modern times since it has become an open book. It has not stood for a code of morality, but it has stood for a life of "otherworldliness" (to use a newly coined, expressive word). What we found to be the deeper realities in the mind of Christ, the human aspirations for the heavenly ideal, are the realities which the New Testament as a whole has impressed upon the world. In this volume the best minds of the Christian generations have found the seal of approval upon their higher instincts; it has led men to know themselves as moral beings,—yes, but as much more, as beings accountable to God, as owners of a dignity with which the earth is not commensurate. The New Testament has brought to the sons of men the consciousness that they are the heirs of a larger inheritance, that they may lay claim to it now, that, while the physical part of man passes away, the spiritual lives forever, and it has ever called men to a life worthy of man's high destiny.

The early church did not maintain the spiritual level of the New Testament. A difference in tone soon begins to pervade the Christian literature. St. James had his successors, who placed more and more emphasis upon the moral. A process of deterioration began. There came to be a separation of two things which belong together. The spiritual was removed to the future and was recognized only as the promise of coming glory. The spirituality of the present was lost sight of. This life came to be conceived solely as under the moral law, though that moral law was still thought of as the will of God.

There began the fatal disruption of the Christian life: the ethical command on the one hand, and on the other the sanction of promised rewards and punishments, while the irrepressible spiritual nature turned to superstition to indemnify itself. For many centuries the Christian life was, for the masses of people, confined within the categories of command and retribution, and as a result the Christian religion has been charged with teaching a morality dependent upon future rewards and punishments. The injurious effects of this tendency have been felt even to our own time, and it has helped to obscure Christian spirituality.

Today new motives have come into play, and the chief cause of the moral interpretation of Christianity in our own time has been humanitarian zeal, desire for the improvement of man's condition, and for the healing of the terrible sores which afflict human society. It is a fine enthusiasm, but its one-sided ardor has narrowed its vision and has led it into serious misapprehensions. Its mistake is twofold. It fails to see that humanity presents deeper and more permanent questions to be solved than those of social improvement—what were the saving social truths to those who suffered in the Messina catastrophe?—and that Christianity is what it is today because it responds to the ultimate questions of life.

Moreover, it fails to grasp the fact that there can be no lasting and effective moral enthusiasm which has not its mainspring in the life of the spirit, the life which is at home in the higher realities. The history of the Christian centuries may be scanned from beginning to end, and no great moral reformation will be

discovered which was not based upon a religious revival, and it is idle to look for such in the future. What our human problems call for above all else is strength of character, and there can be no lasting strength of character which does not know repentance, forgiveness, and faith.

We shall quote the opinion of one whose comprehensive mind and large historic sympathy, added to the keenest critical insight, have given him a unique position in our generation. In his chapter on St. Augustine Professor Harnack says: "It is true that since the days of Leibnitz and the Illumination there has arisen a mighty opponent [to the religious conceptions of St. Augustine], an enemy who seemed for a century to have gained the upper hand, which reduced the Christian religion, so far as it allowed the latter any validity, to energetic action, and assigned to it the part of a joyous optimism, a mode of thinking which removed the living God to a distance and subordinated the religious to the ethical—but in our century this foe yielded, at least within the churches, to the power of the old conception" (*Dogmengeschichte*, iii, p. 66).

This paper has been written to prove that the conception of Christianity of which Harnack here speaks, and which he holds to be fatal to the highest interests of humanity, is contradictory of the religion of Christ and the apostles.

The question with which we have dealt ought to find its definite settlement in thoughtful and candid minds. It is aside from the problem of Christ's person and authority. That question will always receive different answers, because it involves the balancing of spiritual values which are beyond the reach of logical appeal.

But our problem is a purely historical and wholly intellectual one, and therefore it admits of a final conclusion. We submit that for the student of the early literature there is only one answer possible to the question which heads this article.

THEORIES AND BELIEFS

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In an essay entitled "The Scepticism of Believers," Leslie Stephen remarks a common confusion between *unbelief* and *contrary* belief. The term "belief" is at any historical moment almost invariably used to denote the established belief, that is, the belief supported by authority or by the consensus of opinion; while the term "unbelief" is used to denote dissent from the established belief, even when, as is most often the case, this dissent is itself due to belief. The established belief resists change, and must be attacked, weakened, or destroyed, before it is possible for another belief to get a hearing; hence assenters come to regard dissenters as destructive in their primary intent, and are blinded to the fact that there is another belief at stake, which may be as affirmative and constructive in its own terms as that which prevails. Thus modern religious orthodoxy has condemned as unbelief a certain secular tendency, which really has arisen, not from a love of mischief-making, but from a most devoted confidence in the uniformity of nature, and in the power of man to save himself. It is not wholly unjust to assert, as Leslie Stephen does assert, that, in opposing the free advance of science and of individualism, defenders of "the Faith" have virtually sought to prevent or destroy that faith in the enterprise of civilization which has mainly inspired the progress of the last two centuries.

But for our present purposes the significance of this lies not in the issue between warring beliefs, both of which are positive and confident, but in the issue between belief, which puts heart into men, and that state of suspended animation, of hesitation and general impotence, which is properly to be regarded as unbelief. "The man has most faith, in the sense in which faith represents a real force," says our author, "whose convictions are

such as are most favorable to energetic action, and is freest from the doubts which paralyze the will in the great moments of life. He must have a clear vision of an end to be achieved, devotion to which may be the ruling passion of his life and the focus to which all his energies may converge."¹

In the present discussion, I use the phrase "established belief" to denote faith in this sense of *conviction favorable to action*; and it is my purpose to show that the opposite state of mind, unbelief, or the lack of convictions favorable to action, may be induced by *theory*. To avoid even a momentary misunderstanding, let me say at once that belief and theory are inseparable. Theory must necessarily have to do with the environment, and therefore cannot fail to be of practical significance. Theory is the ultimate source not only of knowledge, but of practical enlightenment and skill as well. Similarly, every belief is virtually a theoretical assertion, liable to correction or confirmation by science. Nevertheless, the difference between theory and belief is not only real, but of the greatest human importance. Before theory can become belief it must be assimilated to a plan of life; it must be not only asserted, but also adopted. And when belief becomes theory, it means that an integral component of some man's plan of life is withdrawn; making it necessary that his hand should be stayed, and the plan suspended, if not permanently abandoned. Without a recognition of this radical difference between theory and belief, unless it be understood that as moods, states of mind, or moments of life, they are almost antithetical, one must remain blind to the real tragedy of heresy and doubt.

The virtue of belief lies in the application. Knowledge does not become belief until it is presupposed for the purposes of action. This holds equally of the most elementary common sense, of technical skill, and of religious piety. Common sense consists of the manifold things that can be *taken for granted* for the purposes of everyday life. Common sense must be true to be useful; but it would still not be useful unless it were habitually and implicitly trusted. Technical skill is derived from science; but until scientific principles are sufficiently well established to be relied on, they cannot be applied. And piety, if it

¹ Leslie Stephen, *An Agnostic's Apology*, p. 50.

be not constant, if a life be not founded on it, is not that good thing which is called religion. He who makes plans for the morrow, or constructs a bridge, or prays to God, *believes*. There is, then, a *specific value in belief* over and above the value of truth which it must have in common with knowledge. This value is that confidence and steadiness, without which no consecutive endeavor is possible. And since this is the case, it follows that there is a legitimate and powerful incentive to belief, which may be distinguished from the love of truth. So that they are not wholly unreasonable who resent being robbed of their belief, or, seeking to have it restored, pray God to help their unbelief.

Now it is clear that theory can no more take the place of belief than a stone can take the place of bread. Theory does not directly nourish and sustain life, as belief does; because, unlike belief, it does not suit the humor of action. To theorize is to doubt. The investigator must be both incredulous and credulous, believing nothing, and prepared to believe anything. While he remains theoretically-minded, he remains open-minded, receptive to evidence, committing himself to assertions only tentatively or provisionally. He may be preparing foundations, but he cannot let them stand, and hence is not free to build on them. Furthermore, for the very reason that the theorist is not expected to put his theories into practice, he enjoys a certain irresponsibility. To him is allotted the task of examining a question on its merits, without reference to ulterior motives. He is permitted a certain play of conjecture, a certain oscillation of mind between hypothetical alternatives, that is fatal to administrative competence. Nor is the theoretical mind held to those standards of proportionateness which obtain in life. The scientist is not uncommonly likened to Professor James's "myopic ant," who tumbles into every microscopic crack and fissure, and never suspects that a centre exists. But fatal as such procedure would be to the proper conduct of life, it is neither unworthy nor unfruitful as an incident of theoretical analysis. Chesterton has remarked that "a man does not go mad because he builds a statue a mile high, but he may go mad by thinking it out in square inches."² In the latter case, judged by the standards of

² Chesterton, *Orthodoxy*, p. 67.

social efficiency, the man *is* mad; but his madness is explained, or adjudged not madness after all, when it is recognized that his interest is theoretical. And a similar allowance is made for a certain difference of pace in life and in theory. There is a maxim to the effect that "he that will believe only what he can fully comprehend, must have a very long head or a very short creed." In other words, when theoretically-minded, one proceeds as though life permitted of being invariably guided by good and manifest reasons; whereas practically, if one were to adopt such a principle, one would never reach the first milestone. Intelligent living proceeds not by doubting, examining, experimenting, and proving, but by assuming. There is an urgency and brevity about life that makes it impossible that one should give the rein to one's critical powers or weigh every affirmation in the delicate balance of logic.

I hope it is clear that I am not attempting to divide men into believers and theorists. I am distinguishing not between classes of men, but between characteristic moods or states of mind. The difference, however, is not so much psychological as it is moral. There is a different motive in theory and in belief, a different human good. Hence it follows that these moods may confront one another dramatically both in individual life and in the history of society. There is a party of theory and a party of belief, with a loyalty to each. It happens that in our own time there is more need of emphasizing the motive of belief. We live in a rationalistic age, many of us in a rationalistic fellowship or community, and incline to the party of theory. It is the mark of such partisanship to suppose that advocates of established belief are moved to suspect or resist innovation only by stubbornness or inertia. On the contrary, conservatism is not less passionate than radicalism, nor less moved by the love of good. For the advocate of established belief is the advocate of established life; of that present adjustment of interests which is daily tested and proved, and to which the great majority of men are wholly and irrevocably committed. It is less enlightened to despise him as the enemy of truth than to pay him some respect as the friend of peace and order.

Belief is a psychological and moral necessity, more indispen-

sable to life than hunger or sympathy. But we shall not understand the strength of this motive or the part which it plays in the vital economy until we recognize its *corporate* character. An established belief possesses a value proportional to the number of interests invested in it. And this solidarity of belief manifests itself on every scale, individual, social, and historical. It has been said that every man of action is a fatalist. This is due to the need of a permanence of belief, if the several acts of an individual life are to contribute to one end. A plan of action, in proportion to its scope, requires time and manifold agencies for its execution, and must be adhered to from moment to moment and from act to act. But every plan of action is based on innumerable assumptions concerning the natural and social environment; and if these assumptions be questioned, the plan is virtually suspended. Action is efficient in proportion to its range, and the greater its range the more necessary is it that its components should be rigid and stable. Assumptions must be trusted implicitly, in order that one may be free to leave them behind one's back and face the work to be done.

The larger the enterprise, the greater the need of a fixed orientation, of a view that shall not dissolve until a thousand tributary agencies have been assembled, coördinated, and made jointly and cumulatively to achieve the designated end. It follows that a steadiness of belief is more indispensable to social than to individual action. Every variety of coöperation requires that men shall occupy common ground. The best partners, like the best friends, are those who can take the most for granted. That which is true of every lesser social enterprise is supremely true of politics and religion. The arm of society is the institution, and this owes its power to a wide-spread community of belief. The institution is the most delicate and complicated mechanism of life, constructed out of the purposes and convictions of innumerable individuals. And this mechanism cannot remain intact, and be the instrument that it is designed to be, unless the parts be firm and durable. In short, society could not act, for the maintenance of order or the promotion of civilization, if men's ideas were fluent and transitory. This does not mean merely that social action would be hampered, but that any

political or organized community whatsoever would be impossible. Unbelief is equally fatal to the full benefit of religion. That benefit is realized only when a firm conviction concerning the ultimate source of human fortune, or the supreme object of devotion, dominates and unifies all the varied activities of life. This benefit is never fully attained; but so far as it has been attained, it has given to civilization something of the sweetness and vigor of health. When science and art, common sense and mystical ecstasy, the outer manner and the inner propensity, in all men different and yet in all alike, do but embroider and enact one theme, the circle is closed and the strength of man made perfect. And such unanimity of imagination and enthusiasm, quickening and ennobling the concert of action, must rest on unseen but deep-laid foundations of common belief.

There remains one further proof of the solidarity of belief. If society is to act effectively, it must remain in agreement with itself not only breadthwise but also lengthwise. The temporal continuity of civilization is the indispensable condition of progress. When fundamental convictions are altered, it is much like moving to a new planet; the work must be begun all over again. Apparently the conquests of civilization are gained by swift and sudden victories. But revolution is only the beginning of reformation. It is the slow process of reorganization and education that saves the fruits of such victories, and constitutes that steady if almost imperceptible advance on which the hope of civilization must mainly rely. In order that this shall be possible, it is necessary that beliefs should be transmitted together with problems and opportunities. Unless the burden is to fall, the young must not only grasp what the old have let go, but they must obtain the same foothold.

There are, then, *systems of belief* which condition effective, concerted, and progressive living. Such systems, it may be further remarked, have their more and their less vital parts. There are some beliefs which, like the keystone of the arch or the base of the pyramid, cannot be dislodged without overthrowing the whole structure. If there be a good in all belief, that good will be greater in such beliefs; and if there be a motive which rallies men to the support of any belief, men will be moved

most passionately when such beliefs are at stake. For these are the beliefs most built upon, to which men are most committed, and in which they have invested all their possessions. When they are shaken, it is like the trembling of the solid earth.

Unless, in spite of all prepossessions to the contrary, in spite of a justifiable impatience with every obstacle to progress, we can see a certain rightness and sound loyalty in conservatism, we shall remain blind to the meaning of the great transitional eras. Thus we are swift to condemn the Inquisition of the seventeenth century, and the compromises of Galileo and Descartes. The catholic orthodoxy of the time has been proved wrong, cruelly and fatuously wrong; and Galileo and Descartes lost an opportunity of displaying the heroism of Bruno and Spinoza. But a powerful motive of the drama will have been reduced to a nullity, if it be supposed that the Holy Office was prompted only by malice, or Galileo and Descartes by cowardice.

Galileo, it will be remembered, was convicted of holding that the earth moved. This doctrine was declared to be "absurd, heretical, contrary to the text of Scripture"; and Galileo was compelled to repudiate it. He defended himself on the ground that Scripture was not science. "Hence it appears," he said, "that when we have to do with natural effects brought under our eyes by the experience of our senses, or deduced from absolute demonstrations, these can in no wise be called in question on the strength of Scripture texts that are susceptible of a thousand different interpretations, for the words of Scripture are not so strictly limited in their significance as the phenomena of nature."³ But this defence left out of consideration what was referred to in the charge as the "absurdity" and "heretical" character of the new theory. It was not its contradiction of Scripture texts that made it dangerous, but its contradiction of the prevailing belief. This was definitely committed to the immobility of the earth, and in concluding that the Copernican theory, advocated by Galileo, was a menace to it, the Holy Office was not mistaken.

But why should the immobility of the earth be a cherished belief, to be protected by the penalty of death? Men are not

³ Quoted in Mézières, "Trial of Galileo," *Popular Science Monthly*, vol. x, p. 389.

soberly burned at the stake, or submitted to torment by due process of law, out of sheer bloodthirstiness, or on account of trivial offences. It must all appear childish and wanton unless we can learn to recognize the immense human importance which once attached to what is now regarded only as an obsolete astronomy. For it was not merely that men wondered how, if the sun did not move, Joshua could have commanded it to stand still; the Copernican theory contradicted the entire practical orientation that dominated the imagination and justified the plans of Christendom. Never in the history of European civilization has common sense been so comprehensive and so highly unified as it was in Galileo's day. That synopsis of heaven and earth which was the theme of Dante's *Divine Comedy*, and the fundamental thesis of St. Thomas's *Summa Theologiae*, was not an esoteric truth, but an illumination shared by common men, and revealing to them the objects of their daily hopes and fears. The earth was the centre of a compact and finite created world. It was prepared by the hand of God for man's habitation, and surrounded by sun, moon, and stars for his convenience and delight. God himself dwelt at the periphery of the system, where he could observe and regulate the human drama enacted at the centre. Man's fall and redemption were the very theme of nature, the key to its interpretation; and the earth as the scene of these transactions was its true centre. Now let it be remembered that this image of nature was vividly present to the common mind, portrayed in every form of art, repeatedly implied in the postures of religious observance, and daily represented in common speech and gesture. And let it be remembered furthermore, that this was an age in which secular and religious beliefs were not sharply divorced; when what men believed in particular was subordinated to what they believed on the whole, and when, in spite of a growing worldliness, men could never wholly forget the saving of their souls. Is it any wonder, then, that men were shocked when they heard it said that the earth moved, that it was only the loose swinging satellite of a sun that was but one of many suns? When the Christian imagination has never in the centuries that have followed been able entirely to adapt itself to a decentralized and infinite cosmos, with its

limitless plurality of worlds, is it any wonder that a Christian of the early seventeenth century should have been unable to face such a hypothesis? For a dozen centuries Europeans had been growing accustomed to the world of the Biblical and Ptolemaic imagination; this was for all practical purposes now *their* world, in which they had built their home and laid their plans, and which was endeared to them by every tradition and association. Surely, whatever the Inquisition may have been guilty of, it was not tyranny; for it was the instrument with which this age thought to protect itself and every good thing which it owned.

When I bring myself to feel the force of these considerations, I am convinced that the tragedy of Galileo is not so simple as is sometimes supposed. Neither he nor his accusers could have enjoyed an undivided mind. As they were not the wicked enemies of truth, so he was not a reckless iconoclast forced to keep silence from fear of physical torture. For both must have felt the conflict between loyalty to the existing order and assent to theoretical truth. The difference lay rather in the relative strength of the two motives. The officers of the church were in a position of responsibility; Galileo, in the quiet and isolation of the Belvedere, could free his mind from the thought of social consequences, while dealing with "natural effects brought under our eyes by the experience of our senses."

After his first trial Galileo attempted to avoid the charge of disturbing the common belief by publishing his astronomical studies in the form of *Dialogues on the Two Great Systems of the Universe*. In these dialogues the merits of both systems are argued, with the result that, while the advocate of the traditional system is the nominal victor, the evidence for the Copernican system is actually more convincing to any one qualified to judge. This was undoubtedly an attempt to satisfy the general public by proclaiming in a loud voice, "The earth does not move," while at the same time whispering to his fellow-augurs, "but *we* know that it really does move." Galileo was by no means incapable of such a stroke, and it was their resentment at what they regarded as a bold trick that inspired Galileo's accusers with the bitterness which they manifested at his second trial.

But taken in the light of the real conflict of motives which Galileo must have felt, and in the light of the policy pursued by other men by no means so witty and adroit as he, may we not believe that these dialogues were in part conceived as a serious attempt to reconcile theory and belief? Galileo was not a revolutionist, but he was jealous of his scientific reputation. He wished to be true to the standards of exact research and at the same time avoid disturbing the public peace. And so he proposed to regard his scientific conclusions as "hypothetical," meaning that they were abstracted from belief. He thought that science might be permitted to go its own way, and freely entertain any idea that might recommend itself on purely theoretical grounds, provided that society could be protected from the premature attempt to put such ideas into practice. Society believes, the scientist affirms; they do so on different grounds, and with different values at stake. It would be wise, then, to separate the theoretical and believing processes. They cannot, it is true, be absolutely separated, nor would that be desirable even if it were possible; but they can be regarded as different functions of society and prevented from directly interfering with one another.

If I am mistaken in attributing such reflections as these to Galileo, there can at least be no doubt in the case of Descartes. The news of Galileo's conviction in 1633 reached Descartes just as he was in the act of publishing his *De Mundo*, in which he maintained the doctrine of the motion of the earth. Although, as Descartes himself afterwards affirmed, this doctrine was essential to his whole philosophy of nature, he at once abandoned the project. And when he returned to the topic in his *Principles of Philosophy* he had found a way to reconcile his theory with the accepted belief. He defined motion as "the transporting of one part of matter or of one body from the vicinity of those bodies that are in immediate contact with it, or which we regard as at rest, to the vicinity of other bodies."⁴ Now, according to the Cartesian theory of planetary motion, the planet is embedded in a fluid which sweeps vortex-fashion round the sun. It follows that, while the vortex does move, the planet, in this

⁴ Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy*, trans. by Veitch, p. 245.

case the earth, does not move, since it remains fixed in relation to the matter immediately adjacent to it.

Now why should Descartes attach importance to what we do not hesitate to call a quibble? Is it merely a proof of timidity and disingenuousness? Descartes was not, it is true, of the stuff of which martyrs are made; but he was nevertheless a man of more than average courage, and of eminent intellectual honesty. The explanation lies elsewhere. He did not pander to his age for purposes of private advantage; but he did sympathize with his age, and he did desire practically to identify himself with it. The motion of the earth meant to his age much what the abandonment of the institution of marriage or of the principles of democracy would mean to ours; it was a symbol of failure and of return to chaos. That Descartes was profoundly concerned at the conflict between theory and belief, between that intellectual freedom which was the condition of truth and that uniformity of sentiment which was the condition of social stability, is proved beyond doubt by the most personal of his writings, the famous *Discourse on Method*. There he concludes that just as when we propose to rebuild the house in which we live, we must nevertheless occupy some quarters while the work is going on, so it is necessary to believe practically, even when the theoretical judgment is suspended. Descartes proposes, therefore, to regulate his practice conformably to the opinions of those with whom he has to live. And since neither society nor the individual can make progress if they are forever examining the ground at their feet, he proposes for practical purposes to adhere steadfastly even to doubtful opinions once they are adopted; "imitating in this the example of travellers who, when they have lost their way in a forest, ought not to wander from side to side, far less remain in one place, but proceed constantly towards the same side in as straight a line as possible, . . . for in this way, if they do not exactly reach the point they desire, they will come at least in the end to some place that will probably be preferable to the middle of a forest."⁵

Galileo and Descartes were divided against themselves through feeling the weight of two great human motives, rationalism and

⁵ Descartes, *Discourse on Method*, trans. by Veitch, p. 25.

conservatism. Bruno, Campanella, Ramus, and Vanini, having identified themselves more uncompromisingly with the first of these motives, antagonized the second and were overwhelmed by it. The history of these six men testifies, not to the cruelty and duplicity of human nature, but to the almost unconquerable resistance of an idea which society has built into its foundations.

If established belief be an instance of conservatism, of that loyalty to a dominant system that springs from a large investment of interest, it follows that the right and necessity of a revolution of opinion is comparable to the right and necessity of political revolution. It cannot be denied, it is an indispensable condition of progress, but it is not lightly to be assumed. Revolution is always a doubtful expedient; and the justification of it comes only with the lapse of time. Some revolutionists, like Socrates, Bruno, and Rousseau, are the heroes of mankind, others are its petty mischief-makers.

It may be thought that established belief, like the ruling polity, is capable of taking care of itself. Without doubt there is a heavy inertia in belief, that saves it from being too easily overthrown. Not only are new ideas distrusted by those whose enterprises they threaten to discredit; but they have difficulty even in gaining access to the mind. They must always meet and overcome the charge of "absurdity" that bespeaks the settled habits of common sense. The author of the *Religio Medici* shows a charming indifference to the absurdities of his day. They are so remote from common sense that they may be tolerated without fear of any consequences for life. "Some," he says, "have held that Snow is black, that the earth moves, that the Soul is air, fire, water; but all this is Philosophy, and there is no delirium." In his *Hearts of Men*, Fielding tells us that "all men who have lived to a certain age have learnt that there are certain facts, certain experiences not at all connected with the supernatural, which they dare not tell of for fear of being put down as inventors. . . . Just as the old woman was ready to accept her travelled son's yarns of rivers of milk and islands of cheese; but when he deviated into the truth she stopped. 'Na, na!' she said, 'that the anchor fetched up one of Pharaoh's char-

iot wheels out of the Red Sea, I can believe; but that fish fly! Na, na! dinna come any o' your lies over yer mither.'"⁶

But it is worthy of remark that common sense is not to be conjured with as it once was. We have grown first accustomed to absurdities, and then fond of them. I am not sure that in our day the burden of proof does not lie with the familiar fact. We expect to be surprised, and are suspicious of a theory that lacks novelty. This has doubtless always been the case with *les intellectuels*, but it is fast becoming a general state of mind. Many reasons may be offered for the change. First of all, it is due to the high conductivity of modern society. The state of one individual mind is transmitted with incredible rapidity to the entire community. The doubts, conjectures, and conclusions of theorists are promptly communicated to the public, which straightway itself strikes a theoretical attitude. Again, the general triumph of democratic principles has made a difference here. Intellectual exclusiveness does not suit the temper of liberal societies. It must be share and share alike with knowledge as with other commodities. The best is none too good for every man; hence there can be no living on the paternalistic bounty of a class of wise men. It was once thought that if the eyes of a few were opened, they might lead the rest; but now none consent to remain blind. And, finally, the humanitarian and utilitarian sentiment requires that all knowledge shall promptly be put to use. In order that men may be saved by it, or the conditions of life bettered, or mankind be brought a step forward, knowledge must be instantly worked into life and made to serve.

All these and other tendencies of the day conspire to produce an impatience and over-haste in belief. We suffer from a new kind of credulity. It was once complained that men are too easily inclined to believe what their fathers believed, that men lack originality and independence. But there is now reason to fear that men may too easily believe what no one has ever believed before. Men with settled convictions may become as rare as men with ancestry and traditions. And the consequences must be scarcely less detrimental to social welfare than the conse-

⁶ H. Fielding, *Hearts of Men*, pp. 274-275.

quences of complacency and narrow-mindedness. For that inquisitiveness and fluidity of mind which is the condition of the discovery of new truth, is intolerable in society at large. Theory must correct and enlighten belief, but it cannot, consistently with the conduct of any considerable enterprise, replace belief.

I cannot hope to offer any general solution of what appears to be a recurrent and inevitable problem. It is of the very essence of life that it should be both conserved and changed. To belief society owes its cohesiveness and stability; to theory it owes its chance of betterment. And since every human motive is liable to exaggeration, society will always suffer harm on the one hand from complacency, and on the other hand from reckless innovation. Conflict between the mood of theory and the mood of belief, or between the party of theory and the party of belief, will doubtless remain to the end a source of confusion and waste. And this conflict will be most bitter where the most is at stake; respecting those ideas, namely, in which society is most deeply involved. But I think that we are justified in drawing certain inferences that are not wholly insignificant. In the first place, since there is a virtue in belief that has no equivalent in theory, it is wise to surrender belief reluctantly. A due recognition of the gravity of such a crisis permits no other course. Some degree of stolidity and inertia is a mark of moral poise. Nor is this incompatible with intellectual alertness and curiosity. It requires only that one shall acquire reserve, and refuse to admit strange theories at once to the circle of one's dear convictions. Similarly, conservatism in social action is not incompatible with the liveliest and most serious speculation concerning human institutions; but if this is to be possible, society must act more slowly than the curious-minded speculate, and insist that ideas be long tested, and gradually absorbed.

There is also a certain obligation in this matter that rests with theorists, and more especially with those who are devoted to the examination of the most fundamental ideas. It happens, doubtless because these ideas have not as yet permitted of exact treatment, that there is here the least barrier between theory and belief. Political, social, and philosophical theory speak the language of common sense, using terms that signify the objects of

daily life. It is as though the anthropologist were to allude to his personal friends. But there can never be any exact correspondence between the objects of theory and the objects of belief, because they are defined by different contexts, and belong to different systems. All the more reason, then, why different terms should be employed, and the layman be spared the needless fear that his bread or soul's salvation hangs on the fortunes of an argument.

What I have said applies with peculiar force to the philosopher. No one else debates such grave issues; nor is there any other region of theoretical inquiry in which differences and fluctuations of opinion are so marked. And I refer here not especially to those who proclaim themselves metaphysicians, but to all theoretically minded persons, including scientists and moralists, who busy themselves with ultimate questions. It would seem to follow that society is in special need of avoiding a hasty assimilation of such theory. And yet the terms which it employs are terms which symbolize to mankind their most trusted and cherished objects of belief. No one has taken the name of the Lord his God in vain so frequently and unconcernedly as the philosopher. While philosophers dispute, believers witness with dismay the apparent dissolution not only of God, but of immortality, freedom, marriage, and democracy as well. I wish that philosophy, for theoretical purposes, might speak a language of its own, and settle its disputes in a vernacular that does not arrest the attention of the community. If this were possible, philosophy would be better entitled to the full benefit of that immunity from direct social responsibility which is most conducive to clear seeing and straight thinking. And society could afford to wait for the application of a more refined and better-tested truth.

No theorist is under obligation immediately to give society the benefit of his theorizing. It was said of Samuel Clarke, who sought to overthrow atheism by scientific argument, that no one had really doubted the existence of God until he undertook to prove it. There will always be an absolute difference between rational assent on theoretical grounds, and implicit belief. The theoretical mood, even when a conclusion is reached, is a state of practical doubt. When the transition is made from believing

to theorizing, the loss is certain; and he who lightly encourages such a transition is guilty of recklessness and irresponsibility. It is a grave matter to substitute one's own theory, however well-reasoned, for another man's belief. For the belief is a part of the believer's life, a condition of the confidence and hopefulness of his action. It is a mistaken idea that honesty compels every theorist to be a propagandist; it is true, rather, that in the great majority of instances humanity, and a serious regard for the well-being of society, require that he shall not.

The task of mediating between theory and life is perhaps the most delicate and responsible task which it falls to the lot of any man to perform. And it cannot be denied that the theoretical habit of mind tends to disqualify one for undertaking it. For the investigator is trained to neglect every consideration but such present evidence as he can obtain. The human probability that his conclusions may some day, perhaps tomorrow, be over-ruled by new evidence, he properly excludes from his consideration. It is not relevant to his problem. But while theories may be changed with little cost and with certain gain, this is not true of beliefs. Here the cost is more certain than the gain. And the very consideration which the theorist is trained to neglect, and must neglect if his mind is to be free, is here of paramount importance. He who is to advise men must be the friend of men. He must understand their hopes and share their responsibilities. Hence he must regard every idea with reference to its effect on that present, concrete, human state of mind, from which all social action must proceed. No one has proclaimed more eloquently than Francis Bacon that it is to knowledge that man owes his triumph over nature and his advancement in all noble arts. But he would willingly, I think, have said of established belief, what he said of antiquity, that it "*deserveth that reverence, that men should make a stand thereupon* and discover what is the best way; but when the discovery is well taken, then to make progression."

THE DEFINITION OF THE SUPERNATURAL

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With the ultimate purpose of helping to clarify thought on the subject of the supernatural, the present essay is a study of usage mostly in Christian history and particularly of today. It therefore notes the meanings which seem to be assigned to the word and to its synonyms and associates; and it includes some criticism of usage, according to the accepted laws of thought, such as may contribute to the purpose of clarification.

The literature of the subject contains three chief meanings of the words "nature" and "supernatural," which may be indicated as follows.

Under the first of these views, the supernatural is God the Creator, together with his immediate acts and whatever else has immediate relations with him, such as heaven, his home. Hence nature includes "the whole of created things after they have left the hand of God," especially if connected with matter. In this classification, angels, demons, and discarnate human spirits are not always considered, but, if considered, they are usually classed as supernatural. The meaning thus varies from its smallest content, God alone, to its largest, all beings, superhuman or superearthly. This is the every-day usage among people of ordinary intelligence and generally among their superiors. For convenience these meanings of our two chief words may be designated as nature¹ and supernatural¹.

Secondly, nature is so regarded as to include all being whatever. Such is the implication when we speak of the "nature of God," or say every being has a nature. So wrote Scotus Erigena, "Nature in its broadest sense includes all things created and uncreated"; and Nietzsche says, "Miracles belong to a higher order of things which is a nature also"; and, according to Ruskin, "A human act may be super-doggish, and a divine act super-human, yet both of them are absolutely natural"; and very

lately Professor W. A. Brown of Union Theological Seminary and Professor Stearns of Bangor write, "A miracle is the most natural of all events." Pantheists and other parties have favored this notion quite as much as those who hold chairs in orthodox seminaries. Schelling declared that "nature . . . the creation . . . is not the mere phenomenon and revelation of the Eternal, but is rather the very Eternal itself; and, as Spinoza says, the more we discover the individual things, the more we discover God." We may characterize the movement of thought on this line as an alternating current; the pantheists have reversed the thought and regarded everything as really supernatural, the so-called natural being only an illusion. When, however, the current is direct, it implies that there is no supernatural. With such a meaning Theodore Parker shocked many good people of Boston by saying, "God is the most natural being in the world," and "every [event] is natural because it is true, it is a fact." And many have said that miracles are natural to Christianity.

Thus, following the varying usages of words, one man may say that there is a supernatural, and another that there is no supernatural; and both are right—according to the meanings assigned to nature. This second usage we mark nature^2 and supernatural^2 ; but (except with pantheists) $\text{supernatural}^2 = 0$.

Thirdly, in a large number of expressions nature really means the region of necessity, and supernatural therefore the region of free wills both divine and human, though most writers omit the human. This meaning is perhaps more often found implied than fully intended and purposed; yet, on the whole, it is so often used as to require attention. Bushnell and others have seen in man's free will a creative power, and have therefore regarded human free will as supernatural. A. H. Strong¹ says, "Nature is the manifestation of God under the law of cause and effect. Mind is the manifestation of God under the law of freedom." Observe also that physics is committed to this distinction (except for theism) when it defines cause as the transfer of energy or of $\frac{mc^2}{2}$. For any event that happens outside the circle of mass and velocity may then be called supernatural. And, even so, Huxley

¹Christ in Creation, pp. 55-56; compare Frazer, *Philosophy of Theism*, 1st Series, pp. 248-275.

and others have declared thought to be a miracle. Kant, Deussen, and Dorner² have called morality supernatural. Professor Hudson said, "It cannot be too often asserted that what we call the order of nature is not ethical at all: the laws of nature as such have nothing to do with morality." Matthew Arnold similarly wrote, "Man must begin, know this, where nature ends." J. S. Mill³, if I rightly understand, him recognized nature² and nature³, saying: "Nature has two chief meanings: it either denotes the entire system of things, with the aggregate of all their properties, or it denotes things as they would be apart from human intervention."

In the literature relating to miracles the word "law" is found to be used mostly in the several meanings following:—

1. Arbitrary appointments, human or divine: statute-law.
2. Moral law, not arbitrary, originating not in God's will but in his being or nature, of which his will is an expression.
3. The constituent principles of anything, as in the sentence, "God will act according to the laws of his being."
4. Great scientific generalizations, such as: "The law of gravity is that all matter attracts all other matter directly as the mass and inversely as the square of the distance."
5. Any commonly observed or supposed order in which things occur is called a law. This is the favorite meaning of the scientists, and is often declared to be the only proper meaning. "Physical laws are not compulsory, they rule nothing, they are but statements of our more or less uniform experience."
6. Necessary order: "A mathematical law is a law not only because it is always found to be true, but because its untruth would be impossible."
7. The total of all order, past, present, and to come, observed and unobserved.
8. A force or cause operating regularly. This is the meaning most commonly used, though it is often condemned by those who attempt to be accurate as a gross abuse and as a sign of an unscientific mind—if so, however, one might remark, nearly all the scientists are unscientific.

²System of Ethics, p. 59.

³Three Essays, p. 64.

Several other shades of meaning have been observed or must be inferred as a device for making a statement mean something; but the above seem to include all that we need to notice.

When a man so writes that several of these meanings may apply at the same time without confusion, he may perhaps be entitled to so many as his language may include and yet be true. There are, however, many unconscious attempts to combine several meanings which result in confusion more or less mischievous. Thus where we talk about "laws observed by the lower animals," the mental picture implied is of statute laws (law 1), whereas the objective fact is merely the way in which animals are seen to act (law 5). Similar confusions are in such expressions as: "the laws regulating the growth and decay of vegetation," and "the laws determining the movements of inanimate bodies or masses"—unless indeed those be regarded as instances of law 8.

More serious confusion arises when in the processes of reasoning, a premise is affirmed which is true in one meaning of law, and an inference is drawn which is legitimate only as from another meaning. Something like this seems to be in one of the common arguments for the existence of God. It is said that "if there are laws of nature, there must be a law-giver, that is God." This would be good reasoning if "law of nature" meant such a law as is found in Blackstone. It is true that statute-law is proof of the existence of a law-maker; but such is not the ordinary meaning of the law of nature. It is only in a metaphor that we say "the laws of God are written all over his works." If we speak literally and understand law in its most approved scientific sense (say law 5) the conclusion cannot be confidently drawn. The later teleology does not reason merely from an observed order that there is a personal author of the order. When, however, the order is moral, or seems to have been directed or interfered with in such a way as to benefit mankind, then we apprehend signs of intelligent handling or personal direction, and accordingly we infer a personal author.

In a few writers no distinction is observed among things supernatural; but generally, since the early centuries of Christianity, miracles have been distinguished from magic, in that the former

were done by God and his agents, and the latter by the devils. Loisy's distinction may, however, be preferred. He sees in miracles the socially approved, and in magic the socially disapproved. When therefore, we may infer, St. Hilarion gave a Christian jockey some holy water by means of which he won a horse-race, the question whether the result was a miracle or magic may be decided by vote.

Another distinction almost as ancient as the preceding, and not less important, recognizes the difference between subjective miracles and objective miracles. This distinction has not been uniformly observed; for many are found who speak or write as if the objective miracle were the only kind known to the church. Thus when the Protestants decided that miracles had ceased from the time when Christianity became the religion of the Roman Empire, or again that they ceased when the last apostle died, they meant the objective miracles only; for they have always held to subjective miracles, such as conversion and the ordinary operation of the Holy Spirit when he works within the soul. Nor did they mean all kinds of the objective; for example, prayers for rain and for victory in war are still offered up, and are supposed to be answered objectively.

The growth of intelligence has in three ways reduced the number and changed the quality of miracles believed in. First, mankind have assumed (whether rightly or wrongly, need not be discussed) that whatever is found to occur regularly, especially if it have a physical antecedent or means, is not a miracle. Familiarity is a great enemy of the miracle. We no longer ask, as St. Augustine asked significantly, "Who gave chaff such power to freeze that it preserves snow that has been buried under it, and such power to warm that it ripens green fruit?" "Who can explain the strange properties of fire which, though bright itself, blackens everything it burns?" and so on.

A second example is the decay of belief in the devil and his works, on account of which change we have mostly ceased to believe in magic and witchcraft, that most terrible part of the history of human cruelty. Today we have so far outgrown that kind of thing, that we read with suspicion that until about three hundred years ago all classes of people believed in witchcraft,

—popes, literary men, and reformers, ritualists and puritans, old world and new world; Thomas Aquinas, the greatest mind in the church, Gerson, chancellor of the University of Paris, Bossuet, Erasmus, Luther, Calvin, Beza, John Wesley, Cotton Mather, one of the presidents of Harvard College, Coke, Bacon, Shakspeare—though it is fair to say that some of these were far less credulous than others.

A third cause of the decline of the sense of the supernatural, or of the miracle-habit, is the discrediting of ancient humbugs, accompanied by the accrediting of only a smaller number of new ones. We make jest of Marco Polo's circumstantial account of a mountain in Asia which a Christian "having faith as a grain of mustard seed" had removed to another place by prayer, "by which miracle many Saracens became Christians." It may be well to recall that this miracle occurred before Marco Polo arrived at the place. Reports of eye-witnesses, however, are to be had of many miracles. Sir John Mandeville is apparently responsible for the statement that "iron will float in the Dead Sea and feathers will sink; which he would not have believed had he not seen it." And that witches changed themselves into cats is often affirmed. Lecky quotes a report that one man succeeded in cutting off the leg of a cat that attacked him, and that the leg immediately turned into that of an old woman, and four witnesses signed a certificate attesting the fact.

Miracles were in such a number that "a mere catalogue of those done by Thomas à Becket fills thirteen octavo pages." All this was not among Catholics only. The kings of England, whatever their relations to religion, were very potent against epilepsy and scrofula. Charles II had such virtue that he touched effectively nearly one hundred thousand people. This practice extended to the time of William III, who himself regarded the whole thing as a superstition, and on one occasion, consenting to lay his hand on a patient, said, "God give you better health and more sense." To which Whiston adds that "the patient was healed in spite of William's incredulity."

Those who speak of miracles, whether as friend or foe of the supernatural, commonly use the same defining and describing terms, and a great number of them.

1. The miracle is usually thought of as an act of God in violation of natural law, and as such it breaks, transgresses, opposes, contradicts, antagonizes, contravenes, interferes with, suspends, infringes upon, the law. Some thirty or forty synonymous words and phrases are in use for this idea.

But a moment's consideration might suffice to show that violation of the law cannot distinguish the miracle, for among the forces of nature not commonly called miraculous all the forms of opposition are to be found and are indeed common occurrences. All natural events are brought about by several forces interacting and more or less counteracting. Often with the greatest violence individuals and whole orders are regardlessly swept away. It is said that a hundred times as many species have existed on earth as are now alive. Their laws (senses 3, 5, 8) have been violated, destroyed, annihilated. Violence is itself a part of the great law (sense 5) of evolution. If now violence is in nature and law, it cannot define miracle while that is thought of as the opposite of law.

Some have thought to save the miracle and law and other associated sanctities by acknowledging that miracles are more or less opposed to law or nature and are to some extent within nature as known to us, but "they are examples of laws unknown to us"—Theodore Parker said "laws unknown and unknowable." This definition, at least in Parker's form, presents the difficulty of our knowing the existence of the unknowable. And apart from Parker the definition is merely a special form of the first definition. The same conclusion must be reached with regard to any synonym, such as "unique," or any other form of opposition or exception.

2. The miracle is also thought of as not opposed to law but independent of law, transcending law, outside law, the antithesis of law. The idea may apparently be reached in this way: human thoughts and feelings are real things which have nothing to do with the law of gravity; they do not attract each other like material things, nor do they change the law of attraction between material things. Now imagine some event which is as independent of all laws as thoughts are of gravity, and that is a miracle.

One might inquire how anything so thoroughly outside nature could be known to us, for in our experience things are known by the changes they make in what would otherwise be the order of nature (law 5). At any rate this definition does not help us much in our present study, for the miracles we are interested in, those of the Bible and the church especially, are not outside nature and its order but inside. After all, this idea might be regarded as a subordinate form of opposition. He that is not for us is against us.

3. Rejecting therefore these clews as the defining characteristics, let us inquire whether the idea of direct relation with God may not serve. Miracles are often so defined. But with this there are two difficulties. For when the saints and the ritual perform miracles as the agents of God (according to the Catholic church and some Protestants), God is acting indirectly, and, secondly, we meet the same difficulty as before, for in the usual Christian theory (except deism) God has also direct relations with every event and is one of the active causes in its occurrence.

Some minds are, however, satisfied with the last statement, and accordingly declare that all events are miraculous, as a part of the doctrine of the omnipresent activity of God; and they piously repeat, "It is a mark of wisdom to see the miraculous in all nature." Schleiermacher said, "Miracle is only the religious name for event."

4. Other writers are partly satisfied. They point out, for instance, that some events must be regarded as having in them large elements of human depravity and therefore small elements of the divine; while other events are quite the reverse and are mostly divine. The first must be regarded as for the most part in opposition to God, and the second as specially God's work, or as miraculous. Ritschl said, "A miracle is any striking natural occurrence with which the special help of God is connected."

5. Or shall miracle signify special quality rather than quantity of the divine? Some incline to say that every advance in righteousness is a miracle. Deussen says, "Deeds of morality, being against the world and its laws, contradicting them in every sense, are miracles in the truest and strictest sense."

The facts, however, do not allow us to suppose that God is inter-

ested in morals only, and that miracles are limited to morals, or have no quality except the moral.

6. Accordingly, Dorner inclines to define as miraculous every advance to a higher stage, whether it be of power or knowledge or wisdom or love. Thus, when in the course of evolution there comes into being a new distinction or variation, that advance, great or small, physical or moral, is a miracle. And when it has become established and has taken a regular place among secondary things, it is no longer called miraculous.

7. While, however, it seems rationally impossible to confine miracle to any one of these several ideas, there is nothing to prevent its containing them all in a measure, as in the usage of some authorities it does. Before following this clew there is one other method of classifying the definitions which should be considered. They may be classified without much straining of terms, in two varieties corresponding to the two essential meanings of supernatural, marked above as supernatural¹ and supernatural².

I. Accordingly, the first variety of miracle may be called the *fiat miracle*. Its idea seems to have been originally borrowed from the tricks of the popular magician, who without the use of visible means pronounces some mystic formula, and instantly brings forth a marvellous result. So the people of early times thought of God as the chief magician, and so the type of his action has commonly been regarded as: "Let there be light, and there was light." This idea of the miracle has prevailed in all historic times, and still prevails with most Christians.

The fiat miracle corresponds with the usage marked nature¹ and supernatural¹, and with the idea of violation of natural law, though the milder synonyms may be often used. Many both of friends and foes of the supernatural have assumed this to be the only kind of miracle, and have on the one hand defended it as if they were defending the life of the church and religion and the last stronghold of virtue and piety; or on the other have denounced it as having no rational meaning or support, or more mildly have declared that the church and religion have, or soon will have, nothing to do with miracles or the supernatural.

II. The remaining ideas of the nature of the miracle can perhaps be brought together under the title the *immanent miracle*.

This is especially congruous with the general theory of divine immanence in the world, as the fiat miracle is with that of the divine transcendence. It is also associated with nature² and supernatural³. And its type is the relation of our own human mind or thought among the forces of nature. Or, to be more precise in such a matter, just as our mind makes a difference in a few of the processes of matter, so the divine mind makes a difference with all processes of nature. We may therefore regard everything as a miracle, or for convenience we may call the ordinary activities of God natural, and only the extraordinary activities miraculous. In the words of Professor Bowne, "All events are more or less supernatural"; and according to A. H. Strong, "Law is God's habitual action and miracle is his unique action." This idea or theory correctly interprets the usage of history wherein the word "miracle" is (unconsciously) a relative term, like the word "hot." Everything has some heat, but only those are called hot which have an extraordinary quantity of it.

Now as to the advantages of the two theories.

I. The fiat miracle makes prominent the transcendence of God and the essential difference between God and nature. Moreover it is easily understood, being the long-established custom of speech, and popular theology being built on it. It is directly approved by the writers of the Bible, at least as commonly understood. It is also supported by many of the discoveries or theories of modern science. When, for instance, the physical scientist announces his "closed circle" of material forces, he implies (however unconsciously) that anything (like a thought or feeling of God or man) which comes in effectively from the outside, as it certainly does, must change and do violence to the order within; that is, it violates the law within the "circle." Or, more briefly, "discontinuity of mind and matter" provides for the violation of some of the laws of matter (law 5) whenever mind affects the processes of nature. Still again, the hypnotist and his kind issue orders to their patients, which are distinctly of the fiat variety, and which produce results quite as surprising as many of the miracle stories of Bible or church. A few theologians (if not many) are already claiming that hypnotism, mind-cure, and the like have so nearly duplicated all the Biblical miracles as to remove

whatever objection scientists may have had to them in our former state of ignorance as to the possibilities of psychic activities among the forces of nature.

II. The advantages of the immanent miracle theory are said to be that it is more congruous with theism (as distinct from deism), that it is the real theory of many who have advanced the former idea (miracle I); for they also have taught that God is immanent in all nature, omnipresent and always active. It presents the idea of God as friendly to nature rather than hostile to it. It was the favorite view in the early Christian church in the East. It is also Biblical, it is in 1 Corinthians, where Paul wrote an essay on inspiration (a form of the miraculous), teaching that all "gifts" are of God, and are in grades and degrees. And there is a specialty also. Is there not a specialty in Plato, as truly as in Isaiah? It is more consistent with the facts, with science and philosophy, than is the fiat miracle. For, recognizing that nature abounds in violence, it does not attempt to define miracle by the attribute of violence. Acknowledging that science has in general a right to be believed, it develops its theory in a form unobjectionable from the scientific standpoint. For, speaking both historically and logically, the objections to miracles are objections to the fiat miracle, and have little, if any, force against the immanent miracle. Indeed the latter theory seems able to save to our faith all the Biblical and other miracles that can be rationally saved.

The theory of immanent miracle is equally considerate of the powerful claims of pantheism among the great and pious of all ages. It takes its ontology and something more from pantheism, being careful however to retain personality of God as essential to Christianity.

But not only does this view of the miracle make peace with science and philosophy, it contains the promise and potency of peace among the "two and seventy warring sects" of Christianity, and even the other worthy religions. It is therefore the great missionary theory, for it alone recognizes the probability of miracles in other faiths and the inspiration of their founders and prophets. Evidence grows almost daily that only by this understanding of the subject can Christianity placate its rivals and thus enlist their best intelligence, appreciation, and affection.

Now neither the fiat theory nor the immanent theory is guaranteed by undisputed authority; and which one of them we should personally accept is mostly a matter of convenience, so long as we hold to the facts and to the laws of sound reasoning. But some may prefer (repeating definition 7 above) to generalize usage and to bring into one sentence the several ideas of miracle. We observe, then, that the word "miracle" is a relative term with a composite and variable meaning: it contains some idea of the supernatural (1 or 3), something of the thought of violating natural law (law 5, at any rate), something unique or exceptional, something of good morals or at least of advancing the divine order or purpose; and accordingly the miracle in general more nearly immediate than other events in relation to God; and these elements vary in different authors and different cases even to the extent that one may be at times unexpressed or only subconsciously intended.

The liberals and the scientists often repeat that "miracle in the sense of violation of law is simply impossible." True, when law means moral or necessary law, or all law whatsoever (law 2, 6, or 7), but not when it means law 5 or 8, which are its common meanings, scientific or popular.

It is frequently said among "advanced thinkers" that, in the phrase of one of them, "the occasional interference must go." But every stroke of lightning is an occasional interference, and every summer shower interferes with some farmer's haying, and Jesus himself was a specially great interference with the order of contemporary civilization and on an occasion which in a true sense had long been prepared for. Everything natural or supernatural interferes with something, and, if it be guided by reason, it does so on a proper occasion.

We still hear and read a well-worn protest: "God will not violate his own laws." Of course he will not violate moral and necessary laws (law 2 and 3) and some other laws, but he is violating law in its usual scientific meaning (law 5) perhaps all the time, and so are we men, if we have any initiative or originality.

How often and how confidently is it affirmed that "the church must give up miracles as it has given up witchcraft." Doubtless

it ought to give up certain extreme forms of the idea and certain partial and fragmentary conceptions, but the more moderate and large-minded ideas stand approved (if not quite proved) by science and philosophy as set forth by high authorities.

Quite as zealous are the defenders of the miracle from the charge of offending science and law. A celebrated author lately wrote: "The Creator may modify the course of events without infringing on any law. Man by new combinations of the forces of nature has changed the whole face of things, and surely the Creator must have the same power to an extent infinitely greater." Is it true that one may change the whole face of things, and infinitely more, without infringing on any law? Yet even this might be true if the meaning of law were limited to law 2, 4, 6—which it is not.

Another declares that "God reveals himself in the order of the world, and not by occasional interruptions or breaks in that order." Why not in both? Indeed there could not long remain any faith in God at all in human hearts, were not the established order occasionally changed, that some advance might be made. And among the changes observed are all sorts of violation, even to the extent of annihilation of some laws, as already said.

It is often asserted that "miracle is an event in nature without a material cause." No, every event in nature is brought about by the parallelogram of forces, and the spiritual agencies which have to do with any event may, so far as we now know, be counted in with the forces. At any rate, it does not appear that the spiritual dispenses with the natural in producing an event within nature.

A special dictum of one class of theologians is that "philosophic theism must regard divine power as the immediate source of all phenomena alike." This is true only if pantheism be true. The almost universal Christian view is that the divine power is no more than one of the immediate sources.

Every now and then a minister gets discouraged because the old ideas are being given up. A few years ago a clergyman resigned because, as he said, "there is no longer any final authority in the Scriptures as now understood, and therefore the church can no longer vouch for anything." This, he said, "destroys

the value of the church." But in these days of a larger and more accurate knowledge of the world, and of the compelling power of its rational understanding, Professor Shaler writes, "The admonitions of right-doing and the denunciations of evil conduct which come to us from the world of fact are as mandatory as any that come from the supernatural realm." And, besides, the miracle remains in some accepted definition and has in its own nature a proper relation to authority. "He that made me whole, the same said unto me, Take up thy bed and walk." Power is instinctively obeyed. Let Mrs. Eddy or Mr. Dowie be supposed to perform a miracle, and multitudes will slavishly follow them and obey their commands. Jesus found the instinct too strong at times, and was obliged to rebuke it, that men might honor gentleness and love instead. The authority of the miracle-worker may be trusted to human instinct.

A recent lecture announced: "In the future religion there will be no supernatural, . . . it must conform to natural law, . . . it must be completely natural." But grant all that the author said about the abuse of the supernatural in the past and among the ignorant of the present, there is still a supernatural, as indeed the author himself believes and teaches. Yet his quoted words are true in the meaning of supernatural² and in some extreme forms of supernatural¹. Careful definition, however, being omitted in the lecture quoted, each hearer was liable to take the word in his own meaning, to the increase of confusion, and that, too, on an occasion which in greatness of opportunity for usefulness can seldom be duplicated.

Still more recently a great preacher feels that he has outgrown the need of miracles, and while therefore he has ordinarily kept silent on the subject, he now must speak out in the interests of clear thought and "for the instruction of the young." For this purpose he publishes an eloquent book which in effect conceals the variation of definitions, and everywhere implies that the only kind of miracle is the fiat miracle. Of course he is understood by nearly all parties to be attacking the miraculous and supernatural elements in general of Christianity, whereas he means only to discount a certain special view of the subject. Thus many are unnecessarily offended and estranged, and confusion still remains, for the young and old.

Would it not be well if theologians and others would cease trying to impose their particular definitions on the world, and to judge by them the times present and future, and would recognize instead the rights of other definitions? While therefore we hold individual opinions with all due strength, let us pray that we be able to know and to rejoice in the strength of our foes, and to give them all possible aid and comfort. Has not the time now fully come for an intelligent and sympathetic co-operation, whereby a more abundant life may be given both to special opinions and to the great interests of religion in general?

At any rate, the great and good men whose words are quoted in the few pages just preceding all believe in God, and therefore in the supernatural (in the common sense of the word), and none of them intend to say that religion present or future can get along without the supernatural, in that sense. They also believe that God is at work in the world, changing its order for the better, gently if he can and violently if he must. That is to say, they believe in miracles, in accepted meanings of the word; and they never meant to deny these things, but to affirm that the supernatural and the miracle are essential to Christianity, are its very life and support, and will always be so.

On the whole, then, we may conclude that neither the words of the conservatives nor those of the liberals furnish occasion for wrath or for alarm; and that a study of usage in general contributes not only to clear ideas, but also to peace, even the peace of faith.

JESUS AS SON OF MAN

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In a discussion of the great christological passages of the Synoptic Gospels we have seen that the messianism of Jesus was pre-eminently ethical and religious. His attitude toward current expectations of Israel's redemption resembled that of the prophets in being critical rather than originative. He ethicized and spiritualized a hope which in its origins and in its undisciplined popular manifestations had little to differentiate it from the expectations entertained by heathen worshippers of their tribal or national divinities.

As regards the political hopes of the Zealot, or nationalist, party this is universally recognized. Jesus' prohibition of the application of the title Christ to himself (Mk. 8 30)¹ is commonly explained as due to his unwillingness to be understood to claim messiahship in the political sense.

As regards the Pharisaic, or pietistic, type of messianism, then largely affected by the apocalyptists, many influential critics are endeavoring to convince the modern world that Jesus' attitude was more sympathetic than critical. The apocalyptists since Daniel had given a transcendental turn to the ancient belief, and the Pharisees, once characterized by a more ethical and inward type of pietism, were now degenerating into a more formal legalism, while they enforced the burden of Mosaic requirements imposed by the scribes under penalty of exclusion from a share in the supermundane "world to come." This doctrine of a transcendental messianic "world to come" was an acknowledged innovation borrowed from apocalypse. The contention of J. Weiss and his school is that Jesus was fundamentally an *Apo-*

¹ Parallels are not cited where there is no evidence of independent tradition. In the reference Mk. 8 30 the earliest of the three embodiments of the tradition is appealed to. The fact that it is transcribed with slight modifications in Mt. 16 20 and Lk. 9 21 adds nothing to the force of Mark's evidence.

kaluptiker, in full sympathy with this tendency, especially as represented in John the Baptist, the popularizer of the movement.

Our own attempt has been to show that Jesus' preaching of "the kingdom" involves no less truly a critical attitude toward the transcendental other-worldliness of the Pharisees than toward the worldliness of Sadducee or Zealot. We hold that with all his sympathy for the Baptist's revolt against hierocracy, with all his endorsement of the Baptist's warnings of the impending judgment, Jesus explicitly differentiated his message from that of John also, emphasizing his own milder, more mystical type of messianism. The germs of this may in fact be found in the older literature of Pharisaism, and in the kindred writings of the school of "wisdom."

Jesus' teaching, accordingly, regarding human destiny, as reflected in the messianic hope, goes deeper down and further back than Pharisaism. It is not identified with sect or party. It takes hold upon the ancient hope of Israel before it had suffered its special applications first to the institution of the Davidic monarchy, then to the post-exilic substitution of supermundane for nationalistic hopes. Jesus returns to the elementary principle of messianism, the old popular belief that Israel is (potentially) God's son. He agrees with the Pharisees that this ideal is to be realized by the son's "knowing" and "doing the will" of the Father. The difference lies partly in his conception of that "will"; for to the scribe and to his blind follower the Pharisee the will of God is a written precept to be obeyed; while to Jesus it is an inward disposition to be acquired. In this respect he approaches the wisdom-writers. The difference lies also in the result aimed at, which to the scribe and Pharisee is a reward added to the sonship, to Jesus the sonship itself with whatever of blessing that may entail (Q; Mt. 5 45, Lk. 6 35). In this respect he is more in antagonism than in sympathy with the apocalyptists, and again resembles those of the school of "wisdom," though himself not a man of the schools, but of the people.

If this interpretation of the messianism of Jesus be correct, it remains for us to explain how believers in his messiahship

should have given it the intensely transcendental and apocalyptic interpretation reflected in the earliest evangelic tradition. Both Paul and the Synoptists are saturated with the type of eschatology characteristic of the Synagogue. In both cases the messianic hope is pre-eminently transcendental. How can this be, if Jesus himself had not so taught? The answer in general terms will be that the belief in Jesus' messiahship did not spring from the utterances of his life-time, so much as from the ecstatic experiences of his followers after his death, and that these were conditioned upon the disciples' predetermined forms of thought. At first it was not even pretended that Jesus had made his own person and work the subject of his teaching. This we find only in the late theological gospel emanating from Ephesus, the headquarters of Paulinism. In all the earlier writings, whether historical or epistolary in form, the doctrine of Christ's person and work is avowedly based, not on his remembered teaching, but on psychological phenomena in the experience of Paul and others, principally after Jesus' death. And Paul was an out-and-out Pharisean apocalypticist.³

It is a highly significant fact that while our two ultimate witnesses, Paul and the evangelic tradition, are at one (as they could not fail to be) in their fundamental conviction that Jesus had been "manifested as the Son of God with power by the resurrection from the dead" (Rom. 1 4), or, in Petrine phrase, had been "made" by it "both Lord and Christ" (Acts 2 36), they differ widely in the titles by which they express their conception of his being and office. The title "Lord" is that which in Paul's use expresses the nature and function of the Christ. It is not peculiar to him, for we have just seen it employed in a typical Petrine passage. Neither is it of Pauline coinage; for we find Paul quoting even an Aramaic ejaculation of which it forms part (Maran atha, "Our Lord, come"), and the phrase "Jesus is Lord" is repeatedly referred to as expressing the consensus of

³ The transfiguration story is expressly designed to carry back the Pauline transcendental conception of the messiahship into the earthly career of Jesus. But even in the Synoptic tradition it intervenes as a psychological anachronism, a rebuke of the twelve, which as yet they are incapable of understanding, for conceiving the messiahship of Jesus "after the things that be of men." In the Apocalypse of Peter it is frankly placed after the resurrection.

apostolic faith. Only indirectly and incidentally have we evidence even of Paul's acquaintance with the distinctively apocalyptic title Son of Man. His quotation from Psalm 8 in 1 Cor. 15 27, and his doctrine of "the heavenly man," make us suspect indeed that in his thinking he applied to Christ, in his own distinctive way, this apocalyptic title. But from his writings otherwise we should not so much as guess that the title had ever been applied to Jesus.

The evangelic tradition, on the other hand, displays it in a manner entirely peculiar to itself. The title "Son of Man" occurs in no New Testament writing, outside of those of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John; and these are notoriously interdependent. If, as many maintain, its frequent occurrence in the gospels can be accounted for on no other theory than the usage of Jesus himself, our view of his eschatological teaching will require adjustment to the fact. But we shall also be required to account for its non-appearance outside the four interdependent evangelic writers. If, on the other hand, we advance some other theory to account for its occurrence here, our burden of proof will not be light. We shall not be suffered to reject the combined testimony of the four evangelists that Jesus applied the title to himself, unless we deal comprehensively with this question of the literary interdependence of the sources; for no careful student will admit that the common participation in this feature can be due to accidental coincidence. Let us face the situation. The peculiar term can only have pervaded the four gospels by transmission from some very early common source. Such a primitive common source, capable of affecting all by its use of the title Son of Man as a self-designation of Jesus, is the document Q, only the Gospel of Mark lying, as some hold, outside the range of its influence. No other source definitely known to us ever occupied a place primitive and authoritative enough to produce this result. If, then, this application of the title be a contamination of the primitive tradition rather than a true record of Jesus' usage and consciousness, the evidence for such a conclusion must be sought in the document Q.

This document has been restored more carefully by Harnack than by any predecessor in the field, from the coincident non-

markan material of Matthew and Luke. Harnack singles out the Thanksgiving to the Father (Mt. 11 25-27, Lk. 10 21-22) and the discourse on the Jews' Stumbling in Jesus (Mt. 11 2-11, 12-13, 16-19, Lk. 7 18-23, 31-35, 16 16) as the most important in all Q for their christological content.³ Having already discussed the significance of the former of these passages, we may now take the latter as our starting-point for a consideration of the question of the real origin and significance of the title Son of Man.

In Harnack's restoration the passage reads as follows: "For John came neither eating nor drinking, and they say, He hath a devil. The Son of Man came eating and drinking, and they say, So, a gluttonous man and a wine-bibber, a friend of publicans and sinners. But Wisdom hath been justified by her children."

Harnack concludes his discussion of the christology of Q with a remark both just and significant: "Even with the most conservative application of psychological considerations it is apparent that Jesus' consciousness of sonship must have antedated his consciousness of messiahship, and paved the way for it." We take this to mean that of the two supposedly fundamental passages of Q⁴ Harnack himself recognizes the one distinguished by the use of the title "the Son" as more characteristic than that which employs the title the "Son of Man." Jesus unquestionably had the consciousness of sonship. He probably found in it the solution of the messianic hope cherished by the people. Did he infer from the present leadership imposed by circumstance upon the possessor of this consciousness such continued leadership in "the world to come" as current eschatology expected of the apocalyptic figure of the Son of Man? What ground have we for accepting the authenticity of the second title?

It is scarcely conceivable that in so old a source as Q the title Son of Man should be repeatedly placed in Jesus' mouth if it did not really belong in some way to his vocabulary. But this admission, while abandoning the philological line of argument of the Aramaists who maintain that in Aramaic the expression "the

³ *Sprüche und Reden Jesu*, p. 166.

⁴ In Harnack's *Sprüche und Reden Jesu* they are numbered 25 (Mt. 11 23-27, Lk. 10 21 f.) and 15 (Mt. 11 16-19, Lk. 7 31-35) respectively.

Son of Man," would be impossible, is by no means equivalent to an admission that Jesus applied the title to himself. For, first, it is not only probable but demonstrable that even our most ancient records, including Q itself, insert the title in many cases without authority, and, secondly, among the admittedly authentic instances of Jesus' own use of the term, there are several where the meaning is more characteristic of him if Son of Man is understood as applying to some other than his own glorified personality. We may take up these two propositions in order.

1. It is certainly remarkable that Harnack, in a footnote on the very same page on which occurs his classification of the discourse on the Stumbling of the Jews (Nos. 14, 15) with Jesus' Thanksgiving for his Revelation (No. 25) as the two most important christological passages of Q, expresses the following opinion on the occurrence of the title Son of Man in the former:

Of course in individual cases one is utterly without positive assurance that Jesus referred to himself as "the Son of Man" in sayings wherein Q represents him as so designating himself. It is more than doubtful, for example, that Jesus should have used the expression in No. 15;⁵ while earlier in the same discourse (No. 14, "Blessed is he that shall not be stumbled in me," etc.), he has quite manifestly avoided every messianic self-designation.

In other words, Harnack himself concedes the probable unauthenticity of the term in the passage which he advances as the most important! For we can only escape the linguistic argument of Lietzmann, Wellhausen, and N. Schmidt, that as a title "Son of Man" would be meaningless in the Aramaic spoken by Jesus, if we suppose that the etymologically colorless expression, equivalent to "human being," *homo*, *Mensch*, had acquired a more specific connotation through its application in Daniel and later apocalypses. Its employment, then, by Jesus would be either enigmatic, or distinctly messianic in the transcendental sense. Either employment would call public attention to his personality in a manner admittedly contrary to the policy of silence observed by himself and imposed upon his disciples (Mk. 8 30). Even those, accordingly, who maintain that this was Jesus' "favorite

⁵ The passage whose comparison of the coming of the Baptist with that of "the Son of Man" was quoted above.

self-designation" are cautious about admitting his employment of it otherwise than in the privacy of the apostolic circle, and subsequently to the revelation of the messiahship at Caesarea Philippi. The passage from Q regarded by Harnack as the most important manifestly meets neither of these conditions. Here, therefore, the occurrence of the title is certainly to be attributed to the redactor of Q. To him the appearance of Jesus in his work of preaching and healing in Galilee, contrasting as it did with the Baptist's warning of judgment, was the coming of the Son of Man. Jesus himself, if he really looked upon his work as fulfilling the expected coming of the Son of Man,⁶ could not have thus publicly declared it and at the same time retained the incognito which he imposed upon his disciples.

Since we are dealing with Harnack's discussion of the christology of Q, and since we are clearly within the range of his own conclusions when we infer from the passage under consideration that Q^r manifests a disposition to insert the title Son of Man without historical warrant, we may properly call attention here to a further significant observation of the same distinguished critic:

Christology as Q understood it gives a perfectly consistent and simple portrait. Q has no other conception than this: Jesus was the Messiah, ordained to divine sonship at his baptism, and all his sayings accordingly rest upon this background. If, however, the introductory narrative be removed in thought, an essentially different conception results (p. 169).

This comes very near to an admission of the contention of Wernle in the most thorough study applied to the question until Harnack's, that we must distinguish a Q¹ and a Q², attributing to the later hand (Q²) the introductory narratives relating to John the Baptist, together with some other elements.⁷ Manifestly, the two sections on Jesus' baptism by John, and on the stumbling of the Jews at John and Jesus, have in common not merely the trait of the Baptist's work, but the common purpose, not apparent in Q as a whole, of setting the personality of Jesus on the highest

⁶ On Jesus' idea of the Coming of the Son of Man, see below.

⁷ Wernle, *Synoptische Frage*, p. 226: "Diese zwei Stücke [the Baptist's discourse and the Temptation of Jesus] sehen überhaupt aus wie eine geschichtliche Einleitung, die nachträglich dem Werk vorgesetzt wurde."

plane. Here, if anywhere in Q, we must suspect secondary elements.

Besides the discount to be made on the score of this admitted *Tendenz* of Q^a or Q^f, we must also ask consideration for the effect of a more general disposition of the times illustrated not only in Q, but from the Pauline epistles down to the period of the Oxyrhynchus Logia, namely, the disposition to attribute to Jesus "faithful sayings" or other current saws and apothegms having more or less affinity with his teaching, in particular "wisdom-sayings," such as that of Lk. 13 34-35, which in Mt. 23 37-39 is attributed directly to Jesus, with suppression of the actual derivation from "the Wisdom of God." The Oxyrhynchus logion "I stood in the midst of the world, and in the flesh was I seen of them," etc., is another plaint of the divine Wisdom, kindred to Baruch 3 37, similarly put in the mouth of Jesus. There is strong textual reason for so regarding Mk. 2 27 also, which appears neither in the parallels nor in the text, but is found as a rabbinic saying in *Joma* (fol. 85). To this category of aphorisms included among the sayings of Jesus from very early times because of resemblances of phraseology or content must, in our judgment, be reckoned at least one whose strongest title to the place it occupies is its employment of the expression "the Son of Man." It is the saying of Q: "The foxes have holes and the birds of the air have nests, but the Son of Man hath not where to lay his head" (Mt. 8 19-20, Lk. 9 57-58). The very mode of its employment here (in antithesis to the birds and beasts) is so different from any other of the employments attributed to Jesus, and the plaintive tone of self-pity so opposite to the grateful assurance of his hospitable reception in Mk. 10 29 f. (cf. Lk. 8 3, 10 38-42, 22 35), that we cannot regard the saying as authentic.⁸ It seems to be a current aphorism contrasting the helplessness of the individual human being, a waif and stray when left alone in the environment of nature, with the self-sufficiency of birds and beasts. Only by a play upon the expression "Son of Man" can it be applied to Jesus at all. Even were its authenticity admitted, there is the same reason in this case as in that of the saying contrasting

⁸ Against Harnack, who exclaims, apropos of the same, "Welch' ein Zeichen der Echtheit!" (p. 165).

Jesus' mode of life with the Baptist's for questioning its use of the title Son of Man under the circumstances described. It seems far more probable that this pendant to the warning against superficial discipleship (Mt. 8 21 f., Lk. 9 59 f.) has been taken up merely because of a misunderstanding of its untechnical use of the term "the son of man."

A third instance of Jesus' employment of the title Son of Man, adduced by Harnack in his reconstruction of Q, we are also compelled to reject as unauthentic, though it may possibly have stood in the source. Jesus is reported to have presented "the Son of Man" as "a sign to this generation in explanation of his offer of 'the sign of Jonah.'" Since it occurs in the same discourse as the instance first adduced, which Harnack himself considers doubtful on the ground that Jesus manifestly avoids making a public claim to messianic authority, it is difficult to see the consistency of maintaining the authenticity of this. However, we need not insist on this point, for it is easy to show independently that the explanation offered of "the sign of Jonah" is secondary and unauthentic.

We have at least four variant accounts of Jesus' answer to the demand for a sign from heaven. The oldest of our existing sources presents the enigma without any attempt at solution. Mk. 8 11, 12 (Mt. 16 1-4) treats it as simply a refusal to the unworthy people of their demand for an evidential miracle. Jesus "sighed deeply in his spirit and saith, Why doth this generation seek after a sign? Verily I say unto you, There shall no sign be given unto this generation." The addition, "no sign but the sign of Jonah," made in Matthew's transcript of this verse, is of course due to the influence, direct or indirect, of Q. Both forms of the Markan version agree, however, in representing that Jesus did not make a merely apparent refusal of the demand (which after all was ultimately to be granted), but made absolute the refusal of miraculous confirmation of his message. Both our first and our third Gospels, contrariwise, introduce explanations of the enigma calculated to mitigate the inconsistency of the refusal with their own disposition to find the chief evidences for their claims precisely in the miraculous element of Jesus' career, in particular the resurrection. The explanations given, however,

are inconsistent the one with the other. Critics are agreed that Matthew's interpretation of the sign of Jonah as the resurrection is too flagrantly contradictory of the context to be authentic. They are very generally disposed, however, to accept the explanation of Luke that the sign of Jonah is the person of Jesus.⁹ In reality we have only to place the two side by side in the identical context to see that both are guesses, Luke's only less inconsistent than Matthew's with the general bearing of Jesus' discourse. We give the context in a translation of Harnack's text of Q.

But he said, An evil and adulterous generation seeketh after a sign, and no sign shall be given it save the sign of Jonah.

<p>For like as Jonah was in the sea-monster's belly three days and three nights, so shall the Son of Man be in the heart of the earth three days and three nights.</p>	<p>For like as Jonah was himself a sign to the men of Nineveh, so shall the Son of Man be to this generation.</p>
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The men of Nineveh shall arise in the judgment with this generation and shall condemn it, because they repented at the preaching of Jonah, and lo, a greater matter than Jonah is here.

A glance at Mt. 21 23-32, which, if not also embodying material from Q, is at all events in substance a parallel to the story of the Galilean demand for a sign from heaven, will show that in Jesus' conception the great sign of the times was the repentance of the masses at "the baptism of John." It was to him a fulfilment of the promise (Mal. 4 6) of the great repentance to be wrought by Elias before the Day of Yahweh. In remaining callous to this movement of the publicans and sinners the scribes and Pharisees had rejected their sign "from heaven." Thus the two examples of the Ninevites and the Queen of the South condemn "this generation" for its rejection of the "wailing" of John and the "piping" of Jesus. It is compared to "children in the market-place" because it yields neither to threat nor to entreaty. Whether, then, we have in Mt. 11 and Mt. 21 duplicate traditions of the same incident, or parallel utterances of

⁹ Jn. 6 30 ff. combines these two.

Jesus on similar occasions, in either case they determine for us the sense of the answer unfavorably comparing the men of this generation to the men of Nineveh. It is only in the second member of the poetic comparison, that which compares them unfavorably to "the Queen of the South," that Jesus refers to his own preaching as "a greater matter" than the wisdom of Solomon.¹⁰ In the first member he refers to the preaching of *John the Baptist*. Both the interjected explanations of the sign of Jonah, therefore, Luke's as well as Matthew's, are incorrect; and, if incorrect, then certainly unauthentic. Jesus referred by this expression¹¹ neither to his own personality nor to his resurrection, but to "the baptism of John."

2. Dismissing those instances whose real bearing attests not an authentic use by Jesus of the title Son of Man in application to himself, but on the contrary a disposition on the part of transmitters of the tradition to multiply unauthentic instances, we come to a relatively small residuum whose first value is to explain the *Tendenz* observed. Jesus really did employ the phrase; otherwise the *Tendenz* would be inexplicable. But did he employ it in application to himself? A satisfying answer calls for consideration of every authentic instance without exception, first of all the undisputed occurrences in Q. They are as follows:

(1) Mt. 12 32, Lk. 12 10.¹²

(2) Mt. 24 27, 37, 39, Lk. 17 24, 26, 30.

The former passage is one of the principal bones of contention between Wellhausen and the critics who continue to maintain the priority of Q to Mark. In Wellhausen's view, comparison of the variants in Mt. 12 31, 12 32, derived respectively

¹⁰ Note the similar antithesis in Lk. 12 13-34, where Solomon appears as the rich and wise king of Ecclesiastes in contrast with the poverty of Jesus and his followers.

¹¹ Assonance between the names John and Jonah may have played a part.

¹² It is not apparent from Harnack's language in note 2 on p. 165 whether he regards this occurrence as "unsicher," as well as that in Lk. 12 8, where the parallel Mt. 10 32 has simply "I," or whether he holds to Mt. 12 32, Lk. 12 10 as certainly authentic. The former is designated by him No. 34^a the latter No. 34^b. His statement on p. 165 is: "Doch ist er [der Ausdruck Menschensohn] in Nr. 34 unsicher."

from Mk. 3 28 and Q (cf. Lk. 12 10), shows the priority of Mark to Q. He says:

In Mk. 3 28 we have: All blasphemies are forgiven *the sons of men*, except blasphemy against the Holy Spirit. In Q (Lk. 12 10) on the contrary: Utterances against *the Son of Man* are forgiven, only those against the Holy Spirit are not.

Were Wellhausen right, Q would be convicted in one more instance of introducing the title Son of Man with no better authority than a perversion of Mk. 3 28, thus increasing the probability that it is from later modification that the peculiar usage has pervaded gospel tradition.

But on this question we are constrained to take the view of Wellhausen's opponents. "Son of Man" is the original, "sons of men" the derived form. This is not a mere inference from the conclusion forced upon us by the evidences of Q's priority in all other instances of relation to Mark, it is apparent from the context of this particular discourse. According to all three reporters the utterance in question should explain the peculiarly heinous nature of the offence just committed (the declaration, "He casteth out by Beelzebub") which excepts it from even the divine pardon. According to Q (Mt. 12 32, Lk. 12 10) this is because, while seemingly directed only against Jesus, it had really assailed the Spirit of God. Because it is not Jesus personally who effects the healings and exorcisms, but "the Spirit of God," the offence is unpardonable. This is precisely the distinction which Mark, in accordance with the whole spirit of his gospel as shown in repeated instances, refuses to admit. The difference pointed to by Jesus between his exorcisms, performed "by the Spirit (Lk. finger) of God," without any assumption of special power or gift resident in himself, and the exorcisms of "your sons" (Mt. 12 27 f., Lk. 11 19 f.),—a vital element of the whole argument,—is omitted by Mark. The result—the intended result, so far as we can judge—is to make it appear that blasphemy of Jesus, by calumny of his works of power, is identical with blasphemy of the Holy Spirit, and hence unpardonable. In Q the offence is unpardonable because it is not against Jesus, but against the Holy Spirit. In Mark the offence is unpardonable because it is

against Jesus, and this is equivalent to an offence against the Holy Spirit. It is scarcely needful to indicate which of these two constructions of Jesus' utterance bears the stamp of originality and authenticity.

But the later Markan construction would have encountered an insuperable obstacle if the language of Q, "Whosoever blasphemeth the Son of Man it shall be forgiven him," had been left unchanged. The alteration in Mk. 3 28 to "All blasphemies shall be forgiven to *the sons of men*" is indispensable to Mark's conception, and hence was probably made for this reason.

Have we, then, by establishing in this instance the originality in Q of the title Son of Man, established its authenticity as a title applied by Jesus to himself? On the contrary, the whole force of Jesus' argument depends upon the distinction between his own personality as on a level with other men's, and the superhuman dignity of "the Spirit of God." In other words, the term Son of Man is used here not in the transcendental sense of apocalypse, but in the ordinary Old Testament sense of an every-day mortal as contrasted with God. The article, if the article was used in Jesus' utterance, would have to be understood as generic,—in German, *die Lästerung gegen den Menschen wird vergeben*, which in English must be rendered: "Blasphemy against a man can be forgiven." This, by all the evidence of context, is the real meaning of Jesus' saying. If there is application of a special title to Jesus himself in the passage of Q, it is not meant by Jesus, but is the importation of the compiler himself.

(3) The only other occurrences of the title Son of Man in Q stand in a single context, and unquestionably refer to the apocalyptic figure of the transcendental, Danielic, Deliverer. We give the passage in Harnack's reconstruction (No. 56):

If, then, they shall say unto you, Behold, he is in the wilderness, go not forth; behold, he is in his chambers, believe it not. For as the lightning goeth forth from the east and shineth unto the west, so shall be the Coming of the Son of Man; wheresoever the carcase is, there will the vultures be gathered.

As were the days of Noah, so shall be the Coming of the Son of Man. For as men were in the days before the cataclysm, eating and drinking, marrying and giving in marriage, until the day that Noah entered into

the ark, and knew not until the cataclysm came and swept them all away, so shall be the Coming of the Son of Man.

There will be two in the field; one shall be taken and one left. Two women shall be grinding at the mill; one shall be taken and one left.

If there is any real ground in Q for regarding the title Son of Man as a "self-designation of Jesus," it must be found in these three connected occurrences of the phrase "the Coming of the Son of Man." Did Jesus mean by it his own return in glory; or did he refer to the Executioner of the divine judgment of whom John the Baptist had sounded the warning?

The general bearing of the teaching here in question is the same as of the apocalyptic chapter of Mark, into which parallel utterances have been taken up. Jesus deprecates resort to the casters of horoscopes and calculators of the end of the world and of the coming judgment. Vain and futile are their predictions. The coming of the Son of Man is a great divine event, comparable only to the mighty judgments visited on the earth in the days of Noah, or on the cities of the Plain in the days of Lot. What Old Testament writers refer to as the Day of Yahweh is now spoken of as the day of the coming of the Son of Man. We must certainly allow for the effecting in popular usage of an equivalence between the transcendental figure of Daniel (with the more recent apocalypses dependent on it) and the Coming One of John the Baptist. But there is no indication whatever that the equivalence, "Jesus is the Son of Man," had entered the mind of the speaker in the above discourse, or indeed any mind previous to that of the compiler of the Sayings. Until it can be shown (1) that Jesus regarded himself as the Messiah; (2) that he also considered this office to involve his return as executioner of the divine judgment in the coming of the Son of Man, the passage—the only one in which we have reason to think Jesus employed the title as applying to a transcendental figure—remains utterly without force to prove the contention in support of which it is adduced. The real evidence that Jesus entertained the fantastic dreams of apocalypse as applying to his own personality in a resurrected state thus reduces itself to nothing. There is evidence in plenty that the compiler of Q in the form employed by our evangelists had adopted the equivalence, "Jesus

is the Son of Man," and made no scruple of occasionally substituting the title for the personal pronoun where it seemed to him appropriate. There is here a possible explanation of the practice which has spread to all the gospels. There is no adequate evidence that Jesus ever applied the title to himself.

We have two possible criteria to determine whether this possible explanation of the spread of the usage is also the true one. (1) Mark, if at all dependent on Q, is admittedly so in a different sense and to a less degree than Matthew or Luke. We should expect, then, to find the title Son of Man less at home (so to speak) in Mark than in Q. (2) In Acts, especially in the speeches of Peter, we have by common consent a very early type of christology, if indeed we have not traces of a type of evangelic tradition wholly unaffected by Q. Let us briefly consider these two criteria.

(1) The facts regarding the Markan employment of the title are briefly summarized on p. xxxviii of the introduction to my commentary entitled *Beginnings of Gospel Story*, as follows: "The title Son of Man does not appear to characterize the fundamental elements of Mark (P). It occurs in editorial supplements derived from Q, and even then in an adapted sense." Space limitations of course preclude the citation here of the evidence on which this statement is made, but a reference to the individual instances as discussed in the volume quoted will suffice. The title does not appear from these to be indigenous to Mark, but an exotic. It occurs only in passages where there is independent evidence of the influence of Q.

(2) There is *no* occurrence of the title Son of Man throughout the Petrine speeches of Acts, though these are so largely concerned with the doctrine of Christ's humiliation and exaltation. As is well known, its only occurrence in the New Testament outside the four gospels is in the Speech of Stephen, Acts 7 56, recognized by Harnack and many others as derived from a different source. Even here it is not the words of the speech itself, but of its reporter, which suggest the equivalence, "The Son of Man is Jesus." On the theory that this was "the favorite self-designation of Jesus" the striking fact of its complete absence from the speeches of Peter in Acts remains as inexplicable as the equally unbroken silence of Paul.

We have reached the conclusion of our examination of the data. A just valuation of all the documentary evidence will at least compel us to admit a large discount from its *prima facie* impression. The alleged consensus of witnesses may easily reduce itself to the testimony of one, and the evidence of this one, the compiler of Q, is not altogether consistent with his own material or with the indirect evidence of others. Against it stands the incongruity of the conception with other teachings of Jesus, and the case with which the enthusiastic apocalypticism of the early church might pass from certain sayings about the "Coming of the Son of Man" to the equivalence, "Jesus himself is the coming Son of Man." The preponderance of evidence would seem to incline toward an origin for this equivalence not in the sane and sober mind of Jesus, but in the exalted and visionary expectations of a church on fire with momentary expectations of the end.

*SACERDOTALISM*¹

GEORGE E. HERR

NEWTON THEOLOGICAL INSTITUTION

The provisions for the fourth of the series of Dudleian Lectures are as follows:

"The fourth and last lecture I would have for the maintaining, explaining, and proving the validity of the ordination of ministers or pastors of the churches, and so their administration of the sacraments or ordinances of religion as the same hath been practiced in New England, from the first beginning of it, and so continued at this day. Not that I would in any wise invalidate Episcopal Ordination, as it is commonly called and practiced in the Church of England; but I do esteem the method of ordination as practiced in Scotland, at Geneva, and among the dissenters in England, and in the churches in this country, to be very safe, Scriptural and valid; and that the great Head of the church, by his blessed spirit, hath owned, sanctified, and blessed them accordingly, and will continue to do so to the end of the World. Amen."

The topic of Sacerdotalism is naturally involved in the terms of this Foundation.

The term "Sacerdotalism" has been defined as "the doctrine that the man who ministers in sacred things, the institution through which and the office or order in which he ministers, the acts he performs, the sacraments and rites he celebrates, are so ordained and constituted of God as to be the peculiar channels of His grace, essential to true worship, necessary to the being of religion, and the full realization of the religious life."²

The sacerdotal system is not necessarily connected with an episcopal system, though as an historical fact it has usually been identified with some theory of the rights and powers of bishops. In its widest significance Sacerdotalism is not necessarily con-

¹ Dudleian Lecture, delivered at Harvard University, May 4, 1910.

² A. M. Fairbairn, *Studies in Religion and Theology*, p. 19.

nected, as the etymology of the term indicates, with the priesthood, for the distinctive note of Sacerdotalism is exclusiveness. It signifies that a given order of men, or a given institution, is a peculiar channel of divine grace, in such a sense that true worship and the full significance of the religious life is only possible through it. Any denomination of Christians which holds that its church order, its officials, or its rites are essential to the bestowment of the grace of God, identifies itself with a phase of Sacramentalism. Presbyterianism, Independency, or Quakerism, by a note of exclusiveness, may easily become, in a legitimate, if not in the etymological sense, sacerdotal.

But historically Sacerdotalism, for the most part, has been true to the derivation of the word. It connects itself with a polity and a priesthood, an order of men, who stand in such a relation to Deity that they and they alone become the media of his grace. In Judaism this order was hereditary. In the Roman communion this order reaches back by tactual succession and consecration to the apostles. Grace flows downward from Christ himself and his apostles through a line of bishops every one of whom has received consecration from a predecessor until there is an unbroken line back to Christ himself.

The sharp antithesis to this position is taken by those communions which hold to the true priesthood of all believers. According to their view no intermediary between the soul and Christ is necessary. Any human soul may come directly to him in repentance and faith and receive the full measure of his grace.

The leading distinction between the two systems lies in answer to the question, What must one do to share the grace of God? The sacerdotalist says, "Go to the priest and receive the sacraments, which can only be administered by one who has been prelatically ordained." The evangelical says, "Go directly to Christ in repentance and faith and receive eternal life at his hands."

The Church of England, during the half-century following the reforming parliament of 1529, did not hold strenuously to the sacerdotal system of Rome. The prayer books of Edward and Elizabeth and the Thirty-nine Articles may be interpreted in a sense which favors the Roman theory of the priesthood, but

that interpretation is nullified by various facts. It is difficult for any one who is familiar with the mental attitude and temper of the reforming divines to believe that Hooker and Cranmer and Latimer did not reach a point which was very nearly the modern evangelical position. But we are not left to conjecture; all these men certainly recognized the theologians and pastors of the continent as the possessors of a ministry as valid as their own.³

The view, too, of Hooker in his *Ecclesiastical Polity* left the door open for the recognition of the Presbyterians of Geneva, the Lutherans of Saxony, and the Independents of Frankfort. He said:

I see that certain reformed churches, the Scottish especially and the French, have not that which best agreeth with the Holy Scripture—I mean the government that is by bishops—inasmuch as both those churches are fallen under a different kind of regimen, which to remedy it is for the one altogether too late, and too soon for the other during this present affliction and trouble; this their defect and imperfection I had rather lament in such a case than exagitate.⁴

And Bishop Lancelot Andrews (1555–1625) could write: “He is blind who doth not see churches existing without it [episcopacy]. He is hard-hearted who denieth them salvation. We are not so hard-hearted.”⁵ As late as the reign of James I, Lord Bacon, in his Advertisement, characterized the denial that the Protestant pastors of the continent were “lawful ministers” as the crude and impertinent opinion of “some indiscreet persons.”⁶

Macaulay’s well-known summary of the position of the Church of England as to sacerdotalism during the Reformation and the generations immediately following it can hardly be gainsaid:

The Church of Rome held that Episcopacy was of divine institution and certain supernatural graces of a high order had been transmitted by

³ William Cunningham, *Historical Theology*, vol. i, p. 32.

⁴ *Ecclesiastical Polity*, book iii, chap. 4.

⁵ “Nec tamen si nostra divini juris sit, inde sequitur, vel quod sine ea salus non sit, vel quod stare non possit Ecclesia. Caecus sit, qui non videat stantes sine ea Ecclesias. Ferreus sit, qui salutem eis neget. Nos non sumus illi ferrei.” *Opuscula: Responsio ad epist. II Petri Molinaei*, edition of 1629, p. 176.

⁶ Bacon’s Works, Montagu ed., vol. ii, p. 417.

the imposition of hands through fifty generations from the Eleven who received their commission on the Galilean Mount to the Bishops who met at Trent. A large body of Protestants, on the other hand, regarded prelacy as positively unlawful, and persuaded themselves that they found a very different form of ecclesiastical government prescribed in Scripture. The founders of the Anglican Church took a middle course. They retained episcopacy, but they did not declare it to be an institution essential to the welfare of a Christian society, or to the efficacy of the sacraments. Cranmer, indeed, on one occasion plainly avowed his conviction that, in the primitive times, there was no distinction between bishops and priests, and that the laying on of hands was altogether superfluous.⁷

The *jure divino* theory of Church polity was made a leading issue in England through the Presbyterian Cartwright. Calvin would have agreed with Hooker as to church government. Both would have said that the controlling factors in determining what polity was most advisable in given circumstances were reasonable deductions from Scripture and the experience of the ages, tempered by considerations of expediency. Cartwright, however, became so enamoured of Presbyterianism that he taught that the Presbyterian polity existed by divine right. Archbishop Bancroft took the same ground for episcopacy.⁸ Bancroft himself was not consistent with this view in his own practice, but he sowed the seed. It did not immediately come to harvest, however. So late as 1518 James I recognized the standing of the non-episcopal churches by sending commissioners to the Synod of Dort. But the fruitage was not long delayed. Archbishop Laud (1573-1645) did for the Church of England what Strafford did for the monarchy. The churchmanship of Laud was not the churchmanship of Newman or R. H. Froude, but it was as exclusive in its claims of the necessity of episcopal ordination to constitute a true church or a valid celebration of the eucharist.

The extent to which the sacerdotal theory came to dominate the Church of England is shown by a comparison of the Act of Uniformity of 1662 (14 Charles II, cap. 4) with that of 1559 (1 Elizabeth, cap. 2). In these acts the Prayer Book is enforced with almost equal stringency. But the act of Elizabeth laid no such

⁷ Macaulay, *History of England*, vol. i, pp. 58-59.

⁸ A Sermon preached at Paules Crosse the 9 of Februarie, 1588.

stress upon episcopal ordination as the act of the Restoration parliament. The sacerdotal claim expressed in this Act was one of its principal grounds of offence to the deprived ministers. Howe, for example, made his objection to reordination a principal reason for his refusal to conform. He stated this to the Bishop of Exeter, and when the Bishop inquired how reordination could hurt him, Howe replied: "It hurts my *understanding*. . . . Nothing can have two beginnings. I am sure I am a minister of Christ. I cannot begin again to be a minister."

The New England churches only gradually reached their independent position, though it was logically involved in their general attitude. The Plymouth Colony regarded John Robinson as pastor. There appears to be no evidence that the sacraments were observed before the coming of Lyford, and his disreputable career must have given a shock to any remaining sentiment that the impartation of grace could be in any way dependent on ordination. In the Massachusetts Bay Colony the first ministers had received episcopal ordination in the Church of England, but the events that had been taking place in England, the triumphs of the Presbyterians and Independents, the restoration of Charles II, and his Act of Uniformity, had dispelled the last fleecy cloud of sanctity from episcopal ordination. It is not wonderful that Judge Dudley, trained under the New England system, perfectly familiar with the course of events thus hastily surveyed, should have prescribed that the topic of one of the lecture courses he founded at Harvard College should be the defence of non-episcopal ordination.

It is unnecessary to follow the modern development of Sacerdotalism in the Church of England in the Tractarian and Ritualistic movements. It is sufficient to point out that the Gorham case (1849) settled the right of the Evangelicals within the Established Church, and the *Essays and Reviews* case did the same for the men of the Broad Church. A recent historian states the exact fact when he says: "The position taken by the highest courts is to this effect, that a clergyman may say and write what he pleases on theological matters, so long as he does not distinctly contradict the exact words of the Articles or the Prayer Book. The utmost freedom is now accorded the English clergy, all shades

of opinion abounding.”⁹ It is probably just to say that while the Church of England is largely sacerdotal in practice, it is not necessarily so in doctrine.

In view of this survey we see exactly what the protest of this lectureship is. It is not against the episcopal ordination practiced by the Church of England any more than it is against a theory of Presbyterianism or Independency that would make such organizations the sole channel of divine grace. The protest is against any theory of the ministry or of the church which makes a given order of men or a given institution the necessary intermediary between the soul and Christ. The terms of Judge Dudley’s Foundation make this clear beyond question.

This protest may be vindicated on several distinct grounds.

I. The ground which Judge Dudley specifically mentioned deserves our attention. “The great Head of the Church, by his blessed Spirit, hath owned, sanctified, and blessed them [non-episcopal ordinations] accordingly, and will continue to do so to the end of the world.” Those who are outside the sacerdotal circle actually share the divine grace.

Purcell’s *Life of Cardinal Manning* is one of those biographies which, following the example of Froude’s *Carlyle*, discloses the reverse side of the tapestry quite as much as the pictured. Frequently, towards the close of his life, the Cardinal writes in a tone of disillusionment as to the practical working of the Roman system. I cite Manning’s confession because it so admirably vindicates in our modern world the contention of our founder that the administration of the sacraments or ordinances of religion at the hands of those episcopally ordained is not in the least necessary for the possession of divine grace. Manning wrote August 5, 1890:

My experience among those who are out of the Church confirms all that I have written of the doctrines of grace. I have intimately known souls living by faith, hope, and charity, and the sanctifying Grace with the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, in humility, absolute purity of heart and life, in constant meditation on Holy Scripture, unceasing prayer, complete self-denial, personal work among the poor; in a word, living lives of visible sanctification, as undoubtedly the work of the Holy Ghost

⁹ Newman, *Church History*, vol. ii, p. 658.

as I have ever seen. I have seen this in whole families, rich and poor, and in all conditions of life. . . .

And further, all the great works of charity in England have had their beginning out of the Church, for instance, the abolition of the slave trade and of slavery; and the persevering protest of the Anti-Slavery Society. Not a Catholic name so far as I know shared in this. France, Portugal, and Brazil have been secretly or openly slave trading or, till now even, slave holding. The whole Temperance movement. It was a Quaker that made F. Mathew a total abstainer. Catholic Ireland and the Catholics of England, until now, have done little for temperance. The Anglican and Dissenting ministers are far more numerous total abstainers than our priests. The Act of Parliament to protect animals from cruelty was carried by a non-Catholic Irishman. The Anti-Vivisection Act also. Both are derided to my knowledge among Catholics. The Acts to protect children from cruelty were the work of Dissenters. On these three Societies there is hardly a Catholic name. On the last, mine was for long the only one. So again in the uprising against the horrible depravity which destroys young girls—multitudes of ours—I was literally denounced by Catholics; not one came forward. If it was ill done why did nobody try to mend it? I might go on. There are endless works for the protection of shop assistants, overworked railway and tram men, women and children ground down by sweaters, and driven by starvation wage upon the streets. Not one of the works in their behalf were started by us; hardly a Catholic name is to be found in their Reports. Surely we are in the Sacristy. It is not that our Catholics deliberately refuse, but partly they do not take pains to know; partly they are prejudiced. "Can any good thing come out of Nazareth?" Partly they are suspicious. "Who knows it is not a proselytising affair?" And finally they live on easily, unconscious that Lazarus lies at their gate full of sores.¹⁰

A thorough-going sacerdotalist probably would reply to the argument based on the fact that apparently the fruits of grace are found in those who have never received it through priestly channels, that there are results of grace, and these the most important, which are scarcely manifest in the temporal order, only in the eternal realm. They would say with the author of Tract XXXV (probably John Henry Newman himself):

A person not commissioned from the bishop may use the words of baptism, and sprinkle or bathe with water *on earth*, but there is no promise from Christ that such a man shall admit souls to the Kingdom of Heaven.

¹⁰ Purcell, *Life of Cardinal Manning*, vol. ii, pp. 780-781.

A person not commissioned may break bread and pour out wine and pretend to give the Lord's Supper, but it can afford no comfort to any to receive it at his hands, because there is no warrant from Christ to lead communicants to suppose that while he does so here *on earth* they will be partakers in the Savior's *heavenly* body and blood.¹¹

But is it not a sufficient answer to such a line of reasoning to say that the government of God is a unity, and that the same moral principles control in this world or in any realm of existence that God has created? Just as fire burning in your grate is the same as fire in the remotest fixed stars, so justice, love, and fellowship with God are the same in all realms. Salvation is the same experience in all souls. It is not only deliverance from punishment; it is not only transportation into an ideal environment. At heart and in essence it is fellowship with God, and deliverance from evil and all the anticipations we associate with heaven are the concomitants and sequences of that fellowship. The author of the Twenty-third Psalm had a deep insight into this truth when he wrote:

Yea, though I walk through the valley of death,
I will fear no evil; for thou art with me.

And the author of this psalm based his confidence of fellowship with God in the future upon the fact that he had the evidence and the consciousness of that fellowship now.

The Lord is my shepherd; I shall not want.
He maketh me to lie down in green pastures.
He leadeth me beside the still waters. He restoreth my soul.
He guideth me in the paths of righteousness for his name's sake.

The Christian thought of our time is apprehending this truth of the unity of life and the unity of the divine government with more clearness than ever before. It is the great inference from monotheism which men have been reluctant to draw.

When one traverses a continent to meet a friend whom he has never seen but from whom he has received great benefits and by whose counsels he has been guided; when Emerson crosses the

¹¹ Quoted by H. C. Sheldon, *Sacerdotalism*, New York, 1909.

Atlantic and greets Carlyle; the past experience of fellowship and sympathy is the basis of the deeper relationship growing out of the larger opportunity. We do not know how the eternal realm differs from that of the earth, but we are absolutely certain of the unity of personal life and the identity of spiritual principles. The word of a priest, no matter what his credentials or how precise his ritual, asserting that by something he has done for us our souls are brought into fellowship with God, is so slight and trivial that it is unmeaning compared with the witness of God's spirit that one is accepted of Christ and is in spiritual fellowship with him, or compared with the fact that one is guided by his principles, manifests his temper, and obeys his word. It seems as if our Lord taught precisely this when he said: "If ye love me, keep my commandments. He that hath my commandments and keepeth them, he it is that loveth me, and he that loveth me shall be loved of my Father, and I will love him, and will manifest myself to him."

II. Another consideration deserves attention, viz., that sacerdotalism obscures the broad distinction between the church and the kingdom of God and their relations. The church occupies a small place comparatively in the New Testament; Jesus refers to it only three times. Generally, the word *ecclesia* denotes the local company of believers. For political reasons Paul seldom employed the term "kingdom," instead of *ecclesia*. In the letter to the Ephesians, especially, he idealized the *ecclesia* until its content approximated the conception of Jesus when he spoke of "the kingdom." But the two ideas are entirely distinct. The church is the means for promoting the interests of the kingdom. Men are not in the church to be brought into the kingdom; they should be in the church because they are in the kingdom.

The kingdom is the principal topic of our Lord's parables and discourses. When his disciples came asking what should be the chief objects of human desire, he gave them the Prayer of the Kingdom. When the question was put to him: "What is the *summum bonum*?" he said, "Seek ye first the Kingdom of God and his righteousness." And the kingdom of God is conformity of the spirit and life of the individual and of all the activities

of related individuals to the divine ideal. The kingdom of God comes on earth through the obedience of earth to the divine will as heaven obeys it. "The Kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Spirit." The passage just quoted from Cardinal Manning, in which he describes the temper and the good works of many of those whom he had known outside of his own communion, is an excellent outline of the spirit and purposes and conduct which characterize membership in the kingdom of God. The conditions of this heavenly citizenship are not at all formal or ritualistic; they are spiritual and moral.

The discovery in the New Testament of this doctrine of the kingdom has been the source of some of the strongest inspirations and deepest insights granted to the religious life of our age. We have come to recognize the primacy of the petition that God's kingdom may come and his will be done on earth as it is in heaven. This conception has delivered us from that extreme form of other-worldliness which Byron satirized when he wrote:¹²

"Deep in yon cave Honorius long did dwell,
In hope to merit heaven by making earth a hell."

The doctrine of the kingdom compels us to ask, Who are the proper members of the kingdom? What are the characteristics of a citizen? Or to put it in another way, What manner of person is a good man? What is the true notion of saintship? The Sermon on the Mount is principally devoted to answering that question. But the mediaeval church ignored and forgot the answer of Jesus.

In the view of the mediaevalist the world and the forces of human history are essentially antagonistic to the soul made in the image of God. Man does not realize his true worth in the historic process but by being lifted out of it and above it into a vague supernatural realm. Asceticism is the logical conclusion of this outlook upon life. One of the fundamental distinctions between Romanism and Protestantism is as to this relation of man to nature and the processes of history. Protestant-

¹² Childe Harold, canto i, stanza xx.

ism has not denied that "the world" is in many ways antagonistic to the soul, but at the same time it regards the physical, social, industrial environments in which the lot of men is cast, their place in the historic process, as the field on which men are to manifest devotion to God and their fellows. This is the arena on which sainthood is to be won, and it is to be achieved not by withdrawing one's self from the common duties and relationships of life, but by using them nobly. To one of this cast of thought a merchant or manufacturer who illustrates the Christian temper in his relations to his employees, his customers, and the public, who is living to God as a business man, is just as much entitled to the term "spiritual" as the clergyman or the deaconess.

For the mediaevalist the ideal of the spiritual life is conveyed in unforgettable form in the pages of Thomas à Kempis's *Imitatio*. In that book the antithesis between the spirit and the world is sharpened. The natural desires and emotions are to be stoutly repressed. Interest in the affairs of daily life is condemned. The entire ideal is ascetic. The antithesis between the spiritual life and the life which the Greeks described as "according to nature" is emphasized to an extreme.

The modern ideal is not, perhaps, illustrated in any formal book, but it shows itself clearly in the personal life of Martin Luther, a husband and father, a friend and neighbor, endeavoring to carry into these relations, however imperfectly he succeeded at times, the temper of the Gospel. This ideal is finely exemplified in the modern Christian business man who wins wealth by legitimate means, who uses it to promote many good causes, who gives not only his money but himself to them, who is without reproach as an employer, a neighbor, a citizen, or a Christian. Simeon Stylites is the mediaeval saint; the modern saint is David Livingstone,—explorer, scientist, civilizer, and missionary,—a man who laid the foundations of the kingdom of God in a whole continent.

The mediaeval ideal of sainthood is given in Parkman's description of Jeanne le Ber, the saint of Montreal.¹² The modern ideal of sainthood is represented by a wife and mother who interpenetrates all her duties and relationships with the Christian motive

¹² The Old Régime in Canada, pp. 356-358.

and temper. And this is the ideal of the Sermon on the Mount. The spiritual is not the unearthly but the truly normal.

Membership in the kingdom of God means a life of this kind, and not translation into a vague supernatural realm at variance with the natural order. It means being a good man according to the ideal of Jesus, and the conditions of achieving this goodness are not at all formal or ritual; they are ethical and spiritual. The gospel is not a system of magic by which one may be brought into a life of goodness independently of his own co-operation. The gospel is a message to the intellect, to the affections, and to the will, and no one receives its grace until he makes an intelligent, affectionate, and resolute response to it. No one can exercise faith for another any more than he can see or love for another.

The supreme function of the church is to extend the kingdom of God by bringing to men the message of revelation. Only those who are loyal subjects of the kingdom fulfil the conditions for membership in the church, or minister to the function of the church. Whatever formal or ritual observances may be associated with church membership, the essential condition, without which everything else is worthless, is membership in the kingdom of God.

To one who holds this conception of the church and of the kingdom, and of their mutual relation, the church has no grace to impart. There is no mysterious, magical power conveyed through any of its officers or any of its ceremonies. What the church does is to witness to the truth and to proclaim the revelation of God in Christ, and, since revelation is not revelation unless it is understood, the principal function of the church is making an appeal to the moral natures of men. And the grace of God is imparted to men through that response of self to the Gospel. The church has no treasures of grace. She is not commissioned to impart anything except the truth, to which she witnesses by teaching and example, and when she leads men to embrace it, the grace of God, imparted by himself, comes into the self-surrendered life.

While a church polity and government are amply justified, and we may even, for the sake of argument, concede that there is an ideal polity, all considerations of government or orders are

purely external and subordinate. They are secondary agencies. The primary agency is the divine spirit awakening a response within human hearts which leads them to co-operate with God. In his best moments Luther described faith as "the personal apprehension of Christ's living presence with the heart and the entire surrender to his power." It is personal faith that becomes the tangent point between the soul and Christ, and the channel of divine grace. As Luther said, there is no priesthood except the priesthood of all believers. "There is one mediator between God and men, himself man, Christ Jesus, who gave himself a ransom for all" (1 Tim. 2 5).

III. Our protest also derives great force from a worthy conception of the divine character. By the practical exigencies of human life, the Roman obedience, which carries the sacerdotal theory to an extreme development, has not only admitted the validity of lay baptism but has anathematized those who deny it. This anathema is a magnificent demonstration of the power of a worthy conception of God to destroy a narrow theory. On the Roman assumption that baptism was essential to salvation, any worthy conception of God made it impossible to tolerate the view that the salvation of men was dependent on the act of a priest, who might be physically unable to administer the rite. This breach in the sacerdotal theory indicates the fatal argument against it. The only alternative to the recognition of lay baptism was that baptism is in no wise essential to salvation, and that, in our judgment, was the true position. The Roman church was unable to go to that extent, but it did strike a mortal blow to thorough-going sacerdotalism in its recognition of lay baptism.

In the discussion of the divine character any considerations drawn from a minute exegesis of Scripture or from the interpretations and practices of antiquity seem to be irrelevant. The caution of Lord Bacon is of force:

It were better to have no opinion of God at all than such as is unworthy of Him, for the one is unbelief, the other is contumely, and certainly superstition is the reproach of the Deity. Plutarch well saith to that purpose: "Surely, I had rather a great deal that men should say there was no such man as Plutarch, than that they should say that there

was one Plutarch that would eat his children as soon as they were born." ¹⁴

Erasmus gave beautiful and classic expression to the immediacy of the divine help in his colloquy on the Shipwreck. The ship has struck and everyone is in alarm.

A. Did they pray meanwhile?

B. Earnestly. One sang, *Salve regina!* another, *Credo in Deum*. Some there were who had special prayers, not unlike magic formulas against danger.

A. How religious we are in times of affliction! In times of prosperity neither God nor saints come into our head. What were you doing all this time? Did you offer vows to none of the saints?

B. Not one.

A. But you sought the protection of some saint?

B. Not even that.

A. Why not?

B. Because heaven is a large place. If I commend myself to some saint,—St. Peter, for example, who is most likely to hear me first of all, since he stands at the door,—before he goes to God and explains my case, I shall be already lost.

A. What did you do then?

B. I went immediately to the Father himself, saying: "Our Father who art in heaven." None of the saints hears sooner than he, and none gives more willingly what is asked.

Is it not true that we may go directly to God, that his relationship to the soul is immediate, and that repentance and faith are the only conditions of receiving his choicest blessing? Is it not true that a company of shipwrecked sailors on a desert island whose hearts have been moved toward God in self-surrender by studying a New Testament that has been saved from the sea, may form a church as "valid," in any rational sense of the word "valid," as any church that ever existed, and may celebrate the sacraments in a way as acceptable to God and as profitable to themselves as any enthroned bishop or mitred abbot can minister these symbols? Why is not the principle that the Roman church has admitted in regard to baptism to be applied in case of necessity to all rites of religion?

¹⁴ Bacon, *Essays*, "On Superstition."

But, it may be replied, however this position may be justified from a theoretical point of view, as a matter of historical fact has not the divine grace been mediated to men through specific channels? Was there not under Judaism a chosen people and a restricted priesthood? Is not the burden of the Old Testament the peculiar relationship of Israel to the Most High, one shared by no other race or people?

All this might be admitted, but when we argue from the Old Testament that similar conditions prevail in Christian times, we overlook the distinctive note of universality that Christianity introduced into the whole conception of religion. It was given to Peter, by nature one of the most narrow and exclusive of our Lord's first disciples, to see that "God is no respecter of persons; but in every nation he that feareth him and worketh righteousness is acceptable to him." The Epistles to the Hebrews and to the Galatians lose most of their significance if the grace of God is dependent on any human means or order whatever. It is interesting to observe with what painful art the New Testament must be treated to draw from it any conclusion but that the main thing, so transcending all others that in comparison with it they become almost negligible, is the personal attitude of the individual soul toward God. This is the true universality of Christianity. In its heart and essence it emancipates itself from all externalities and, as Luther saw, brings the human soul into direct personal relationship with God in Christ.

But does not this view disparage the place of the church in the Christian religion? To some it may appear to have this result, but it only does so by remanding the church to its true place and indicating its proper function. Immense mischief has been done by conceiving of the church as composed of those who are to receive the Christian life because they are members of it, instead of being composed of those who are members of it because they have received divine grace. From this point of view the church is only in a limited and secondary sense a channel of grace; it is primarily a witness and a seal to grace. And so, when we come to the question with which we are specifically concerned, ordination, whether episcopal or that of Geneva or of Scotland, only formally, externally, creates a ministry. The creation, as

Hooker clearly saw, is by the call and the grace of Christ, and the act of the bishop or of the presbytery or of the council or of the single church simply authenticates and attests, so far as prayerful human judgment may, the reality of the divine call. But the grace that resides in the ministry, and is transmitted through it, is not imparted to men by men through any process whatever; it comes to the man from the Risen Lord, and seals a human ministry with divine tokens.

**STRZYGOWSKI AND HIS THEORY OF EARLY
CHRISTIAN ART**

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The study of the monuments of the early centuries of the Christian Era has hitherto received its inspiration from one or other of two sources. Christian scholars, like De Rossi and Wilpert and Kraus, have been interested in the subject because of its Christian content and significance, and classical scholars, like Wickhoff and Riegl, have studied the monuments of this period as the expiring forms of classic art. Both classes of scholars have, in great measure, confined their observations to the monuments of Italy, especially to those of Rome and to the distinctly Roman provinces. Against this point of view that "All roads lead to Rome," a new battle-cry is raised, "*Ex oriente lux.*" It is not to Rome, but to Alexandria and Egypt, Ephesus and Asia Minor, Antioch and Syria, Jerusalem and Palestine, that we must look for the solution of early Christian and mediæval art. The new champion is Dr. Josef Strzygowski, and he is gathering adherents amongst the younger writers in various German universities.

We assume that little is known about Strzygowski in this country. His works are not translated into English and his name does not yet figure in our biographical dictionaries. From the German *Wer ist's?* we gather a few biographical details. He was born in 1862 at Biala in Galicia, near Bielitz in Austrian Silesia; his father was a manufacturer, his mother, Edle von Friedenfeldt, belonged to a family raised to the nobility by Charles VI. He received his education at the Realschule at Jena, the Gymnasium at Vienna, and the Universities of Vienna, Berlin, and Munich. Prior to his university studies he had gone

into the manufacturing business, but broke away and determined to become a scholar in 1883. In 1895 he married Elfriede Hofmann, and has had four children. Their names, Elfi, Sese, Senta, Nora, are not uninteresting.

An adequate appreciation of Strzygowski through his works would be no easy task. His articles cover a wide field and are scattered in many scientific periodicals; his books are rapidly increasing in number, but his most important work, a General History of Byzantine Art, is not yet published. We shall content ourselves, therefore, with calling attention to a few examples of his work, especially to such as will give some notion of his theory of early Christian art.

In 1885 he published his *Iconographie der Taufe Christi*. This book was published in Munich, was dedicated to Heinrich von Brunn and to Anton Springer, and is apparently a developed doctor's thesis. Nowhere else can one find so full a treatment of the representations of the Baptism of Christ. The 169 illustrations give it the character of a *Corpus*, especially in the early periods of Christian history. Not content with early Christian, Byzantine, Lombard, and Carolingian representations, he traces his theme down to the beginning of the Renaissance in German, French, English, Flemish, and Italian sources. His comprehensive command of material and his careful attention to all the variations of his theme resulted in making this volume a model of that "*Detailforschung*," without which as a foundation general treatises have little value. It may be noted in passing that in this volume, apart from the emphasis given to Byzantine, Russian, and German monuments, there is evinced no oriental or anti-roman bias.

Less comprehensive in scope, but equally careful in treatment, is his study entitled *Calenderbilder des Chronographen vom Jahre 354*, published as *Ergänzungsheft No. 1* of the *Jahrbuch des kaiserlich-deutschen archaeologischen Instituts*, 1888. In this case he is examining a manuscript ultimately of Roman origin, but is led to distinguish between the ancient calendars of the East and those of the West. The study of this class of miniatures is thus leading him to observe the characteristics of oriental miniatures in contrast to those of Roman origin.

During the two years from April, 1888, to April, 1890, the young scholar made his *Studienreise*, visiting Salonica, Mount Athos, Athens, Constantinople, the west coast of Asia Minor, the Caucasus, St. Petersburg, and Moscow. This journey gave him an opportunity of personally inspecting many Byzantine monuments, inspired a series of articles, and deepened a resolve to devote his chief energies to a comprehensive History of Byzantine Art. After his return from this journey we find him in 1891 installed as privat-dozent in the History of Art at the University of Vienna, a position from which he was called in 1892 to a professorship in the University at Graz. His *Byzantinische Denkmäler* (1891-1903) represent very inadequately his activity at this period. Here he published the important Armenian Evangelary from Etschmiadzin, as a prelude to a general discussion of Armenian miniature painting. Here also, in collaboration with Professor Forchheimer, he gave a detailed and historical account of the cisterns of Constantinople. Constantinople in his view does not represent a source of new art motives. It was a new Rome, a maelstrom of classic and oriental forms, a receiving and distributing centre for many centuries. The cisterns point to Alexandria as an important source of the complex product known as Byzantine art. Ten years elapsed between the publication of the second and third volumes of the *Byzantinische Denkmäler*, and to this third volume Strzygowski contributes only a general introduction on the Rise and Triumph of Byzantine Art. The remainder of the volume is the work of his pupils. But for our purposes the catalogue of Strzygowski's writings at the end of the volume is of special interest. Here he has enumerated only such articles as are concerned with the history of oriental art and published between the years 1885 and 1903. They are no less than 71 in number, distributed as follows: 3 are of general character, 15 have reference to Egypt, 10 to Syria and Palestine, 10 to Asia Minor, 8 to Constantinople and Thrace, 2 to Salonica and Macedonia, 6 to Greece, 5 to the West in its relation to the East, and 12 deal with iconography and miscellaneous subjects. When we remember that during this period was founded the *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, a periodical to which Strzygowski has been from the outset a constant contributor of articles, notes,

and numberless reviews, we begin to form some notion of the great mental activity of a man already well occupied with university lecturing and other official duties. The volume entitled *Orient oder Rom*, bearing the date 1901, is not only an excellent sample of his works, but illustrates also the ever-growing tendency in his mind to emphasize the Orient and to diminish the importance of Rome as a factor in the civilization and art of the early centuries of our era. In the introduction he attacks the theories of Wickhoff, as believing in the development of a specifically Roman art during the first three centuries of the Christian Era, while admitting oriental influences during the fourth and fifth centuries; Kraus, on the other hand, he represents as believing that Alexandria was the formative influence for the first three centuries, and that Rome then became the centre throughout the entire period of the Middle Ages. To these theories Strzygowski opposes his own. Kraus, he holds, is right in recognizing oriental influences in the early period and wrong in emphasizing Rome for the later; Wickhoff is right in recognizing the Orient in the later period, wrong in supposing that there was any specifically Roman art in the first three centuries. Stated baldly, whoever explains Christian art through the Orient is right, whoever raises the banner for Rome is wrong. This is the point of view for which henceforth Strzygowski becomes a violent partisan. The four articles which make up the remainder of the volume are specific interpretations of this general view. The first relates to a Palmyrene tomb dating from the year 259 A.D. The plan of the tomb, its vaults, and its decoration, he contends are not Roman, but hellenistic. This, however, might readily be granted even by the advocates of Roman art. The second article describes a *Christus-relief* in the Berlin Museum, which he properly classes with other similar sculptures as exhibiting hellenistic and specifically Asia-Minor sources of inspiration. This might also be admitted without denying all individuality to Roman art. Then follows an article on a figured fragment of wood-sculpture from Egypt. The types here figured have some analogy with those on the Helena sarcophagus in the Vatican and with some well-known ivory carvings in Paris and elsewhere, but the reasoning in support of the thesis that these types are all of

Egyptian origin is inconclusive. The fourth article concerns what are popularly known as Coptic tapestries with Christian subjects, a little-appreciated class of objects which may readily have exerted an important influence upon later ecclesiastical wall painting and window-glass decoration. As nearly all these textiles have been found in Egypt and the types represented are not specifically Roman, the contention that they belong to the Christian art of the Orient will not be seriously contested. The final article treats of Important Remains of Constantine's Building on the Site of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem. The important remains here referred to are portions of an ancient decorated cornice, analogous in style to architectural remains at Damascus, Palmyra, and Baalbec, and referable in this case to a portion of the building erected by Constantine himself. This cornice, he concludes, very properly, is non-roman in style. It belongs to a family, the other members of which are found in Syria and in Egypt, but not in Rome. The domical building and the basilica erected here by Constantine, and designed to be more beautiful than any other, give to Jerusalem an importance in the history of art which is often forgotten. But it does not necessarily follow that Strzygowski is right in looking to Jerusalem for the origin of the basilica or in his belief that from Jerusalem Christian art as well as Christianity itself radiated to the ends of the earth.

In 1903 he published his *Kleinasien*, the sub-title of which, *Ein Neuland der Kunstgeschichte*, was expressly designed to attract attention. This is not a work inspired by his own explorations, for the materials of the volume consist of photographs and plans taken by G. I. Smirnov in 1895 and by G. W. Crowfoot and J. G. C. Anderson in 1900. Strzygowski, however, publishes and explains the significance of the revelations of these explorers in central and southern Asia Minor. It is not easy in a few words to summarize the contents of this volume, and a very brief sketch must suffice. Strzygowski distinguishes between the art of the coast cities and that of the interior. The coast cities were in communication by sea with the chief cities of the hellenistic world. Near the coast, therefore, we are apt to find throughout a longer period basilicas oriented towards the East, preceded by atria, and covered by wooden roofs; whereas in the interior

oriental features, derived from the earlier civilizations, are widespread. Here we find, for example, churches with two towers on the façade, recalling Hittite and Jewish prototypes; doors and windows piercing the lateral walls, as in Syria; compound piers, instead of columns; arches instead of architraves; vaults in place of coffered wooden ceilings. These oriental characteristics make their way to the coast and thence spread to the western world. Asia Minor becomes therefore, with Syria, an important source of inspiration not only for Byzantine, but for mediaeval European architecture. As compared with the churches of northern and central Syria, those of Asia Minor are not inscribed with their dates, hence the dating problem is more difficult, although Strzygowski is probably right in referring some of these buildings to a period as early as the fourth century. In Asia Minor, besides the basilica various buildings of central construction are found; octagons with and without galleries, octagons pierced by the cross as described by Gregory of Nyssa, the domed basilica (*Kuppelbasilica*) and the domed cruciform church (*Kreuzkuppelkirche*). The domed cruciform church appears to have existed in Armenia as early as the time of Nerses III (640–661), later became a popular Byzantine type, and from Constantinople may have spread to Asia Minor as well as to Venice and western France. The revelation of this series of churches in the heart of Asia Minor establishes for the history of architecture a new link connecting the East and the West.

Sculpture and painting for this period in Asia Minor are still largely an unknown quantity, though the few examples accessible reflect a similar mixture of hellenistic and oriental qualities. Rome, as an artistic power in Asia Minor, may now be set aside.

The concluding chapter of this volume treats of the origin of Romanesque art, and points out in rather unsystematic fashion the many oriental features which found their way into European art. These influences, he believes, came not through Rome, but direct from the Orient to such distributing centres as Ravenna, Milan, and Marseilles. In the Carolingian empire oriental and Germanic ideals met and formed a new product analogous to that established at Byzantium by the intermingling of oriental with Hellenic aims. If any one would like to follow Strzygowski

further in this direction, let him read his pamphlet entitled *Der Dom zu Aachen und seine Entwicklung* (1904), where the oriental character of the great Carolingian church is developed in detail.

The year 1904 marks the publication of two important works by Strzygowski, one a detailed catalogue of the Coptic monuments in the Cairo Museum, entitled *Koptische Kunst*, the other an exhaustive study of the ruins of *Mschatta*, published in the *Jahrbuch der königlich-preussischen Kunstsammlungen*, 1904, pp. 225-373. To the one, scholars will turn for accurate knowledge of the little-known but important field of Coptic sculpture, to the other for types of elaborate decorative motives which spread from Mesopotamia both east and west. The magnificent slabs of sculptured ornament from *Mschatta*, now the pride of the Berlin Museum, aroused Strzygowski's enthusiasm to the highest pitch. His appreciation of these sculptures and his instrumentality in bringing them to Europe he considers one of his most important works. *Mschatta* is not a Christian monument, but it is henceforth to be reckoned with in the history of Christian art as furnishing the most striking example of certain types of ornament found on Christian monuments in the West.

Strzygowski's general theory of Christian art is developed somewhat systematically in Schiele's *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, now in course of publication. The article *Altchristliche Kunst* is by Strzygowski, and appeared in 1908. The first three centuries of our era he describes as the hellenistic period. Jerusalem was the starting-point. From the synagogue was derived the Christian basilica; from the tombs of Palestine came the cruciform ground-plan; and from the East, also, buildings of circular and polygonal plan. Sculpture and painting were likewise hellenistic. From Asia Minor came the typical forms of Roman sarcophagi; from Alexandria and Antioch the artistic motives in catacomb paintings and early miniatures. Carthage, Alexandria, Antioch, Ephesus, the important centres, suffered from disastrous earthquakes. Rome was more fortunate in the preservation of her monuments. The second period, covering the second three centuries, is described as the oriental period. During this period Rome stagnates, Constantinople becomes not only the centre of the Empire, but also of artistic activity. Hel-

lenistic types cease to develop, or are fused with oriental forms from Egypt, Syria, Asia Minor, Armenia, and Mesopotamia. The monasteries of Egypt, Syria, and Asia Minor are now exerting a wide influence. With their spread come the oriental types of buildings, with towered façades, vaults, and domes; oriental methods in sculpture and painting, substituting historical for the mythological and symbolic treatment of religious themes; and various oriental arts, such as ivory carvings, mosaics, and enamels. From Syria and from Egypt come such important types as the bearded Christ and the enthroned Mary. The later periods he treats under the headings, Islam, Byzantium, the West. The taste for fine ornament without human elements, which characterized the art of Islam, was at once anti-hellenic and anti-christian and was derived from the interior of Western Asia. Byzantium looked to Asia Minor for the architects of such important buildings as Hagia Sophia and the Church of the Apostles, and adopted many Armenian and Persian types of ornament. Western Europe, after being deeply impressed with a *Schmuckstil* consisting largely of glass inlays derived from Persia and of braid ornaments from Armenia and Mesopotamia, entered upon the so-called Romanesque period, during which architectural, sculptural, and pictorial types were predominantly oriental in character. In all this development Rome had little or no share. Strzygowski concludes with a recommendation to theologians and to all readers of the new encyclopaedia to revise their conceptions in all directions. It is interesting to note that in an appended bibliography he mentions a half-dozen authors as having entirely erroneous views, and commends the reading of some seventeen of his own writings.

It has been our purpose to state rather than to criticise Strzygowski's general theory. We may, however, allow ourselves a few general remarks. Rome, as a cradle of Christian art, is too firmly established to be easily set aside as having a powerful influence on mediaeval and subsequent art. The spread of the Roman church throughout Europe carried with it, almost of necessity, the art forms with which that cult was associated. How much of the early art in Italy was due to initiative of Italian artists and how much was borrowed, is a question to be deter-

mined by the most careful study of specific examples. Rivoira, in his monumental work on Lombardic Architecture, has given us the best general treatise from the Italian point of view. His patriotic spirit impels him to find in Italy the origins of subsequent European art, and it is surprising to find how many prototypes of later architecture may be found without leaving the confines of Italy. On the other hand, Italy had been saturated from time immemorial with oriental and with classic influences, due to the influx of foreign artists, to the importation of foreign works of art, and to the impression made upon the minds of Roman conquerors by the great monuments of the older civilizations. However, an absolute antithesis between Rome on the one hand and the Orient on the other is an unfortunate one. Even more evidently than Alexandria and Ephesus and Antioch, Rome reflects both hellenistic and oriental influences. As our knowledge of the East increases, it becomes more and more clear that Rome was not the only centre of early Christian art. The value of Strzygowski's work consists, not in his attacks on classical or Christian scholars, but in the enthusiasm and the energy with which his scholarly efforts have opened up new vistas into the art of Asia Minor and Armenia, Syria, Egypt, and Constantinople. He has already given us so many important views of special portions of the field that we may look forward with ever-increasing interest to the promised general History of Byzantine Art, as one of the monumental works in the history of Christian art.

*A NEW NATURAL HISTORY OF RELIGION*¹

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That religion has a natural history, being included under the concepts that constitute the sciences of biology, psychology, and sociology, may by this time be assumed without argument. Details of the movement remain to be determined, but there is no longer any occasion to ask whether religion, or some form of it, is interpolated into the system of nature. But to adopt a principle is not the same as to apply it consistently. In spite of good intentions, remnants of the older view become incorporated into our would-be scientific structures. As instances, Professor King, in the book under review, specifies Max Müller's "perception of the infinite," Morris Jastrow's "religious instinct," Tiele's "innate sense of infinity," Brinton's postulate of "a religiosity of man as a part of his psychical being," and the theological notion of the gradual revelation of a specific and so-to-say pre-determined idea of God. In all these King sees only so many interpolations. They inject a formed religious consciousness into history, instead of explaining the genesis of the consciousness itself. The author therefore undertakes to show how religion first emerges out of a pre-religious type of life, and how ceremonial, the gods, and the development of high religions can all be fully accounted for by strictly natural conditions. Whether or not all his conclusions are convincing, he has produced a book that must be reckoned with. For not only does he attack a fundamental problem in a radical manner; not only has he collected a rich fund of anthropological material; he also brings to the analysis of this material the learning and the methods of a trained psychologist. The book is noteworthy, also, for the tenacity with which it follows the social clew to the origin and development of religion as opposed to all theories that give large

¹ Irving King, *The Development of Religion: A Study in Anthropology and Social Psychology*. New York, The Macmillan Company. 1910. pp. xxiv, 371.

place to emotional and intellectual reactions that are aroused by the phenomena of nature.

The central idea of the work is that religious states of mind arise from antecedent "overt" acts called forth from the psychophysical organism by the conditions of existence, particularly social existence. "The lack of a psychological basis is evident in practically all discussions of religious phenomena. . . . Nearly all are one-sided on account of the failure to take account of the reaction as the fundamental psychic unit." In the words of Goethe, "*Im Anfang war die That.*" Among social activities that are simple and natural responses to specific environmental conditions, certain ones may be called religious practices. They originate from no religious motive, aspiration, or antecedent of any kind, but they awaken a type of consciousness that is religious. What, then, are these spontaneous religious practices? Not those that serve an immediate biological utility, but rather accessory acts or chance accompaniments of utility-acts, sports and festivals expressing emotional overflow, and acts intermediate to relatively remote ends. They all represent values, but the values of more or less reflective appreciation rather than those of immediate pains and pleasures. By association of ideas these activities take on the importance of the primary utility-acts, and by imitation they are repeated and consolidated into a relatively distinct body. Thus the religious reaction is "secondary to a social process of some sort originating in other than a religious need."

If, then, we will retrace the evolution of religion, we must go backward from individual religious consciousness to a strictly social consciousness; from religious consciousness to religious group-practices; and these practices we shall find to be a sort of "aside" that has differentiated itself from the primary adjustment-reactions. Back of all religion, moreover, we reach an undifferentiated social existence that is non-religious.

The earliest development of the religious consciousness proceeds through the apparently universal primitive belief in a "mysterious power" (manitou, wakonda, orenda, mana, etc.) that can bless or injure. This power, King says, is impersonal and quasi-mechanical. If by animism is meant the notion that

things are spirits or the abode of spirits, then animism is not the earliest type of thought. Men must have undergone a considerable mental development before they could form the concept of spirit or person. For the same reason, however, they could not at first form the idea of the impersonal. We may therefore question whether King's repeated declaration that the "mysterious power" is impersonal is not an expression of his own distinction-making mind rather than of the standpoint of the primitive mind. In any case, King maintains, the "power" is not distinctly either religious or magical, but it is capable of playing into the hands of either religion or magic. Religion did not arise through the breakdown of magical control of the "power," for magic and religion coexist, and both use the "power." They shade into each other. Yet they differ in that religion is a more distinctly social development, an affair of the group, while magic is predominantly an individual affair. King makes many acute suggestions as to the probable rise of various magical practices. As in the case of religion, so here, the real explanation is no general principle such as the "sympathetic" view of spatial or causal connections, but rather accessory, or excess, or anticipatory, activities which by association and imitation acquire the importance of the central utility-act.

The appearance of deities is a direct consequence of social organization. The most primitive form of religion is simply the regulative social structure. "Whether there is also present a religious *consciousness* or not, is a matter of indifference." But because religious values are fundamentally social they had to be expressed at least in personal terms. The gods are not nature-powers that have been personified, but symbols of social valuations. Worship, too, is not based upon a mere analogy of social relations; it is itself a portion of the social activity. The ancestor-god simply perpetuates the family relations. Animals and other objects became gods because they seemed to possess the "power," and the favorable or unfavorable use of the "power" could be thought of in no other terms than those of friendliness or un-friendliness, the more so that many of the gods, without doubt, were simply men who had seemed to have an extraordinary portion of the "power."

Any profound change in the social interests of a group, as a transformation of industries, produces a corresponding change in the gods. Then the old gods are likely to grow dim, generalized, the "high gods of low religions"—high, not because of any function they perform, but because of their high abstractedness. Thus the actual social life is the universally controlling factor. Religion has no identity or continuity of its own; higher forms do not evolve out of lower; there is no true natural series in such successions as polytheism, henotheism, monotheism; rather, religion is nothing but the flowing product of social forces that are continuous.

All this applies to ethical monotheism, as to lower forms. The notion that there is one only god is not primarily an intellectual achievement; it arises neither through speculation nor through observation of the uniformities of nature, but by way of an intense and unified social consciousness. If a god, even a tribal god, fills the horizon of his worshippers, he is to them ultimate, supreme, functionally a *monotheos*. Even the Yahweh of the later prophets represents rather psychological than metaphysical monotheism. His high moral character, too, not less than his unity, has its roots in the social life of the people. "Primitive morals and primitive religion are but two sides of the same thing," and the primitive *ethos*, as King is careful to show, contains all the fundamental human virtues. These virtues, all through their development, are reflected into the gods, and the unrealized effort after goodness also reflects itself in the ideal qualities of the divine.

Thus we have in principle a complete natural history of religion. Its factors are simply psycho-physical organisms reacting socially to the conditions of existence. Religion is a product of these factors, and only a product. No special instinct, germ, or other primordial factor is needed. Moreover, this theory makes religion practically a by-product, for it is not directly related to the struggle for existence, or even to any immediate social utility. It is "appreciative" rather than "practical," a luxury rather than a staple food. The gods take no part in our actual adjustments. A deity is nothing but a symbol for values already realized in experience or else looked for in future experience. King is careful to say that he speaks within the limits of psychology

only, leaving out of account the question of the metaphysical existence of a deity. Nevertheless, he explicitly commits himself to a view of reality that makes it merely functional, and therefore brings it wholly within the sphere of functional psychology. "Our concepts are only functionally valid, and do not refer to ontological realities. All our realities are of the functional variety. They are realities because they serve these definite functions, and for no other reason." Possibly the meaning of the first of these apparently contradictory statements is this: "If you hold to a transcendental metaphysics, you can accept this psychological account without necessarily contradicting the notion of a really existing and transcendently efficient deity." But it is clear that King himself writes from the standpoint, not merely of scientific method in general, but also of the philosophy of absolute empiricism. This is not the place to weigh this or any other metaphysics, but it will be appropriate to examine briefly one or two of his broadest generalizations.

The datum out of which religion is to be deduced is psycho-physical organisms reacting overtly and in groups to the conditions of existence, and becoming conscious as a consequence. Obviously the adequacy of this datum for the work that is required of it depends upon how we conceive these "psycho-physical organisms." In the first place, being organisms, they must have structure; being psychical, they must have psychical structure. Granted that there are no innate principles such as Locke combated; granted that there is no religious instinct, just as there is no scientific, artistic, or political instinct; nevertheless, political, artistic, and scientific reactions, when they appear, necessitate the assumption of antecedents different from those that would otherwise be required. We learn what the structure is by what the organism does. In various details King uses this principle, though he ignores its applicability to religion as a whole. "When the worth of an object is established by its relations to a group's practical and social life," he says, "it thereby gains enough internal momentum to go on increasing in relative independence of practical and social interests." Again, in each religious rite there are both "form" and "content," the former being determined by the structure of the worshipping body. Especially in the

higher religions we find a certain individuality, a predetermined direction of variations. Further, a god never reflects merely the actual character of his devotees, but also a certain outreaching or projection beyond actual achievements. Finally, variation, however obscure its ground, does always have a specific ground for the particular form that it takes. In view of all these detailed recognitions of the principle, how is it that no specific ground for religion is attributed to the "psycho-physical organism"? The part played by this important factor is, in fact, obscure. What is described as a psycho-physical organism seems to acquire psychological qualities first through its own "overt" activities. Again, consciousness is represented as first of all purely individual. "It is not . . . a part of a larger life, either social or divine." Nevertheless sociality is *assumed* as a precondition of religion.

This indefiniteness in the antecedents accounts in part for a certain shadowiness with respect to the dynamic relations of religion. The wide-spread and persistent activities of religion can hardly be a mere "aside." They can hardly be mere "products" of social forces. If the practically universal religious activity could be shown to have no effect upon mere biological survival, it would of itself demonstrate how far a merely biological conception of the psycho-physical organism comes from explaining religion. That religion is only a product of society and not a producer thereof; that it is only a reflective valuation of life, and not life itself, not adjustment to actual conditions that come to light even in the religious reaction itself; how could one possibly hold to all this except through some over-fondness for data and presuppositions that are inadequately conceived? At several points principles assumed in the work itself seem to require, or at least favor, a more dynamic view of religion. Thus, if we start with overt action as the primal datum of the development, why should not the development itself consist in the gradual attainment of fully controlled, rational, efficient action? And in fact, has religion really gone off on a side-track of uncreative appreciation? In its highest forms is it not, rather, an assertion of a purpose adequate to all the conditions of life, and is not its call precisely to the hardest kind of action? Again, if religion has its source in social action, we should expect it to have some

function in promoting social development. In the case of ancestor-worship such a function is perfectly distinct; and again in the religion of Israel and its continuation in Christianity we have a further development of just such social forces. Here the divinity, like the ancestor-god, appears as a member of a social circle and essential to its completeness. Indeed, a fully socialized religion can no more merely "use" its gods than a fully socialized child can merely use its parents.

It is, therefore, only a partially socialized religion in which the divinity is nothing but a symbol for values experienced, or to be experienced, by the worshipper. Every item of evidence, moreover, that deities are nothing but such symbols can be paralleled by evidence that my fellow-men are likewise simply symbols for my values. In short, it is no mere natural history that we are dealing with here, but a metaphysical or epistemological view which governs the whole argument. "A scientific statement has no meaning," asserts the author, "except within a closed system of definite relations." It would be interesting to know where such a system can be found in any observational science. Professor King applies an altogether too severe standard to his own work. The book is replete with important facts and convincing details of interpretation, but it presents no "closed system."

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*SOME THINGS WORTH WHILE IN THEOLOGY*¹

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I

The first step into clearness in the bewildering total of the subjects of theological science would seem to be an agreement concerning the true perspective of faith. In some way or other the world of religious thought needs to be ordered in different degrees of worth. Some scheme involving a gradation of rank, valid for the religious human being, should be imposed upon the objects of religious concern. Relativity is the law of our being,—not the relativity which excludes, but that which is contained in, the absolute, as the planet in infinite space; and a deep and sure grasp of this law would seem to be of the utmost moment in theology. The story is told that Francis W. Newman, the radical, made a journey from London to Birmingham to discuss the profounder issues of religious belief with his brother, John Henry Newman, the Catholic; and when the question arose as to the axiom from which debate should begin, the Catholic proposed to the radical as the surest principle of faith the infallibility of the Pope. This story has, if not literal, at least symbolic truth. It serves admirably as an illustration of Cardinal Newman's sense of the perplexity and contradiction of his time, and his fine irony. It is almost needless to add that, while men are thus at variance concerning the relative security and value of the different interests of Christian faith, discussion can be nothing but a discipline in confusion.

¹A lecture delivered at the close of the Twelfth Session of the Harvard Summer School of Theology, July 21, 1910.

Doubtless it would be worth while to know everything that exists, whether as fact or force or idea, if one had mind enough and time enough for the task. We figure that in the divine intellect all being and all phases of being find perfect reflection. We cannot, however, bring ourselves to believe that even for the divine intellect one thing is as important as another. It may be difficult, perhaps impossible, to make out the perspective of values in the vision of God, but it can hardly be doubted that for him there exists some perspective. Nothing is more impressive in the teaching of Jesus than his representation of the eternal perspective: "Are not two sparrows sold for a penny? And not one of them shall fall on the ground without your Father. . . . Fear not therefore, ye are of more value than many sparrows."—"Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow; they toil not, neither do they spin: and yet I say unto you that even Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these. But if God doth so clothe the grass of the field, which to-day is, and to-morrow is cast into the oven, shall he not much more clothe you, O ye of little faith?" According to this teaching, while all things are known to God, all things have not the same worth for God; for him there is substance and accident, essential and incidental, temporal and eternal.

As matter of fact, perspective rules the lives of men. The world is shaped for each man according to his dominant interest. The chief object in the human landscape with the barber is the hair of his fellow-men, with the bootblack it is the feet. The special scholar is a person with a special perspective of values; it may be Greek, classic, Hellenistic, ecclesiastic; it may be Hebrew or Aramaic or Syriac, or any one of a large number of antique tongues; it may be research in any one of a score of different lines; in each case the world is shaped into important and unimportant by the special interest. The elective system is grounded upon two necessities; first, upon the necessity for division of labor, and second upon the necessity for freedom in determining this division. The world of knowledge is too big for the individual scholar or scientist. Bacon's boast that he took all knowledge for his province was vain even in his day; it would be a sign of insanity in ours. Bacon did nothing for

his province in ethics, in political theory, in metaphysics, or in the philosophy of religion. He stands simply as a great prophet of the coming glory of natural science; as such he has a definite and limited outlook upon reality.

The mere fact of perspective does not help us much. Nor do we gain very much in clearness when we note that perspective is determined partly by capacity and partly by environment. The ideal physician has an outlook upon life that has arisen from native force and opportunity. Capacity and call, in a way, fix the perspective of mankind; and the capacities being many and the calls different, the perspective becomes a vast aggregate of contrasts. So far relativity would seem to reduce all value to mere like and dislike working through the call and the prohibition of society. It would appear to be impossible to escape this issue unless we are willing to go deeper and stand upon the universal capacity of man as a human being, and upon the universal call of duty. Below all special capacities is the universal humanity; below all the separate callings is the undivided summons to quit ourselves like men.

Religion generates this just perspective because religion founds it upon the universal capacity and the universal call. Religion lives in the heavenly vision and obedience thereto. In the courses of this obedience the perspective is purified and extended, as with this obedience the new perspective was introduced. When Paul said, "I was not disobedient unto the heavenly vision," he there and then changed the perspective of his life; Jesus of Nazareth, who had been the object of his enmity, then became his Master. We hear further of this perspective in these words: "What things were gain to me, these have I counted loss for Christ"; still again, "If any man be in Christ, he is a new creature; old things have passed away, all things have become new." Religion begins in the vision of the moral ideal as the image of God's will for man; the resolve to become the servant of the moral ideal puts one on a new earth and under a new heaven; it does this with all religious souls. It therefore opens up one general perspective; and the basis of this one general perspective is, as I have said, the universal capacity and call.

From the life of the soul in God there arises when unhindered the normal perspective of faith. The trouble is that this normal perspective in the ideas and beliefs of religious men is so often suppressed. Our attitude toward the Bible may serve as an example. The old theory of the verbal inspiration of the Scriptures was an error in sound human perspective. It made of equal importance all parts of the Bible because all stood in an equal infallibility. The modern method of research is wanting in perspective. All parts of the Bible are equally questionable because all share in a common uncertainty. Besides, the truth of research has thrown into shadow the truth of religious intuition. The ensign of Scotland is a lion rampant on a field of blood. That ensign hardly tells the truth about the heroic, but peace-loving, people of Scotland. Modern discussion about the Bible presents the historical scholar rampant on a field of waste and ruin; and thus it has come to pass that the Bible as the witness to the Eternal has suffered that last woe of greatness, it has been taken for granted.

Since the Bible has its chief value as a witness to the Eternal, the approach to what is central in that witness, whether historical or human, should be in the vision of sound perspective. The approach should be like that to Zermatt along the valley of the Visp. There is tumult and wild beauty all along the way. When, however, one gets to Zermatt, still more when one ascends to the Riffel Alp or the Gorner Grat, a new and grander perspective has replaced the old, and in the centre of the vista towers the mighty obelisk of the Matterhorn. It is useless to cry that this is not all; it is all the traveller thinks worth while; at all events, it is better worth while than anything else.

There is a similar ascent in the Bible through historical research and through ideas of worth to that which is central and supreme. There is the rich humanity of Genesis, the stormy epic of the Exodus, the roll of great oratory in the Deuteronomy, the barbaric magnificence of Joshua and Judges, the sign of growing civilization in the records of the kingdom, the interior depth of the Psalms; there are the piety, speculative daring, and world-sympathy of Job, the moral theism and the moral humanism of the prophets. All along the advance the scenery is great. Still,

when one comes to the elevation from which the sublime figure of Jesus is visible, it is seen to be central, and to call at once for a new perspective of values.

So we judge concerning the very numerous beliefs of Christian people. The apostle tells us that all flesh is not the same flesh, that one star differs from another star in glory. All faith is not the same faith; there is a faith in the relatively unimportant and there is a faith in the central and supreme. The jumble of interests and values that one so often sees, as if all were of equal moment and worth, is a sign of the uneducated intellect and the unenlightened conscience. The men who contend for apostolical succession with as much zeal as they do for the permanence of the prophetic mind, who fight for ritual as uncompromisingly as for the morality of the Sermon on the Mount, who are as sure of the miracles of the Lord as they are of his love, who are unable to discern between beliefs about Jesus and the reality of his Person working through conceptions clearly inadequate, who refuse to judge between the temporal and the eternal, who believe in the coming of the Holy Ghost and yet leave little or nothing for him to do beyond giving his sanction to the arrested intellect of the church, who will not subordinate the ends of the ecclesiastic and the traditionalist to the ideals of the Christian thinker and man, are not "walking in the light," but in the night of which Hegel wrote, in which "all the cows are black."

II

Next to just perspective in the values of faith, I should place insight into the society of persons in our world and in our universe. For the Christian thinker the last word about the nature of our human world would appear to be that it is a society of persons; the final thought about the eternal world would seem to be that it too is a society of persons or spirits. The ultimate wisdom concerning the universe is that its substance is in souls. All else is accident, mode, temporal form; the truth of our universe lies in what I have elsewhere called a republic of souls.

If we look into the gospels, we shall find this statement confirmed in every part and in its full intention and scope. In the

message of Jesus the first emphasis is on God the eternal soul: "Our Father, who art in heaven, hallowed be thy name, thy kingdom come, thy will be done as in heaven so in earth." "God is a spirit, and they that worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth." This emphasis is final and sovereign in the teaching of Jesus. God the Father of men is the indispensable background of his life; without the soul of the Eternal the soul of Jesus would be an enigma, and his career meaningless and vain. When we cease to put the sovereign emphasis where Jesus put that emphasis, however orthodox we may appear to be, we part company with him.

At this point the Unitarian and the Trinitarian traditions naturally correct and strengthen each other. Frederic Denison Maurice learned from his inheritance of faith that this emphasis upon the fatherhood of God was the strength of the old Unitarianism; he learned from the rich and sober Trinitarianism into which his inherited faith grew that the revealing, mediatorial, reconciling soul of Jesus Christ became the supreme single assurance of the fatherhood of God. When Unitarianism and Trinitarianism are reduced to two great lines of testimony to the reality of souls, we see new possibilities of service in them, each to the other; how Unitarianism may plead for the aboriginal soul, and how Trinitarianism, as one of its merits, may renew the vision of God in the vision of Jesus Christ.

The second line of emphasis in the gospels, and in the entire New Testament, is upon the soul of the Lord. He is at the heart of his religion. The significance of his soul is bound up on the one side with the character of God, and on the other with the moral being and value of Man. The immediate interest of the New Testament is as an introduction to the soul of Jesus Christ, as its ultimate interest is as an introduction to God the Father. It is a symbol of the soul of the Lord, a reflection thereof, a way of approach to him, an elevation from which he may be seen. Questions of criticism, textual or historical, the apparatus of the scholar and his entire achievement, are means to this end. If we are serious, and if we know what we are about, we seek through the purified and authentic record the vision of the soul of the Master.

The third line of emphasis in the message of Jesus is on the souls of men. For Jesus these are the only ultimate realities: the soul of the Eternal Father, the soul of his Son and Prophet Christ, and the souls of men. These souls constitute the substance of all worlds, visible and invisible, so far as we are able to judge. All outside moral personality is accident, mode, temporal form, the mere field or camping-ground for the discipline of soul. For obvious reasons the idealistic philosophy of the world must always appear to be the friend of Christianity. It divides the world and the universe into two parts; it reduces them to the abiding and the fleeting; it describes the abiding as persons or under some aspect of personality; it holds as fleeting all things that fall below moral being. The universe comes before the sense as material reality, beautiful to the eye, full of melody to the ear, substantial to touch, and at the farthest remove from soul, older than soul, underlying it, determining its fate. This same universe comes before reason in its analytic and constructive might, and at once its beauty and melody are seen to be forms of man's experience; its substance dissolves into force, force becomes spirit, and that which at first appeared to be the final antithesis of soul is now apprehended as the singular and impressive appeal to the soul of man from the soul of God. This is the idealistic analysis which no enemy can long resist. When moral personality is accentuated through a vast and precious experience, with all its misgivings, it knows itself as the worthiest and the most enduring force in our world; thence it moves to a confident and compassionate view of all souls; thence to the sublime Master and Bishop of souls, and through him to the moral being of God, to the soul of our Father in heaven.

From this position the entire world of sense and time becomes the sacrament of soul. Berkeley is right about the world as it lives in the senses; it is the incessant and ordered speech of the Infinite Spirit to the spirit in man. Trade, art, science, government, philosophy, religion, and all records of religion are but sacraments of the soul of man with the soul of his brother, or between the soul of man and the soul of God. Everywhere soul is the reality and the end; everything else—church, creed,

Bible—is means, the precious but passing servant of the sovereign and everlasting soul. Death awaits everything but soul; in the transformations of being nothing is perdurable but soul. Soul and its works are the heart of all we know, and the relation between these two parts of the spiritual life of the world is defined with unsurpassable clearness and pathos in these ancient words of faith:—

“Of old didst thou lay the foundations of the earth;
And the heavens are the work of thy hands.
They shall perish, but thou shalt endure;
Yea, all of them shall wax old like a garment;
As a vesture shalt thou change them, and they shall be changed:
But thou art the same,
And thy years shall have no end.”

Such is the soul of God; according to Christian faith, such is the soul of the Lord and such the soul of man.

III

Originality in theological thought is another of the things that are worth while, and never since the apostolic age has there been an opportunity for originality in the sane meaning of the word such as exists today. By originality I do not mean mere individuality or brilliance or charm of mind. There is a type of mind to which the word originality is applied because of its mode of operation, and not because of its achievement. Such a mind scintillates with wit and humor; it moves by sudden turns and surprises; it deals in hints and suggestions that are novel; its chief value is in its strange, brilliant movement and not in its goal. Again, such a mind is artistic, original in device, but not in the substance of its thought, not in insight or command over its subject. This subjective originality is immensely interesting and in its way valuable, but it does not concern us here. The originality that seems to be priceless is objective; it advances upon its subject in a great invasion, illuminates reality like the sun, and while it is itself hard to look at, makes the world that lives in its light visible and beautiful.

This objective originality is of several grades and is adjusted to the differing capacities of serious minds. It means first of

all the new, either absolutely or relatively; in the second place, it signifies greater depth in the apprehension of the old and the putting of the old thus apprehended in new relations; finally, it stands for immediate contact with reality.

That there should be absolutely new insights in the sphere of religion has from time immemorial been regarded as something akin to madness or blasphemy. Such originality, it is generally believed, is possible only to ignorance. Only those who know little of what the great world has thought can live in the vain hope of this achievement. The Christian church has accepted the ancient insight as exhaustive and final, notwithstanding its belief in the infinitude of the sphere of the soul and the coming of the Holy Ghost. Even the relatively new has been expected only from minds of the rarest distinction, and this relatively new has been considered infinitesimal in amount and incidental in importance. The antinomies of the old categories of theology have vexed the intellect into dissatisfaction; they have paralyzed it with despair of anything new and better. Under this load of humility, enough to sink a navy, it is not strange that so few new insights have freshened and enriched the weary way of theological science. It is a misfortune to acquiesce in the feeling that hereafter the sole possibility of originality, in the sense of the relatively new, lies in the sphere of natural science; it is likewise a mistake.

Today we are the witness of at least one example of this kind of originality, in the universal emergence of a new category of theological thought. This new category may be expressed in the term *humanism*. This term has been sadly abused in the philosophical world; it has been used now in a profound way and again in a shallow; it has advanced by evil report and good report; and whether they that are for it or they that are against it are the greater in number is not clear. Yet the word covers what is incontestably the profoundest insight of our time, and in a genuine and wholesome sense this insight is new.

Notwithstanding what old Xenophanes said of the crude anthropomorphism of his day, and his fine scorn thereof expressed in his famous words that "if cattle or lions had hands, so as to paint with their hands and produce works of art as men do, they

would paint their gods and give them bodies in form like their own, horses like horses, cattle like cattle," his remark is chiefly valuable as showing that he understood little of his essential nature as man, and little of the one Supreme Being whose existence he confessed. The same want of fundamental clearness and grasp confuses the theistic argument both in attack and defence through almost the entire history of thought. It is open to serious question whether Plato knew that his Idea of the Good was a form of humanism, whether Aristotle perceived that his Eternal thinker was an Eternal man. It is hardly open to question that Hume and Mill, in their negative process, failed of fundamental clearness here. Indeed, it is perhaps not too much to say that for the first time in history men are now beginning to see clearly that theism is humanism applied to the interpretation of the universe; that humanism means the apprehension of the Infinite through man as the highest we know; that man comes to his best in Jesus Christ, and therefore, that Christianity is the sovereign form of humanism. That there is risk in this interpretation is clear; it is, however, the risk of a great faith, and is therefore worth while. Besides, it is well to see that belief in God and its opposite mean the victory and the defeat of man. Further, we must make this choice of the Eternal humanity, or an inferior choice, with less reason for its truth, or we must stand dumb and helpless in the presence of the Infinite. It is not true to say that the human interpretation of the Infinite is all we can do: we can do nothing; we can substitute for the human the sub-human or brutal. It is true that the human interpretation of God is the best we can do, and that while it involves the venture of faith, it is infinitely worth while.

Turning now for a moment to the fruitfulness of this new insight, we see at once that if God and man are essentially akin, the humanity of God is that in him which chiefly concerns our race. The emphasis is upon his character, and the approach to the mystery of his being is best made through his character. Love is the great illumination in the metaphysic of faith. Again, if the divine and the human are in essence identical, the old devices that were invented to save the dignity of Jesus Christ are outgrown. To call Jesus the ideal or perfect man is to give

him the highest possible praise; it is the same kind of praise that we give to God when we address him as the Eternal humanity, or when we say, "Our Father who art in heaven." The kinship and continuity of souls in all worlds is an insight working widely today in free minds in the Christian church and beyond it; it is an insight slowly bringing about something like a revolution in the three great departments of Christian philosophy,—in theology, in Christology, and in anthropology; it is a single instance awakening the religious mind of the time to the possibility of other new insights of a fundamental nature. The time is ripe for the discovery of a relatively new order of categories as the intellectual expression of the religious and Christian heart.

If originality in the sense of the new or the relatively new is a possibility open to question, originality as meaning greater depth of apprehension is not exposed to the same degree of doubt. This kind of originality is sorely needed, and it is open to a much larger number of minds. The old concepts must be made to bear profounder meanings; as matter of fact, in the lives of religious depth these categories carry vaster and more precious burdens. In this generation the idea of God means something immeasurably more just and humane than it meant even two generations ago. The relation of the idea of God to the world of human beings, contemporary, historic, and racial, has brought this idea to a content of moral meaning inexpressibly richer and grander. Here comes into full view one great aspect of the originality of Jesus. Compare for a moment the idea of God entertained by the loftiest of the prophets of Israel and the idea of the God and Father of Jesus. The idea is inexpressibly more inward and spiritual, it is set in vastly deeper and more vital relations, and it carries a burden of moral tenderness and humanity immeasurably greater. Jesus takes the old ideas of God, the love of God and the love of man, the kingdom of God, and transforms them by the greater depth of his thought and the nobler content of meaning which he makes them bear. The silver currency has become gold, and the gold represents the empire of absolute goodness. So the ideas of law and sin, ethical ideal and capacity, under the profounder insight of Jesus, become something new. For the precious ideas in the faith of

his people the mind of Jesus was the refiner's fire; what went in and what came out were the same only in name. This note of originality in the teaching of Jesus seldom receives the emphasis that it should receive. The question is not whether Plato and Aristotle were monotheists, whether the Hebrew prophets were the originators of moral monotheism, whether there have not been numberless persons of high distinction who held with Jesus the Fatherhood of God. The question is, what content of meaning did the concept carry? The contention is that here, over all competing systems, there is immeasurably greater purity and depth, and therefore originality, in the teaching of Jesus.

The example of the Master should stimulate the disciple. Many ideas of great worth are inlaid in the soil of superstition. The ideas of revelation, inspiration, regeneration, atonement, especially the ideas of the supernatural, need the refiner's fire. There are elements in them of the utmost preciousness; and yet, because of the mass of ignorance and absurdity in which they are imprisoned, they are in danger of being flung, by impatient thinkers, to the dust-heap. The ideas of faith over its entire circle call for greater depth and purity of apprehension. Learning is good but learning alone will not do; penetration is needed, the love of ideas that leads the mind to ponder them till the day break and the shadows flee away.

The widest opportunity for originality is in the immediate contact with spiritual reality. Here we touch the peculiar distinction and genius of Christianity. The disciples of Jesus Christ have free access to God; they are kings and priests to God. Mediatorial systems and all devices that put the soul and the Eternal apart are foreign to the Gospel. One of the greatest of the New Testament writings has for its object the presentation of this universal privilege of Christian men; they have the right to personal approach and immediate fellowship with God. This, too, is the deepest meaning of our Protestantism. The right of private judgment is contained in the deeper right of immediate access to God. This profoundest privilege of the disciple of Jesus provides for a religion that shall be a religion in immediacy, a religion greatedened by the sense of history yet resting in the present vision of eternal realities.

We have seen that the structure of our human world is personal, that the constitution of our universe is personal; both the personal world and the personal universe are in action and inter-action. This action and inter-action are going on under our eyes; they mean throwing into the field of vision the phenomena in which souls in time and the supreme eternal soul are revealed. The social world and the social universe are volcanic; the fire and flame are pouring forth under our observation. We are free not from ancient aid, but from ancient domination; we welcome the light of all the ages while we refuse to wear their colored spectacles; we cherish tradition, but decline to employ it as a measuring-rod of truth; we behold God face to face working in this tremendous world of man, flaming forth his justice and pity and calling upon us to lay to heart the vision.

At length we stand in theology where science has stood for centuries, holding the past as an aid to immediate vision, declining to substitute antique opinion for present insight. The pure in heart shall see God. If the pure soul may see God the Supreme soul, surely he may see all other souls in relation one to another and to God; may see this world of souls instinct with God in action, and thus come to know through immediate beholding the greater things of the religion of the Lord.

Second-hand religion is doomed; it turns the Christian church into a pawn-shop and encourages men to trade in things of the spirit. Second-hand religion at best is but preserved fruit, tolerable only between seasons and in the winter of our discontent. The call is for the primary dealing with the spiritual world and a mind rich in the impressions and images that come from immediate contact with God.

One form of immediate contact with God has always been held by the faithful. Prayer lives in immediacy; perhaps the most significant thing in prayer as used by the faithful in all ages and among all races is this fact of immediacy. It is an impressive exercise to assemble in imagination the world as it kneels or stands in its moments of prayer, and to reflect upon the fact that the world in its prayer is in immediate fellowship with God.

The exercise of mind involved in prayer when it ceases to be vain repetition is remarkable. No great soul has ever been

content to address God wholly in the thoughts and words of another. Liturgy has its uses; but liturgy as an exclusive prescription is an impertinence to the soul that would speak to God its own life in all its fulness of sorrow and hope; it is a serious embarrassment to the soul that would, in a congregation of souls, discern their need and present that need in the simplicity and energy of personal vision to God. Liturgy is to be feared, however, chiefly because it encourages the dismissal of immediacy in religion. Prayer does not begin till it becomes a dialogue of the soul with God, a dialogue in the depths of sin and distress or on the heights of victory and peace. Prayer, like speech, has its style; and while words and phrases are adopted from the litanies of the race, they are wrought into new individuality and become the servants of the master who employs them, living in the distinction of his manner. Substitutes here carry with them the shadow of death; to be driven by the difficulty of prayer to the refuge of liturgy, is to be driven to defeat along one line of supreme privilege and hope. The day that a Congregational minister confesses his dependence upon liturgy he acknowledges himself beaten where victory is worth more than at any other point of the field, and he goes forth like Samson shorn of his locks, who wist not that his strength was departed.

I suppose that no great soul has ever used liturgy other than as an aid. It has been set at nought in the central personal wrestle of the spirit with God. It is this fact that saves prayer to the witness of immediacy. Here we see that the dialogue of the pious and rapt soul with God is one of the things that have kept the church close to eternal reality. So long as men pray and want to pray, so long as they carry hearts burdened with great meanings to God, and speak them to him in the simplicities and nobilities of speech coined under the constraint of profound feeling, there will be one section of human life, at least, in immediate communion with God.

Prayer is, however, an example of the law of immediacy that should extend over the entire range of religious experience. All the interests of religion should be seen by those who deal in them. Upon coming from his study to the room where his family were

gathered, Bushnell, with his face shining, replied to the question, "What have you seen?" "I have seen the Gospel." He had looked for it, toiled through worlds of débris to get to it; finally, he arrived; there it stood in its aboriginal splendor and he beheld it. It is pathetic to reflect that on the whole Bushnell's experience is singular. It should be universal; for it exhibits the call and privilege of every Christian man. The hope that in Bushnell seemed audacious should seem so no longer. The débris grows less and less. No world of authority today throws the sun of righteousness into eclipse. When Carlyle began his effort to recover Cromwell to the vision of mankind, it seemed to him hopeless. He set forth his despair in words of rare pathos and beauty even for him. The hunt was for the god Balder; it was long, hard, desperate; at length the pursuing soul came to the innermost recesses of the underworld where Balder was imprisoned, beheld him as he was, saw the veritable Balder, but could not bring him back. As with the lost Balder so it has been with the Gospel of Christ. It has sunk under world-encumbrances, and great spirits have in the past despaired of even seeing it, much less of bringing it back. But the day of the Lord is here; and because it is here, his disciples may see him and his kingdom and restore them to the immediate vision of the faithful.

IV

It is worth while to try to get at the interior meaning of traditional theological ideas. Those who have won their freedom should be without impatience, certainly without unfairness, in dealing with the dominating ideas of the past. Freemen should be the first to see the elements of present availability in ancient beliefs, the swiftest to recognize under antique forms of thought the evolving spirit of truth. Failure here is disgrace, as we see in a mind like Bacon. The reader of Bacon who knows Plato and Aristotle is ashamed of the Englishman's depreciation of the Greek thinkers, whose grasp of human truth is immeasurably greater than his; indeed, he figures as an extempore genius in comparison with their mature and monumental achievement.

Bacon would have done far better for his new truth had he set it in the presence of the old with sympathy and honor.

The theological achievement of Christian history needs revaluation; in this revaluation there is surely much to enrich the thinker today. The sense of history has indeed been too often a paralyzing influence; freedom has too frequently been gained by an abrupt break with the past, and maintained in fierce antagonism to it. This is abnormal. The sense of history should be the recognition of the working and expression of the spirit of truth in men; the work and the expression must go on; but continuity among thinkers should be preserved by the present greatening the past. Essential ideas need not lose their historic associations when lifted into new range and character. Progressive minds have greatly erred here; they have seldom seen the law of the kingdom of truth,—first the blade, then the ear, and then the full corn in the ear; seldom have they kept the memory of the spring morning in the rich and glowing beauty of autumn. Background is thus apt to be absent from the work of the pioneer; the vast world of man is reduced to a single aspect; the vitalization of ideas that comes from their association with the greatest minds in immemorial reaches of time is too lightly regarded; the prophet is not lifted as he should be by the consciousness that the whole ideal majesty of the past seeks new and higher utterance in him. Our creative work in theology is crude on this account; it is mean through narrow sympathies; and our spirituality lacks the body and flavor which the consciousness of history alone can impart.

For these reasons I deplore the easy disregard, so common today, of the great imperfect ideas of historic theology. The mention of the Trinity today, among progressive minds of every name, is apt to produce a smile; to say a word in its behalf is apt to be regarded as at best a pardonable lapse into sentiment. This attitude I am bold enough to call unworthy and even shallow. Great minds contended with one another in a battle royal for the attainment of the best insight into the being of God. You may dislike their name for what they found; are you sure that you can live without the reality on which their vision rested? When a thinker like Professor Royce comes to the conclusion,

in his great essay supplementary to that on the Conception of God, that distinctions of vital moment to man are eternal in the Godhead, students of theology should pause and reflect.

I confess that the vision of the Deity with an ineffable society in himself, complete and perfect in himself before all worlds, the ground and hope of our social humanity when in the fullness of time it was brought forth, a social Deity, expressing himself in the evangelical terms that denote the generic phases of our human world,—the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit,—is to me, both for the intellect and the heart, of quite inexpressible moment. Here I find the eternal archetype of the social world of man; here I discover its eternal basis and the hope of its perfect realization. It is worth while to try to get inside the hard, arithmetical dialectical movement of thought, and thus gain something of the richness and grandeur of this ancient theistic insight.

In the Nicene creed and the ideas that lie behind it, one finds the great conception of man constituted as spirit in the image of the Eternal Son. The deeper Unitarian thinkers have always seen how much greater the Athanasian doctrine is than the Arian. The doctrine of man depends upon the doctrine of Christ; if Christ is only similar to God, then man is only similar. If Christ is consubstantial with the Father, so are all his children in time. I am unable to see why men who think resolutely should hesitate to affirm the deity of Jesus Christ. If there is no deity in Jesus Christ, he is not the son of God; if there is no deity in man, he is not the child of God. What we need today is faith in a race consubstantial with God, issuing in the sincere confession of the deity of Jesus Christ and the deity of man. The special incarnation of God in Jesus has been held and fought for by the historic church; the incarnation of God in man as man has been revived from early Christian thought by the Unitarian leaders; we should see that these beliefs are not contradictory. The belief about Jesus implies the belief about man. We are not called upon to dethrone the Lord; the summons is to lift the race whose prophet he is. When we repeat the Lord's Prayer, if we know what we are doing, we confess the consubstantiality of our being with the being of God. When we fall

from this doctrine of the essential identity in difference of God and man, we fall into a sea of images. God is our Father and we are his children only in parable; the family relation is only an image, dear to feeling, of something transcendental and inscrutable. Our human world forms images of God according to its own best relations, and it employs these as symbols of its worth to the Eternal; the truth being that the Eternal is essentially unlike us men and in his essence absolutely inaccessible to men. This is the nemesis that waits upon an inferior doctrine of man; and he alone moves on a level to which this nemesis cannot rise who has entered the ancient conception of the consubstantiality of man with God.

When we come to our New England theology it is fair to say that its humanity is undivine and its Divinity inhuman. That, however, is not the whole truth. Its ideas of sovereignty, sin, regeneration, reconciliation, and life in the spirit, are essentially imperishable conceptions of faith. The sovereignty of the universe belongs to something; our great predecessors reasoned that it belonged to God. The tragedy of the world of man is before us; it is a wild and terrible issue of inherited tendency and individual initiative, of mistake and perversity; it lies heavy upon the soul of the idealist today, and no doctrine of man can long detain serious persons that refuses to take this tremendous aspect of human society into account. The old idea of the exceeding sinfulness of man is but the dark obverse of blazing idealism with which our fathers judged the world. With a conscience in heaven man discovered himself and his world in hell. There is a moral depth in the old anthropology that atones for much of its theoretic crudeness. There is probably no tradition in the church so utterly worthless from a formal point of view as the doctrine of the atonement. Intellectually, it is confusion worse confounded; yet the human need that works through this tradition of reconciliation to the highest ideal within the soul and to the Holiest in the universe and rests there forevermore, is a revelation of the utmost depth in man and the utmost moral height in God. It is one thing to see the dust-heap of tradition and another to discover there the gold and the precious stones.

It is no valid objection to say that we do not construe the doctrine of God or of man as these were construed by men of old. Our object as thinkers is truth; and in the search for truth we do not resolve ideas into the times of their immaturity and keep them in this bondage, but following the supreme example we wink at these ideas so conceived and expressed. Our purpose is to conserve the intellectual treasure of faith and turn it to new and more fruitful issues. The history of Christian theology may be written in a manner that makes it look as the Roman Forum or the Coliseum looks today. It may be conceived as the achievement of an outgrown age and presented as a great and tragic ruin. Surely there is another and a better way of conceiving and representing these imperishable ideal forces. It is possible to enter the mind of these antique architects of thought, everywhere revise and greaten the plan; it is possible to do something toward the presentation of the finished design. Such an attempt is at least worth while: it issues in the sense of the great unbroken succession of prophets and thinkers; it preserves the precious sense of the continuity of faith; it enables the profoundest and the most unsparing criticism to go hand in hand with generous constructive purpose; it blends in one the passion for truth and the passion for humanity.

V

The way of salvation is another thing worth while. The actual condition and the ideal condition of human beings and the way from the one to the other are worthy of profound consideration. For most men life is a sordid and miserable labyrinth; to picture the freedom that exists beyond this labyrinth is not enough; the chief need is to find the way out. Jesus came to seek and to save men lost to the true uses, satisfactions, and hopes of existence; and his religion still offers itself as the way of rescue and return. Human beings are caught in a tremendous tragedy in which death seems to be the only way out. Perversity is one fountain of the moral evil or sin of the soul; men distinctly refuse light and prefer Barabbas to Jesus. Ignorance is another fountain of wrongdoing; there is a gigantic mistake

firing the pulse of wickedness; "if thou hadst known the things which belong to thy peace!" The evil condition is confirmed through weakness; the animal in man is strong, the spirit is faint. Thus moral evil tends more and more to take on the character of a malady; the world is sick and needs the physician of the soul.

Here is the material which was shaped by men of old into doctrines of original sin, depravity, and atonement. These were forms of diagnosis; we set them aside because they do not explain the case or call for the best treatment. The old material, the complex misery of man, is still here; our understanding of it must be less morbid, less the work of imagination, less at the mercy of strange riotous emotions, simpler, healthier, and more in accord with the fundamental notion that we are living in a redemptive universe. Still, the woful condition must be acknowledged; men who pattern existence after the beast of the field are ill at ease. Those who try to live on bread alone are attempting the impossible, and their sorrow is great. The world was made to run on the two rails of flesh and mind, energized from a third rail alive with God, and this world is engaged in the reduction of existence to an impossible simplicity. When the heart has a thousand tongues, it is vain to declare that it has but one.

There is crime in the world, and law undertakes to deal with that; there is vice in society, and public opinion measures itself against that; there is the selfishness sanctified by custom that works through the established order of human life, often ruthless as death, and the moral reformer attacks that; there is the hidden, pitiable plight of the soul in its perversity, ignorance, and malady, and the prophet of the Christian gospel addresses himself primarily to that. The seat of our difficulty and our woe is here. In this labyrinth we are caught, and religion is nothing unless it shall provide a way of escape.

The appeal of the gospel at this point is great. It does not limit its attention to the moral patrician; it does not select the fairest portion of society and pitch its tent there; it does not come to call the righteous, who are often merely the self-righteous, but sinners. It sees and understands the tragedy in which the

vast majority of human beings live and suffer; it has insight, wide and profound, and boundless sympathy. It thus wins its way, gains a hearing, and sets up the moral ideal in the depraved life in an atmosphere of Divine pity and Eternal consolation; it is thus able to begin a new creation in the animal life of men, to found and build the kingdom of God; it thus becomes a redemptive religion, a way of salvation, and Jesus is known as Redeemer and Saviour.

Here we see the strength of the evangelical tradition. Its analyses are poor, its formal beliefs inadequate, its philosophies of the life of the soul crude; but all these defects are as nothing when set beside its sense of the sin and woe of the world, its great sympathies, and its message of the compassion of God in Jesus Christ. On account of its primal consciousness of the moral tragedy of human life, its experimental knowledge of deliverance through the pity of God mediated by Jesus Christ, its abiding sympathy, and its glorious service, the Christianity of the evangelical survives and is bound to survive.

The purified philosophy of the Christian religion must absorb this precious element in the evangelical tradition. To take over all that goes with that tradition is impossible; can two walk together unless they are agreed? The origin of our human tragedy as in the Adam and Eve story; the universality and necessity of human depravity as the inescapable devil's birth-right of every child that comes into the world; the cross of Christ as the symbol of the expiation of God's wrath or as a debt paid on our behalf, or as a substitution for our suffering demanded by the majesty of offended law; the limitation of moral opportunity to this life; the reduction of the vocation of Jesus to the salvation of the elect; the claim that God is not on the side of every soul that he has made, are not essential to the spirit of the evangelical tradition; rather they are the impedimenta to be abandoned in the decisive battle that is now upon us.

As thought about God is freed from fear it must at once ascend in love. Here is our difficulty, the difficulty, too, of the nobler tradition of the intellect in all generations. As the intellect has been freed from fear it has not always ascended in love; it has abandoned the lower and its peculiar power, while it has failed

to find the higher and its mightier motive. An evil spirit has too often haunted the work of the free intellect. This spirit has made the intellect careless of the religion of children and youth, unmindful of the religious needs of pagans at home and abroad, and callous in presence of the moral and spiritual condition of society. Religion has become a programme for the patrician; it has lost its democratic breadth and vitality; it has sunk into an affair of concepts. Better concepts are a gain surely over poorer; but what are better concepts with no enthusiasm for humanity in comparison with crude concepts fired with passionate concern for human souls.

The reasonable faith of the future must take up into itself the prevailing forces in historic Christianity. It must shape its ideas in the presence of human need, conserve the spirit that makes the wilderness and the solitary place rejoice, concern itself with the highways to Zion, remember those who sit in darkness and in the shadow of death; it must be the prophet of a redemptive universe and present the Christian religion as the way of salvation; it must not surrender to a crude and discredited scheme of thought the great names of Redeemer and Saviour as applied to Jesus; it must reclaim them and fill them with a purer and mightier content.

VI

There is still another interest which, it seems to me, is of the gravest concern for religious men of all types of opinion—the demonstration of the spirit. Is there a spirit in man? Is there a Spirit in the universe? Is it possible for the spirit in man and the Spirit in the universe to meet now, and may we look for the demonstration of the Holy Spirit?

This brings us face to face with that which is absolutely essential to Christian faith. The reality of the Christian religion depends upon the truth of those three propositions: there is a spirit in man; there is a Spirit in the universe; these meet in the victorious moral experience. The denial of spirit is the denial of God, the denial of the moral being of man and the denial of the truth of the teaching of Jesus. If these three

propositions are untrue, our faith is vain; if they are incapable of attestation, we are left in hopeless confusion; if they are true, and if they are open to verification, all other interests of faith become subordinate and even incidental.

Here we see at once how impossible it is to limit the process of faith to the intellect. The proof that we seek, the evidence that we demand, the demonstration that we crave, must be in and through the courses of life. Spirit is not adequately defined as immaterial force, nor as bare, unqualified consciousness, nor as personality pure and simple. Spirit is moral personality, conscious being in the character and power of love. If it is true that God is love, it is true that God is spirit. If it is true that man may become a lover and servant of the heavenly vision, it is true that man has the capacity of perfect spirit. If it is true that the Eternal lover and the human may meet in time and live, the Divine love in the human, it is true that man may have fellowship with God. These propositions are, however, hypothetical, and no more, while they remain in the sphere of the intellect; only through moral being in action can they be authenticated as true.

Christian experience is the great defence of the faith. All other defences run back into this; the citadel of faith is in the possibility of moral victory amid the waste and shame of the world. In this demonstration of spirit the first note is in the joint action of the personal soul with the Infinite soul. Then follows the social endeavor always in joint action with God, in the attack upon the brutalities of trade, the inhumanities of wealth and power, the mean acquiescence of men in their weakness and sordidness, the infamy of race hatreds, the fatal force of class distinctions when viewed in any other light than as providing distinct and greater service to the whole; the injustice of government, the merely provisional character of much in law, the warfare of man upon man, the colossal denial in action of human brotherhood. The joint action of the spirit in man and the Spirit in the universe over the whole breadth of humanity is the sole and only way to articulate the demonstration of the ultimate realities of faith.

It is reported that Daniel Webster during his last days said,

in answer to some words about the hereafter, "The fact is what I want." What we need in the deepest things of the soul is reality. Subtle reasoning may be a clever concealment of ignorance, skill in dialectics may be merely the trick of the intellectual juggler, even a sober and weighty order of concepts may come to appear an imagination, insubstantial as a dream. Substance, reality, fact, is the great demand of the vexed soul; and in vain do we try to meet this demand beyond the tides of life itself.

If we look into the Old Testament, we see at once that its strength is here. Reality is an issue through the intellect from the moral being of man. Everywhere reality is attained and articulated through action. The Old Testament presents a moral world in action; and through this world in action the eternal reality is delivered. Speculation apart from the suffering and achieving spirit is foreign to the genius of the Old Testament. It is equally foreign to the genius of the New Testament. The greatest thing in the gospels is the authentication which the teaching of Jesus receives in his life. He returned from his temptation in the power of the Spirit; his whole career was in the demonstration of the Spirit. His method of authentication is set forth in the words: "He that doeth the will of God shall know the doctrine." Thus Arnold's plea for conduct as three-fourths of life, Robertson's contention in behalf of knowledge through obedience, and Fichte's great insight that the test of reality is not in feeling nor in thought, but in action, are set forth with incomparable clearness and completeness in the way of the Lord.

If our homage to intellect is to be a reasonable homage, the limits of pure intellect must be clearly seen. No man can by mere searching find God. Reality is not originated by thought, and in the realm of the soul it is not discovered by pure thought. Here the will is king and the intellect servant. Men wait today as never before for the new and deeper thought; but they wait for something more. The best thought leaves us at the outer gate of Paradise; it leaves this Paradise in the region of possibility. Aristotle's two great words are *δύναμις* and *ἐνέργεια*, possibility and actuality, and they are of moment here. Pure

thought gives possibility and no more; to give actuality, the will must work with the intellect. Hence the universal appreciation of the great moral personality; such a personality is a world-revealer, a world-authenticator. The society of moral persons interpreted through moral genius is therefore the ultimate source of revelation, because it is the final authentication of the ideas of faith. Christian society inhabited by the heavenly vision, thoroughly aroused, in action, and going as the sea goes when the tempest has been upon it for many days, or as the planet goes in perpetual exemplification of the great law of gravity, would know itself and its universe as spirit, and it would declare in the irresistible logic of the creative life the reality and the coming of the kingdom of love.

Our wisest thinkers have always seen that the doctrine of the Holy Spirit is the deepest in our Christian faith. Here is the hope of the hardened impenitent, the demoralized penitent, the soul in its ignorance and perversity, in its blazing idealism and its mean and black actuality. Here is the ground of our confidence in the growing revelation of God to mankind, in the unbroken succession of the prophets and their availing service in the continuous upward movement of the thought and character of the race. That nothing essential may be lost, that everything prophetic may be brought to perfect realization, that error may be eliminated, that evil may be overcome and done away, converted into eternal warning, and used as material to deepen the moral consciousness of man, that the great past may find expression in the greater present, and that the greater present may come at length to the consummation of the future, we rely upon the Holy Spirit. But this reliance must not be through mere or pure thought; it must be through action, joint action, till our world heaves and sighs with the indwelling energy of God, consciously invoked and let in through the consent and authentic cry of the soul.

Apart from this world of triumph and moral energy, all great symbols of the Christian faith, all theologies and philosophies of religion, the poetry of the church, and even the Bible itself with its attestation of a moral humanity in communion with a moral Deity, become as dead leaves in the whirl of the autumn

wind. A contemporary world devoid of God in the rhythm and fire of its action, leaves the historic world of faith pale and ineffectual. In religion the sovereign word is now. Man and the universe are today before the judgment seat, and nothing in the way of defence will finally avail but the present attestation of spirit.

The principle of unity in this series of things that have been said to be worth while is the living soul of man in fellowship with other souls and with God. From this aboriginal order we gain our vision of a world of spirit, a universe of Spirit; to this primal order of persons we come for original insight; this authentic order it is that sanctifies the antique in all its nobler phases; for man as soul we seek the way of salvation; and through this ultimate reality we crave the demonstration of the Spirit. The rational approximates the real as its image, but the rational is not the real; being and thought are two and not one,—twins of the Siamese order they may be, yet each has a distinct existence. The world is constituted in God; our humanity is constituted in God; it is the task of thought to discover this divine constitution of man and his world. The discovery is an intellectual satisfaction, and it is more; it is a condition of vital enlargement. For in the case of beings constituted in moral freedom, growth is not inevitable, it waits upon self-discovery. The great words in the Parable of the Lost Son are these: "When he came to himself." From the first he had been made according to a noble plan; the operation of this plan was not inevitable; it was helpless save in the way of protest and nemesis till self-knowledge arrived. Therefore man's being and the being of man's world demand the service of the enlightened mind.

Indeed, one of the woes of religion in all time is its refusal of the service of the enlightened and noble intellect. All other human interests prosper as they are served by clear intellect; no sane person imagines that progress is anywhere possible in these interests except through larger knowledge and deeper insight. Our world of science and applied science is the demonstration of what the intellect can do for human advancement; the advancement of science is in many ways the advancement of man. Yet in the face of all this, men are tempted to exclude

the intellect from religion, or to reduce it to an affair of the intellect. The refusal to admit the intellect to the service of religion means the rapid degeneration of religion. Many painful examples of this degeneration exist. Where degeneration has become decided, religion has sunk to a compound of superstition and reality, a jumble of the incredible and the precious; and as a consequence it has lost its power over the educated mind. It is indeed deplorable to reflect how distrust and exclusion of the scientific intellect have reduced even the Christian religion, in many places, to the consolation of ignorance.

On the other side, it must be said that intellect is not scientific if it be not in full sympathy with its subject. In the free world of Protestantism we have intellect enough and more than enough of its kind. It is too often intellect without so much as the smell of religion in its operations; it is intellect unaware of the infinite reality of the Christian religion as it lives in the heart and conscience of Christendom, unconscious of its task as interpreter, and unfit through want of experience for insight and service. Therefore the damage that ensues to religion from the unfit intellect is about as great as that which results from the exclusion of intellect. Between religion as a mindless product and religion as the issue of an irreverent mind, there is little to choose. We are not shut in, however, to either alternative; we hear the call of the truly scientific intellect that loves facts, that lives in them, that seeks for reality in the suffering and achieving spirit, that finds it there as the miner discovers the gold in the rock, that digs it and brings it forth, passes it through its thousand furnace-fires, and presents it at last to the world that cares for reality beyond everything else, in utter purity and splendor.

In dividing the world of faith into the essential and unessential there is always involved some sacrifice of sentiment, some danger of melting the rich detail of religion into the abstract and remote, some liability of substituting for the glowing compound of experience "an unearthly ballet of bloodless categories." While the division is valid and must be made, I do not forget that things eternal come through things temporal, that great religion naturally expresses itself in the sensuous richness and color of great poetry; nor do I undervalue the immense gain for

human feeling when the Eternal is transfigured in the pathos and beauty of our human world. I recall that I once saw Mont Blanc at sunset from Morges on the Lake of Geneva. Across the lake the vision passed, and up the ravine beyond to the base of the great mountain, and from the base to the summit. There it stood in the glow of evening, transfigured for a few great moments, in the farewell fires of day. Soon the shadow of flame passed; it passed with regret to those who saw it come, who beheld it fade, and who loved its beauty; but when it was gone the main object of interest remained, the mountain, solitary, sublime, everlasting. So in our faith the imperishable burns in the fires of the perishable. The abiding substance of faith is thus transfigured in the pathos of time. The shadow of God becomes inexpressibly dear to men; still the shadow of God is only shadow, and when it vanishes, God himself remains the Eternal wonder and joy.

*THE RELATION OF THE GOSPEL OF MARK TO
PRIMITIVE CHRISTIAN TRADITION¹*

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The main conclusions that were widely accepted at the close of the last century with reference to the origin of our first three gospels have been confirmed by the investigations of the first decade of the new century. Thoroughgoing re-examinations of the whole problem, such as those of Wellhausen, Burton, and Loisy, have resulted in the reaffirmation of the so-called Theory

¹ Bacon, B. W., *The Beginnings of Gospel Story*. 1909. "A Turning Point in Synoptic Criticism," in the *Harvard Theological Review*, vol. i, 1908, pp. 48-69. "The Purpose of Mark's Gospel," in *Journal of Biblical Literature*, vol. xxix, 1910, pp. 41-60.

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of Two Sources. According to this theory Mark is the earliest of the Synoptic Gospels, and served, in some form, as a documentary source for each of the other two Synoptists, who had, besides Mark, another written source, made up to a large extent of the sayings and teachings of Jesus. The term *Logia* was formerly much used as a designation of this second source, on the supposition that it was to be identified with the writing to which the church father Papias applied that name, but there is now a general disposition to avoid this usage and to employ some more neutral symbol, like the letter Q (*Quelle*, "source").

In spite of the continued dissent of a few eminent scholars, it still remains true that no explanation accounts so fully and so satisfactorily for the whole body of facts involved in the Synoptic Problem as does the hypothesis of two sources. Indeed there is good ground for the oft-repeated assertion that this view has long since passed the hypothetical stage and should now be accounted an established fact. For it is possible to prove not only that Mark served as a source for Matthew and Luke, but further that it supplied to them the outline and framework for their narratives. Why otherwise should all three have generally the same order of

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events? Why otherwise should Matthew and Luke, after introducing new material, resume Mark's order? This is done by Luke, for example, after his so-called Greater and Lesser Insertions (6 20-8 7, 9 51-18 14) and by Matthew after the Sermon on the Mount (chapters 5-7). Reasons are usually discernible when transpositions have been made, or at least very plausible ones can be suggested. Dependence on Mark is evidenced, however, not only by the same sequence of events, but also by the same succession of details in most of the incidents which the other Synoptists recount in common with him. The variety that exists in this regard is slight when compared with the general parallelism, and that, too, when there is no evident or inner necessity for any particular order. Again, Mark's vocabulary and turns of expression have been incorporated into the other gospels in considerable measure. This has been done, to be sure, by each writer with much freedom and without abandoning his own literary methods. Luke especially has introduced many changes that are obviously intended to serve the end of clearness and improvement of style, with the result that he actually becomes a commentator on Mark. If it is granted that Mark, in its present form or one that was not essentially different, was used to such an extent and at such an early date by the writers of our first and third gospels, its prime importance is at once evident. The theory of two sources has given it a value that it did not possess under former views as to the origin of the gospels, for ancient tradition and the conclusions of the earliest critical study were not favorable to its priority. Thus Augustine held that it might be an abbreviation of Matthew, and in modern times a kindred view has a distinguished advocate in Professor Zahn. F. C. Baur, founder of the Tübingen School, regarded it as the latest of the Synoptic Gospels and as a colorless excerpt from them, thus accepting in substance the theory that had been put forward by an earlier scholar, Griesbach, and numerous other modern scholars before and since his day are so far in accord with this position that they have made Mark secondary to either one or both of the companion narratives.

But, supposing Mark to have been used as a documentary source by each of the other Synoptists, can we decide whether

they knew it in substantially its present form or in an earlier edition, a primitive Mark, of which the present gospel is the outcome? This question has been much discussed in recent years, and the end is not yet. It must still be regarded as belonging in the category of unsettled problems, notwithstanding the fact that both those who favor and those who oppose the assumption of an earlier form are very positive in their convictions. Decision one way or the other does not materially affect the general estimate of the gospel. It may be said that the majority of scholars at present do not think that the evidence is favorable to such an hypothesis. It is not denied that there have been various textual modifications in Mark, for the manuscript evidence proves that this has been the case no less than in Matthew and Luke, but it is another thing to demand an earlier form that was essentially different, one that was either shorter or longer than our present gospel.²

If it be agreed that Mark possesses relative priority and was a main source for each of the other Synoptic Gospels, we have only reached a notable mile-stone on the way. Other stretches

² The principal reason for assuming the use of an earlier Mark, differing somewhat in form or extent from the present gospel, is the agreement of Matthew and Luke against Mark in omissions, additions, and forms of expression. The omissions, estimated at about thirty verses, are particularly perplexing. Why, it is asked, should such a parable as that of the Seed Growing by Itself be omitted (4 26-29), and why the two miracles in 7 32-37 and 8 22-26? Why, in the narrative of the healing of the epileptic boy after the descent from the mount of transfiguration, should the striking conversation with the father of the child be found in Mark only? And why should the indications of chronological progress that stand out so prominently in Mark's account of the last week in Jerusalem be obliterated? Professor Johannes Weiss of Heidelberg feels that the hypothesis of a primitive Mark best accounts for these and like instances. On the other hand, Jülicher, Wernle, and Hawkins, not to mention others who are equally entitled to an opinion, think that the extended omissions can be accounted for more naturally on the ground of consolidation, transposition, or the substitution of other accounts. As for the agreements in expression between Matthew and Luke as over against Mark, they may in some cases be due to the tendency to assimilate one gospel to another.

There is a difference of view among those holding to a primitive Mark as to that gospel's original extent. A fuller text was formerly postulated, and is still contended for by some, but at present it is more usual to assume that Mark, as used by Matthew and Luke, was somewhat briefer than our canonical gospel. R. A. Hoffmann in a recent work (*Das Marcusevangelium und seine Quellen*, 1904) supposes that there were two differing forms of the primitive Mark in Aramaic.

that are beset with greater difficulties and are even more important continue to separate us from the end of our quest. What shall we say of the second gospel as to its historical character and origin? Does it give evidence of being a faithful record of primitive tradition? Does it represent the first attempt of any considerable magnitude to set down the gospel in written form? Or are there indications that it is itself the outcome of a varied and complex antecedent literary activity? It is upon this stage of investigation that we find ourselves entering in earnest in the opening years of the new century. There has of late been a remarkable activity in the work of pioneering and in the reopening of old trails that seems to promise a safe footing for advance. We have no definite information as to how early a beginning was made with written records of Jesus' deeds and teachings, and consequently all kinds of *a priori* conjectures have been hazarded. The year 50 A.D. has been suggested by several writers as a probable date. It is likely that the need of such accounts would not be felt for a considerable time, since oral tradition would suffice for all the demands of teaching and preaching, and from Paul we gain no certain evidence of a written gospel. When, however, we come to the prologue of Luke, we are told that "many had taken in hand to draw up" such narratives. Were some of these writers predecessors of Mark? Schleiermacher in his day had a theory that brief written records formed the basis of our present gospels. For nearly fifty years Professor Bernhard Weiss has steadfastly asserted Mark's dependence on an earlier Discourse-source (Q) that included considerable narrative material. For the rest he supposes the use of oral tradition, namely, communications of Peter. Nearly twenty years ago Professor Wendt of Jena advanced the theory that several independent documents had been used in Mark which represented distinct groups of Petrine tradition. These were combined and commented upon by the author of the second gospel. Professor von Soden of Berlin has for some years held that a Petrine source could be separated out from other later material. But, in general, up to the beginning of the present century few believers in the priority of Mark felt the need of postulating that this gospel, aside from the apocalyptic discourse in chapter 13, rests on written

sources. So Professor Jülicher holds to the essential unity and originality of Mark as regards earlier written sources, as does also Professor Wernle. Professor Schmiedel of Zürich, in his well-known article "Gospels" in the *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, introduces his paragraph on "Sources of Sources" with the statement that of course except at a few points the use of such earlier written sources cannot be raised above the level of conjecture. Of late, however, it has been affirmed with increasing frequency and emphasis that Mark gives unmistakable evidence of being composite in character, that it rests on sources, no less than Matthew and Luke, that it does not so much inaugurate Christian literary activity as register an important stage in its progress. Mark impresses Professor Zahn, for instance, as a "mosaic carefully constructed out of numerous pieces."

The scholar to whom perhaps more than any other is due the credit of focussing attention on the question of the origin and historical character of the Second Gospel is the late Professor William Wrede, of Breslau. In 1901 he published a book entitled "The Messianic Secret in the Gospels" (*Das Messiasgeheimnis in den Evangelien*). After stating his acceptance of the theory of two sources, he proceeded to point out that this put on Mark the responsibility of being the main witness for the outline and development of the gospel history. How important, then, to study this gospel in all its parts with utmost care and come to some conclusion about it as a whole! He set forth most forcibly the inadequacy of the prevailing fragmentary, atomistic investigation which dealt only with detached portions of the Synoptic tradition. It was his view that Mark was written at the earliest some thirty years after the events therein recorded, and that this period afforded abundant opportunity for the recasting of tradition. Only in a part of the book, at most, can we assume that we have the memories of an eye-witness, and these come to us as the free reproduction of a narrative the written form of which was separated by a considerable time from its original oral form. He finds that the gospel as a whole gives unmistakable evidence of extensive editorial transformation, and has been adapted and supplemented, in accordance with later dogmatic views, to such an extent that the primitive facts are effectually

obscured. He bases this conclusion on the assumption that Jesus was not regarded as Messiah during his lifetime, but only after his resurrection. Soon after that event, however, it came to be believed that he must have been Messiah already during his earthly ministry. The writer of Mark so teaches, and reconciles this view with the real facts by the theory that Jesus did all that was possible during his life to hide his Messiahship. This is the dominating conception that colors the whole gospel, with the result that it is not so much an historical record of trustworthy recollections regarding Jesus, as a disconnected narrative lacking real progress, and written in the interests of a dogmatic conception of primitive Christian belief. It is not strange that this book created a stir, or that its conclusions should be widely challenged. At the same time it speedily became recognized as a most important contribution to the method of New Testament study. In disproof of Wrede's main conclusion it was pointed out that Mark itself affords the best evidence that it was as Messiah that Jesus was crucified by the Roman authorities. It was also shown how the writer's failure to consider the whole evidence, his reading into the account motives of which the evangelist was probably innocent, and his rigid demand for logical sequence where it could not reasonably be expected, had led him to false deductions. Yet the influence of his discussion has been far-reaching. By provoking dissent it has powerfully stimulated renewed investigation. It has raised in a clear and definite way once and for all the question as to the historical character and origin of Mark.

One of the early results of its appearance was to hasten the publication of a work by Professor Johannes Weiss, which appeared two years later (1903) and has proved to be in some respects one of the most valuable contributions thus far made to the study of the second gospel. Its title, "The Oldest Gospel" (*Das älteste Evangelium*), indicates the writer's view as to the priority of Mark, but he also believes that the gospel is itself based on traditions that had already to some extent assumed written form. Particularly is this thought to be the case with the words of Jesus, which were probably known and used in the churches of that day in a reasonably complete collection. Accord-

ingly, Weiss claims for Mark only that it may represent the earliest attempt to present the apostolic gospel in the form of a narrative of Jesus' life. This does not mean that the motive of the writer is supposed to have been primarily historical or biographical. It was rather a missionary impulse that moved him. He aimed to present that which should be known by those who believed on Jesus as the Christ, the Son of God. He recorded not what was new, but what was known and received under apostolic sanction. Thus we have in Mark the gospel prepared for the service of the missionary church and written down from the point of view of the religious ideas of its author. It is as such that the thorough-going analysis of J. Weiss seeks to understand it.

In Weiss's view a considerable portion of the contents of Mark is derived from reminiscences of Peter, and it is deemed probable that these memories had already taken definite form. Clearly they did not present a connected picture of the daily life of Jesus, but consisted rather of a collection of anecdotes and small narrative groups, giving glimpses of especially significant incidents and experiences in Jesus' life or in Peter's association with him. They presented Jesus as the Son of God, the Chosen One, already equipped on earth with all power and authority and about to come as Messiah. A second group of passages entitled "Party Discussions and Controversies" (*die Schul- und Streit-gespräche*) is also thought to preserve excellent tradition. It is so designated because it has about it a scholastic atmosphere but is not marked by any traits of personal memory that would necessarily connect it with Peter. The description given to a third class of material that Mark has incorporated into his gospel is "Words of Jesus with or without Narrative Setting" (*Worte Jesu mit oder ohne Erzählungsrahmen*). Here are included single sayings and more extended accounts that have parallels in the discourse-material of Matthew and Luke and that do not seem to possess the characteristics of the Petrine narrative. In some few instances Mark may have been dependent on the reminiscences of Peter, while Matthew and Luke on their side used the Discourse-source (Q). So, too, Mark may at such times have drawn also from oral tradition. He evidently did not have so much interest in collecting sayings as in applying them in connection with his nar-

ration after the manner of a teacher or preacher. J. Weiss agrees with his father, B. Weiss, in thus supposing that the evangelist was dependent in considerable measure on the Discourse-source (Q) and that this contained not alone the teaching and sayings of Jesus, but some narratives as well. The method of referring to Jesus' teaching is thought to imply that a reasonably full form of such a source was known to the readers of the second gospel. Finally, in the fourth place, it is held that Mark incorporated into his account some "Secondary Incidental Traditions," which may be old but which are marked by legendary traits. J. Weiss thus finds that in most of its parts Mark is a faithful and trustworthy witness to early Christian tradition. It is not, however, the neutral, comprehensive writing that some have supposed it to be. The selection and grouping of material, the views of Jesus' passion and death, of the province of the gospel, and of the end of the world, show that the writer belonged in temper and interest to the Pauline missionary circle. So far as the symbolical and poetical is present in his narrative, it is to be referred to the material at his disposal rather than to him.

The book of J. Weiss is important because of its soberness and balance, because it gives such abundant evidence of careful investigation, and finally because it frankly recognizes the difficulty and complexity presented by the problem of Mark's sources and the tentative character of any present solution thereof. The author realizes, as some who have followed him have not done, that we are not in a position to advance in this field beyond that which is probable and conjectural.

Professor Julius Wellhausen of Göttingen published a brief commentary on Mark in the same year that Weiss's book appeared (1903). It was followed in rapid succession in the next year by one on Luke and one on Matthew, and finally in 1905 by a compact "Introduction to the Synoptic Gospels" in which Wellhausen presented his conclusions as to their origin and relationship. His view is characterized by a peculiarly high estimate of Mark. It is the gospel *par excellence*, and was retained by the early church, after other gospels, more to the taste of the time, came into existence, on account of the sacredness given it by its age. The writer of Mark, according to Wellhausen, without doubt

intended to be comprehensive and to include in his account all the surviving traditions, the discourse-material no less than the narrative material. There is no reason to assume that he did not set down all that came to him or that he omitted what he knew had been previously recorded. He is least of all a supplementor. Mark is thus made to precede and to be entirely independent of the Discourse-source (Q) used by Matthew and Luke. It is said that the discourse-material developed and changed more in the course of time than did the narrative material. Wellhausen emphasizes the importance of literary attestation as the first standard of authenticity. The spirit of Jesus lived on in the primitive community and not only created a gospel about him, but further developed his ethical teaching—although, to be sure, on the basis he had laid. The ethics of the early church was really the work of Jesus, and that which manifested his spirit appeared to have the value of what he would have said in like circumstances. This view of Wellhausen as to the later and secondary character of the Discourse-source (Q) is regarded by many as one of the weak points in his investigation and can hardly be said to have withstood the arguments that have been urged against it by Jülicher, Harnack, Bousset, and others. He agrees that Mark's aim was not to describe the life and person of Jesus, but rather to show that he was the Christ. As this was the interest of Mark, so it was the interest of his day, and thus an explanation is found of why oral tradition had shrunk to such small proportions. Although Mark is the oldest gospel, yet its contents do not give evidence of coming directly from the intimate companions of Jesus. The narrative seems rather to have taken shape in popular tradition after a considerable course from mouth to mouth. The evangelist took up the anecdotal material and arranged it in three divisions (chapters 1-5, 6-10, 11-16). His work included further a certain amount of editing, the adding of introductions, conclusions, transitions, short summaries, lists, and sketches of such addresses of Jesus as by exception were not linked on to events. Oral tradition might be expected to be incoherent, and to contain varying accounts and parts belonging to various stages of development, but this consideration does not serve to explain all unevennesses

of form and content in Mark. A revision of the first writing has taken place, and sections of a secondary historical character have been added. Whether they are also secondary as to their literary form Wellhausen does not believe that we are often in a position to decide. As used by Matthew and Luke, Mark had substantially its present form, though they may have been able to consult also an Aramaic original. The defence of the theory of an Aramaic original for our gospel is perhaps Wellhausen's most valuable contribution to the discussion of Mark. There are few living scholars who are so well qualified as he to pronounce on this point. The proof that he advances does not consist so much in single phrases and isolated examples as in a combination of facts that prove the presence of an underlying Semitic syntax and style. This might possibly come through the use of oral Aramaic tradition, but it is far more probable that Mark was first written in this language. The place of writing would then probably be Jerusalem, and the date some time after the capture of the city by the Romans.

While Wellhausen indicates sections in Mark that he regards as secondary in their historical character, he does not believe that it is possible to separate out a primitive Mark or to trace stages of revision in the gospel. This had been attempted previously, and was undertaken anew in a work the first part of which appeared in the same year with Wellhausen's "Introduction." It is a small volume by Dr. Emil Wendling bearing the title "Primitive Mark" (*Urmarcus*), and described in the subtitle as an attempt to recover the oldest accounts of the life of Jesus. The author is the principal of the Gymnasium in Zabern, and is a specialist in classical philology rather than in theology. He disavows any particular doctrinal or religious interest, and says that he reaches his conclusions as a philologist, employing solely the methods of literary criticism. He finds that an earlier and a later source are present in the gospel, and indicates each, in printing the Greek text, by the use of different forms of type. From these two sources he distinguishes a series of additions, made by the final editor, which he brings together and prints in a section by themselves. Three years later, in 1908, a larger companion volume gave in detail the grounds for the earlier analysis. A third

part is contemplated, to deal with the vocabulary of the different sources, as well as with their historical character and value. It may be doubted whether what has thus far appeared will incline Wellhausen to a more favorable view of such an undertaking.

It is possible to speak here of some of the general conclusions only. Wendling tells us that he began his investigations with the study of chapter 4, where there seems to be unmistakable evidence of the presence of material from different hands. One hand is that of the editor, who is the real evangelist. His presence is said to be traceable in some sections preceding the chapter in question and in much that follows. In all, more than a third of the gospel is assigned to him. A study of his additions reveals him to be a dogmatist, and an awkward narrator, who in an unskilful way has imposed upon the simple historical narrative, or rather inserted into it, his theory of the mystical, allegorical character of Jesus' parables. He is credited with taking over and confusedly blending motives that belong to older material in the gospel. He generalizes and exaggerates. He seeks to have Jesus give instruction regarding pressing questions of the community life. The entire section, chapters 6 45-8 45, is thought to come from him by reason both of its form and content. It is he who took over sayings from the Discourse-source (Q) used by Matthew and Luke. He had a pronounced eschatological interest, and introduced most of the discourse of chapter 13 and also the designation "Son of Man." Where he uses older traditions he may transmit valuable information, but his own adaptations are serviceable only for ascertaining the conceptions, hopes, and desires of his own age.

The two main strata, which are the further outcome of the writer's analysis of the gospel, are assigned to two writers designated as M¹ and M². The latter (M²) made large additions to the composition of his predecessor (M¹). Especially is this true of the narratives of Jesus' miracles and of sayings intimately connected with some historical situation. This later writer has a joy in narration, and sees events not so much with the eyes of a historian as with the imagination and faith of a poet. He is farther removed from actual events than his predecessor (M¹) and views them in a transfigured light. He enlarged the historical

and geographical setting of the narrative that came to him, but kept the old order of events. He has given to the second gospel its reputation for vividness and liveliness. He too, like the third hand and final editor, takes over and uses in a new way themes of earlier narratives, but he does it with a skill, appreciation, and poetical touch that were lacking in that writer. He likewise makes use of Old Testament examples. He was probably in contact with living tradition regarding Jesus, even if we cannot succeed in uncovering the historical kernel in his narratives. He is, moreover, a valuable witness to the views of an age that was still permeated with Jesus' spirit, but he is less valuable than M¹, or than the evangelist, for information regarding the events of Jesus' life.

The original writer (M¹) was of a different character. Whereas M² may be called the poet of the gospel, and the evangelist the dogmatist, he may be called the historian. For he aims to reproduce from faithful memory the spiritual content of unforgettable experiences. There is little of the Messianic in him, and Jesus' sayings have the form of apothegms. His style is simple, clear, and concise. The material that Wendling assigns to this writer corresponds in considerable part to that which Professor von Soden refers to his Petrine source. In the investigations of von Soden Wendling seems to have found much suggestion, particularly in the contrast pointed out by that writer between the terse narrative in 1 14-4 34 and the amplitude that characterizes the three following incidents, 4 35-5 43. Such a narrative as that of M¹ may well have been, it is thought, a first attempt to record in a continuous account the memories of Jesus' life, beginning with the Galilean experiences and ending with the passion. The fundamental plan of the Gospel of Mark would then go back to this first writer, although his successor, M², did much to give the book its chronological appearance, and the evangelist on his part also added new journeys and incidents.

Many suggestive observations are to be found in Wendling, but his method as a whole is too subjective and lacks real foundation. The canon of style and of literary character is not equal to the burden that he seeks to impose upon it. What is called a philological and literary investigation is evidently governed largely

by dogmatic presuppositions. The theory of doublets is carried to an unreasonable extreme.³

Of much greater importance are two works of recent date. The first, and the more comprehensive in its scope, is a commentary on the Synoptic Gospels, in two volumes with a total of more than 1800 pages, by Professor Alfred Loisy. In the introduction (pages 1-268) the author reviews previous investigations, and also gives his own conclusions as to the origin and development of the Synoptic records. His discussion of Mark and of its relation to primitive Christian tradition is of particular interest, for it is written with a large knowledge of what has been previously wrought out in this field and brings together the results, old and new, which he accepts.

Loisy believes that our present Mark is removed several stages from the incidents therein recounted. It does not rest solely on oral tradition, nor does it represent memories that were guarded solely by eye-witnesses, any more than do the other gospels. He thinks that the fact that Matthew and Luke made use of written sources would of itself suggest that Mark did the same, and this presupposition is found to be confirmed by a careful examination of that gospel. The real author is the editor, or redactor, who used the material at his disposal to produce a work that is very far from being a biography, but is rather a didactic or catechetical demonstration of the Messiahship of Jesus. Loisy agrees with Wellhausen and others that the oldest apostolic traditions were probably of the same type.

³ For example, it is held that the incident of the healing of the demoniac in the synagogue in the original account of M¹ has furnished the motive to M² in the account of the stilling of the tempest (4 35-41) and also in that of the Gadarene demoniac (5 1-20), and supplied to the evangelist a motive for the story of the visit to Nazareth (6 1-6). This last-named paragraph contains, further, a duplication of 3 31 f., where there is a reference to Jesus' family. Evidence is also found that use has been made here of the Discourse-source (Q). At the same time the account is said to have upon it the impress of Paulinism. That, in spite of this, the whole trend of the incident seems to accord so poorly with the dogmatic tendencies of the evangelist is explained on the ground that the original saying implied Jesus' impotence to heal in a specific case. And, again, it is said that the writer does maintain his view by referring the lack of success to the people of Nazareth. Finally, it is asserted that the evangelist gives the incident as a particularly convincing example of the hardening of Israel. Such results do not commend the method.

That which was remembered and preached was what corresponded to Jesus' character as Messiah and was suited to edify believers. It will accordingly be hard, if not impossible, to distinguish between personal impression or memory and traditional interpretation, inference, idealization, or amplification. All was not false in the mythical hypothesis of Strauss, but the work of tradition has been much more complex and varied than that critic supposed. Difficult and delicate as is the task, the historian must seek to discriminate between that which represents the immediate action of the Saviour on those who had known him and that which represents his mediate action; that is to say, between the nucleus of primitive memories concerning his career and teaching and the progressive elaboration of the same in Christian preaching, in the ardent imagination of those who had believed on him through the testimony of other believers, and in the editing of evangelical records. Primitive recollections were idealized and enlarged into symbols of doctrine. Simple miracles of faith have been transformed into Messianic arguments and are recounted and interpreted as allegories in action. Loisy holds that there may have been an historical basis in most cases, but says that in many instances we are no longer in a position to decide whether this is true or whether a metaphor or a parable may not have been the real point of departure, or whether a sentiment of faith may not have been transformed into a material symbol. There may, for instance, have been a real incident back of the stilling of the storm (4 35-41), but, in his opinion, it is not probable that the same can be assumed for the walking on the sea (6 45-52). So, too, the account of the blind man at Jericho (10 46-52) may be purely legendary or symbolical. The two duplicate accounts of the multiplication of the loaves give symbolical instruction on a theme derived from the Old Testament. There is little probability that either of these accounts had a place in the preaching of an apostle, although they may have been put into circulation before the death of Peter and the leading apostles. Loisy thinks it may be questioned whether there is any historical incident back of the account of the transfiguration, which is now so evidently symbolical. In the narrative of the events of the last week in Jeru-

saalem there have been many additions and modifications that are calculated to show that Jesus was the Messiah, who by his death was to fulfil prophecy and accomplish the salvation of the world. How far these are due to the evangelist and how far they are due to a preceding development may not be easy to decide. Loisy thinks that the evangelist's hand is especially responsible for much in the account of the burial of Jesus and of the discovery of the empty tomb, and that such an account could be written only after most of the eye-witnesses of the gospel history had disappeared. So the account of the trial before Caiaphas and of the release of Barabbas, which are so evidently apologetic, could hardly, he thinks, have been written before Caiaphas, Pilate, and the apostles had quitted the scene of history. The trial before Pilate, on the other hand, rests upon good historical foundation. He follows Keim in holding that the incident of the young man who fled away at the time of Jesus' arrest (14 51 f.) goes back primarily to the prophecy in Amos 2 16. All that follows Mark 15 40 may be due to the same hand that wrote 14 28, and this hand is called that of the last redactor.

As in the case of the narrative material, so also in the case of Jesus' teaching, Loisy finds evidence of extensive modification and amplification. Much of Jesus' teaching was lost, and that which survived existed in the form of short, incisive sentences, vivid comparisons, and pointed narratives. That alone was retained which was of practical utility and was directly suited to contribute to the edification of believers and the progress of the new religion. Its use to this end gave it a didactic, catechetical form. The text of the parables seems to have been less carefully guarded than that of the sayings. The allegorizing of them went on in a way that would be possible only for a generation that had not received the direct impression. Some parables may have been created, just as new sayings came into existence. An illuminating illustration of how this might come to pass in all good faith is found in the way Paul recounts Jesus' words at the Last Supper in 1 Corinthians 11 23 f. It may be remarked in passing that there is good reason for seriously questioning Loisy's exegesis of this passage.

What has been said shows the large place that historical criticism plays in Loisy's decisions. He recognizes the difficulty of literary analysis, when we are no longer in possession of an older source or sources that were probably used by the second evangelist, but still he thinks that a careful examination of the writing itself will afford us sufficient data. Mere absence of cohesion will not, indeed, suffice as a basis for analysis in a work that is so little literary in its character, but positive incoherence, and the correspondence of parts actually separated, will enable us to make trustworthy deductions. If there is lack of harmony between contiguous bits that come from different streams of ideas, if we find an accumulation of incongruous data that can be divided into homogeneous groups, each of which is characterized by its own inspiring motive, if we find double accounts of the same events, we shall be justified in assuming that we have here, as in other works possessing like characteristics, the combination of traditions or of written sources, and the complexity of redactional work. It is thus that in his commentary Loisy seeks to distinguish between what is really primitive and what is to be attributed to development and to editing. The first element will be important for the history of Jesus, whereas the last will enable us to recognize the tendencies, the aim, and even the personality of the editor himself.

When Loisy comes to his recapitulation of the residuum of historical facts embodied in the Synoptic Gospels, we find that it makes a substantial outline of Jesus' ministry. He accepts the theory of two sources, and distinguishes between the narratives of Jesus' deeds and his teachings. The Galilean ministry in and about Capernaum may have lasted a few weeks or a few months. Jesus' popularity almost affrighted him. He chose twelve and sent them out, because the Kingdom was to fulfil the promises of God to Israel. Loisy does not believe that Jesus' Messianic consciousness was a development. The time was too short, and the experiences after the first popularity were too unfavorable. He began his ministry with the conviction that he was to have a chief place in the coming Kingdom. The main contribution of experience would be an understanding of the chances that the Messiah would enter into his glory through death. Jesus main-

tained silence as to his Messiahship, because he was not such in reality, but was the one to whom this function belonged. After the retirement to the North and East he went to Jerusalem, not to die, but at the risk of his life to prepare for and procure God's coming. He knew the danger, but, if the Kingdom could only come through his death, the price was not too dear. To save his life was to lose it. Still he did not cease to expect the immediate consummation of the Kingdom. The Messianic manifestation on the Mount of Olives, if it rests on historical fact, would indicate that the time was near. So, too, his words at the supper with the faithful in the house of Simon the leper, which was really the Last Supper, do not signify that his death was at hand, but only that a radical change was impending. The Kingdom may be there tomorrow. Judas possibly saw the hopelessness of the cause. Jesus did avow his Messiahship before Pilate. If he used the terms Son of God and Son of Man, it could have been only on rare occasions at an advanced stage of his ministry, and in a sense that made them synonymous with Messiah. We cannot assume that he expected his death, but only that he contemplated its possibility, and this he can hardly have done without thinking of the resurrection.

The disciples probably fled to Galilee after the encounter in the garden, and we do not know that one of them continued in Jerusalem after Jesus' death. The empty tomb is regarded by Loisy as a probable close of the original account. The writer might well have regarded this as a conclusive proof of the resurrection. The stories of the appearances of the risen Lord given in the other gospels are really duplicate accounts of the Markan narrative. It may be that the account of the transfiguration was intended to supplement the record of the empty tomb, the aim being to correct the scandal of Jesus' death by an anticipation of his glory.

With reference to the redactor of the second gospel, Loisy agrees with the view that he was a Paulinist; that is, he may have been a disciple of Paul, and was in any event his great admirer, or, better still, his great partisan. Many evidences are found of his zeal for Paul and of his defence of him. It is suggested that the incident of the stranger exorcist (9 38 ff.) may have been

imagined in Paul's behalf. His gospel is a consciously Pauline interpretation of primitive tradition. Though of Jewish origin, he takes a decided stand against the Jews, and looks on them as devoted in a body to destruction. So, too, it can be said that he almost takes sides against the Galilean apostles, so much does he do to set forth their lack of intelligence and courage, especially the former. He was not an inhabitant of Jerusalem, and does not seem bound by his own memories or by information received from eye-witnesses. He dogmatizes as Paul does, and treats his sources with as much freedom as does the author of the fourth gospel, only he does it in a more superficial way, to demonstrate the Messiahship of Jesus. So also he makes notable additions to serve his didactic, apologetic, and polemic purposes. It is inconceivable that the writer was through long years the friend, disciple, and confidant of Peter, but he may have received a series of memories from the apostle, or may have made use of a source that came from one who stood in close relation to him. In any event it is certain that Peter had a preponderating part in the formation of apostolic catechetics. Thereby at least the fundamental tradition of the evangelical history goes back to him.

It is difficult to distinguish between what must be regarded as the memories of Peter and what may have come from the Discourse-source (Q). Both of these expressed the memories and the faith of the primitive community without the influence of Pauline theology. The Galilean apostles appeared there as the authorized witnesses for the life of Christ and for his teaching. Primitive apologetic would have the task of explaining Jesus' condemnation by Rome and his death. The apostles, accordingly, would not at first preach the history of Jesus, or any theme fixed by him, but their thought would centre, as did that of Paul, about his passion and resurrection. Proof would be sought in the Scriptures. Following this would come the need of showing that Jesus' ministry and teaching was such as befitted the Christ. We may conjecture that a written record of the principal sayings of Jesus, of which the apostolic generation guarded the memory, would be made relatively early. It is possible, though not certain, that this might be in Aramaic. So there may have been an early record of Jesus' ministry and passion, either joined

to the Discourse-source (Q) or, more probably, distinct from it. The first redaction of these documents would be considerably before 70 A.D., though one ought not to go much farther back than 50 A.D. These were small, catechetical works, implements of the apostolate, which had become useful, even indispensable, to Christian preachers who had not listened to the Saviour. These writings would be much copied, corrected, and amplified according to need. The collection of sayings grew rich in new sentences and the historical narrative in new anecdotes. The most ancient attempt that has come down to us to join the accounts together in a single book of instruction is the Gospel of Mark, which ought probably to be dated shortly after 70 A.D. It is an insufficient sketch and presupposes the preservation of a collection of discourse-material, whereas the compilers who follow sought to include all the traditional material in one book.

Shortly after the publication of Loisy's volumes, the second book above referred to appeared. It is a brief commentary on the Gospel of Mark by Professor B. W. Bacon, and is designed for English readers, but evidently for those who have busied themselves to a considerable extent with the Synoptic Problem. Besides the critical discussions that precede each section of exegetical comments, short introductions to the first and second parts of the book give in a summary way Professor Bacon's conclusions regarding the origin and historical character of the second gospel. Had these two introductions been combined, the change might possibly have contributed to a readier understanding of his view as to the actual course of Jesus' life. Although working in entire independence of Loisy, he is in agreement with him at many important points. He, too, believes that an early, simple narrative, which, by reason not only of tradition, but also of its own intrinsic characteristics, may be appropriately designated as Petrine, has been interpolated and embellished by a Paulinist whom we need not suppose to have had even a modicum of acquaintance with any one of the twelve. The Petrine element lies very far back and shows itself in spite of the evangelist rather than by his intention. It seems perhaps to have been already too firmly fixed to admit of radical

recasting. One of the sources drawn upon very largely to embellish and supplement the fundamental narrative was the Discourse-source (Q) used by Matthew and Luke. The material taken therefrom has not been joined on in any mechanical way, but is introduced in what often seem to be memoriter interpolations and supplements. Bacon thinks that the editor at times derives his narrative additions from a special form of the Lukan source (Q^{Lk}). In a few instances he supposes that the special Matthean form of this source was used (Q^{Mt}). Appropriate symbols, written in the margin beside the English translation, indicate Bacon's judgment as to the origin of the Markan narrative. He goes much beyond Loisy in the definiteness with which he seeks to determine this, every verse and phrase being accounted for, after the manner of the analysis of Wendling.

Bacon also goes beyond Loisy and most predecessors in the extent to which he finds the gospel dominated by Paulinism. The evidence adduced in proof of this is manifold. There is, first, a succession of incidents and utterances that are extremely anti-legalistic and anti-judaistic. A series of conflicts emphasizes Jesus' independence, and the independence of his disciples, of Jewish religious observances. The whole ceremonial system of Mosaism is denounced as "doctrines and precepts of men" (7 7). Marital relations countenanced by Mosaism are denounced as adultery (10 1-12). The Pauline apologetic of Israel's unbelief is adopted (4 11, 12). The way in which the various sayings and incidents are toned down, and even transformed, when transcribed in the parallel accounts of Matthew and Luke, makes the spirit of Pauline radicalism present in Mark all the more evident. Further, the attitude exhibited toward Jesus' kindred and toward the members of the apostolic circle is ultra-pauline. Peter is subordinated and repeatedly appears in an unfortunate light. The account of Jesus' appearance to him after the resurrection and of his "turning again" and "strengthening his brethren" (Luke 22 32) has been modified by the evangelist and finally omitted. Against the claims to primacy or authority for James and John and the rest of the twelve, he seems "to find the sharpest phrases all too weak." Peter, James, and

John never appear individually save for purposes of rebuke. Collectively, in the capacity of martyr apostles, they are, on three occasions, the exclusive witnesses of Jesus' conflict with the power of death. Finally, the positive and conclusive reason for regarding the second evangelist as an extreme Paulinist is the manner in which he conceives of his task. He seeks simply to produce belief in Jesus' person as the Son of God. He leaves his readers completely without information as to the law of Jesus, though he certainly was not ignorant of the teachings and commandments of the law. He does not give the content of Jesus' message until we come to the section 8 27-10 52, and here it is the Pauline principle of the doctrine of the cross. The evangelist's whole conception of what constitutes the apostolic message is the supreme manifestation of his Paulinism. He is dominated by theoretical considerations, and does not give evidence of a sympathetic and appreciative understanding of the real course of history.

The adjectives that Bacon repeatedly employs to describe the method and motive of the evangelist are "aetiological" and "apologetic." By the first is meant that the primary attempt is never to write history, but to explain and justify the beliefs and practices of the contemporary church by means of the tradition of its origin. Hence the proper approach for understanding the gospel in its present form is an acquaintance with the real and practical problems of gentile Christian life between 70 and 90 A.D. This knowledge is to be gained, before all else, from a study of the great epistles of Paul,—Romans, Corinthians, Galatians. The evangelist strings together groups of anecdotes from the story of Jesus to illustrate five general themes: (1) Baptism and Gifts of the Spirit; (2) the Ministry in its two functions of teaching and healing; (3) the Agapé and its symbolism of the bread of life; (4) the institution of the Church; and (5) the Eucharist. In undertaking an investigation of the gospel, the thing first of all to be looked for is the motive prompting the narration, and this is usually transparent enough when the conditions of the churches are understood. The unveiling, step by step, of the motives that led the evangelist to choose, mould, and rearrange his material, and in some few instances practically

to create it, is the most prominent feature of Bacon's commentary. He does not give to the independent, creative activity of the writer so large scope as does Loisy, but goes far beyond him in assigning motives for the redactional activity. Bacon also differs widely from Loisy in method and in the kind of motives assumed. He accepts in its essence the *tendenz*-method of Baur, holding, "first," that "the gospels are ecclesiastical formulations of the traditions, and must be interpreted as the products of their time," and, secondly, that "the issues of that time must be defined by independent scrutiny of the great Pauline epistles."⁴ In addition to this source we have as a means for controlling and correcting the account of the second gospel the material taken from the Discourse-source (Q), and from the special source of Luke (Q^{Lk}).

The story of the real course of Jesus' life which results from Bacon's analysis of the second gospel and from the comparison with all other known sources, is not as full as the sketch of Loisy, and differs from it considerably in fundamental points and also in details. "Jesus was a wage-earner of Nazareth, an ideal representative of that simple piety exemplified in the earlier type of Pharisaism unspoiled as yet by the ecclesiasticism of the synagogue system." "His public career began as a consequence of the violent interruption of the work of John" (the Baptist). In his message he went beyond John's summons to repentance and proclaimed the assurance of forgiveness. There is little in Mark to explain the popular support that gave to the movement of Jesus its Messianist character, but from the special source of Luke (Q^{Lk}) we get the needed information which is the key to the whole career of Jesus. This is his championship of the cause of the lost sheep of the house of Israel, his yearning to seek and to save that which was lost. God worked with him in preaching and healing, but the evangelist has transformed the character of the miracles by introducing marvellous features and thaumaturgic traits to prove Jesus' divine sonship. A collision with the synagogue authorities was inevitable from the first. Excluded from Galilee, no choice was left him but the transference of his mission to Judea, for there could be no thought of abandoning the cause

⁴ Harvard Theological Review, vol. i, p. 65.

of the lost sons of Israel, and systematic activity among the Gentiles is not likely to have entered his mind. There are indications that the primitive Petrine narrative told how Jesus at this juncture "assumed in the confidential circle of the Twelve the wholly new rôle and title of 'the Christ,'" not in its later meaning but in its original sense of "the expected Deliverer," "who brings Israel into its predestined relation of sonship to God." In any case he "*did go up to Jerusalem*" and "*did follow a rôle that led to his execution by Pilate as a political agitator.*" Shortly afterward his followers "*did ascribe to him not mere reappearance from the tomb, but exaltation to the place of the Messiah 'at the right hand of God'—attributes so exalted that it is difficult to believe they had no other foundation than mere reverence for an admired teacher. No; from the moment of his coup d'état upon the Temple, Jesus' career passes beyond that of a mere rabbi or even prophet.*" Still, Bacon thinks it is a question whether Jesus admitted the application to himself of strictly Messianic titles and attributes. It could only be "in a purely ethico-religious sense, and only for the preservation of that deepest and most vital element of the Messianic hope—the *sonship* of Israel." "Even if Jesus himself regarded his calling as in some remote sense Messianic, historical criticism may reasonably question whether the direct claim of his Messiahship would ever have been put forth by his disciples had it not first appeared as a malignant imputation of his mortal enemies, in the charge by which they secured his crucifixion from a complacently cruel governor." It is a question "whether, up to the crucifixion itself, the prophet of Nazareth had been seriously regarded as 'the Christ' by even the most ardent disciple." However, the account of the anointing in 14 3-9 is cited as old and as possibly indicating Messianic faith. It was when Jesus was excluded from Galilee, and when he set his face toward Judea, that a new phase of his activity began "which inevitably led to a Messianic outcome, even if he himself had neither the expectation nor ambition of being proclaimed 'the Christ.'" "He foresaw martyrdom, vindicated not by *his own* Coming again, but by the Coming of the Danielic Son of Man." This was to take place "while the evil generation still lived that had slain God's messengers." Jesus could not have used Son of

Man as a favorite self-designation to describe himself as one who was to be brought back from the underworld on the clouds of heaven. The Son of Man of whom he speaks "is simply the conventional figure, not necessarily himself, who is to be the agent of God's vindication in the coming judgment." The view that we find in the gospel is that of the enthusiastic church. Such apocalyptic fanaticism was characteristic of Pharisaism and of the later generation of Jesus' followers, but not "of the sane and well-poised mind of the plain mechanic of Nazareth." Peter, whose stumbling had been most conspicuous, was the first to be converted and after that to strengthen his brethren. It is in his beholding of the risen Christ in apocalyptic glory that the church has its beginning. Bacon would date the second gospel somewhere between 70 and 75 A.D.

Numerous other books that concern themselves more or less directly with the problems of Mark have been published recently, but those already mentioned have perhaps attracted most attention. They have certainly given a new importance and a new interest to the study of the second gospel. This will be granted even by those who still think that we are without sufficient data for determining the exact course of the development of tradition antecedent to Mark, as also by those who continue unshaken in their conviction that there was no development. Of the investigations not previously alluded to which have an important bearing on the present theme, those by the elder Weiss are particularly noteworthy. He develops a view of Luke's special source that would give it a prominent place in the list of primitive authorities and would put us in possession of a Jewish-Christian standard, emanating from Jerusalem, that might be used along with the Discourse-source (Q) for testing and measuring Mark. It is hardly possible at present to forecast the future development of the study of the Synoptic Gospels or to decide how much of the work that has been recently done will prove to be a permanent contribution. Past experience teaches that the large agreement among the writers that we have reviewed as to the character of the Markan sources does not of itself prove the correctness of their general position. No more does their wide divergence in matters of detail disprove their whole method. They have at least

established, with a clearness never before attained, that the second gospel in its structure, compass, and points of view presents problems that call for solution. These problems will continue to challenge the best efforts of Christian scholarship until satisfactory explanations have been found or every resource has been exhausted. Even if the recent discussions shall be held to be inadequate, earnest students of the gospels will not cease to feel their great indebtedness to the patient labor and the rich, devout scholarship of the expert workers in this difficult field. And it must be said that, notwithstanding the marked progress that has been made in many phases of the investigation of the second gospel, it may still be doubted whether we have reached a point where the exact sources upon which it depends can be determined. Possibly this can never be done, even approximately. The whole problem is more difficult and more baffling than some recent discussions might lead one to suppose. That written records lie back of various portions of the Gospel, besides chapter 13 and other discourse-paragraphs, seems *a priori* not unlikely, though it may not be easy to supply certain proof of it. That the writer also used such oral tradition as was suited to his purpose is likewise very probable, though it may be impossible to bring oneself to believe that a gospel of such fulness and completeness could spring into being as a first product of the movement to record oral tradition. The probability seems to be that the second gospel depends in all its parts upon one or the other of these sources, but no written record employed by the evangelist, so far as we know, has survived, and this is the great hindrance which up to the present has not been successfully overcome. Professor Burkitt has pointed out (*The Gospel History and Its Transmission*, pp. 123 and 131) that it is very doubtful whether we could recover Mark if it had been preserved only as a component part of Matthew and Luke. And yet this might be supposed to be an easier task than the reconstruction of one of Mark's own main sources on the basis of internal evidence alone. It has so far proved impossible to get anything like a consensus of opinion regarding the exact form of the Discourse-source (Q), even though we are fortunate enough to possess two documents in which it is supposedly incorporated, and even though we can make some

reasonably certain deductions as to the style and methods of the writers of these documents. The attempts at the literary analysis of other New Testament books, particularly the Book of Acts, where we are also without parallels or any proper basis for comparison, are not of a character to make one hopeful of the outcome in Mark. None of the schemes reviewed, or that have thus far been propounded, promises to be widely accepted, because the evidence is too inadequate and too conflicting. The demonstration hardly ever rises, for any considerable portion of the gospel, above the level of plausible conjecture. The more definite and detailed the scheme, the more questionable it has always proved to be.

The writer of the second gospel apparently did not feel any sense of proprietorship in his material. He nowhere suggests that he is giving testimony as an eye-witness or as the exclusive possessor of important information. He does not feel the necessity, as do the writers of the third and fourth gospels, of making any statement as to his sources. That about which we inquire in this respect was either self-evident or not likely to be of interest to his readers. Apart from ancient tradition, it would hardly occur to any one to suppose that Peter was the exclusive authority for what is narrated. In parts he is a prominent figure, and what is said often centres round his experiences, while certain accounts are most naturally explained as proceeding ultimately from what he recounted; but this is by no means true of the whole gospel. There is much that might possibly go back to his reminiscences, but it might go back equally well to other sources. A literary unity runs through the second gospel, notwithstanding its fragmentary, anecdotal character. We can understand how this might be, for the procedure of the other evangelists and of other New Testament writers, so far as this is discoverable, makes it probable that the sources have not been literally reproduced, but have been treated with great freedom. A clew to the writer's method and characteristics has been sought in the few passages where he speaks in his own person, but they are hardly sufficient to supply this. The editorial comments are in indirect form, and usually appear as admonitions, or as applications of what has been recorded, or as explanations of what might be strange to non-

jewish readers. Nicolardot has recently endeavored to throw light on the evangelist's method by the study of the way in which the Discourse-source (Q) was probably used by him. This is a legitimate procedure, for it is more widely recognized than ever that this source existed early and probably made its contribution to the second gospel. But too much is likely to remain problematical regarding its form and extent, and particularly regarding the form in which it was known and employed by the second evangelist, to make us hopeful of large results from such a method of approach. It cannot be counted strange, in view of what has thus far been achieved, that Wellhausen should doubt whether sections that he regards as of secondary historical character can also be shown to be secondary as regards their literary form.

We have seen that the two most recent writers, Loisy and Bacon, have been guided in their analyses more by the content of the gospel than by its form. And this was also true of Johannes Weiss. The so-called "historico-critical" method has been adopted. The effort has been to observe what is inharmonious or disconnected, to separate out related points of view, and to arrange in order the resulting bodies of material. The difficulty and delicacy of such a task is self-evident. There is always danger that the age, ancestry, and relation of conceptions be mistaken, or that they be made tenants of dwellings not built for their habitation. There is the further possibility that such ideas may have been at home in more than one mind or one community. If the presence of certain forms of the miraculous is made a basis for judgment, it may be questioned whether this of itself gives evidence of the late date which these writers suppose. The position of Harnack is truer,—namely, that modern views of the miraculous cannot be made a criterion to decide what early writers could or could not believe. They looked out of their own eyes, and not through those of men living today. Furthermore, the classification of the contents of the gospel according to our estimate of its character, and the supposition that we can thus establish what stood in different sources, are very questionable. Why may not material of diverse character have had its place in any or all of the evangelist's sources, as well as in his own narrative and in his

own mind? Indeed, after an interval of thirty or forty years, during which it may be presumed that all disciples, even those who had companied with the Master, listened eagerly to all that could be learned, would it not be strange if there were not a mingling of tradition? This remains true, whether we assume that the sources were written, or hold that the evangelist was dependent upon what was treasured in the memory of his informants. Is it probable that interblending could begin only with him? Even such a seemingly certain criterion for analysis as the presence of parallel accounts of the same event may fail us, when there are no other weighty supplemental considerations. Why, for example, should our writer necessarily be the first who failed to identify accounts so evidently duplicate as those of the two feedings of the multitude?

If now to other more or less elusive considerations we add that of the evangelist's interest and purpose, do we get a better basis for our analysis and for properly relating the second gospel to what went before? There is general agreement that the evangelist did not write as a chronicler whose primary interest was to record events. The gospel is far from being a chronicle, or a complete record of Jesus' ministry, and it is hardly conceivable that it could have been the writer's purpose to make it such. It has been estimated that we have incidents from not more than forty of the four hundred days that may be taken as the shortest possible estimate of the duration of Jesus' ministry. What might naturally be anticipated appears actually to have happened. Characteristic and noteworthy incidents and experiences were the ones that were remembered and afterwards most frequently recounted. What the writer seems to present to his readers is a series of brief, often unconnected, sketches of impressive incidents suited to awaken and strengthen faith by acquainting the reader with what was important for understanding the course and development of Jesus' ministry in the light of its outcome. Particular interest is manifested in the close of that ministry and in the last week in Jerusalem. The view that this is the real theme, and that all that is told besides is intended to be contributory thereto, is not an altogether false estimate. The order is, on the whole, chronological, and was evidently intended to be so.

There is a sketch of the early days and the work in Galilee, of the gathering of followers, of the opposition of enemies, of retirement, of the journey to Jerusalem, and of the closing days, but within this general framework the grouping is often topical or suggested by some like principle of association. So far as we can judge, other arrangements of the material would have been equally possible. There is nowhere a statement as to purpose, and yet at the beginning and throughout there seems to be an unmistakable aim, which may be defined as an effort to quicken and confirm faith in Jesus as Messiah, the Son of God. What in the writer's view would best contribute to this end seems to have been singled out for narration. In so far the presence of a tendency may be recognized; and even beyond this, in the adaptation of the narrative to the needs and understanding of the writer's age. To the extent that this was the method of Baur, that method may be said to remain, but to go beyond this and make the controversies, difficulties, and institutions of the early church, or specifically of the church at Rome from 70 to 90 A.D., the key to the contents of the gospel, as is done in Bacon's aetiological method, is another matter. The weighty objections to such a procedure are, of course, not unknown to him, for they have been urged with telling effect against like explanations in the past. The question is whether he has reduced them to silence. One can still hardly avoid the conviction that the motives and tendencies which he discovers in many of the narratives are first read into them, and that a naïve evangelist would be greatly surprised at much of the subtlety that is imputed to him. If what is presented with much brilliancy and suggestiveness is often possible, there are nearly always other possibilities at least equally near at hand. Then, too, the Aramaic foundation and background, if not the Aramaic original, of the evangelical material, is not sufficiently reckoned with. The presence of this element promises to continue one of the strongest arguments against the late date to which much of the Gospel of Mark is assigned by both Loisy and Bacon. It is not possible to limit it to the Discourse-source (Q), as though this alone were Syrian and the narrative matter Roman. But if the gospel tradition took shape in such large measure on the soil of Palestine, it was not at the period nor within the sphere of

influence postulated by the aetiological theory. No more would it originate in the devout faith of a later evangelist. Again, is it supposable that a gospel could have won such general acceptance, displaced other tradition, and become the foundation for writers soon to follow, if it was made up to such an extent of material that had come into being, or had been entirely remoulded, at so late a date? Would not the living witnesses and the early Christian converts, and after forty years these must have been many, have discredited or hindered the acceptance of such accounts? Loisy feels this difficulty, and thinks that we must come down to a time when the main actors, Jews, Christians, and Romans, were no more, and faith was not restrained by the memory of what had actually taken place. But how reconcile this with a gospel showing the influence of the Aramaic, and written about 70 A.D., that told of what must have been often repeated during many years, both by those who were actors in the history and by the larger numbers who had been their auditors? Whatever may be concluded as to the historical facts that lie back of the evangelical tradition, or back of any single section, the high age of the main content of the second gospel seems to be better established today than ever before. Advances in the knowledge of this early period following many lines tend thus far to increase rather than to diminish this possibility.

It may be urged that the Paulinism of the evangelist is against such a conclusion. We have seen that the gospel responds to Bacon's tests for Paulinism in nearly all its parts, and Loisy and others find it impregnated to a lesser extent. Aside from the fact that this same gospel has been found in the past to respond to very different tests, and from the fact that many skilled experimenters today can detect only slight traces of the Pauline element, it may be questioned whether another alternative has been sufficiently reckoned with. What if Paulinism shall be found to contain a strong infusion of primitive Christianity? Or what if it shall turn out that there was a pre-pauline doctrine akin to Paulinism? What if it shall be deemed wise eventually to confine the differences between the great apostle to the gentiles and his fellow-christians more nearly to the points that he himself mentions? Most of the arguments used by Bacon for Mark's

Paulinism may be, and have been, urged in favor of its primitive character. Especially is this true of the main argument, the form of the evangelist's message. What need could be earlier felt or more fundamental than the defence of Jesus' Messiahship? Does it seem probable that the apostles and elders of Jerusalem could presuppose faith in Christ rather than aim to produce it, that the didactic element in the tradition would be the all-important one for the churches of Palestine? Furthermore, does not the attitude toward the Jews, and the picture of the apostles, and of Jesus' kindred, suit an earlier age much better than any later one? Have we adequate reasons for substituting another historical background for one so well fitted to account for what follows? Are not the changes of the later Synoptists best explained as modifications of this earlier setting? It is evident that, prior to the question of the relation of Mark to primitive Christian tradition, there is the question of the relation of Paul to those who were apostles and disciples before him. If the second evangelist gives some evidence of being influenced by Pauline thought and teaching, this cannot be accounted strange. That, however, he was a pronounced partisan of the apostle, and that this motive shaped, yes, created his narrative, or even that such an influence is clearly traceable to any great extent, can hardly be said thus far to have been established. The assertion that we should have a very different gospel if it had been written by such a Paulinist, and according to the methods he is supposed to have employed, is not unfounded. To say that his Paulinism is that of a layman, that it was superficial, imperfect, and in part mistaken, hardly disposes of this objection. We thus conclude that the evidences of tendency and purpose hitherto adduced are not sufficient to give us important aid in separating out the sources of the second gospel from its present final form.

There is general agreement among the investigators named in this article, and among many others not mentioned, that we should look first of all to the second gospel itself rather than to the tradition of its origin for answers to the questions under discussion. The soundness of this position will probably be generally conceded. The gospel will continue to stand for what it is found to be in itself, whoever was the author or compiler. This does

not mean that the tradition of the Markan authorship is to be dismissed as without value. Indeed, it is generally accepted today in some form by eminent and impartial scholars. Johannes Weiss gives more attention to the question than do most recent writers on Mark. The difficulties and conflicting accounts in the oldest tradition, the question whether a distinction should be made between the author Mark and the John Mark of the New Testament, between the Mark of Peter and the Mark of Paul, are considered by him at length, and he finds the evidence such that he is willing neither to reject the prevailing assumption of their identity nor to affirm it. On the whole, he thinks the gospel best explained as coming from one who was a pupil of Peter and of Paul.

There is as much difference of opinion as ever as to the conclusion of Mark. Do the last twelve verses, which are so evidently from another and later hand, replace an ending that was accidentally lost, or one that was suppressed, or one that for some reason was never written? To these views, each of which has its advocates, we may add the further one, to which Loisy subscribes, that the gospel may have ended abruptly with 16 8, as it has come down to us in the oldest manuscripts. He finds it conceivable that the evangelist may have regarded the empty tomb, supplemented possibly by the account of the transfiguration, as the most convincing proof of the resurrection. He admits as possible the view that the evangelist contemplated a further narrative which was never written or has been lost. Bacon believes that the end of the gospel has been cancelled, either for dogmatic reasons or from lack of harmony with other accounts, and that the substitutes for this that have come down to us were supplied about 140 A.D. He says further, "It is as certain as anything in the field of critical conjecture can be that our evangelist's story once went on to relate the substance of the early narrative of Acts, and may even have wound up, as Acts does, with the planting of the gospel in *Rome*" (p. xix). Elsewhere he suggests that if the Roman evangelist himself did not continue his gospel, then we must suppose that there was current "some narrative corresponding to the more radical of the two main sources employed in Acts, perhaps represented in degenerate form in the later

'Acts,' 'Predications,' and 'Peregrinations' of Peter and Paul" (p. 234). Others, for example Zahn, are inclined to conjecture that our evangelist at least contemplated another and perhaps more extended writing, but Zahn does not express the degree of certainty regarding this that we find in Bacon. We may say that most scholars hold that the second gospel must have had some ending other than the present, but the hypothesis that the writer must have gone, or contemplated going, beyond the limits of the first, third, and fourth gospels, has far less probability, if it has any whatever.

Besides the question of the relation of Mark to Peter and to the Discourse-source (Q), there arises the further problem of its relation to the Johannine tradition, but up to the present this has not been widely discussed. Other points also, as yet little canvassed, will doubtless in due time assume a new importance. Meanwhile the progress recently made in the investigation of the second gospel and in the solution of the Synoptic Problem must be accounted most encouraging.

JESUS AND HIS MODERN CRITICS

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As our buildings today bear the impress of Greek genius in architecture, and our law in great measure holds the form that was given it under the Roman Empire, so do religion and morals with us still feel the influence of the Jew. Through Christianity that strain of spiritual life which had been nurtured under a great line of Hebrew prophets was taken over to and planted in the new soil of Graeco-Roman life: so that its heroes finally displaced the heroes of classical antiquity and its forms of thought, in part at least, superseded those which belonged by natural inheritance to pagan faith. The beginner of the movement which accomplished this change was Jesus of Nazareth, who thus made himself one of the foremost figures in the world's affairs.

As part of this process of getting itself rooted in a new habitat, and by way of adaptation to alien conditions, Christianity underwent considerable modification of form. First it was worked over into somewhat different shape in the mind of Paul. Petrine Christianity, no doubt, was held strictly within Judaic lines, and was designed only for "home consumption." The Pauline form introduced changes which better fitted it for a "foreign market." A later and more profound change was made by those influences which our fourth gospel represents. In this new guise it was such a different thing that it became thenceforth, almost of necessity, a stranger in the house of its birth. These modifications of it, innocently assumed to be its original shape, have lived on till our own day.

And now a new force is being brought to bear upon it whose ultimate effect we cannot wholly measure. The new science of historical criticism has come into this field, possessing an equipment and a determination which blind tradition will be unable to resist. One of the first facts to attract its attention was that

change of form which Christianity had undergone in getting itself transformed from Eastern to Western life; and one of its first problems was to retranslate these later versions of its message back into a primitive gospel.

This has been a problem of no small size; because, for one thing, our sources of information about the land and the people in the time of Christ are none too abundant; and also because the earliest literature of Christianity which we possess comes from that period in which its transplanting had been partially effected. Nevertheless, historical criticism has made substantial progress with its task; and the great ferment produced by such conclusions as it has already announced is evidence enough of marked changes in the life of the church that are yet to be enforced.

None of us can see with perfect clearness what is going forward in the church of our day. Still, it is well for us to use what wisdom we have to get our proper bearings under the forces that are shaping the thought of the age. This new science has demonstrations to make, and in the end is very sure to triumph over every kind of opposition.

In making some estimate of what historical criticism has done or is likely to do for Christianity, our first question is what (if anything) it gives us as the spring and source out of which this spiritual movement originally came. So far as it can go behind Greek and Pauline forms of Christian faith, what does it find to be the historic reality which they worked over into the tradition of later times? Our second question concerns the worth of this historic basis to the modern world, and the probable future of the church having that for a foundation.

First, is there anything in the early Christian tradition which can be received and held as valid history? Because at the present time there is considerable disposition to look upon the whole gospel story as a fabric of myths; so largely spun and woven out of subjective idealism that any element of fact it contains may be treated as a negligible quantity. Thus Mr. Anderson, in the *Hibbert Journal* for January of this present year, takes the position that almost nothing of the real story of Jesus of Nazareth is now recoverable. He seems to imply indeed that,

if we could recover it, it might be found too poor or cheap to deserve serious consideration. Meanwhile what we actually have in our possession is a great spiritual drama evolved out of the inner consciousness of the Early Church; a purely fictitious creation embodying only certain deep insights of the human soul.

This view of the case appears to be, in its origin, a gigantic bluff made by the upholders of traditional creeds in order to save their citadel from further attack; and one observes with mingled sorrow and amusement how well the bluff seems to work. The Christian world has stood these many centuries, without question, on the historic basis of its faith. Now comes this new authority, which the church has learned it cannot altogether ignore, to tell it that, as it understands the life of Christ, that narration is not history. What shall the church answer to this assertion?

Naturally enough many are now replying, "Well, why after all do we require any historic basis? The beautiful symbol is worth more than any mere narrative of fact. We freely give you whatever you can extract from your higher criticism and your historical research. It is not much that you can reclaim from the dust heaps of the past; but, whatever it is, take it for your pains, and make the most of it. We cling to that mighty structure which we know as Christianity, and which, of whatever substance it may be composed, is better than anything to be put together out of the fragments of what you are pleased to call historic truth."

It is a good bluff, bravely put on, and for a time will suffice to hold the fort. It is rather amusing, however, to see other people, always on the hunt for some last new thing, taking up this subterfuge and solemnly proclaiming it as that great discovery which shows us the next step of the world's advance. Because, as a matter of fact, the only body of opinion which can be regarded in this matter as having some weight of authority stands uncaptured and undismayed by this idea of the mythical origin of Christianity.

The historical students themselves, who have raised all this rumpus, have as a class never swerved from the conviction with

which they began,—that something once happened in Judea rather out of the common order of events to give Christianity its start, and that they could find out with some approach to accuracy what that happening was. They are the experts in this investigation. Their feeling about historical reality is worth any amount of loose popular conjecture; and, on the whole, they give no aid and comfort whatever to the notion that the gospel story grew up out of the imagination of a religious cult in the Graeco-Roman world. Their opinion ought to go far to settle the matter, at least until some new discovery is made; and if we pay heed to the reasons they have to give for the faith that is in them, we certainly shall not join in the cry of a distressed orthodoxy,—that, since there is no historical basis we are free to choose the best poetry within our reach.

The fact that the story, as it now stands, contains parts of a somewhat different story, inconsistent with the purpose for which the later version was proposed, is evidence enough that it is a revamped narrative of fact, not a mere fanciful drama of the soul. Schmiedel's "nine foundation pillars" have never been removed, and they are not likely to be overturned. Moreover, students of the gospel narrative are deeply impressed that the shadings of the story are often too subtle to be reasonably ascribed to a legendary source. The absence of contemporary witnesses in the general literature of the time is easily accounted for. The career of Jesus was not likely to attract the notice of historians of the age. It was too brief, too obscure, too little attended by any portent or disturbance to have found its way into their chronicles.

Altogether the scholarship best entitled to our confidence tells us that Jesus of Nazareth really lived, and that the main outline of his life-story is about as valid history as any record of the past that we possess.

It is not proposed here to set forth that story as understood by scholars of the present day. Suffice it to say, in general terms, that he is now presented to us as a man of his time rather than as a kind of universal king. He has been regarded as one who not only saw life from the divine point of view, but as one who saw it with divine omniscience of all its future and its past. It has been

thought that in all his teaching he was consciously legislating for the whole world of men. Although through his mother he was doubtless of Jewish birth, it has not been supposed that there was anything of the Jew in his mental and moral make-up. In the Christian imagination he has been a "man without a country"; one without special attachment to any national tradition, holding all races equally in his regard.

Modern scholarship places his life once more in its true setting as that of the latest and greatest among Hebrew prophets. It makes him first of all a loyal son of Israel, a child of the age which bore him. It sees him immersed in the ideas and struggles and ambitions of his own people. It does not suppose that he knew much about the world beyond the borders of his native land, and it does affirm that he saw life with such eyes as his Jewish ancestry had given him. This, in a broad way, is the change that modern thought has made in the picture of his mind and his career.

It is a change from which many infer that the story of his life is now practically discharged of its whole significance. What can a Jew of the first century have to say to us of the twentieth century? The world in which he lived has passed away. Many at least of its ideas have become obsolete. How is it possible that one who believed, for instance, in demoniacal possession can instruct or enlighten the man of today?

But if we make too much of the limitations of time and place, we destroy the value of historic instances altogether. Does one say it is another world which has come into existence since his day? Yes! But it is a very different world that has arisen since Washington's day. We do not consider his words entirely out of date. Or, since we are near the centennial anniversary of another famous man, we may remind ourselves of the impression that widely prevails as of a new heaven and a new earth that have come into being since Theodore Parker's day. Are we not frequently told that Darwinism has revolutionized the whole world of thought?

The truth is, however, that if a man be big enough in his own place, he is never out of date for those who have discernment enough to see somewhat beneath the fashion of the garments that he wears. What is of the moment in his life and

thought is of slight importance, as compared with qualities that fit every age; and therefore possesses monumental significance for all who come after him. To say that because a man is deeply absorbed in the situation of the world as he knows it, or of that little part of it only with which he is immediately concerned; and that because he does not see with perfect accuracy what the outcome of his life-struggle is to be, therefore his example can set no beacon for other men to observe in the different trains of circumstance with which they are involved, amounts to saying that no great life of the past can teach us anything.

Now, to speak of nothing else, we may specify four instances in which the thought of Jesus rose to the very highest level of human consciousness; reached a height indeed which, so far as we can see, stands as the topmost summit of human thinking. First, his thought of God is ideally perfect. Religion has never found and never will find a better object of worship. His "Father in Heaven," as depicted in the matchless parables of the gospels, marks an ultimate achievement of religious idealism. Secondly, his thought of man as God's child is equally sublime. The unfolding of that thought discloses the loftiest ideas of human nature that the mind can form. And it is evident that he did unfold the thought; it was with him no mere "glittering generality." Thirdly, his teaching about the relation that should exist between God and man leaves nothing to be desired. Even his practical sagacity in counselling the soul how it should find this right solution remains of immense consequence to all students of the higher life; though in the nature of the case such counsels change as conditions vary. Finally, in finding love to be the heart and essence of all right relationship between man and man, Jesus rose to the highest reach of spiritual attainment. In this direction nothing is to be had better than he has given us.

And it takes nothing from his glory to say that these ideas have found expression again and again in the course of man's spiritual development; any more than it cheapens the beauty of some great model of female loveliness to say that other women have eyes and lips and noses of the same general pattern. There the ideas are in the mind of Jesus in what we can only regard as their perfect form. We know not how to improve upon his

statement of a single one of them. We have no reason to say that he borrowed them from any source whatever. They grew out of his own life; and they are among the very greatest things that could grow out of any life.

Of the thought thus briefly sketched I am ready to say, in the language of another (Professor Henry Jones), "Its central truth was so great and its consequences so momentous that it contains the substantial virtue and essence of all idealism." It seems to me that this writer gives us what is sure to be the ultimate verdict of rational criticism when he goes on to say, "It was the boldest idealism, and it was the most unflinchingly held in the face of every doubt and every tragedy, that was ever taught to man." "No man ever lived who was more deeply possessed by a great thought, or who lived in its service and its power with such sublime consistency, and with such an all-challenging courage."

The person of whom such words may be justly and fitly spoken surely stands in the highest rank among great souls of the past; and in view of such supreme excellence, in mind and character, the attempt to show defects in his ethical or religious sense appears to me trivial. It may be granted that he cherished some mistaken expectation of a return to earth to finish in person the work which he had begun. In this his mind was probably swayed by the current Messianic dream. But in this he was no common fanatic, and he professed no very clear foresight of the coming time.

Moreover this expectation produced little, if any, appreciable effect upon the character of his moral teaching; for the charge that his precepts have only an *ad interim* quality, and are largely vitiated by his belief in the coming end of the world (to which approaching catastrophe alone they were designed to run), is simply absurd. Every reasonable mind knows that he was constantly busy trying to illustrate, by word and deed, what he considered the kingdom of heaven to be. He had a splendid vision, both of individual and of social righteousness, which was always foremost in his thoughts. It was no vision that he could set forth in formal rules, such as the scribes and rabbis loved, but one that he sought to convey by parable and paradox

and glowing allegory, that his disciples might catch the spirit of it all. So clearly was this the main purpose of his life and so much was he intent upon it, that in summing up his moral and religious precepts any views that he held about a "second coming" may be safely left out of the reckoning.

With regard to the claim that he was the Christ, the Messiah of God, it is difficult to see how this can be justly turned against him. The critics here are not yet agreed as to the facts, some doubt being entertained whether he did make that claim. But he was crucified for something, and the fear and distrust of him which produced that judicial murder seem rather inexplicable unless he had set up, more or less openly, a Messianic claim. But is any one in position to say that this was a mistake on his part? Surely the Messianic idea played a great part in the early history of the new faith. If there is a Providence in the affairs of men, may not this have been a part of it? Meantime it is highly significant that in his use of this idea he so spiritualized the popular hope as to transform a rather cheap and tawdry picture of millennial glory into an ideal on which the spiritual vision can still linger with delight.

These questions, as to his Messiahship and his expectation of the approaching end of the world, are well worth talking about; though one does not see that they have much bearing on that religious idealism which was his great gift to subsequent time. When, however, it comes down to the criticism which alleges that in giving his indignation against the Pharisees free rein, or that in what he said in answer to a question about divorce he displayed a lack of regard for womankind,—is not that rather poor stuff? However interesting it may be to those who produce it, it will probably never enter into the world's serious thought.

One consideration alone lends to it a kind of momentary relevance. The Christian world now entertains a purely theological belief in the absolute sinlessness of Christ. There is no possible way to establish the accuracy of that belief. Even if we had a full record of every thought and every deed of his life, so many different moral estimates of that record would be likely to arise that complete sinlessness would lie beyond the realm of convincing demonstration. From what we know of the mind

of Christ we gain an impression of the greatest moral purity. Whether he stood entirely without fault we can only say as we make that assertion an article of pure faith.

Some people, it would seem, are much annoyed when instances of such faith are brought under their notice, and feel an irresistible impulse to shatter it. But, really, to go after such game as this is not much better than the hunting of the snark. There is a strong tendency in human nature to deal in superlatives, and to say "most" when it only means "very much." The dogma of the sinlessness of Christ can have no other reasonable meaning than that of the words ascribed to Pilate, "I find no fault in him." Is it worth while to attack that dogma by seeking to find some small instance in which Jesus was possibly wrong? In that kind of shot there may be a sharp recoil, and some question may arise at which end of the gun most damage is likely to be done. Fault-finding of a petty sort removes attention from those greater things where emphasis belongs. One may signalize his own independence of mind in this fashion; but for my part I think no other form of color-blindness is worse than that which sees only the strong red and green of courage and intellectual honesty, as if the moral spectrum contained no other colors.

One who undertakes to do damage to what in the eyes of others is a great ideal, should be very sure of just pretext for his action. And this consideration may lead us to take up the other question with which we began: What is the worth of this life of Jesus to the modern world? How does it matter whether or not there is a Jesus of history, and of what importance is he to the religion of this and the coming time? To go at once to the heart of this question, probably one's sense of the worth of the personality of Christ will depend much upon his sense of the value of personal influence in the general life of mankind. This is so large a theme that we cannot here follow it outside the limits of our immediate field of inquiry.

It becomes more and more evident, as the various religions of the world are better understood, that the one unique possession of Christianity has been the picture it has cherished of its Founder's character and career. Its ideas are to be found paralleled or

parodied on every hand. Scholars are at a loss to say why Christianity has survived, when other faiths have perished, if the explanation must be limited to the kinds of religious belief which have been held and advocated. To go back to the beginning, we are told by those who ought to know that, so far as moral and religious teachings are concerned, it is somewhat puzzling to determine why the name of Rabbi Hillel should have fallen into obscurity, while that of Jesus rose to commanding fame. Unless we are content to stay in that last ditch of unreason, provided for us by the supposition that things merely happened thus and so, we are driven to the assertion that there was something in the personality of Jesus which appealed to men, as the personality of that other Jewish teacher did not.

When we take up the work of Paul, we see at once how it all centred in the person of Christ. It is true that his writings contain little reference to incidents in the life of Jesus. Whether or not he was familiar with what eye-witnesses had to say on this subject, that earthly life appears to have been mostly of secondary consequence to him, as compared with the impression of a spiritual Jesus that was somehow burned into his soul on the way to Damascus. Still, however conceived, the figure of Jesus rose above everything else in his regard; and it was the figure of a person of unquestioned reality. We may now say, if we like, that his idea of Jesus was more or less a dream. It needs to be remembered, however, that this is not at all the view which Paul himself held. Jesus Christ was to him no mere bright ideal of human excellence, but a most real and vivid personality; one who had walked the earth and suffered death upon the cross. Had it been otherwise, no shade of Saul of Tarsus would now haunt the memory of travellers who wander over the ruins of Ephesus, or stand on Mars' Hill at Athens.

Coming to the period, later than Paul, when Christianity was competing with Mithraism and the worship of Isis for supremacy throughout the Roman Empire, what shall we say determined that struggle? Note the words of Professor Emerton, a wise and careful student. "Christianity," he says, "shared with these other cults the concentration of thought upon one single redeeming

personality. But the immense and decisive difference was that this personality was, in the Christian scheme, not merely a divine abstraction requiring to be represented by symbols and sacrifices, but also an absolute and perfect historical human being. That was the one fundamental fact which not all the speculations of all the theological schools could obscure."

Here is an opinion to tie to amid the floods of loose talk with which the world is deluged, for one may judge it to be an opinion that will hold. It would be easy enough to supplement this with a great array of competent observers and witnesses whose testimony would be that, in their judgment, throughout the whole life of the church the personality of Jesus had exercised commanding power. Christianity is, of course, a highly complex affair. But the real key to the combination of those elements of which it is composed, the key which thus far has guaranteed the stability of that combination, is the person of Christ.

What other view of religious history is reasonable in the light of what we know of the natural behavior of men? Everywhere and at all times a great personality is the best rallying-point which the units of the social mass can find, about which to gather. It is hard for these units to combine and stay together within the bond of common belief. Differences of thought soon arise to drive them apart; and so strong is this disruptive influence that no organization long endures apart from allegiance to those persons who represent to the common mind its spirit and purpose.

It has become a kind of instinct with men to follow such personal leadership in political affairs. They have a feeling of helplessness without it. When the name of some prominent leader has become a rallying cry for the masses, many who would be glad to get rid of him are afraid to let him go, realizing the difficulty of transferring this loyalty to any other object. Let any one who thinks that personalism is of slight consequence in a democracy study Bryanism and what it stands for. It is not that any one man can, by his own might, so "bestride the narrow world like a Colossus"; it is that many men who desire to stand and act together find often in personal allegiance not merely their strongest but their only bond.

A great personality is for the common mind its best symbol

of the things it most cares for; its most comprehensive and satisfactory definition of such spiritual values as are precious in its sight. And this appears to be true whether it be the prize-fighters' world or the communion of saints which is taken for purposes of illustration. It ought not, therefore, to be to us a singular phenomenon that the great religions of this world are so associated with the names of their founders, and that this personal influence of these men has remained so much the life and strength of all their following.

To my own mind the problem of the future of Christianity presents itself in very simple guise. It is mainly the question whether that Jesus of history, now presented by modern scholars to the thought of the church, can serve, as the half-mythological figure of Christ has served in time past, to inspire and unite men for such work as the Church is set to do. If the proper answer to this question be an affirmative one, then I should hold it probable that we stand at the beginning of a new development of Christianity, of quite as much worth to the world as any phase of it which lies behind us. If, on the other hand, this question must be answered in the negative, then I should say that nothing is left to this ancient spiritual movement but gradual retirement from the world's affairs. In that case it would perhaps be most fitting for those of us who profess to be Christians, of what is called the "liberal" kind, to look at each other with what Emerson once called "eyes of speculation," and wonder what we are doing "in this gallery."

I do not say that I know what answer to this question the future will give. I do say that there is ground for a reasonable hope and faith in the possibility of starting Christianity upon a new career; and I declare that, in the sight of those who are willing to commit themselves to that venture, there is a goal to be reached, a prize to be won, which is one of the most splendid inducements ever offered to the courage and loyalty of human hearts. The rebirth of the Christian religion is a magnificent dream. If, through the preaching of a Jesus of history, this renewal of its life can be accomplished, that is a possibility of stupendous significance. And to make trial and test of this possible opening to a larger future seems to me, above everything else, the desig-

nated task of those who now occupy the extreme left wing of Protestantism.

The movements which hold that position began in deep attachment and loyalty to what they understood to be the historic Christ. Down to a very recent time this continued to be a distinguishing feature of their faith. Of late there has come some change; a change sufficiently indicated perhaps by a sentence in one of Mr. Robert's articles, where he says that "the supreme need of the hour, in these matters, is the disengagement of religion from its dependence on historical personalities." At least one probably does not misconstrue the feeling of a certain number of Unitarians, at this time, when one says that they really want to get away from Jesus. He does not mean much to them. They would prefer to cease talking about him, and they are somewhat inclined to suspect insincerity in those who do like to talk of him.

This change may be due to a variety of causes. With us, here in New England, transcendentalism very likely began it. The remedy for Emerson's one-sidedness is generally to be found somewhere in his other-sidedness. But his disciples do not always look for this remedy, and some of his sayings have produced a quite disproportionate effect on their minds. Then, many have been somewhat carried away by the dream of universal religion. To universal religion the Hegelian formula that "being and non-being are identical," appears to be peculiarly applicable. Strip away that particular religious feeling which is the distinguishing face of any existing type of faith, and what is left may be a skeleton of philosophy, more or less identical with other similar skeletons in other kindred faiths; but of religion, in any proper sense of that word, nothing then survives. Of all "forlorn hopes" that of turning Christianity into universal religion is about the most hopeless.

Mysticism has to some seemed the way out. But while we may say of the mystics, in the words of Mark Antony, that they are "all honorable men," we have no reason to think that in the world, as we are called to deal with it, mysticism can ever be a great popular faith. If we are by way of caring anything about large world-movements, or ambitious in any wise to make

our lives count toward the shaping of currents of history, then the ruling purpose with which, for example, Unitarianism began remains the one sure guiding star of "advanced" Christian communions. It is quite certain that whatever new development Christianity is capable of attaining will be brought forth only among those who profess heartfelt allegiance to Jesus of Nazareth.

The attempt to enthrone a Jesus of history, where the Christ of theology has stood, should commend itself to sober minds by the fact that it is in no sense revolutionary. It is the central purpose of Protestantism reasserting itself under the changed conditions of the present day. Protestants have insisted all along that they would only know their Christ as the New Testament actually revealed him. Now comes the time when a new reading of the original documents of our faith compels a new interpretation of them. As Protestants, we must hold to this new knowledge, once we are convinced that modern scholars know what they are talking about. Why should not that simple determination point the way for the church to a new era of constructive triumphs? No doubt they who seem to see a path in this direction will still have to encounter much ridicule. But so many mighty Nimrods have gone forth to hunt liberal Christianity out of existence, its speedy demise has been so often predicted and its funeral has been so many times appointed, that some of us are no longer much frightened by the presence of these cheerful undertakers on the scene. For a plant which is on the verge of extinction liberal Christianity manifests a surprising vigor of growth, in an astonishing number of places.

Of course, when one says that the new Jesus of history can be made to take the place of that Christ which theology has known, he does not mean that any personality, merely as it stands in the critical intelligence of the time, can fill that high office. Men do not dissect their heroes, or treat them like specimens in a museum. In a way they do and must idealize the great persons of history. They must use their imagination, that is to say, to make these characters once more living realities. They will see through the medium of their own affection and reverence any life which greatly appeals to them. May we not become too superstitious

about the "thing in itself"? All things, as we know them, are a compound of qualities which they themselves possess, and of other qualities which reside in the seeing mind. We cannot live without idealism, and it is only a question on what basis of reality our idealism stands. In fact, so far as moral and spiritual affairs are concerned, realism can perform for us no decent service save as it makes the foundation on which a nobler idealism is built.

Historical research, unaided, will not give us a supreme personality such as a great religion seems to demand. But it should be possible for criticism to revise and correct the picture of such a personality without destroying it. No Jesus of history, it is true, will be worth much to coming time unless men are to love him for what he was and what he did. But suppose that love builds anew this ancient image of what a true son of God should be; why should it be calmly assumed that this image is valueless without those precise theological adornments which schoolmen have added to it? At least this lack of worth remains to be proved, and the issue is not yet so far tried out as to justify the lofty scorn with which many affect to regard it.

It is quite possible that men will learn to love Jesus of Nazareth all the more, when they come to see him as one of their own kind; a man with a great word of God in his heart, who died to impart that word to a world which he deeply loved. It is only a few fragments of his life-story which we possess; but they are just those fragments which were first found useful to perpetuate the image of his personality, and out of which, even now, that image can be most easily produced. What does the ordinary man know of Lincoln or Napoleon, save a few anecdotes through which the character of these famous men is revealed? When history has done her best to set forth the whole career of some favorite child of fortune, a half-dozen incidents in which he figured may lend the imagination more help than volumes of laborious record and description. As such incidents in the life of Jesus have been told, over and over, they have taken deep hold of the heart of the Christian world, and an immense amount of pure sentiment has sprung up in answer to the appeal thus made. Surely we are the most foolish of mortals if we now allow that sentiment to go to waste.

One trouble is, perhaps, that we are apt to get more interested in correcting our neighbors than in attending to our own affairs. We see them doing various unwarrantable things, and we get so excited about this that we forget to study how our work should best be done. Let me appeal in this matter from Philip drunk to Philip sober; from the critic who, when he is fighting orthodoxy, thinks religion ought to be "disengaged from historical personalities," to this same critic when in calmer mood he has a clearer vision of fixed values. "Is Jesus to be blamed," he asks, "for the dismal tragedies of the Christian centuries?" And then he says: "For my own part I answer quite frankly,—most assuredly he is not. He, assuming his historicity, has held up the ideal. Amid the savageries of egoism, we catch the vision of a Selfless One; we hear the calm, sweet voice which tells of peace and joy. With that Vision Beautiful at its heart, Christendom may hope to live down its ape and tiger elements."

There, I am persuaded, the voice of wisdom speaks. In theory, Jesus has been these many centuries the guide and pattern of the Christian world. In so far, however, as the attempt has been seriously made to follow his precepts, they have generally been construed in too narrow and literal fashion; and always this endeavor has been much hindered by a mediatorial scheme of Christendom's own devising. To make him now the real spiritual hero of his church, as childhood is sure to find somewhere in the life surrounding it an adorable image of what it would like to be; to make the common mind truly in love with the kind of man that Jesus was, appears to me one of the most desirable ends that can possibly be reached.

His intensely personalistic gospel is a veritable specific for the faults and weaknesses of a mechanical age. His unwavering trust in the winning power of the spirit is a much-needed correction of the popular illusion that only compulsory forces count. His devotion to an ideal, which it may require ages yet to work out, is an immense steadying influence to that impatience which thinks that the world ought to be made all over, like a pair of shoes, while we wait. His passion for reality, his contempt for the whole art of keeping up appearances, his tenderness toward sins of weakness, and his hatred for every form of

cruelty,—all this constitutes a ceaseless rebuke for that Pharisaeism which is, on the whole, the deadliest foe to man's higher life.

His thought of God means life and purity to the whole world's religious faith. His words are deep wells of wisdom, out of which mankind can never cease to draw the water of life. Our race will not forget him, or turn away from him; and there is no eminence to which the modern man can climb from which he can look down upon this Carpenter of Nazareth.

THE INFLUENCE OF DEMOCRACY UPON RELIGION

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During the last five hundred years there has been taking place throughout the world a fundamental revolution in government,—first as to its actual condition, and secondly as to its theory; for that and not the reverse is always the order of development. Up to that time in each community the mass of people, with rare exceptions, had been governed by a few, with one man at their head. The change, which came slowly, consisted in the rise of the governed from passive acquiescence into active participation, the recognition of this as rightful, and the growth of ability among the people for governing. This up-swelling tide, surging everywhere, has been defined by one of its ablest exponents as “government of the people, by the people, for the people.”

According to this theory government arises out of the people. It is not a system imposed on them *ab extra*, which they must accept whether they like it or not, and to which their only duty is obedience. It is founded in their own hearts, minds, wills. Instead of being their master who takes them by the shoulder and makes them walk in the path, whether wisely or unwisely, prescribed, a governor is their agent, whose business is appointed by them and whom they intrust with its execution. Rulers are therefore, on this theory, not autonomous but representative, with powers limited and defined. Government becomes more or less constitutional, with arbitrariness more or less eliminated. There is established a responsibility of the governors to the source of their power—the governed; and government becomes not only of the people but by the people.

It is also for the people. Their welfare is the only object it may legitimately have. Undemocratic government has always aimed at furthering the interests either of a class or of an institution. The pomp and wealth of kings or of their nobles, and the

comfort of those who could rise above their fellows, were accepted by high and low alike as the natural objects of government. Or all interests were subordinated to the advancement of the ruling family, the State, the Church, of the institution, whatever it was, which wielded the machinery of government. The individual as such had no or few rights. He existed for the sake of the institution. Democracy, on the other hand, holds that institutions exist for the sake of individuals; that the welfare of all men and every man is the only legitimate object of human society, and that government therefore must be not only of the people and by the people but for the people.

Such a shifting of the centre of gravity in the State has of course had a profound influence upon the Church; for the upper and the nether springs are fed from the same source. Heaven and earth react upon each other. We are told that in the beginning God made man in His own image. History shows that men ever since have been making God in their own image; that is, men have always attributed to their gods the conditions which seemed to them the highest. Where brute power has held sway, some Baal-embodiment of force has been worshipped. Where the indulgence of appetite has been a thing to be envied, Bacchus and Venus in low forms or in high have been in the Pantheon. The impress of the Roman Empire upon early Christianity was profound. Under it God became a magnified emperor, dealing out arbitrary rewards and punishments, while the Atonement was a legal contract between the First and Second Persons of the Trinity. Every rise in civilization has gone on and registered itself in men's conception of God. So mighty a current of thought as the swing towards democracy in government must therefore have had a profound influence upon theology and upon the constitution of the Church.

This influence has been by no means wholly beneficial; for democracy has brought with it the defects of its excellences. In its recognition of the worth of each individual there lies a tendency to blur distinctions, and so to lower all moral judgments to a level. The yawning valleys of human evil are obligingly exalted, and the mountainous standards of righteousness are made conveniently low. The eternal hostility between right and wrong

tends to melt away in a kindly tolerance, and the problem of sin to have little interest for such theology as remains. An easy-going optimism insists that there is no such thing as permanent loss, since God is too amiable to hurt anybody. I am not sure but the Church has aided this tendency by sounding too exclusively that key-note of the Gospel—"God is Love." It is indeed the key-note, and it is a veritable gospel to those who can understand it. But to those whose ideal of love is low, it is likely to mean the easy-going good nature they have seen in indulgent parents or little-demanding friends. It is the tragedy of great phrases that their very greatness by making them common makes them outworn. They need translation in order to be freshened, brightened, sharpened. So we must set forth love's highly demanding nature, its sternness, its moral passion, or else we must cease to take for granted that the glory of the gospel will be apprehended when we sum it up in "God is Love."

It is but a different aspect of this same democratic tendency—to regard one thing as equally good with another—when we see that the religion inspired by it lays little emphasis upon any imperative. If every man's opinion has a right to existence, there is no need for authority, indeed there is no such thing as authority. Why have recourse to specialists when every man knows enough to get along? An absolute, an eternal, a "Thou shalt," the mind taught by democracy has become almost incapable of hearing. What it needs is the message of the prophet Ezekiel: "Go, get thee unto the children of thy people and speak unto them and tell them, Thus saith the Lord God!" Do we ask what else he was to say? Nothing; that was the whole of it. A bookful of details indeed follows; but they were all summed up and embodied in this one message—that there is a God, whose word is imperative. Such a recognition of ultimate authority is what the scientific tendency of the last half-century has been insisting upon in its inculcation of reverence for the fact. It is what the easy popular religion of the day tends to smile upon lightly. Democracy may be right in insisting that the abode of this ultimate authority is not outside men's mind and soul but is within it; and theology is certainly right in insisting that being within the soul, it is none the less of God. But both unite in solemnly

declaring that it is of vital importance to all men that they should acknowledge an imperative and know that there is a God in Israel.

Democracy claims that the ultimate authority in government is of the people. This has therefore lent strength to the claim for religion that it is immanent, that is, having its base in the heart and mind of humanity. It is true that the doctrine of the immanence of God was enunciated by the Alexandrine theologians long before democracy appeared as a force in the world. But the time then was not ripe for it, and it disappeared for a thousand years, except to the discerning few, under the dominant fervor of transcendence and Augustinianism. But at the Renaissance democracy and immanence shyly emerged and went hand in hand. Religion came then to be regarded less as a system handed down from above than as an ideal towards which the thoughts and desires of men were up-reaching. Even in the heart of the Church in the early centuries there had dwelt the recognition of the human soul as the cave from which issued divine oracles. The Bible was guaranteed by the Church. The Church was the blessed company of all faithful people. The test of truth was, "*Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus creditum est.*" For a long time, however, this inward revelation was regarded as no revelation at all in the proper sense of the word, but as a realm of wholly human knowledge distinct from knowledge divinely given. The latter, Revelation properly so called, came wholly from without and was guaranteed by the Church, according to the Roman Catholics; by the Bible, according to the Protestants. The realm of inward revelation had no standing with the orthodox, but was held to be either opposed to revealed truth or to be a separate sphere wholly apart from it. It is only within the last half-century that these have been recognized as not two but one. Revelation and discovery are but different aspects of the same process. When we emphasize the human agency in the coming of truth to the soul, we call it discovery; when we emphasize the divine agency, we call it revelation; and both statements are correct.

The thought of our time, scientific, literary, theological, cannot be understood unless we recognize not only the divine and the human but the divine in the human. If God made man in his

own image, then the spirit in man is, as the Hebrew poet said, the candle of the Lord; and the light it sheds is part of the incarnate Light of the world. Democracy has been in this respect a John the Baptist, preparing the way for the dispensation of the spirit. Out of the heart of the Hebrew monarchy rose this vision of a democracy which should be both human and divine. "Behold the days come, saith the Lord, that I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel. I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts. And also upon the servants and upon the handmaids in those days will I pour out my spirit."

When we ask next whether the condition of religion today shows any influence of democracy's second doctrine—that government must be by the people—we are confronted with a remarkable change from early times. Religion was then almost wholly the affair of a class. Those only administered religion, spoke for it, concerned themselves with it, who were certified by its agent, the Church; or if others attempted these functions, they were cast out as heretics or schismatics. But today it is those who claim an exclusive patent on religion who are themselves on trial. The spirit of democracy refuses to recognize any one ecclesiastical system as possessing exclusive right of way. On every side there have arisen bodies claiming orthodoxy, apostolicity, legitimacy; and the spirit of our age looks on indulgently and only smiles when one of them gets angry with the others and refuses to play. Instead of councils of clergy to settle church affairs, we have great conferences and movements by laymen. We hear lamentations that the authority of the clergy has declined. They are no longer looked to as the sources of light and knowledge, and their word when uttered is likely to be treated as of little weight. The moving forces of the religious world today are not only in the pulpit but also in the newspaper and the magazine.

This is a melancholy spectacle for those who regard the Church as the only agent of God in the world, and who tend to identify the Church with the clergy. Sometimes the endeavor is made to amend the situation by exalting the minister of religion as a priest. But the effort accomplishes little; not, as might be

claimed for it, because the ideal is high, but because in fact it is not high enough. For the type of priesthood thus set up is that of Aaron, where the priest belongs to a tribe apart from his fellows, and his functions consist in performing acts of ceremonial. Such, the Epistle to the Hebrews assures us, is too low an ideal of priesthood for the uplifting of the world. That which is needed is a priesthood of the order of Melchizedek, which is not based on genealogic descent, since it is without father, without mother; and whose functions are not primarily ritual but reside in kingship in righteousness and kingship in peace. Wherever today there is a minister of religion with a message, one who is a Melchizedek, an authority in righteousness, who can illustrate it and draw men to it; one who is king of Salem, a master of peace, who can lead men to the still waters of divine comfort,—there are hungry souls waiting for him. Priesthood such as this, after the order of Melchizedek, based upon character, our age welcomes with reverence and obedience; while for the assertion of prerogatives of official position it has less and less toleration. Is the minister of religion a priest because other men are not, or is he a priest just because others are? Is he different from them in kind, or is he what all others may be, not in occupation but in spirit? Has he official authority to forgive sins, and therefore to exact obedience; or is he in these respects representative of the priesthood of all believers? Questions such as these democracy has been calling on religion to answer. The presence of large numbers of intelligent and devout persons outside the churches shows that they reject the ecclesiastical answer, and, while still recognizing the sovereignty of religion, insist that its ministers do not constitute an aristocracy but are representative.

This same trend of thought has resulted in setting forth the object of religion as for the people. The necessity for machinery inevitably brought into existence ecclesiasticism. And ecclesiasticism did a service of great importance in building a fortress into which Christianity retreated, and where it remained in safety during the upheavals by which the ancient world passed into the modern. But the price paid by Christianity was high; for the Roman Empire and feudalism joined in stamping their

characteristic features upon the Church, and in getting both the Church and the world to acknowledge them as integral parts of the Christian religion. Ecclesiasticism, like a political party, has always tended to take itself too seriously, and to forget that its Master, the Son of Man, came not to be ministered unto but to minister. The effect of this serving of its own glory may be seen in that plainest instance in the modern world—the Ultramontane party in the Roman Catholic Church. The countries which a century ago, before democracy had found its tongue, were the most loyal to Rome, are today openly in revolt. And this, it may safely be said, is owing not so much to a rejection of the theology or the ritual of that Church as to the extreme ecclesiastical claims of Ultramontanism. It is pathetic to see that Rome's only answer to her sons' complaint that they have been chastised with whips, is that she will chastise them with scorpions.

In opposition to this claim of dominance, the demand is being made everywhere on the churches today that they shall justify their existence by their service to the needs of the world. The insistence that religion shall be practical often, indeed, leaves out of sight the important requirement that the Church shall do the world's religious thinking for it in religion and furnish it with moral steam-power. But the demand for service of some kind as a test of legitimacy and a condition of toleration is but an appeal to the canon our Lord established in His significant word "Because." "The spirit of the Lord God is upon me," He said, "*because* he hath anointed me to preach the gospel to the poor, to heal the broken-hearted, and to set at liberty them that are bruised." It is only through such service that any one approves himself a messenger of God.

One of the most remarkable events of the last half-century has been the sweep through the world of socialism. With us in America the social consciousness is developing a higher social conscience than the world has ever known. Even Russia, the home of absolutism, has glowed with the spirit of brotherhood and martyrdom; and, though she fights against it with prisons and exile and death, she knows that she must eventually yield to the intangible, on-surg-ing, conquering tide. We may not

approve some of the theories of socialism nor some of the forms it takes; but we shall misunderstand one of the mighty forces of our generation and the next if we miss the connection between this and that spirit of brotherhood which our Lord prescribed as His test of discipleship: "By this shall all men know that ye are my disciples—if ye have love one toward another." The vision of a state of society where, when one member suffers all the members suffer with it, or when one member is honored all the members rejoice with it,—this ideal has by no means worked itself free from the limitations of trades-unionism and class-feeling; but it has received through them a mighty impetus, which it is imperative for the Church to recognize and welcome with outstretched hand. It is the suspicion that the Church is too much occupied with preserving her own class-prerogatives, which has alienated from her many who are stirred by this gospel of brotherhood. Said the late Bishop Potter of New York in his Convention Address of 1901, "The great fault with our Church today is that it has become too largely interested in its own organization, instead of being interested in the betterment of mankind."

However the Church may turn from socialism as a political theory, she will do well to listen with welcome to the call to brotherhood which social organizations are uttering, and, with an awakened sense of kinship, to respond to it, with King Saul, "Is this thy voice, my son David?"

Perhaps the greatest service democracy has done for religion is in transferring the conception of God from that of an arbitrary monarch to that of a constitutional ruler. The fundamental idea of a monarch in the ancient world was based on unrelated will. It was desirable indeed that a king or emperor should rule in accordance with such public opinion as existed, in the interest of his subjects, with justice and uprightness. But if he did so, it was a matter of grace, not of obligation, for which he was to be regarded as an exception and highly praised. His right was, so it was believed, to consider solely his own will, unrelated to anything else. When therefore this monarchical conception was applied to God, as all political conceptions were, it expressed each feature in a superlative degree. His power was omnipotent; He was under no obligations; His will was unrelated to anything

but itself. Such a conception inevitably developed a deity who was an oriental despot magnified. The centuries even down to our own have been darkened by the fear or the contempt of this arbitrary and therefore cruel divinity. Probably all of us have felt or seen the shadow of this thick darkness—the dread of the saint lest he may wake up after death and find that he was not after all one of the elect; the scorn of the thinker when assured that there is no certainty that what is reasonable to him is reasonable to God; the apparent divine sanction given to the mere worship of will and power. Humanity wants to be able to bring its best to God and say, “All mine are Thine, and Thine are mine.” As the spirit of democracy has spread, it has insisted that government must be constitutional; that there must be certain principles which it must follow, certain things it shall not do; that the will of those in power shall be related to the eternal laws of righteousness and the interests of the governed. This constitution may be written or unwritten, narrow or ample; but in all countries of the world the contest is going on today between will unrelated and will related. And so the spirit of the age has been applying its test to God Himself, and asking the patriarch’s question, “Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?” For even the Infinite Judge there is a code, and the standard to which the Divine will is brought to be judged is the Divine character. Because God can swear by no greater, He swears by Himself. We can no longer without a shock, which is deepest in the most devout, conceive of God as acting independently of right and wrong, or as making right and wrong by His mere fiat. We refuse to allow that He can damn an innocent soul, or that any act, wrong by the standard He has established for men, can be made out right because declared to have been done by Him. We hold Him, as it were, responsible before the bar of His own judgment. That moral sense which He has implanted in us must, we reverently claim, be the arbiter of His actions too. When the question arises, “Is God’s will founded upon His character, or His character upon His will?” the answer springs confidently to our lips, “The immutable will must rest upon the infinite righteousness.” Constitutional government has revealed to us the greater glory of will that is not arbitrary but is based upon and

responsible to something behind itself. The question, "Which is the more fundamental in God—His will or His character?" is of no trifling import. Does it make no difference whether I feel my path predestined by a mighty force, while I am powerless to turn or resist, or whether I believe it marked out by infinite wisdom and infinite love? whether the force which drives the world has behind it no rational and moral plan? From every one who has meditated with terror on the thought of an omnipotent Deity, not bound by the moral laws by which all men are bound, there will at once arise a cry, "It does make a difference! The centre of the Divine nature must be not in abstract will but in eternal righteousness."

For this thought of God, if again we may use the phrase with reverence, as a constitutional Ruler, we are largely indebted to the change throughout the world from absolute sovereignty to constitutional government.

I am inclined to think our age has gained from the doctrine of the divine immanence all that is at present possible for it, and can progress little further until it draws more upon the thought of the divine transcendence. Not that we shall return to painting the deity seated upon a throne in a distant heaven, issuing arbitrary decrees; but while recognizing the true voice of the soul as the voice of God, we must endue it with that majesty, that awe, that obedience-compelling strain, which were inspired by the clouds and darkness, the lightnings, the thunders, which surrounded the abode of Jahveh. It is only when we are filled with the conviction that the voice of the Lord is upon the waters and is full of majesty, that we are moved to give unto the Lord glory and strength, the glory due unto His name. Yet when the Divine voice is fully recognized within the soul, an imperative-ness will be found in it which no external fulminations can secure; or rather, the distinction between inward and outward revelation will have vanished, and the Kingdom of God will be real in the world because it is real in the hearts of men.

*HAS OLD TESTAMENT CRITICISM COLLAPSED?*¹

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The theory now for many years held by most critical students of the Old Testament is that the early narratives from Genesis to Kings are composite, and, further, that the sources from which they were compiled belong to different periods in Hebrew history, having been produced by authors, or schools of authors, occupying various points of view, but so related to one another that their contributions, when arranged in chronological order, reflect the course of events for many successive generations and the progressive development of ethical and religious culture among the Chosen People.

With reference to the dates of the supposed documents, especially those underlying the Hexateuch, there has always been difference of opinion among those who have adopted this general scheme. The great majority of the critics have more or less closely followed Wellhausen, whose original statement is to the effect that the Yahwistic and Elohist elements were mostly the product of the golden period of Hebrew literature, preceding the destructive invasions of Palestine by the Assyrians, the Elohist being somewhat the later of the two; that both of them had a history before they were united; that Deuteronomy appeared just before the Restoration under Josiah, and, after circulating in two editions until some time after the fall of the Jewish monarchy, finally took a form combining the peculiarities of both and was added to the preceding compilation; and that the Priestly document, which was the product of a school of writers during and after the Exile, was completed and added to the other three before 444 B.C., when the first five parts of the resulting Hexateuch were promulgated as the law of God by Ezra.

Dillmann's theory of the age of the sources differed somewhat less widely from that of the critics of the preceding gen-

¹ A lecture delivered at the Harvard Summer School of Theology, July 6, 1910.

eration. He held that the Elohist was the earliest of the four documents, and that much of the Priestly was not materially later, while the Yahwistic belonged to the middle of the eighth century; also that these three were first wrought by themselves into a composite work, to which Deuteronomy, written in the reign of Josiah, together with considerable legal matter were added during the Exile.

These are the two general forms which the "documentary hypothesis" took in the last decades of the nineteenth century. In one or the other it was generally accepted among the Biblical scholars of the Continent, and later, in spite of strenuous opposition, became prevalent in Great Britain and America. More than once there has been a report that its days were numbered; that an opposing champion, or unwitting instrument, of tradition had dealt it a mortal blow, or that its defenders were destroying it and one another. There is such a report now in circulation, and there are those who for various reasons, conscious or unconscious, "partly believe it." Is it well founded? Is this hypothesis, after all, only an eddy in which the Biblical scholars of the last thirty years, one after another, have almost without exception been caught, and from which they must escape to reach the current of real progress in knowledge of the Old Testament?

The question must evidently be divided, and it will be most convenient to inquire first of all whether Biblical scholars are abandoning the documentary hypothesis. Note the terms used. The point is not whether scholars in other fields of learning have changed their minds with reference to the validity of a Biblical theory, nor whether Biblical scholars have changed their minds with reference to views held by certain adherents of the documentary hypothesis, but whether authorities on Biblical literature are deserting the position that the Hexateuch is a composite production compiled from other works by at least four authors of as many different periods. To the question thus defined, the answer, allowing of course for sporadic exceptions under peculiar circumstances, must be a decided negative. In fact, the critics, so far from abandoning this theory, are now taking it for granted and devoting themselves to the task of perfecting its application, and that along two lines. In the first place, although they are

at one on the principle that the Hexateuch is composite, and, in the main, on the proper analysis of its contents, there are details on which they have not yet been able to agree. These they are now making the subject of research and discussion, revising past findings as it becomes necessary, and drawing more and more satisfactorily the lines separating the recognized sources. It sometimes makes much difference whether a single verse or sentence is referred to one source or another. Thus, if in Exodus, chap. 2, as Meyer claims, vs. 15 is from the Yahwist and is the continuation of vs. 10a, the reason why Pharaoh sought to put Moses to death would be, not, as one would naturally infer from the text as it stands, that he had slain an Egyptian, but that the princess, his foster-mother, had brought him into the royal family.

The analysis of the Hexateuch, however, is not complete when the critic has identified the parts, long or short, that originally belonged to the main documents. The theory, as has been intimated, is that each of these sources had a history of its own before it became a part of the present compilation; that during its separate circulation it was more or less changed and enlarged; and that, when it was finally united with one or more of the others, it was again subjected to revision to adapt it, or parts of it, to its new relations. Moreover, some additions were naturally made after the compilation had been effected. Now, it is the business of the critics to dissect, if possible, the work of the reviser and the compiler from that of the author, and thus carry the history of each of the documents back to its origin; and, although they doubtless sometimes go too far, there never was a time when they were more satisfactorily accomplishing this task. It is not necessary to go far to find examples of the result of such work. There is one in Gen. 2 10-15, where there has been inserted the description of a river that had no place in the original author's conception of Eden, and another in the next chapter, where the tree of life is just as clearly foreign to the story of the first disobedience. The skill with which such interpolations are sometimes adapted to the context is seen in Gen. 2 15, which repeats a part of vs. 1, and in Gen. 16 9 f., where the compiler who united the Yahwistic and Elohist writings made Yahweh instruct Hagar

to return to her mistress, and thus prepared the way for a second version of the story of her quarrel with Sarah, now found in Gen. 21 8 ff. The last passage, on the other hand, furnishes an illustration of another sort. In vs. 14, as translated in the English Version, Abraham "took bread and a bottle of water, and gave it unto Hagar, putting it on her shoulder, and the boy." The meaning is tolerably clear, but the sentence, which literally reproduces the Hebrew, is certainly awkward. The key to the matter is found in the Greek Version, which says that the patriarch "took bread and a skin of water, and gave them to Hagar; and he placed upon her shoulder the boy," that she might carry him as Syrian mothers still carry their babies. It is clear that this was the original reading in Hebrew, and that the compiler who added the Priestly writing to the previous compilation let it stand, but that a later reader, finding that, according to the Priestly chronology, Ishmael must have been about seventeen years of age when Hagar left home, transposed some of the words and thus suppressed an unintentional absurdity.

When the analysis is complete, and the contents of the Hexateuch have been distributed to the various authors, revisers, and compilers, it remains to fix, if possible, the dates of all these contributors. This is a complicated and difficult problem, requiring not only a thorough knowledge of the Old Testament, but a familiar acquaintance with the history of the Orient and a well-balanced judgment. The fact that there are still two schools of critics shows that it has not yet been satisfactorily solved; but both schools are at work on it, and, to prove that they are making progress without abandoning the documentary hypothesis, I will cite the opinions of representatives of each school.

Let the representatives of the school of Dillmann be Kittel, Baudissin, and König. The first differs somewhat from his chief. He maintains that the Elohist document originated near the beginning, and the Yahwistic toward the end, of the ninth century B.C.; that the original of Deuteronomy was written in the reign of Manasseh; and that the three were united with one another during or just before the Exile. Meanwhile the Priestly document, the oldest parts of which may date from the reign of Solomon, reached its final proportions, was carried by the Jews to

Babylonia, and was there added to the previous compilation. The resultant work, without the book of Joshua, was the Law promulgated in 444 B.C. by Ezra.

Baudissin puts the Yahwist about the beginning of the eighth century B.C., the Elohist a little earlier. About the same time the priests began to put into writing their ceremonial regulations, but the Priestly document in its original form was not produced much before Josiah's reformation, which is also the date of the original Deuteronomy. The first two were united before Deuteronomy was written. This last, enlarged soon after the beginning of the Exile, and the Priestly document, completed about the end of the same period, were incorporated with the previous compilation a little later by a Deuteronomic editor. The result was a Pentateuch, not a Hexateuch, which was recognized as the law of God in 445 B.C.

König thinks that the Elohist lived as early as the time of the Judges, and that the Yahwist should be placed in the reign of David. Deuteronomy originated soon after 722 B.C., the date of the fall of Samaria. The completion of the Priestly document, however, he brings down into the sixth century before our era. These various writings were finally wrought into the Pentateuch, or, perhaps, the Priestly document was added by Ezra in Babylonia to a compilation previously made from the other three,

A comparison of these three schemes will bring out the significant fact, that, while they all follow Dillmann in placing the Elohist before the Yahwist, they incline to place Deuteronomy considerably earlier than 621 B.C., but to bring the Priestly document nearer to the date proposed by Wellhausen.

Let us now consult a few representatives of Wellhausen's school, and first Cornill. In the sixth edition of his *Einleitung* (1908) he dates the various sources as follows: the Yahwistic in its original form in the reign of Jehoshaphat, or about 850 B.C.; the Elohist in the reign of Jeroboam II, about a century later; Deuteronomy a little before 621 B.C.; and the Priestly document about 500 B.C. The first two, after being revised and enlarged, were united about 650 B.C.; the third, after having gone through two editions, was added during the Exile; and the fourth, which Cornill identifies with the Law promulgated by Ezra, between 444 and 400 B.C.

The dates given by Cornill are very widely accepted, and have the support of many eminent scholars. I will mention only Holzinger in Germany and Carpenter in England, who, as the result of special and thorough researches on the subject, have adopted them all. But it will be well to add the testimony of three other scholars who differ more or less from Cornill.

The first is Gunkel, the introduction to whose commentary on Genesis has been translated into English. He attributes to schools of story-tellers the substance of the two works on which the first compilation was based. The Yahwistic collection, he thinks, had its origin in the ninth century B.C., the Elohist in the first half of the eighth; they were wrought into one work toward the end of the Jewish monarchy. The Priestly document—he has no occasion to discuss the age of Deuteronomy—was completed in the first half of the fifth century B.C., and was not added to the previous compilation until after its publication by Ezra in 444 B.C.

The opinion of Baentsch is important because he has recently been quoted as against the theory of Wellhausen. His views are found in his commentary on the Middle Books of the Pentateuch, which he has analyzed as thoroughly as any one who has ever made them an object of study. He does not assign exact dates to the sources from which these books were compiled, but he holds that the Yahwistic document originated not long before 800 B.C., the Elohist somewhat later, and Deuteronomy in the seventh century B.C. In the Priestly document he sees a work, very little of which is earlier than Ezekiel, substantially complete in 444 B.C., when it was made public by Ezra.

Finally, let me cite Steuernagel, because he has made a special study of Deuteronomy. His conclusion with reference to the sources of the Pentateuch is as follows: The original Yahwist dates from the beginning of the ninth century B.C., the Elohist from the first half of the eighth. The original of Deuteronomy, parts of which may have been written as early as 720 B.C., was composed about 650 B.C. and made public in 623 (621). The Priestly document, a product of the literary activity of the Exile, dates from perhaps 500 B.C. The first two were united between 700 and 623 (621) B.C. Deuteronomy in an enlarged form was

added about 550 B.C., and the Priestly document between 445 and 330 B.C.

It has frequently been made a subject of reproach and ridicule that the Biblical critics do not agree among themselves. Those who thus treat them forget that men who value the truth above all else do not take kindly to compromises. This being the case, it is significant that these five representatives of the school of Wellhausen differ so little from one another and from the original position of their leader. They all refer the Yahwist to the ninth century B.C., the Elohist to the eighth, and Deuteronomy to the seventh century; and none of them dates the Priestly source before the Exile. The one who varies most from the average opinion is Steuernagel, whose elaborate theory on the origin of Deuteronomy requires that the collection of laws which formed the nucleus of the book be placed as early as 690 B.C. It should also be noted that all those who express an opinion on the subject agree with Kuenen that it was the Priestly document, and not, as Wellhausen still holds, the completed Pentateuch, to which the Jews pledged obedience in 444 (445) B.C. There are, however, no signs of a disposition to abandon the documentary hypothesis.

This is the situation in the critical camp; but, say some, these scholars are living in a fool's paradise, taking no thought of the danger threatening from more than one direction. Personally, I do not believe that there is cause for apprehension. We cannot pass in review all the attempts to disprove the prevalent theory, but it is worth while to notice the book entitled *The Problem of the Old Testament*, published in 1906 by Professor James Orr of Glasgow. The author is a theologian with an enviable reputation, who has read widely, and apparently feels at home in his subject. His book, of which the jaunty motto is, *Nubecula est, quae cito evanescet*, puts the case against the critics as well, perhaps, as any work that could be mentioned. It has doubtless encouraged for the time being popular opposition to their contention; but is it convincing?

Professor Orr begins with a statement of the problem. He insists that it is twofold, and that the first question is how we are to conceive of the religion of the Old Testament "as respects its nature and origin" (p. 4), because, although, as he admits,

the rule is not without exceptions, "the decisions arrived at on purely literary questions . . . are largely controlled by the view taken of the origin and course of development of the religion, and, with a different theory on these subjects, the judgments passed on the age, relations, and historical value of particular writings would be different" (p. 5). In the end he requires that the student have, not only a conception of the Hebrew religion, but one that involves a supernatural revelation, and he warns his readers that "it cannot be too constantly borne in mind that it is not any and every kind of admission of the supernatural which satisfies the Christian demand" (p. 22). In other words, in spite of his assertion that "the age, authorship, and simple or composite character of a book are matters for investigation" (p. 16), he really substitutes for the bias of which he repeatedly accuses the critics a prejudice in favor of an opposite opinion. He goes so far as to claim the support of Wellhausen in this position, although any one who will take the trouble to read in their connection the words quoted,—*"it is only within the region of religious antiquities and dominant religious ideas . . . that the controversy can be brought to a definite issue,"*—will find that they refer, not to the standpoint of the critic, but to data by which, as well as by the linguistic and historical contents, he must be guided in his analysis. He will find, also, that they immediately follow an arraignment of the writer's predecessors for being blinded by their prejudices, and therefore acting like firemen who make a great show of zeal but take care not to go near the conflagration.

In his second chapter, Professor Orr, not content with the preparation already made for the study of the Old Testament, thinks it desirable to "look for a little at the book itself, in the form in which we have it, and allow its own voice to be heard on its own character and place in the economy of revelation." Then he proceeds in advance of proof to claim for it "in the form," be it noted, "in which we have it," a "remarkable" unity and a progressive development in its history and religion toward completion in the person and work of Jesus of Nazareth. Now, while most Biblical scholars would probably agree that a unity of purpose shows itself in the actual history of the Chosen People, and

progress toward the revelation of God in and by Christ, it is rather too much to ask them to allow any one to take for granted one of the most essential points in dispute. The modern critic says, and undertakes to prove, that the Pentateuch is not, in the proper sense of the word, a unit, that is, homogeneous; and, as for progress in doctrine, the first chapter of Genesis implies an idea of God more advanced than is found in Deuteronomy.

The body of Professor Orr's work consists of eight chapters. The first is an argument from critical premises to show the antiquity and credibility of the Pentateuchal history. The next three are devoted to criticism of critical theories relating to this history and to the religion and institutions of the Hebrews. In the remaining four are discussed, in order, the Jehovistic analysis, the question of Deuteronomy, the Priestly code, and the Priestly document as a whole. His treatment of these various topics constantly betrays the influence of the doctrine of revelation assumed in the beginning; its tone throughout is apologetic rather than scientific; and it does scant justice to the evidence on which the documentary theory is founded. The close of the last chapter shows what is the outcome of his argument.

"To what conclusion," he asks, "have we now been led?" and he replies, "Not to the conclusion that Moses himself wrote the Pentateuch in the precise shape or extent in which we now possess it; for the work, we think, shows very evident signs of various pens and styles, of editorial redaction, of stages of compilation. . . . On the other hand, very strongly to the view of the unity, essential *Mosaicity*, and relative antiquity of the Pentateuch. . . . In the collation and preparation of the materials for this work—some of them, perhaps, reaching back into pre-Mosaic times—and the laying of the foundations of the existing narrative, to which Moses by his own compositions, according to the consistent tradition, lent the initial impulse, many hands and minds may have co-operated, and may have continued to co-operate after the master mind was removed; but unity of purpose and will gave a corresponding unity to the product of their labors. . . . We have found no good reason for separating the *J* and *E* of the critics, and regarding them as independent documents; and as little for placing their origin as late as the ninth or eighth century. . . . We have been led on historical and critical grounds to reject the theory of the Josianic origin of *Deuteronomy* and, in accordance with the claims of the book itself, to affirm the genuineness of the Deuteronomic discourses, substan-

tially in the form in which we have them. . . . We have found that there are the strongest critical reasons for denying that the *P writing* (the peculiarities of which are acknowledged) ever subsisted as an independent document. . . . Further, from the close relation subsisting between P and JE in the narratives, we are compelled to assign both, as elements of a composite work, to practically the same age. . . . We have used the term 'collaboration' and 'co-operation' to *express the kind and manner of the activity* which, in our view, brought the Pentateuchal books into their present shape, less, however, as suggesting the definite theory of origin than as indicating the labor of original composers, working with a common end, in contrast with the idea of late irresponsible redactions, combining, altering, manipulating, enlarging at pleasure. . . . Beyond this we do not find it possible to go with any degree of confidence. It may well be—though everything here is more or less conjectural—that, as already hinted, the original JEP history and Code embraced, not simply the Book of the Covenant, but a brief summary of the Levitical ordinances, analogous, as Dillmann thinks, to the so-called Law of Holiness; possibly, also, as Delitzsch supposes, a short narrative, in its proper place, of the decisions of Moses and of his death. We have seen that Deuteronomy, in its original form, was probably an independent work; the priestly laws, also, would be at first chiefly in the hands of the priests. Later, but still, in our opinion early,—possibly in the times immediately succeeding the conquest, but not later than the days of the undivided kingdom,—the original work would be enlarged by union with Deuteronomy and the incorporation of the larger mass of Levitical material. In some such way, with possible revision by Ezra, or whoever else gave the work its final, canonical shape, our Pentateuch may have arisen."

This is Professor Orr's solution of the problem of the Old Testament as it relates to the Pentateuch. The first thing that strikes one on reading it is that it is by no means the traditional view, but a new theory, or rather a combination of features from various theories that have been, or are, entertained by others. Then, one after another, its weaknesses emerge.

In the first place, this theory, with its various pens and styles, its authors, redactors, and compilers, is as complicated as the one that its author ridicules, and much less intelligible.

Secondly, it is unsatisfactory in that the author, having assumed the unity of the Pentateuch, and proved to his own satisfaction that the Yahwist and the Elohist are one, and that the Priestly writer belongs to the same age, has no sufficient basis for so elaborate a scheme.

Thirdly, it is asserted that Moses by his own compositions "lent the impulse" to the production of the Pentateuch, but the only parts of it attributed, or, if they represent him, attributable to him, are the discourses in Deuteronomy, delivered just before his death in Moab.

Fourthly, the view that the Yahwistic and the Deuteronomic documents, and the Priestly so far as to include the Law of Holiness, belong to the same age, is open to the same objection made against the traditional belief on the subject, namely, that the origin of the three, not merely distinct, but at many points conflicting, codes found in these sources within the Mosaic period is incredible.

Fifthly, the reasons for distinguishing between a Yahwist and an Elohist are as good of their kind as those for recognizing a Priestly writer distinct from either or both of them. It is therefore inconsistent to admit the latter, and refuse to admit the former distinction.

Finally, the denial, with Klostermann, of the independence of the Priestly writer or writers, is an attempt to revive the "supplementary hypothesis," which was widely accepted in the first half of the last century, but was long ago abandoned by Biblical scholars generally because it did not do justice to the persistent internal discrepancy between passages of any given literary type and those belonging to any other.

I need not go into further details. Professor Orr's theory will not satisfy conservative students of the Old Testament when they come to understand it. I am sure that it will not convert any of the critics. It will probably, after having served for a season as a sort of half-way house for careful or timid people, go the way of all makeshifts and compromises—and be forgotten.

The Problem of the Old Testament, and other works of the same character, are not the only agency on which those who reject the current theory of the origin of the Pentateuch rest their hope that it will speedily be overthrown. They think they have found powerful allies in the archaeologists, some of whom have gone out of their way to encourage this opinion. Not long ago there appeared in a theological review the statement that "these new revelations from the mounds of the old Orient prove conclusively

that what Wellhausen and his school have regarded as basal facts were after all nothing more than plausible but unfounded hypotheses, the fond fancies of dreamers" (*Methodist Review*, 1908, pp. 645 ff.). In a later issue of the same publication Professor Orr is quoted as saying that "in Old Testament scholarship itself, under the influence of the new so-called historical-critical movement, there is taking place a profound change of opinion, which threatens very soon to make the Wellhausen school, alike in its historical construction and in many of its critical results, as obsolete as the school of Baur is in New Testament criticism" (1909, pp. 646 ff.).

These statements are evidently made in good faith. If they are well founded, although the documentary hypothesis has thus far withstood the direct attacks of conservative scholars, the outlook for it is gloomy.

The first thing that strikes one on reading such an announcement is the strangeness of an appeal to the orientalist, who, however much they may reverence the Scriptures, do not accept the traditional interpretation of it, and therefore must sometimes prove unwelcome allies. There is, perhaps, no Assyriologist who is more frequently quoted in America by conservative students of the Old Testament than Professor Hommel. He is reckoned among the defenders of the faith because he maintains that Abraham and Chedorlaomer were contemporaries, and that the fourteenth chapter of Genesis is veritable history. But those who thus regard him overlook the fact that, in so doing, he throws out of joint the entire system of chronology interwoven with the historical books from Genesis to Kings; also that, although, if the invasion of Palestine by the king of Elam occurred between 1772 and 1742 B.C., then according to the Biblical figures the world must have been created about 3775 B.C., he yet has no hesitation in saying in *Hastings's Dictionary* (I, p. 223a) that we have records of a civilization in Babylonia as far back as 5000 B.C. Now, it is evident that, whether Hommel is right or wrong with reference to the date of Chedorlaomer, or the antiquity of Babylonian civilization, it is hardly safe for conservatives to quote him as one of their authorities, or for him to allow himself to be so regarded.

The point I have just made has its value, but it does not go

to the root of the matter. The real weakness of the appeal to archaeology is in the fact that its testimony has no bearing on the question at issue. Cornill, in the preface to the last edition of his *Einleitung*, referring to what he calls "the panbabylonian deluge," says: "It does not touch the problem of literary criticism. If there were discovered today, on a tablet of Ur-ghanna of Sirgulla, dated 4500 B.C., a legal document corresponding to the Priests' Code, the Priests' Code as a product of Israelite literature would nevertheless remain a Babylonian writing of 500 B.C.; and if the excavations in Palestine brought to light an authentic monument commemorating a victory by Hammurabi, Genesis 14 would not cease to be a very late midrash partly based on ancient material." This is not a vain boast, as any one can see who will consider just what Biblical criticism means and what the critical hypothesis claims to have determined. The critics, finding in the Pentateuch as it has been transmitted reasons for believing it a composite production, proceed by means of divergencies in style and content to analyze it and restore, as far as possible, the sources from which they suspect that it was compiled. If they find these supposed documents not strictly homogeneous, they note the elements of which they seem to be composed and their relation to one another. Finally, they compare with one another, the documents, or parts of documents discovered, determine, if possible, by means of indications of various kinds, their relative dates, and arrange them in chronological order. Now it is plain that, when the critics decide that a document is of a certain date, they do not mean that every part of it without exception originated at that time, or that the parts that betray lateness may not have had earlier, even much earlier, forms, but only that the document or passage, in its present form or setting, belongs to a certain period. If, therefore, as Cornill says, it could be proved that Chedorlaomer actually invaded Palestine, with Hammurabi in his train, the establishment of this fact would not invalidate evidence of lateness in the Biblical account of the expedition.

The point I have been trying to illustrate, that the documentary hypothesis has to do with the process by which the Pentateuch became what it is rather than with the substance of its contents, explains some things about which there has been no little confu-

sion. In the first place, it explains how it is that, as Professor Orr says, "among the foremost" critical scholars "there are many whom no one who understands their work would dream of classing as other than believing, and defenders of revealed religion" (p. 8). It explains, also, some alleged defections from the ranks of the higher critics. Thus the author of one of the articles on recent phases of German theology quotes Baentsch as saying in a previous publication: "They [the views of Wellhausen] capture one theological chair after another. In spite of the disfavor with which conservatives in State and Church regarded them, they nevertheless have forced men of mature judgment and unquestionable piety to accept and defend them." Then he adds: "The above from Professor Baentsch's pen no doubt reflected the opinion of most Old Testament scholars in Germany for the past quarter of a century. Now, however, we see signs on every hand that there is a change going on. Wellhausenism, though strongly intrenched, is being gradually assailed, and that from different standpoints. Strange to say, one of its most resolute assailants is Baentsch. He has gone so far as to write a very interesting brochure entitled 'The Monotheism of the Ancient Orient and of Israel,' with the avowed purpose of reconstructing or superseding the teaching of Wellhausen and his adherents." Now, although in the extract the documentary hypothesis is not mentioned, I think one is justified in supposing that the author had it in mind as a part of the teaching of Wellhausen, and that the average reader would so understand him. If so, the language used misrepresents Baentsch and his position. He has not, like Professor Eerdmans of Leyden, rejected the critical hypothesis, or thought of so doing. In 1903, when he published his commentary on the book of Numbers, he said: "The examples [of repetition and divergence] cited, which might be multiplied, sufficiently show that the books from Exodus to Numbers present, not a homogeneous narrative, but a composite of different elements. The separate elements are not disconnected fragments, but they dispose themselves according to language and style and internal relations in three distinct, characteristic narratives, in which can easily be discerned the peculiarities of the three sources, namely, the Yahwist (J), the Elohist (E), and the Priest Code,

or so-called Original Document (P), first distinguished in Genesis" (*Einleitung*, p. viii). In another place he declares that "we have in the Pentateuch the product of a literary process beginning with the close of the ninth century and continuing into the second century B.C." (p. lxvi). This was his position in 1903, and, strange as it may appear, there is nothing in his more recent book to show that he has abandoned it. In fact, he declares in that work that the determination of the structure and origin of these books must be left to Biblical criticism (p. 99); also that the reports concerning the work of Moses "come from a time so much later that we may not unhesitatingly use them as records" (p. 83); and finally, that it must not be forgotten that Wellhausen, Stade, and others have brought to light knowledge concerning the prophets and the historical position of the Law that has lasting value and entitles them to enduring fame (p. 108). This is Baentsch's position in the book in question with regard to the documentary hypothesis. How then can he be reckoned among the assailants of Wellhausenism? The explanation is simple. When the documentary hypothesis was launched in its prevalent form, some of its adherents coupled with it views on historical or theological subjects which the acceptance of it did not require or imply. There were those, for example, who not only questioned the historicity of the patriarchs and Moses, but, with Kuenen, denied the uniqueness of the Hebrew religion. From the first there have been many, especially in Great Britain and America, who refused to adopt these radical opinions. There have also always been more conservative scholars on the Continent. One of the latter is Cornill, who says of himself in the preface already quoted: "In the summer of 1879, when, as a newly inducted instructor at Marburg, I lectured for the first time on the earliest history of Israel, at a time when such a view was not the fashion, but, for a young beginner, positively perilous,—since he could thereby only bring upon himself the reproach of being most lamentably behind the times,—I declared, and thoroughly proved my contention, that Abraham was a strictly historical character and religious hero, and the covenant and legislation through Moses at Sinai an indisputable fact; and I have always maintained this position." Now Baentsch thinks that the critics do not give

the Hebrews, or the neighboring peoples, due credit for the progress they had made, even in early times, on the way toward monotheism,—another question, observe, distinct from that of the origin of the Pentateuch,—and his book is his protest in the matter. It is by no means hostile to the documentary theory, of which, as I have shown, he is one of the most prominent exponents.

The survey here undertaken would not be complete without a word about what is called “panbabylonianism.” This had its origin in an intellectual tendency corresponding to the optical illusion that causes one to see things on which one’s eyes have for some time been intently fixed in places where they are not objectively present. The general doctrine of panbabylonianism has various phases. The one in which we are at present interested is that which has been given to it by Winckler and Jeremias, and which might be more exactly denominated panbabylonian astralism, the gist of it being that the popular Babylonian religion made the starry sky a revelation of the will of the gods, and that this system of astral mythology was disseminated among other peoples, and is reflected more or less clearly in the conception of the world and religion embodied in the Old Testament. I shall not go into a further description of the theory or attempt a detailed estimate of its value. Such a description and criticism by Professor Toy appeared in this *Review* for January of the current year. I will, however, in a few words indicate why it should not disturb us.

In the first place, it has no bearing on Wellhausen’s theory, properly so called, since it has to do, not with the literary form, but with the religious content, of the Hebrew Scriptures. It is therefore not surprising that Winckler and Jeremias, who are its best-known exponents, and its adherents generally, take for granted the composite character of the Pentateuch.

Secondly, strange as it may seem, this theory is not hostile to a generous estimate of the historical and religious value of the Old Testament. Thus Baentsch, who has adopted it, finds in it support for his protest against the representation of the Mosaic age as a barbarous one, and the Hebrew religion of the time as largely a combination of fetishism, totemism, animism, and other like

superstitions. Jeremias, in the preface to the last edition of his book, *Das Alte Testament im Lichte des alten Orients*, is even more explicitly conservative. He says: "I agree with those who seek in the Old Testament a realm of historically developed revelation. The Israelite representation of God and redemption is not a distillation of human ideas produced in various regions of the Orient, but everlasting truth in the brilliant dress of oriental modes of thought." This avowal ought to convince any one that, whether panbabylonianism is a reality or only a figment of the orientalist imagination, it is not a serious menace to a rational faith in the divine origin of the Hebrew religion.

A few words, to close, on the outlook. First, it can hardly be doubted that the documentary hypothesis, in substantially the prevalent outlines, has come to stay: that is to say, we shall have to accept the theory that the early narratives of the Old Testament are composite productions, compiled from various sources in which had previously been embodied the unfolding conceptions of the Hebrews concerning their past. If I were asked to go more into detail, I should say that this theory will finally be modified to this extent, namely, that the critics will have to agree to refer the original of Deuteronomy to a date nearer 700 than 621 B.C., and more clearly to recognize the existence in all the documents of material derived from oral or written sources, older, and in some cases much older, than the documents themselves. These concessions made, the result will be just what it was in the case of the theory of evolution. At first we rejected and anathematized it, because some who held it ignored God, and we saw no way to reconcile it with faith in his sovereignty; but, when we realized that no law can execute itself, we accepted the new doctrine, and soon found it even more worthy of "his eternal power and god-head" than our previous ideas concerning the origin of the world. So also we shall finally adjust ourselves to the idea of evolution as applied to the Pentateuch and the Hebrew Scriptures generally, and find in it one of our strongest arguments for the divinity of their origin.

Meanwhile the archaeologists will not have been idle. They will not have made good the sweeping boast that Hebrew religious thought was dominated by astral myths, because it will be easy,

when some one thoroughly at home in the Old Testament undertakes it, to show that the indications on which the panbabylonians base their contention are really only relics of popular beliefs which the Biblical writers, so far from accepting, were engaged in eliminating. These enthusiastic scholars, however, will have thrown so much light upon the ancient Orient that it will then be much easier than now to test the correctness of the earliest Hebrew narratives, and, I think, also, much easier to believe in the historicity of at least the more significant Hebrew worthies.

I will close with a quotation from the Dutch critic, Wildeboer. "We must go forward," he says, "in the new way; and with firm confidence. We will not allow ourselves to be disturbed in our work, either by presumptuous Assyriologists or by those who, in the name of religion and Christendom, think they must call us from our path. . . . We are confident that the same Power who has brought us face to face with these problems will lead us forth from the struggle to higher ground and a deeper conviction. He who trusts the truth has God at his side."

SOME ASPECTS OF NEW TESTAMENT MIRACLES¹

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Christianity is a religion of the spirit,—a religion of faith, as the Apostle Paul would have said. That is, its essential nature resides in unseen and spiritual attributes; on the persistence of spiritual forces depends its identity from age to age; the inner attitude of the soul is the sphere of its true life. Neither letter nor form, but spirit, is the characteristic mark of Christianity. If this is true, it follows that the life of Christianity necessarily implies the continually new expression of the Christian spirit amid the ever-changing phases of human thought and life. And historical conditions will govern not only the outward forms and modes of Christian life, but also, at least in its concrete formulation, the thought of Christians about religion. The changes that have taken place in Christian thought and doctrine may well be no indication of any weakness or imperfection in Christianity. They are, in fact, rather the manifestation of its excellence, the proof that it is indeed the supreme religion, capable of bringing in the kingdom of God.

Some have tried, by a process of successive eliminations, to discard the Jewish, the Greek, the pagan, the Teutonic influences which from time to time have affected Christianity, as if by such expurgations they could isolate essential Christianity from its accidents, and separate the kernel from the husk. But if Christianity is a religion of the spirit expressing itself under historical conditions, its expression in any period of history will be made through the ideas, true and false, through the modes of life, crude or refined, through the existing beliefs, philosophies, laws, customs, and even superstitions of the time. Many philosophies which we deem false, many rites which we find degrading, have been the well-justified means of expressing the religion of the

¹A lecture given in the Lowell Institute course at King's Chapel, Boston, November 29, 1909.

spirit for men who held those philosophies and to whom those rites were dear. Those things are to be called foreign influences upon a pure Christianity only in the same sense in which that would be true of the inadequate science, clumsy philosophy, and sorry philistinism of custom which in our own day do duty, as the best we have, for civilization.

If it be asked, wherein, then, lies the assurance that our Christianity is properly called Christian, what force binds together these shifting phases of life and thought, and entitles us to speak of them as belonging to one religion, a personal conviction is the only answer that can be given,—namely, that the identity of the Christian religion through the ages depends on the New Testament, and in particular on the presentation of Jesus Christ found in the gospels and on the persistent spiritual power of his person.

From the general point of view thus outlined the question of the miracles of the New Testament, like every other historical topic connected with the Christian religion, must be considered.

I

The fundamental requisite for modern educated Christians with regard to the accounts of miracles in the New Testament is integrity of thought. It is far less important that one's knowledge should be scientifically exact, or his principles in accord with those prevalent at the present day, than it is that all one's thinking should be in substantial agreement with the real, underlying principles by which he lives. Every one has such principles,—precisely the deepest and most constantly influential of them are often not explicitly formulated in consciousness. They are the profound massive convictions which control motives and judgments, form a man's real character, and in the long run determine his actions. They are the prejudices, if that name is insisted on, which no reasoning, however plausible or cogent, ever fully overcomes, which rise up to disconcert us when we violate them, which now give us solid peace, or again stir recurrent and unappeasable doubts. To shake these deep principles may be necessary, but it is always dangerous. But the man of power and freedom is the

man whose fundamental convictions are sound, and who stands sturdy in the full consistency of his mind.

If a man's fundamental principles leave him in the happy exercise of belief in the miracles of the New Testament, as has been true of many of the best who have ever lived, there is for him no problem in the matter, and no great occasion for clarifying his thought. To the man, however, who feels a constant uneasy prick of tormenting doubt, as is the case with great numbers of educated Christians at the present day, there are several things to be said.

First, he must not shut his eyes to such doubt, and deliberately drown it in an insincere forgetfulness. Peace is too dearly bought at the price of such a moral and intellectual narcotic. A subtle weakening of mind and conscience is the natural result of this, as of other opiates.

Secondly, he must not force his own judgment by special pleading. A man has a full right to say that he does not know; he has no right—though too many good people have done so—to crowd down intellectual doubts by the exercise of will-power. There is a place for the exercise of the will against doubt, but it is where doubt touches a moral choice, not an intellectual judgment. We will refuse to doubt the moral imperative, or the goodness of God, but we are bound to doubt when it is a case of mere weight of evidence, and the balance inclines to the negative side.

Thirdly, the grave religious aspects of the situation are to be frankly admitted. Confidence in the general trustworthiness of the gospels as historical records is undoubtedly important for Christian faith. It may not be easy to say just how much in the way of historical conclusions is requisite in order to provide the necessary basis for the faith of intelligent and reasonable Christians; but for most of us it clearly is important to be convinced that Jesus Christ lived, and that a trustworthy notion can be reached of his character and teaching, his conception of God, his idea of man's relation to God, his utterances about God's requirements of man. To be deprived of this confidence and driven to the belief that the gospels are mere fairy-tales, or even that we can have no knowledge at all about these matters, would for most of us not only destroy the possibility of any clear understanding

of Christian history, but would be likely to require such a reconstruction of our general religious thinking as greatly to impair the vitality and integrity of our religious life. But if all the gospel narratives of miracles—or even many of them—are held to be legendary, can we believe in the rest of the gospels? If we disbelieve the stories of miracles, do the report of the Sermon on the Mount and the incident of the rich young man rest on any better evidence than they? This question is a serious one. Doubtless, precisely this result has sometimes come about, and the fear of it is probably the strongest motive and chief concern with those who at the present day resolutely defend every part of the gospels as proved history.

II

The conception of God, and of God's relation to the world, on which the New Testament ideas about miracles rest is not difficult to see. God is the source of all activity. He created the world at the beginning; he maintains it; from him proceeds the orderly working of the heavenly bodies and the seasons; he gives life and sustains existence. To him the ravens cry for food, from him men receive what the bountiful earth provides. And in all this—in the support and administration of the created world—God is immediately present and active.

If ye walk in my statutes, and keep my commandments, and do them, then I will give you rain in due season, and the land shall yield her increase, and the trees of the field shall yield their fruit. . . . And I will give peace in the land, and ye shall lie down, and none shall make you afraid: and I will rid evil beasts out of the land, neither shall the sword go through your land. . . .

But if ye will not hearken unto me, and will not do all these commandments, . . . I will even appoint over you terror, consumption, and the burning ague, . . . and ye shall sow your seed in vain, for your enemies shall eat it. And I will set my face against you, and ye shall be slain before your enemies; they that hate you shall reign over you; and ye shall flee when none pursueth you.

It is often hard to know just where the line between literal belief and the poetical representation of dependence on God is to be drawn; and the lofty language of the Psalms about God who

sendeth the springs into the valleys, and watereth the earth with rain, and maketh darkness and it is night, can be used by modern as well as ancient worshippers of the living God. Nevertheless it is clear that to the pious Israelite the hand of God was immediately present in Nature much as a man's is present in his own works,—that God's activity was likened to that of a man, and was thought of as directly subject to a will acting like a man's, and capable of varying its decisions to suit the immediate needs of God's dependent creatures. Indeed, it can hardly be said that the Bible thinks of Nature in our sense at all,—as a mechanism of material existence set over against God and organized by laws. This place is taken by the conception—far simpler and more closely analogous to human relations—of Creation, the handiwork of God, which he has fashioned, and which his instant purpose and will controls.

Similarly with the forces of evil. Behind the calamities of life, especially sicknesses, were believed to stand wicked personalities, temporarily permitted to exercise their malign activity, which deliberately inflicted harm on men, wholly after the analogy of a malicious human being but with a greater and mysterious power. To them were ascribed not only temptation to sin but especially sickness and misfortune,—derangement of the mind, the nerves, and the various organs of the body.

But it is necessary to observe that this conception of the immediate control of the world by free personal wills, arbitrarily acting with reference to the immediate object to be attained, intervening directly to promote the good or to effect the harm of the individual, was not the whole of the ancient view, whether among the Israelites or others. The regular courses of the sun and moon and stars had attracted attention; and the science of astronomy had already been founded in Babylonia and Egypt. The courses of the seasons, the permanent physical properties of matter, the tendency of iron to sink, of oil to rise to the surface of water, and thousands of other observations of the working of what we call natural laws were of course known to the simplest mind, and used for all the operations of daily work. Without such a practical use of the uniformity of nature civilization would be impossible, and these were highly civilized peoples. And the

characteristic fact about the stage of thought from which the New Testament comes to us was just this inconsistency. In the religious interpretation of the world, which constitutes the philosophy of a devout people, the immediate activity of personal wills explained everything. Yet in the ordinary affairs of daily life vast numbers of things were known to show a stability and regularity which did not naturally or strongly suggest the voluntary adaptation of means to immediate ends by a divine person. For such voluntary adaptation (as distinguished from the mechanical uniformity of impersonal forces) can reveal itself only by fluctuation of method under changing conditions. When a machine adapts itself automatically to the different sizes of the objects which are fed into it, then we say that it is almost human.

These ancient people, then, had a simple view of the direct relation of facts to underlying spiritual forces, good and bad, a view in which they were not shaken (although they were sometimes perplexed) by the obvious fact that the usual operation of Nature was uniform. The outcome of this combination of two ways of looking at the world of creation was a natural one, as we all recognize. The uniform is familiar, we take it as a matter of course, it seems to belong to us. Only the poet or the theologian feels God in and behind uniformity. But occasionally we are startled out of our complacency by the inexplicable, which runs counter to our usual observation and knowledge. Then, if we share the fundamental theistic belief of the Jews, we are likely to exclaim, God is in this place! The bushes of the desert are customary objects of our horizon, and seem to require no special explanation, even though we are aware that they clothe the slopes of the mountain of God. It is the bush that burns with fire and is not consumed which impels us to put our shoes from off our feet as on holy ground. The inexplicable is instinctively recognized as supernatural, and, if it commend itself as good, is pronounced divine. Certain South Sea islanders first clearly recognized the direct activity of God in the missionary because in a time of drought he dug them a well, and by novel and inexplicable power brought water from the rock.

Of all this there are abundant illustrations in the Bible. The

unaccountable mood in a man was regularly thought of as due to a spirit, whether of jealousy or anger, of insanity or meekness. The spirit was a demon, if the mood was evil; if the mood was good, it was the Holy Spirit of God. Unusual powers of any kind, if apparently good, were interpreted as due to direct endowment from God. The tendency of popular religion was to see divine activity not mainly and predominantly in the regular working of God's law, but in the irregular, the unusual, the startling, the thing which had no analogy, which was not explained by the well-known forces, and for the production of which, therefore, the hand of God must be assumed.

This condition of thought is made very clear by many facts that come to us from the Apostolic Age. All the unusual powers of the church, whether powers of government or of healing, of preaching or of the meaningless speech under the influence of religious excitement called speaking with tongues, were ascribed to God because they were unusual. The more unusual the gifts, the more the possessors of them prided themselves on their possession. The more inexplicable they were, the more divine and the more valuable they were accounted.

Since this general habit of mind thus saw a miracle in every inexplicable beneficence, no reported event, however strange, could seem to it highly and necessarily improbable. For all the exceptional there was a recognized place in the system, and one natural and acceptable explanation. Today, beyond question, the common view does not easily find place for a miracle, and tends to deny the trustworthiness of many accounts of unusual events. What has caused the change? We, too, believe in spiritual forces, at least in those of God's activity, underlying and superior to phenomena, and we call the supreme spiritual Force a person. We use for Him the analogy of human will and find satisfaction in it. Under prevalent conceptions of the immanent working of God we see him in all phenomena of matter and force, of physical and psychic life. If God be infinite personal will and infinite love, if nothing is removed from the sphere of his activity, how can we set limits to his action? He is everywhere directly and immediately present; why should he not set to his hand where he will, and on occasion act with reference to im-

mediate ends, as well as usually proceed with steady regard to general principles? That was substantially the ancient view; why does the world of today find difficulty with it?

The most important thing to notice in such an inquiry is the comparative simplicity of ancient popular experience. The idea of God is the highest concept in the human mind, and it is vital in proportion as it can take up into itself all the elements of human experience. The ancient man—in the circles from which the Bible comes to us—had a relatively simple experience. In government he was acquainted only with a simple organization; an absolute monarch with his arbitrary or even capricious will embodied for him the whole substance of government. Of the modern conception of society as a complicated and delicate organism in which forces, hidden and subtle but all-powerful, unite in intricate combination to produce a mechanism that may easily be put out of order and work badly or refuse to work at all,—of all that, with its clear significance for our thought of God, the popular world of the time of the Bible had hardly an inkling. The writers of the Bible had never seen a great machine such as a loom or a printing machine, with its infinite complexity of parts, its superhuman power, its perfect adjustment to the inconceivably varied duties before it,—and, we may add, its capacity for being put out of gear by any exception to the orderly working for which it was designed. Moreover, although there was much travel, and foreign nations were well-known, yet the actual field before the mind in thinking of the world was small, and only a few neighboring peoples touched the popular imagination of the inhabitants of any country. And although the vast distances of the stars were evident, and their number countless as the sands of the sea, yet any adequate notion of the complex unity of the system of the sidereal universe, which necessarily brings home to us the uniformity of natural laws and forces, was lacking.

There are doubtless many causes that have brought about the temper of modern thought. The religious motive which makes us like to find God in the natural and uniform—provided it is beneficent—has played its part; and the germ of the modern movement was here when the Apostle Paul, who shared the fundamental conceptions of antiquity, yet rose above them and

insisted that not the bare inexplicable, but the useful and edifying, reveals itself by its inner character as divine. The interests of modern science also, and the constant and repeated verification which it uses and on which it depends, have done their great work. Philosophical reflection and analysis have carried to their logical outcome the conceptions of uniformity upon which, as we have seen, civilization rests, and which, in their elements and embryo, were not absent from ancient popular thought. All these influences have contributed, but I cannot help thinking that the greatest influence of all on the mind of the masses of men has been the complexity of modern experience of the world.

For the result of our acquaintance with complicated machinery and our experience of complex systems of laws and forces in society and nature has been to give the ordinary man of today a vivid and new apprehension of the significance and value to mankind of the uniformity of natural law, and a keen sense that in a system of such extreme complexity as the universe exceptions to regular laws would be dangerous in a high degree. To the ordinary man of today it is not agreeable to think that nature is controlled by a will which is itself affected by the pathos or the wickedness of individual instances. Such a conception seems to him to contradict the notion of a trustworthy organization.

All this directly influences the idea of God, and of what God is likely to do or to have done; and hence in the normal, the regular, the uniform, we in our time see God more clearly than in the exceptional and inexplicable. Miracles once belonged to the natural conception of God's working; but now, entirely apart from any intruding idea of a separation of God from the universe in which he has worked hitherto and still works, we do not find them natural to our conception of God and his nature. The failure of the ancient world to find any such difficulty with miracles as we feel was a part of the historical conditions, and spiritual religion had to express itself in those conditions and no others, if it expressed itself at all. That Christianity comes to us in the gospels in the dress of the first century is evidence not against but for the antiquity and trustworthiness of those precious records. A primitive Christianity in which miracles were doubted would be itself an object of critical suspicion.

III

It is doubtless true that from the theistic point of view the possibility of miracles cannot be denied. But such an abstract possibility is empty. What troubles us is not what God might have done or permitted, but what certain narratives of the New Testament say that he did do,—statements which seem to us, at first sight at least, improbable.

Before proceeding farther it is worth while to inquire what the considerations are which would probably lead us to accept such narratives of miracles as true. Under what conditions would they seem no longer improbable but probable?

Would the belief that the testimony is that of a perfectly honest eye-witness convince you that the stilling of the storm was actually accomplished by Jesus' word, that through the power of Jesus bread for the five thousand actually came into existence when it had not previously been existent? I hardly think so, permanently. If you doubt these narratives, you doubt them on grounds which no evidence can touch. That an honest eye-witness told the story would cause you to believe that probably something happened which he so interpreted. If two honest eye-witnesses agreed, you would be even more convinced of this, and would perhaps have materials for making your own guess as to what the real and perceived phenomena were which the eye-witnesses thought they understood. You might be led to admit your own ignorance, or to suppose a hitherto unknown set of facts (as such have been brought to our knowledge by the discovery of the X-rays, and of new elements in the atmosphere); but that you should believe what the writers believed, and what they thought themselves to be describing, would not be brought about even by the coincident testimony of several persons who were present. It would always be possible to contrive a different theory than theirs and so to account for the admitted facts, or at least to say that they must have been mistaken.

No, the real difficulty is that miracles do not seem to be in accord with the analogies of life as we know it, and this difficulty

can only be overcome in one of two ways. It may, first, be shown that there are analogies, perhaps little known, which are within our knowledge and partial comprehension, and which enable us to see the naturalness of these events. Automatic writing on a planchette used to seem half-supernatural, or actually to be the work of Satan and witchcraft; when it was brought into relation with countless analogous phenomena of abnormal and normal psychology, it lost both its improbability as fact, and also the uncanny sense of contact with another world which had made it both attractive and repellent. Wholly similar is the case of the speaking with tongues at Corinth. There is no difficulty in understanding it, or in accepting Paul's statements as perfectly trustworthy, now that we have abundant illustrations of like results of religious excitement, at many dates and in many parts of the world. To Paul it was a miracle; we find in it an unusual, but not an isolated nor an unclassified, natural phenomenon. The observation or discovery of analogies which link a miracle in with our regular experience at once relieves the improbability which had before oppressed us. But, of course, this at the same time transforms the nature of the event from the exhibition of the direct intervention of God to a normal but unusual example of the regular working of his almighty power.

Secondly, there is another kind of consideration which, if admissible, might—and to some minds actually does—relieve the improbability that attaches to the miraculous narratives of the gospels. It is the consideration of the fitness of such events to the special situation. The difficulty with miracles is that they do not seem to accord with the analogies of life as we know it. But in the given instance there might have been something in the conditions and circumstances which made life different from what we know. May it not be that we have failed to see the general difference of situation, and that this makes us blind to the substantial analogies which would enable us to find a place for these events in our whole system? The jewels of an Indian prince seem to us fabulous; yet we do not deny their existence, for the whole condition of his life is foreign to our experience. If there were four dimensions, the conditions of existence under them would be so altered that much of what now holds true in space would be

false. So with countless strange facts in history. If we could believe that an archangel had appeared to men, we should fully expect, and could easily believe, that he would show many powers which neither a man nor a great bird possesses. These attributes would be easily credible, because they would fit the situation. We should not ask for analogies from our own life, for in the nature of the case such analogies would not be at hand.

Many thoughtful modern Christians hold that here is to be found relief in the matter of the New Testament miracles. If, it is said, we believe in the Incarnation of the Son of God, that is the great miracle, and all minor miracles become fitting by virtue of that belief and lose the improbability which would otherwise attach to them. Faith in the Incarnation, it is said, carries with it such a view of the person of Jesus Christ that his miracles are no longer improbable, but are natural, appropriate, and easy to understand and believe.

Whether this consideration will give aid or not will depend on the conception of the meaning of the Incarnation which is held. Under some conceptions this contention will hold, under others it will not. The thorough-going conception of a docetic Christ, the apparition of a spiritual being made visible but devoid of real contact with the world, as some Christians and some half-Christians of the earliest centuries frankly believed, will obviously make it easy to think that miracles of many sorts accompanied his appearance on earth. And a less extreme view, which yet makes its starting-point the idea of an intrusion from outside into human life, and sets divine and human over against each other in sharp contrast, conceiving of Christ as a man, indeed, but as in some sense an alien in human guise, will likewise permit with comparative readiness the belief in other coincident and subsidiary miracles. On the other hand a sincere belief in the Incarnation may start from the conception of God and man as one, and from the fact that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, made in all things like unto his brethren that he might succor them that are tempted and make propitiation for the sins of the people, one whom we have heard, we have seen with our eyes, we beheld, and our hands handled. To such a view the Incarnation is faith's interpretation of fact, not a fact which can be known or accepted with-

out religious faith; the dramatic story of its process is likely to seem the symbol or outward form of the reality, not its essence. This conception of the Incarnation is as genuine and reverent and profound as any other; but to it miracles are not specially congenial, nor, under such a view, does the belief that in Jesus Christ is to be seen the divine man who in his person brings to us God himself, relieve the difficulty of the miraculous narratives of the gospels,—where, after all, miracles are on the whole occasional and exceptional, not the ordinary and universal attendants and conditions of Jesus' mode of existence.

But this is not the place to discuss and answer these questions. No answer is possible apart from the general fundamental convictions of each individual, upon which his view in this matter will rest. What is here desired is to point out that, if a strictly miraculous character is ascribed to certain events reported in the gospel history, belief that those events actually took place does not, and cannot, rest on mere evidence, but necessarily depends on a general system of thought and in particular on our special view of the nature of the Incarnation.

IV

Without here attempting to examine in detail the narratives of New Testament miracles, or to introduce a comparison of the narratives of similar events, ancient and modern, outside the New Testament which throw light—and they do throw much light²—on certain classes of the New Testament miracles, we may approach the miracles of the New Testament by dividing them into three classes:

(1) First come those events reported as miracles which rest on good testimony (such testimony as for other than miraculous narratives would be deemed adequate), and which, by the analogy of our own knowledge, or the reports of credible witnesses, we are able to link in with other well-attested experience.

²Illuminating facts are to be found, for instance, in Harnack, *The Expansion of Christianity in the First Three Centuries*, and in P. Janet, *The Major Symptoms of Hysteria*.

It has already been said that such an attitude toward these miracles will remove them from the class of miracles proper and lead us to treat them as unusual or startling, but yet explicable and natural, occurrences. We may take as examples of this class of miracles some of the narratives of the Book of Acts, as for instance the raising by Paul from apparent death of Eutychus who fell out of the window, or the events at Malta where Paul was protected against the viper's bite, and the father of Publius cured of fever and dysentery. These are all told with the evident belief on the writer's part that they were miracles. Yet in the two latter instances the writer seems himself to have been present. Stories of this group are numerous, and should cause no difficulty. They relate to real and entirely credible events. All that is miraculous is the writer's interpretation of the phenomena, and this we are at liberty to accept or reject.

So, again, the cases of the cure of demoniacs, whether in gospels or Acts, find their full analogy in the many instances of the wholly similar exorcism of demons attested in early centuries by church fathers as well as by heathen like Celsus, and known also in modern times. Wherever—as in China today—demons are believed to take possession of men, there will be cases known of marvellous cures wrought not by medical skill but in one instance by the power of a great personality, in another by some radical change in the circumstances or inner state of the possessed. These were cases of mental and nervous derangement, and the cures were wrought by similar means to those to which these strange and subtle disorders have often yielded within the experience of careful modern observers.

Not unlike these are many of the other cases reported in the New Testament of sickness not specially called demoniacal. Well-attested instances in modern times present satisfactory parallels. At no time in the history of the world from that day to this has the stream of such cases failed. For we must recognize that the number of illnesses due in part or wholly to mental and nervous causes, and so in greater or less degree susceptible to mental and nervous influences, is enormous. The paralysis of hysteria is as actual as that of apoplexy, but it may be made to disappear by a variety of influences. Blindness, deafness, dumb-

ness, lameness, the withered hand, catalepsy, are all naturally ascribed to this cause. These hysterical affections are still common among the lower classes of our population. They are rarely seen in most physicians' private practice, but are frequent in the cases applying for relief at the hospitals of great cities. So many of the cures reported or referred to in the New Testament can be accounted for in this way that it is easy to believe that, if we could learn accurately all the circumstances of most of the others, we should find them to contradict nothing that we know in well-attested experience. The marvels of mediaeval Tours and modern Lourdes and hundreds of other places, and of Christian Science, are real; and they can be matched from abundant sober records of critical physicians.

Of course it is to be remembered that these narratives have come to us through reporters who believed these events to be due to the exercise of supernatural and divine power, and not to be in accordance with natural analogies. The stories are told in that spirit, and it may well be that under that conception details have crept in which are not true and which in reality could only be explained by assuming a miracle. It must be borne in mind that we have no scientific diagnosis of these cases, but only the general impression, perhaps of ignorant by-standers, perhaps of the evangelist himself; and that no careful investigation was, or could be, made. In many cases we are not in a position to know exactly what the disease was, still less to judge whether it could have been helped by the means employed. And there is always a good chance of some degree of mere exaggeration.

Ready analogies also enable us in a measure to understand visions (like those to Paul on his voyage to Rome), and manifestations of the Spirit in the bestowal of graces of prophecy, of powerful speech, of the gift of tongues. These things fall in perfectly with the world as we know it. They belong to somewhat unusual, but by no means to unreal, fields of human experience.

Into this class of miracles,—events which really happened and were honestly reported, which were believed by those who narrated them to be miracles, but which have for us sufficient analogy in experience to make them wholly credible, will fall the vast and overwhelming majority—nearly the whole—of the miracles

of the New Testament. The New Testament is full of miracles, but they are not mere legendary wonders, they are mainly such honest accounts of entirely real events as were naturally given by a generation which fully believed in miracles.

(2) A second class consists of certain miracles narrated by the same writers who have given us the accounts of the first class, just discussed, but in the case of which no satisfactory analogy from experience seems to exist, or to be possible. Such are the walking on the water, the feeding of the five thousand, the appearance of the dead from their graves at the crucifixion, the miraculous release of Peter from prison, the cursing of the fig-tree, and some others.

These events are doubted, not because of any defect in their attestation, but solely because they are miracles. With regard to them no single statement can be made. It is easy to suggest that as analogies from experience have been found for many strange events recorded in history, so others may be discovered for these, and the abstract possibility of this is not easy to deny. It is also possible in some cases to imagine how under the influence of a theological conception the story of a real event may have been completely transformed in the telling. And, doubtless, we must also be prepared to admit the possibility of some legends, even in the generally trustworthy narratives of our gospels. The point to be urged is that the number of these narratives is small, that they must be studied individually, and, in view of all that we have seen, that they do not discredit the record.

(3) A third class of miracles, also small, but important, presents different problems. They are those cases where the question about the evidence itself is complex, and the difficulty of the problem does not lie solely in the miraculous element of the narratives. Such are the miracles found in the Gospel of John, notably the wine at Cana and the raising of Lazarus. It cannot be said that the historical testimony here is as strong as it is for incidents recorded by Mark; and the whole character of the Fourth Gospel is an essential element in forming a judgment about these miracles. Only as we understand that profound writer's purpose and method can we tell what those narratives carry of underlying historical fact.

Here will also fall the two great miracles of the virgin birth of Jesus and his resurrection. Into the discussion of these we cannot enter. But it is important to notice that in both cases the evidence is complicated and not simple, and that the difficulties do not reside wholly in the miraculous elements of the story, and, further, that both of these relate to events partly outside the limits of this world of space and time.

The sum of the matter is familiar, and has been often stated. The theistic position in itself does not require, or even necessarily permit to the modern thinker, a belief in miracles. Such a belief must be a part of a special system of theological views, and only in that case can it be held with freedom and peace of mind. To ancient theistic thought it was entirely congenial, and when Christianity, the religion of the spirit, expressed itself in the historical conditions of the first century, those who remembered and recorded its history naturally and properly saw in many events the miraculous working of divine power. That they did so casts no discredit on the general trustworthiness of their work, where that is attested by other internal and external evidence. Their willingness to report miracles is no sign of credulity, but is only one phase of the whole intellectual system through the medium of which they viewed the facts. Miracles were at first arguments. They are so no longer, but therein they have only shared the fate of all arguments, for an effective argument is in the nature of the case related to current modes of thought and hence likely to prove of temporary validity. The gospel narratives of miracles are one of the historical modes through which spiritual Christianity reveals itself to us. They are to be treated like all the historical expressions of our religion, that is to say, understood historically, and approached as forms which can teach us much about underlying substance.

As expressions of truth, miraculous narratives are not to be taken as allegories, but from them we can yet learn the specific thought about God and Jesus Christ which, in its own historically conditioned way, primitive Christianity thus expressed. As to their value as statements of historical fact, we can often use them with confidence. Often, however, we must be content to leave

pressing questions undecided. We cannot know in every case what the facts were, nor how far the story rests on actual recollection, nor how or why it arose. This is true in all ancient history, and we have no right to ask for more certainty in the New Testament than elsewhere. Such willingness to admit that uncertain things are uncertain is essential if the modern world is to be convinced that the early history of Christianity is substantially true.

*DOES EVOLUTIONARY PHILOSOPHY OFFER ANY
CONSTRUCTIVE ARGUMENT FOR THE REALITY
OF GOD?*

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The doctrine of the evolution or gradual development of organisms has had a most interesting history in recent years. In speculative philosophy, as is well known, the evolutionary conception is by no means new. The work of Darwin and his immediate predecessors and successors has given it a definiteness, however, and a backing of facts which have since kept it in the forefront of thought.

Because it is a direct blow at arbitrary and supernaturalistic explanations and exalts orderliness as the supreme law of procedure, it has been deemed by many thinkers to be essentially atheistic and irreligious. Much of the early polemic literature raged about this point. Out of this debate gradually emerged the conclusion that the process of evolution and the theory of development do not contribute in any way, either favorably or unfavorably, to the solution of the question as to the possible existence of God, and to the validity of the higher spiritual aspirations of man. It has been realized that evolution can, in the nature of the case, have nothing to say as to ultimate origins, and it has therefore been concluded that it can neither be theistic nor atheistic, but must be merely agnostic. The view of the majority of thoughtful men on the subject today probably is, that the religious problems stand on the whole about where they did before the wide acceptance of the evolutionary doctrine; that religious views are, after all, purely a matter of philosophy, and as such take us back of the point where evolution must begin.

It has come to be frankly allowed that a man may be an evolutionist and at the same time believe in a theistic solution of the universe. Only in relatively recent years, however, is it appear-

ing that the evolutionary philosophy has something constructive to offer regarding the higher human qualities and the religious impulses.

In the mean time the fundamental principles of organic evolution have been applied to all departments of human knowledge and interests, with the result that the whole realm of knowledge has gained a significance and unity which it has never had under any other assumption. Our mental qualities and knowledge, our spiritual states and development, our habits, our social organization and customs, history, literature, religion, interpreted from the evolutionary point of view, receive a great illumination which is very satisfying to the rational quality in man. Such rational satisfaction is usually taken to mean truth, so far as we are able to measure truth. In the light of these facts it is desirable that we attempt to determine whether the doctrine of evolution and the scientific method can make any constructive contribution to the great religious questions of the ages, which are at bottom philosophical questions.

The most significant conclusions of the evolutionist are very simple, and of manifest truth. They are that organisms are plastic and variable; that some elements in the environment have great influence in modifying life and others have not; that many individuals and many types of organisms are eliminated because their variations are not in accordance with the needs of the organism as determined by the environment; that, in the long run, only those will persist, develop, and flourish whose structures and actions bring them into accordance with at least those factors of the environment which are of most moment to life. The result of this process must ultimately be a more or less close adjustment of the qualities of organisms to their surroundings. This adjustment, achieved by purely natural evolutionary processes, is called *adaptation*. Adaptation, in an evolutionary sense, means more than mere harmony, mere correspondence. It means that the environment is the moulding influence; that the organism is the thing moulded. It means that the course of evolution is, on last analysis, determined by the environment rather than by an internal arbitrary principle of development.

This principle of adaptation exalts the environment to its

proper place. Our philosophy has exalted the individual, forgetting that the present individual is the product of the environment working upon earlier simpler personal endowments; and so, back to the simplest point of beginning. It is necessary to exalt the individual so long as we are thinking primarily of the *interpreting* process. So soon as we begin to examine the process whereby the present interpreter has reached the point where he may interpret, and to discover why he may rightly interpret, it is uniformly found that greater and greater significance attaches to the action of the environment. This is the great contribution which modern biology has made to the philosophy of life: — while the environment alone may not produce life, all evolution must be in fundamental accordance with the potent realities in the environment; whatever furnishes the original impetus in organisms, the environment limits and guides the direction of progress.

We mean by environment, broadly, all the conditions, things, forces, and influences which act in such a way upon organisms as to cause them to respond by motion, by growth, or by any change which makes the organism different from what it would have been without their action. Through the continuous interaction of organism and environment, the organisms must of necessity become fitted or adjusted to the vital factors of the surroundings. The organism thus comes to have the environment, in a way, worked into the texture of its personality. Its personality must accord with the potent realities. No important external force or agency can long influence life without living things coming to show in their character the particular results of this element. On the other hand, no quality in organisms will arise, persist, become generally prevalent, and be the subject of further evolutionary development, unless it is in some way related to an influence in the total environment of the organism adequate to produce or preserve that particular personal quality, by making it useful.

The genuine evolutionist of the present day must then be a realist, and he cannot be far removed from the realism of the plain man, who is neither scientist nor philosopher, but a mixture of both. No evolutionist has ever been able to escape the recognition that all evolution involves the interaction of two equally

genuine sets of elements,—the internal and the external. This is just as true when he considers the evolution of forms lower than himself as when he considers his own personal evolution. He cannot escape the conclusion, as an evolutionist, that both his *selfhood* and the environing *not-self* are equally real, and furthermore, for all practical purposes, essentially as they appear to be. No consistent general evolutionist can deny the reality of the self nor the consciousness of self; the reality of the environment nor the consciousness of the environment. The selfhood of the self and the genuineness of things-in-themselves are exactly upon the same evolutionary plane. Theoretically, as judgments, they are of equal validity to the evolutionist. Existentially, he has no ground for giving one a standing above the other. In the denial of either he necessarily negatives the whole scientific procedure, and equally all that knowledge, whether of the self or of the not-self, by which he makes the denial.

It is entirely competent for the idealist, who considers the seeming external reality to be merely states of consciousness, to deny that there is any genuine evolution,—however impossible it would be for him to explain the progressive character of even those mental states which he recognizes; but it is wholly impossible for the consistent believer in the doctrine of organic evolution not to recognize both the self and the not-self, the individual and his environment, and the indissoluble and efficient relation which exists between the two.

Assuming, then, that things internal and external to the self are essentially as they seem to be; that the basal principle of organic evolution is correct,—namely, that the environment has the power of guiding evolution through its selective effect upon the responses, the desires, and the unconscious and conscious choices of organisms; and that all organic qualities therefore come to be marks and indices of certain real and adequate environmental agencies whose long action has made the qualities of survival value,—the scientist has succeeded in finding a satisfying reason *why* things should appear to the individual essentially as they are. No other form of philosophy has even remotely accomplished this in such a way as to satisfy reason.

The evolutionist does not—or should not—claim that the principle of natural organic evolution really solves any ultimate philosophical difficulty. It cannot explain the ultimate origin of anything. It must allow in the first beginning of which it can take any cognizance all the possibilities of the very latest manifestations. It cannot explain the fact of causation which it assumes. It cannot directly predicate or deny teleology, except by analogy. It does, however, aid tremendously in illuminating processes and relations,—which are after all our only known clew to the meaning of our personality and the validity of the whole process whereby that personality receives or rejects a presentation as true.

The present qualities of man, including his power of interpreting the universe, must have belonged to his remotest ancestor, or must have come by the interaction of the whole succession of personalities and the whole efficient environment. If they were originally in the individual himself, evolutionary philosophy throws no more light on the situation than the most arbitrary supernaturalistic interpretation. If the adjustment is the result of the compelling effect of the environment upon a plastic organism, and organisms come progressively into better and better adaptation to all the vital forces of the environment, the organism becomes, in all its basal structures, instincts, processes, habits, ideals, a progressive revelation of the reality and nature of the environment.

If, then, man is, in his whole nature, physical, mental, social, moral, and spiritual, the product of the evolutionary process; if the fundamental physiological qualities have gradually given rise, by perfection and selection, to sensation and ordered response; if from these consciousness has gradually come, bringing in its train memory, desire, reason, purpose, choice; if, from the simplest social relations, the sense of kind—using the personal qualities mentioned above—has produced the present social instincts, organization, codes, and moral standards; if his spiritual and religious nature, impulses, ideals, and standards are the evolutionary outcome of the synthesis and development of all the lower qualities; if at every step of this evolution the direction of it is controlled by the efficient power of the environmental reali-

ties,—then, all of these qualities—which can be shown to be generally possessed by mankind, to be persistent and even increasing in their efficient effect upon conduct, and to be of large survival utility—are adaptations to something *real* in the environment and *adequate* to have given them their value. The environment of organisms, in order to produce or preserve organic qualities, must be made up of factors of a grade and of a significance to life which would enable it to do this work.

For example, tactile stimuli in the environment could never have given rise to the eye nor to its sense of sight. Only the existence of light as an environmental reality having a profound influence upon life could account for the origin and useful persistence of the eye. On the other hand, light waves could never have produced, nor have selected after it had arisen, the sense of thirst nor the desire for water. Only the real existence of water, as a constant and powerful modifier of life, can produce and develop the racial thirst for water. None of the physical agents, alone or in conjunction, could have given rise to the consciousness of self. Only the reality of the self, as separate from and yet related to these agents, could have produced it. Nothing but the reality of organisms, like the self and yet different from the self, and the actual contacts between the self and them, could have produced a consciousness of kind and through it have given rise to the whole mass of social instincts of the individual. Nothing but actual reproduction and actual offspring could produce parental care of offspring and the organization of the home and all the elements of sympathy and sacrifice related thereto. None of these things mentioned could account for the power of reasoning, the sense of orderliness, the logical faculty in man, on an evolutionary assumption. Nothing short of real orderliness, efficient in its conditioning power upon life and conduct, could so control evolution as to produce a sense of orderliness, and that respect for it in the very structure of personality which we call reason. If the environment determines the course of evolution and thus has a vetoing power on organic possessions, human reason and human conclusions must, in the long run, be in accordance with truth. The very ground-structure of human reason is the reality and efficient orderliness of those environmental proc-

esses which have made reason and inference a means of survival and success.

Idealistic philosophy has long said, "There is a seeming harmony between an external objective world and personal consciousness as related to that world; but there is no possible way of knowing whether there is such a real world external to consciousness; nor, if there is such a world, can its real nature be known." Evolution says that if consciousness in man is an evolutionary product, actually developed by the action of an external world upon developing consciousness in organisms, such correspondence is inevitable and necessarily appreciable, and that the nature of this real environment must necessarily come, sooner or later, and come correctly into the ken of that consciousness.

Idealistic philosophy says, "There seems to be real and adequate causation. It seems to be true that certain conditions actually produce certain other conditions." But philosophy allows the question, "Is this anything more than a sequence? Is there necessarily any causation?" And it is unable to answer the question. Evolution says, "The idea of causation is itself a product. It is the result of race experience. It is unquestionably of survival value as a guide to conduct. It is therefore a genuine adaptation, and as such is an expression of reality. It has an adjusting value upon conduct; but it could not adjust an organism and make it successful in a situation which did not really exist."

Similarly, philosophy says, "There seems to be a *sanity* about the general order of things. It commends itself to the human mind as reasonable in its broad outlines. It in some degree satisfies." But philosophy also says, "This may be only seeming; of course the mind will approve the order of a world of its own creating." The evolutionist says, "The world appears as it does because it has been acting upon the developing organisms so long and so powerfully that the nature of the organism reflects the history of the past; and thus the mind approves the universe because it is really a product of that universe and could not possibly have done otherwise and persist." The apparent sanity of the world-order is necessarily a result of an evolutionary process in which the evolving object becomes the interpreter of an effective environment.

This is a very different proposition from the philosophically barren "ontological" argument, which predicates the existence of objects of thought, including God, upon the mere idea of them. Evolution predicates the reality of environmental factors upon the development, the utility, the persistence, and the increase of elements of personality which, if of evolutionary origin, must have had adequate environmental conditions to give them point. The mere ability to formulate an idea does not make it true; but the practical utility of such an idea resulting in its general acceptance and its replacement of earlier and simpler ideas, its persistence in practice, its later development coupled with increasing utility,—indicate a harmony with reality and an existential efficiency in that reality. Philosophically, we are back of the point where we started.

The evolutionist cannot raise a question as to the sanity, from a human point of view, of the world-order; he deals with the reasons for that sanity. To the evolutionist, then, the ground of belief in the reality of the external universe and the essential sanity of the relation of the individual to that universe is found not by way of our belief in an arbitrarily preëstablished harmony; nor by way of innate ideas and intuitions; nor through a supernaturally acquired belief in a God who would not deceive us, but by way of, and because of, the organic codification of race experience in the persistent qualities of organisms,—because of the moulding effect of the environment upon every organism which presents itself as a candidate for selection. All human qualities which enable man to succeed by modifying conduct *must* be in accord with real and potent factors of the environment.

These conclusions are the commonplaces of our present evolutionary philosophy. They furnish a rationally satisfying unification of the processes and qualities mentioned. Are we in a position to apply the principles to the realm of ethics, morals, and religion? That depends wholly upon whether these latter qualities are evolutionary derivatives from those qualities which lie below and are known to be in adaptation to reality. Unless in some way consciousness of God and moral obligation are derived from consciousness of self, of environment, of kind, and of ideas related to these; unless religious instincts, habits, ideas,

and ideals are organically related to the rational and social instincts, ideas, and standards, as these in turn are related to the physiological, we are not at liberty to say that our study of natural history throws any light upon the higher human possessions. In that case, there is no analogy. If they have been created *de novo*, they may be, so far as we know, purely arbitrary, unrelated, and unreal.

According to the non-evolutionary philosophy the religious and moral qualities get their value and claim because of their supposed *separateness* from the other elements of our nature. To the evolutionist the evidences of the connection—the inseparable relation of the religious and spiritual to the social, mental, and physiological are the *ground* of our valuation and interpretation of the religious qualities. If religion and morals are a part of the series of evolutionary qualities, their interpretation is not arbitrary, but is, by the strongest possible analogy, the analogy of life itself, as really a fundamental adaptation to genuine, external, and adequate factors as is any other human quality.

Applying, then, our analogy to the moral and religious qualities, impulses, desires, ideas, and modes of consciousness, the following may be said of them:

1. They have had, and do have, much power in moulding conduct, through their influence on choice. They bring about the substitution of unselfish for selfish behavior; of sacrifice for struggle; of internal control, by standards, for external compulsion or indulgence; of action under sense of responsibility to God for responsibility to man or for irresponsibility; of “I ought” for “I desire” or “I am accustomed.”

2. If they chronically modify individual conduct, they must influence evolution.

3. They could not possibly arise, persist, and become the subject of evolution (as they undoubtedly have become) unless they modified evolution in some favorable direction,—that is, unless they were useful to the organism.

4. They could not influence evolution favorably (as they undoubtedly have done) except by bringing the organism into what is, on the whole, more perfect or more catholic adjustment to the more important elements of its environment.

5. The possession of these qualities would not have brought the human organism into an adjustment to its total environment more perfect and satisfactory than that possessed by the organisms that had not achieved these characters, unless there were real and genuine factors in the environment which would make these new and high qualities of distinct evolutionary value.

6. Furthermore, in order to make the religious qualities of individuals of survival value to organisms, there must be elements in the total environment of a *grade* to produce and select the religious and spiritual elements of personality. No new impetus is gained by evolutionary philosophy. Physical evolution cannot carry the organism into an intellectual realm unless the intellectual permeates or accompanies the physical in the environment. Causation must be adequate. Only spiritual reality can give rise, in an evolved organism, to spiritual qualities of personality.

7. In the absence of the power directly to measure, in terms of the science based upon the physical senses, the external reality of a moral order of right and wrong; the real existence of sympathy and self-sacrifice as an integral part of the universe-order; the validity of the spiritual forces; the existence of God, and the like,—the principle of adaptation allows us to say, by the profoundest analogy which we are yet capable of applying to life, that nothing but the really immanent God could make behavior based on the consciousness of God of value in the development of human life; nothing but real right and wrong, outside of us, could rouse the consciousness of standards, which we call conscience; nothing but spiritual reality could make the spiritual nature an adaptation. Were intelligence, morality, righteousness, love, and God not at the heart of the universe and fundamentally potent in modifying and guiding life, they, or ideas of them, could not have appeared and have persisted in man as the crowning glory both of the development of life and of self-appreciation.

The evidential value of this line of argument—when applied to this new realm in which consciousness, reason, conscience, sense of God, and all the higher and more recent personal and social emotions and desires and responses play their part—is to

the effect that God is the most important factor in the total human environment; that he is constantly and effectively present in every part of it; that there is some way in which the personality of God is coming to make itself more perfectly and consciously felt by the human individual; that, while God has always been at the heart of the total environment, the organism had to reach a certain stage of personality himself before the sense of God as a personality could emerge; that, as the physical environment is mirrored in the nature of organisms, so the power and nature of God are being progressively mirrored—and for exactly the same reasons—in the nature of man. This is the evolutionary explanation of the deep philosophy which says that God made man in his own image. It is the ground for the hope that we shall be like him when we see him as he is. Evolution is thus a continuous self-revelation of God to man; a continuous and progressive incarnation of the environment, and hence of God as the dominant factor in the environment, in man.

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